Alamo Defender Organization

Short answer on this one is go to the FAQs and "Defender Numbers". As to where the various units and individuals actually were, it would be reasonable to infer that each had its own alarm point where it was supposed to go at the outset of an action, with the expectation that they would be redeployed once the actual point of danger was known. What each unit's post was we simply don't know, but there is a pretty shrewd suspicion that apart from the gunners, nearly everybody who made it out of the barracks simply headed for the north wall at the start, and that resistance started to collapse when Morales got in over or through the southern defences, at which point those who could make it out tried to get away to the east.

I am afraid that I have to agree with Stuart on this one. When you subtract the gunners that leaves something between 80-100 riflemen to defend a perimeter about a third of a mile long. Not very many considering that they were armed with weapons that could on average pump out about three rounds a minute providing that rifleman was skilled in the use of his weapon.

There was obviously something up north that caused some confusion. It could have been the darkness. It could have been very effective defensive fire. It could have been a poor choice of attacking formations. It could have been the early loss of key leaders. It could have been any one or more likely all of the above. I think the evidence does suggest however that the northern area was more heavily defended than the rest, which lends a lot of weight in my mind to Stuart's views. Always keep in mind Stuart's tag line at the end of each of his posts, and add in a little of the natural instinct to "ride to the sound of the guns"

I have always seen, and perhaps I am wrong, that the battle for the "north" wall was not a battle for that wall exclusively at all. But rather, the northern action actually included the area from the cattle pen along the east side to about one third the way down the west wall, in a horseshoe shape with the top of the horseshoe about where the battery was emplaced in the center of the north wall.

All of your speculation, and I don't think I missed anything, could easily fit into what I just outlined. By the way for someone who admits that he does not have much information on the battle I think you have done a pretty decent job of envisioning it in your mind, and afterall that is what it is all about.

I noticed that you have asked some ORBAT questions. Alan Huffines in "Blood of Noble Men" has a pretty decent recap of defender organization. I would post it for you but my copy is presently lent out. Perhaps if he sees this he will be good enough to post his stuff

It may not be correct, my guess however is a good as anybody's, that the northern attack was the pinning attack and the breech of wall on the southwest corner is where Santa Anna placed his money. About a month or so ago on this forum, I forget what thread, we discussed this issue (southwest corner) in depth. This is a typical light infantry break and enter operation, and the troops that Santa Anna allocated to this are were probably his best.

I would agree that most if not all of the artillery fired only one or at most two rounds, save the guns at the rear of the church, which probably had targets exposed for a longer period of time. Perhaps not. The Mexican infantry probably got under the guns (the inability the adequately depress the piece) quite quickly.

I suspect that there were a few troops that retained their positions on the wall. Coming up with any figure is next to, no, impossible to determine. I think a lot of this would have to do with how much discipline they have. The correct thing is to thin out your force and honor the threat. This is quite hard to do with trained forces and excellent leadership. I will leave it to you to decide if either of those elements were present.

Stough: I have re-read your posts this morning and I have the following comments:

In looking at them again I get the impression that you envision that the attack in the early morning hours of 6 March was an attack of the entire perimeter. I do not think this is correct, although Mexican forces started from each of the four cardinal directions. To attack the entire perimeter would violate the principle of mass. I do not believe Santa Anna had enough forces at hand to do anything but attack specific objectives within the fort. I further believe that two of these attacks were driven from their initial objectives toward the north. It would seem reasonable to assume that the two objectives they were driven from, for reasons unknown, would be the small gates on the east and west side of the plaza. Neither of these two gates are that far from the north wall.

In the south, the objective was clearly the southwest corner. The fact that the 18 pounder was there I do not believe had much or any bearing on the selection of this objective. I think the real factor is the concealed, if not actually covered, avenue of approach was the deciding factor. Despite the popular view that the palisade was weak, and I do not share that view, I doubt that any effort was made to attack it, and anything in that area was diversion only, and I don't see any convincing evidence that there was even that.

Just about everyone talks about the 18 pounder. Was it really that much of a threat? Keep in mind that this gun was rather large, mounted on a small platform, with little in the way of ability to traverse. Staying out of the cone of fire for an attacking force who knew it was there was a piece of cake. I believe, and the acolytes of Saint Barbara can get me straight on this issue, that the 18 pounders great ability was in counter-battery and H and I fires.

As far as the larger issue of all around defense coverage, we know from S.L.A. Marshall's analysis of a later war (Men Against Fire) that soldiers in danger and under fire tend to bunch up for the illusion of safety in numbers. This is an area that takes constant training and supervision to overcome. While I am admittedly drawing this lesson from WWII that does not change the fact that it is a human thing rather than one unique to only one era. Allen will tell you, I am sure, based upon observations from his recent trip to Little Big Horn that it was just such a bunching up that contributed to Custer's defeat along the great length of Battle Ridge. Keep in mind here the bunching up of small forces is far different from concentration of forces.

I would love to see the finished model. Perhaps we can talk modeling technique in PM's as I am a ship modeler and always looking for new ways and methods to present my subjects.

Look forward to your reply.

I've never heard that the location of the funeral pyres were somehow related to the breakout attempts. My understanding is that both pyres were south and east of the Alamo compound. What are you referring to when you say "the one to the west.."

I like your theory that it was flanking fire from the southern half of the west and east walls that forced those two columns northward.

George

Herb: I fully agree that there is no evidence to suggest an attack on the palisade. Morales had three companies in his provisional battalion, say about a 120 men. It would seem that about forty would be enough to allocate to the break in at the southwest corner. He had only two ladders assigned, which would not be sufficient for the employment of the larger force. The question then becomes how was the remainder employed?

This leaves us two possibilities. Either some sort of a diversion to draw attention away from the break in, or holding them in reserve to exploit the break in what Liddell-Hart called the expanding torrent defined as - concentration - initial penetration - lateral expansion - exploitation.