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Post by stough on Sept 28, 2010 22:31:07 GMT -5
Christ, i just wrote a paragraph and it got then my connection snapped and i lost it. Boo. Try again tomorrow.
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Post by Tom Nuckols on Sept 28, 2010 23:21:52 GMT -5
Could topography have had something to do with Cos attacking the northeast corner of the west wall rather than the center of the west wall? The San Antonio River comes nearest the plaza at the southwest corner. You'll notice this if you walk from the Alamo to the Riverwalk today via the Paseo del Rio. As soon as you walk west past the excavated remnant of the west wall that is under plexiglass there, the grade drops precipitously. You walk down some fairly steep stairs. The terrain gets more level the farther north you go along the west side of the plaza. I'm no military tactician, but it seems to me that you want an infantry advance to be on level ground rather than uphill (a la Pickett's Charge) if you have that choice, which SA did here. Hence, Cos started his attack from the level ground to the northwest. He didn't start from the west and veer north. That's clearly what the Sanchez plat shows.
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Post by Chuck T on Sept 28, 2010 23:54:37 GMT -5
gbj heir: I fully concur. Topography is always a factor. Just walked those same steps on Easter Sunday. The northern part of the west wall makes sense on so many levels. Sanchez clearly shows the orientation of Cos' units (I am going to stop using the term column).
As far as being a tactician goes, you certainly have the right skills to sort this one out.
I believe that Santa Anna scouted every bit of this ground personally and, as Allen said earlier, he had a real good handle on everything the defense could throw at him. He probably had to make a few hard Hobson's Choices. I think you can bet your last dollar though that he was satisfied with the avenues of approach for each of the attacking units.
As a sidebar: I had not been back to San Antonio in almost thirty years. As we walked around it seemed like I had never left. My wife and I along with our daughter and son-in-law and the grandkids were on a walking tour in the Downtown/ Alamo/Riverwalk area. From time to time my son-law and daughter would become disoriented as to where such and such place was. Invaribly I would say over a block this way and turn right and go two blocks or some such thing. My daughter finally said - Dad I live here and you know more about this town than I do - Why? My answer was two words - Gary Zaboly. I don't think she still knows what I was talking about, nor did I explain.
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Post by stuart on Sept 29, 2010 1:04:33 GMT -5
Stough:
Napoleonic era Column tactics were as I described them up above. The French never aimed to just push through the enemy in column formation; this was something their military thinkers had been working on well before the revolution. Instead they used their thick skirmish line to pin and hopefully soften up the opposition's battle-line while the rest of the battalions maneouvred up in column with the intention of deploying into line for the final assault. A variation was the ordre mix (excuse my rotten French) which had only the centre battalion deploying in line with the two flanking ones staying in column to exploit the gap blasted by the line. This worked pretty well against everybody except the British, who countered with an even heavier skirmish line of their own and wherever possible put their own main battle line in a reverse slope position. What happened next was a straightforward but far from simple matter of timing with the French taking too long to clear the British skirmish line and then getting hit by the British battle-line before they themselves had time to deploy. In the Waterloo example cited by Chieftain the French tried very hard to deploy, but British units coming in on the flank kept shooting down the second and third line companies as they tried to extend outwards and as a result the "back" of the column crumbled away while the leading companies were still engaged in a heavy firefight with the British immediately in front of them.
I likewise agree with Chieftain on light infantry. Light/Cazadore companies were a battalion elite whose primary role was as fast moving assault troops. Ideally they would do so in an extended formation, but it wasn't necessarily so. Now so far as those Napoleonic battle tactics go (as distinct from deliberate assaults on fortified positions), they still didn't play like Indians. The extended formation and working in pairs - one man covers while his mate reloads - certainly allowed them to behave in a more "modern" fashion rather than just standing up and taking it, but it was primarily intended to mask a greater area of ground and ultimately they were still expected to pour it into the opposition rather than take all day setting up shots. One of the reasons why the British skirmish lines were so successful was that they didn't just send out their light companies (one per battalion) but first supplemented them with marksmen drawn from the battalion companies as well and latterly took to throwing in as many companies as it took irrespective of their notional designation. At Toulouse the whole of the 88th Foot, less the colour party, were sent into the skirmish line in order to overwhelm the French skirmishers with sheer weight of numbers.
Now I've already gone on a bit and can't cram everything about Napoleonic era infantry tactics into a single post relating to the assault on the Alamo, but the point is that its a lot more complex than the "cartoon" image of line versus column.
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Post by Allen Wiener on Sept 29, 2010 8:40:17 GMT -5
There's a discussion of the action at the southwest corner somewhere, but regarding terrain, artifacts have been found in the area where the acequia ran (the area GBJ mentions where the plexiglass is now) in that area and it appears to have been either dry or very low -- enough to permit Morales's men to use it as cover before their assault on the southwest corner.
Also, regarding Santa Anna's intel, remember that Cos had occupied the Alamo recently and probably constructed most of the improvements in it. Combined with info that seems to have been passing between the fort and the town, the Mexicans probably had a very good idea about the state of affairs in the Alamo.
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Post by Chuck T on Sept 29, 2010 9:47:45 GMT -5
Allen: The two areas selected by Santa Anna for the assault from the south and west seem to be ideal in terms of the terrain vs. the type of forces making the assault. In the south the acequia and the remaining buildings or ruins of buildings provided concealment for the light infantry, if not outright cover. In the Northwest the relatively level terrain were much more in line with the employment of line infantry battalions preceded by light infantry in the role of skirmishers.
I just don't seem to be able to shake this idea that the emphasis Santa Anna placed on the southwest corner and the results he expected to achieve, were greater than that held by conventional wisdom. Perhaps it is my own inclination to and great respect for what can be accomplished by well handled light forces. They can achieve amazing results all out of proportion to their numbers.
Of course I could be completely wrong, and it will not be the first or last time. I would just like to have been a fly on the wall to hear what went on in the pre-assault commander's orders group where we could ascertain Santa Anna's intent rather than speculate about a rather well written (by early 19th century standards) operations order.
It is wise to be wary of a man wielding a broadsword. It is equally wise to be wary of a man wielding an ice pick. One is bigger and seemingly more formidable than the other, but both can kill you just as dead.
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Post by stough on Sept 29, 2010 13:37:32 GMT -5
Great discussion.
I am work so I can't dally too long. But I would like to see if Stuart agrees with the following statements on light infantry.
The French Revolution and the levee en masse brought in huge numbers of untrained troops whose best function was to attack in column. To better the chance for a successful assault by column, the French deployed light infantry and light atrillery (6 pounders) to prep the line that was to be assaulted.
The light infantry tactics were inspired by the French experience in the US Revolutionary war.
Agree?
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Post by Herb on Sept 29, 2010 15:29:18 GMT -5
My two cents:
First I'm using the Sanchez diagrahm, in Nelson and the key in Hansen. one offers a better picture, the other a better translation, imo.
Very clearly to me, Cos attacked in column and deployed into line. I think the confusion, here, is Cos was only commanding roughly the equivilant of a French Battalion, not the massed battalions that made a Napoleonic column on a major battlefield.
Sanchez shows a column of three companies in line and three companies deep. Sanchez also shows that they were initially oriented on the western 1/3rd of the North Wall. He states that due to friendly fire from Duque's Column that Cos' column shifted their attack to the west wall and shows the maneuvers taken to reach it, and shows that only the northern 1/3rd of that wall was attacked.
This was accomplished by a series of turning movments and a final maneuver deploying the column into a line formation. The first line of three companies deploying against the NW corner/northern postern the second line of three companies deploying in line to their right (south) and primarily facing what appears to be the southern Castenada House. The third line of three companies moved to a position centered and to the rear of the now linear formation.
Sanchez does not show what the Cazadore company of the Aldama Bn was doing. One Mexican account says that only two companies of the San Luis Potosi Bn attacked with the Aldama. If this is true did Cos use the Cazadore Company as a line company in the assault?
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Post by Chuck T on Sept 29, 2010 15:42:56 GMT -5
Stough:
You will have to wait a while for Stuart's views. He is on GMT so it is evening where he is. Look for his thoughts around 0200 EDT. MAYBE NOT - SEE BELOW STOUGH - I COMMINGLED AND REVERSED THE TERMS OF GUARD AND SCREEN. I LEFT THE POST INTACT BECAUSE, WHILE I SCREWED UP THE TERMINOLOGY THE IDEAS THAT I AM TRYING TO PORTRAY ARE VALID. SEE MY QUESTION TO WOLFPACK AND HIS ANSWER BELOW TO SORT OUT THE MESS I CREATED
Although your question was not directed at me, I would like to take the liberty to chime in if I may.
The primary role of light infantry in the 19th century was to screen, guard, and shape the battlefield at the battalion, brigade, and divisional level. Of course special units of light infantry would take on special missions such as deep raids and break and enter operations from time to time, but those were the exceptions and not the rule. In the main they were more experienced, better trained, and more skilled in field craft then their brothers in the line companies.
Screening operations mean just that, drawing a screen across your force on the battlefield so that the main (screened) force could maneuver faster, more effectively, and most importantly react to any weaknesses discovered by the screen in the enemies dispositions. One final role for light infantry as a screen is to clear out any attempts to delay your advance by the other fellows guard force.
In light infantry terms - guard - is the direct mirror image of screen. They are meant to obscure defensive dispositions. Typically this is done across the front or flanks of a defensive line with skirmishers and outposts. They provide warning of the enemy's advance causing a maximum of disruption to that advance. Today we would call this a combat outpost line whose mission is to deceive the enemy as to the true location of the main defense, determine the location of the enemy main and supporting attacks, cause him to deploy prematurely, and generally raise enough hell with him that causes him to expend time and resources to overcome your effort. You are most concerned with buying time and as such are expendable.
Columns: A column is an approach formation meant to give your unit speed in the advance. It is easier to control than a line, and therefore the formation of choice in an attack, but only to a certain point. Once you are nearing the point where you expect to engage the enemy you shift into line. Now that line can take different forms depending upon where you wish to weight the attack, and a few other factors, but none the less it is a line.
As Stuart pointed out the Old Guard at Waterloo was caught by a combination of factors in a column. I am sure their commander did not expect to meet the British battle line where he did. As you will I am sure recall the were concealed on a reverse slope, and when the reached the topographical crest they had a big surprise waiting for them. I am equally sure that the French commander tried to move heaven and earth to get them deployed into a line of battle formation and failed.
Before proceeding on with this column business, please ask yourself one question - Why, especially in an era that depended upon mass in line to produce a high volume of firepower, would any commander willingly wish to meet his adversary in column, which is the direct opposite in terms of the ability to do so. The column facilitates command and control. The line facilitates fighting. Don't get caught in one when you should be in another.
Relatively recent historic examples of being caught in column, like the Old Guard at Waterloo, is what happened to the 2nd Battalion, 7th Cavalry, 1st Cavalry Division in November 1965 or to the French Union Forces, Mobile Group 100 in Indochina. Bad days for both units. Really bad days.
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Post by stuart on Sept 29, 2010 15:57:06 GMT -5
Great discussion. I am work so I can't dally too long. But I would like to see if Stuart agrees with the following statements on light infantry. The French Revolution and the levee en masse brought in huge numbers of untrained troops whose best function was to attack in column. To better the chance for a successful assault by column, the French deployed light infantry and light atrillery (6 pounders) to prep the line that was to be assaulted. The light infantry tactics were inspired by the French experience in the US Revolutionary war. Agree? Not really, as I wrote before the French had been working on column attacks pretty well right through the 18th century - they tried it for example at Quebec in 1759 and Wandewash in 1760. Likewise the close artillery support, but the intention was always - as Cos did at the Alamo - to maneouvre in column and deploy to fight. What was different if anything about the Revolutionary period wasn't that the line infantry conscripts could only be pushed around in massed columns, but the fact that they were able to throw all these enthusiastic amateurs into thickening up the skirmish line. Think how the militia were used in the Southern campaigns against Cornwallis. Everybody knew they were useless in a stand-up fight, so instead of trying to incorporate them in the battle line they were deployed out front to mask it and the deal was that they only had to keep shooting until the British got close and then they were free to run for it. Worked too. Same in the Revlutionary Wars; lots of conscripts who can't manouvre without holding a union meeting, but are quite happy to be tiralliers potting away to their hearts content, masking the columns until they get close enough to deploy into line. At the Alamo Santa Anna dispensed with a skirmish line because he was using darkness and surprise to cover his movements instead, hence using the cazadore companies as regular assault troops either with their parent units or under Morales at the south end.
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Post by Chuck T on Sept 29, 2010 16:04:22 GMT -5
Wolfpack: I am looking at the Sanchez diagram in both Hansen and Nelson and I don't see the three deep part for each line. Am I missing something on the drawing or is this explained in the text and I missed it?
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Post by Herb on Sept 29, 2010 16:20:13 GMT -5
What I see, is a column made up of three lines. It appears to me, that each line is composed of three companies in line formation (looking at the individual figures presumably of company officers and key NCOs), and the location where the colors are posted.
How many ranks were in each line, I don't know, but I would expect three following the older Spanish tradition. If that was the case you would have a column with a frontage of roughly 40-45 yards (approx 30 - 36 men with gaps between companies) and a depth of 50 - 60 yards with gaps between lines.
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Post by Chuck T on Sept 29, 2010 16:59:19 GMT -5
Wolfpack: In column in line and I have the colors. My confusion was on how many ranks there would be in each of the three lines, and you are saying that three was the period norm.
In my post above did I get the use of the words screen and guard correct? It has been a long time since I looked at a field manual and something tells me that I defined guard as screen and screen as guard. The body of the definitions stand,, I just think I might have used one term while meaning another.
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Post by Herb on Sept 29, 2010 17:18:44 GMT -5
In my post above did I get the use of the words screen and guard correct? It has been a long time since I looked at a field manual and something tells me that I defined guard as screen and screen as guard. The body of the definitions stand,, I just think I might have used one term while meaning another. SECURITY Operations: (modern definitions) SCREEN: maintain surveilance, provide early warning, impede and harras the enemy with artillery fires, destroys enemy reconn withn capabilities. Always defensvie in nature. GUARD: all screen tasks + prevents the enemy ground observation and direct fire engagement of the main body. The guard force may use all offensive. defensive, and reconnasiance operations to accomplish the mission. COVER: all guard tasks + operates apart from the main body, develops the situation early. It's purpose is to destroy, disrupt and deceive enemy forces, unlike screen and guard forces it is tactically self contained, Normally an ACR or an independent Bde. A common mistake is people think of security missions as defensive, except for a screen they can be both defensive and offensive. The 2nd ACR, during Desert Storm was performing an offensive cover mission.
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Post by Chuck T on Sept 29, 2010 18:03:11 GMT -5
Herb: It has been much tooooooooooooooo long, nearly 23 years. I will write this down, and will probably use it again 23 years hence, but by that time I will forget where I put the paper.
A good dose of humility and associated embarrassment is good for the soul now and again.
Regardless of mental and memory challenged poster (me), I think Stough will get the thrust of my intention.
Thanks
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