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Post by stough on Sept 27, 2010 22:29:40 GMT -5
Chieftan: in response to your post of 10:07. 1) I agree with your assessment of the attack and their objectives; it seems well reasoned. 2) I absolutely agree that men will bunch up under these conditions; I believe this to be true for both attacker and defender. Specificly, I do believe that the vast majority of the defenders would have moved towards the point of greatest conflict. My only caveat, is that they did so after their intial reaction of going to their posts 3) As to what made the east/west columns veer north; I still believe that it was the fire from the south of their columns. Assume for arguements sake, that the Texans moved to their assigned posistions first. If so, although perpendicular to the Mex assault, the fire from the southern portion of the walls would have had the effect of being flanking fire- thus pushing them north. 4) After which the defenders pushed northwards and bunched up. 5) Then, with the defenders focussed on the north wall, the southern attack was able to easily take the SW corner.
I'm making several HUGE assumptions here. One is that the initial attacks were repulsed, and that the Mexicans had yo make another go of it . Two, is that the sw corner wasn't hit untill after the North Wall was in peril.
RE your 1:39 post 1)I'm not sure why I think soem guys were pinched off the west wall. My head may be up my a$$ on this point. 2) If I actually knew where the ashes were that were outside the wall (and I'm starting to get the impression that both were to the east and south) then I would know more. I think they tell the tale better than any accounts (not that the eye witness accounts are invalid, I just place more weight on the ash piles.)
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Post by stough on Sept 27, 2010 22:45:32 GMT -5
As to the West wall and Cos' column and my theory as to why it veered north.
There are many maps and pictures of the Alamo. So it's confusing to see exactly what the defenders of the west wall had to work with. However my guess is that they had a continuous fring points along the length of the wall. Either by using the tops of the buildings or piled earth behind the wall sections. To my mind it would seem absolutely assanine to have it any other way. I think this is what Navaro's map in fact shows- that you could place a line of men along (or in line ) that wall from the corner of the NW wall to the bottom of the SW wall. If this was so, and I believe it was, their firing line would have 'crossed the T', in naval terms (or in Waterloo terms they would have had some of the advantages enjoyed by Wellington's line vs. Napoleons columns. Not everyone can get close to that wall- certanly not 300 guys on that small front- the bulk would have been exposed to flanking fire. And wheather it was accurate or not, it would have pushed them north. In my mind Cos' would have made three attempts, the first would have met mostly fire from the front. Cos' column would have recoiled then pressed on again. The second attempy, although more determined would expose them to the flanking fire mentioned above. This would have pushed the column farth north, where they were finally successful.
A couple of questions 1) Where were SA's reserves posted? 2) To the North?
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Post by stough on Sept 27, 2010 22:50:03 GMT -5
As to the posting of the defenders; (I'll elaborate tomorrow nnight when I have more time- gotta to go to bed)
I think 1) Most of the defenders were at their stations on the night of the attack (about 1/2) 2) Their first movements were to these stations 3) They left these stations as the inertia of the battle moved northwards 4) these stations were , in general, manned by groups that were familiar with each other (Bowie's men, Crockets, the Grey's etc)
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Post by Chuck T on Sept 27, 2010 23:28:41 GMT -5
Stough: You make some interesting points. Your 50% alert is conventional and exactly how I would have done it. The problem is that it was not I but Travis in command. Try as I might I cannot get my head completely around Travis. He did some things that showed signs of a trained hand and original thought. At other times he blundered badly, making mistakes that really exposed him as being a better lawyer than a soldier. At least I hope he was a better lawyer.
Engineers and Grenadiers (a provisional battalion of heavy infantry) were posted near the battery north east of the north wall, probably about 400 yards from that wall.
Your basing a lot on speculation that there were multiple attacks. My first Alamo book was Meyer's "Alamo" which contained such a theory - "Twice he charged and blew recall, and on the fatal third time". Not sure that will stand unchallenged today. I am sure others will quote you chapter and verse. Like you my day is done. Getting old is a pain in the point of contact. On the morrow.
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Post by Chuck T on Sept 27, 2010 23:35:50 GMT -5
Stough: Might you have gotten the ashes on the west from the old story that I believe was also in Meyer's book about the ashes being buried near a pecan tree. If it was not Meyers then it was somewhere back in my early reading. A pecan tree or what was supposedly "the" pecan tree was located near the junction of the north and west wall, and later ended up in Sam Maverick's back yard. He built a home on that site and there are still pictures available of the home with the tree still standing post civil war.
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Post by Chuck T on Sept 27, 2010 23:55:32 GMT -5
Stough: Crossing the T in naval terms refers to one force being in line and another force being in column. The force in line can direct their fire at the column with assurance that they will have a great percentage of hits. You do not have to worry so much about shorts and overs. A short will hit toward the bow of your target and an over will hit more toward the stern. For more details read about the Battle of Surigao Strait.
As to Waterloo. Well aimed musketry trumps arrogantly advanced Old Guards every time. Now Maitland now.
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Post by Chuck T on Sept 28, 2010 9:45:31 GMT -5
Stough: As I do every morning I re-read the previous days posts. In re-reading your post of `9:45 MDT it suddenly dawned on me your use of columns. Not to quick these days after the sun goes down. Must be my anticipation of my 50th high school reunion this coming weekend, hanging around with all those "old" folks.
In the context of the Alamo I don't believe that column referred to the actual deployment formation of Cos, or anyone else. The term was widely used to mean a detachment or portion of the whole in the 19th Century. Tactically a column is not the greatest of formations to attack in. While a larger force may be in column the reserve following the main attack for instance, the pointed end on the spear is usually in some form of line of battle once the line of departure, or place you expect to first start receiving resistance, is crossed.
I expect that Cos, and the others may have initially left their bivouacs in column and as they drew closer to their attack positions deployed into line of battle, thereby maximizing firepower forward. This would seem quite logical seeing that there was no expected danger of enemy maneuver to the their flanks. This would mean that, in terms of the present discussion, that only a small percentage of men were on the flanks and thus exposed to fire from that direction.
As with most things Alamo we have no way of knowing for sure.
At Waterloo, the Old Guard did attack in a column, which in fact was a huge box. I forget how many across and how many deep, but it was huge. Maybe Stuart, our friend from the Land of Glens, Bens, and Heroes can help us there. Once Wellington ordered his men to fire, that firepower was so devastating that the formation actually collapsed upon itself. It reached a tipping point where panic set in and the result was the unit that had never been broken in battle - was.
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Post by stuart on Sept 28, 2010 12:42:29 GMT -5
The Mexican attack formations, or at least some of them are graphically depicted on the Sanchez plat - see Hansen: 401 and the commentary following.
In more general terms, Chieftain's comments are bang on the nail. The term column was just as frequently used in the 18th and 19th centuries to refer to the body of troops commanded by a particular (subordinate or detached) officer as it was to describe the formation actually adopted.
In terms of tactical use of columns, the idea was to maneouvre more rapidly than in line, but then deploy into line to either win the firefight or simply assault with bayonets. The French problem both in the Peninsula and at Waterloo was that the British skirmish lines were so thick and so aggressively handled that the French tended to stumble into the main battle-line before they had a chance to deploy. In short the problem wasn't faulty French tactics but superior British ones
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Post by Chuck T on Sept 28, 2010 15:34:54 GMT -5
Stuart: I pulled out Hansen this morning and looked at the Sanchez plat before you posted. Cos was how I expected him to be. My memory is short these days and I wanted to refresh it before I commented further. I don't think Sanchez shows the complete route of march from bivouac thought, or perhaps it is not to scale. The northern column does not seem to be in quite the right position either, but again I presume he was working from memory.
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Post by stough on Sept 28, 2010 19:48:33 GMT -5
Chieftain/Stuart- Hmmm. I'm unaware of the Hansen information. Does he state that Cos' column deployed in line formation; if so, what did this look like - as in how many men wide and deep was the line?
Without that information; my idea would be that Cos' column was deployed in column; light infantry to the front. This would be standard attack formation; especially if they were looking to pierce a line (wall)
There are three uses of the term column with which I am aware. 1) Column; as in a group of soldiers (“take that column over their and pick those apples”). 2) Column; as in column marching formation. 3) Column; as in column attack formation.
I am referring to the last use.
The French (and the rest of Europe who copied them; excluding the British) used the column formation in the attack. This meant skirmishers out front and artillery. Their job was to rattle the enemy’s opposing line; to reduce morale and unit cohesion so that the attacking column could pierce the line. Once this was done, the cavalry or other infantry formations would exploit the breech. If all went well, the enemy would be reduced to an unorganized mob. (Pardon me if this sounds patronizing; I’m not trying to be, I’m just trying to get all of us on the same page as to what these tactics look like- if you disagree with the above , feel free….)
The British were successful against this formation because the French Artillery could not create enough havoc on their line. Because of, as stated, better British use of terrain and tactics. The result being that the French columns got blasted back.
Back to the Alamo, without information to the contrary (Hansen?) my guess was that Cos' column main job would be to pierce a portion of that wall. In short, the attack columns job would be to get up and over as fast as possible.
So, I feel pretty confident that Cos' men were in attack column formation. The formation would be consistent with their objective- to break the line. Whereas a line formation would have them engaging in a fire fight and not breaking that line.
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Post by stough on Sept 28, 2010 20:00:34 GMT -5
As to the combined Cazadores Unit under Morales, I think their main task was to pin down the defenders. They are light infantry; that it was light infantry does, they shoot and move like ‘Indians’. They might have some limited objectives, but their main purpose is to disrupt the enemy. Picking off officers and making people keep their heads down until the main force delivers it’s Sunday punch.
If Santa Anna’s reserves were to the North and/or Northeast; that is where he wanted a breakthrough.
On a side note. Check out the Civil war battle of Fort Pillow; I think the tactics there would have been put to good use at the Alamo. I would venture that the Mexicans may have figured this out and that is what led to their success in mounting the walls in force.
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Post by Chuck T on Sept 28, 2010 20:32:42 GMT -5
Sanchez in Hansen --- Two up one back - line formation, which does not preclude skirmishers (light infantry)
If you want to understand light infantry old and current, read Rommel "Infantry in the Attack" He did the same thing with light infantry in Italy in WWI that he later did with Armor in Africa.
More after NCIS, my one must see a week.
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Post by Allen Wiener on Sept 28, 2010 20:38:34 GMT -5
As to the combined Cazadores Unit under Morales, I think their main task was to pin down the defenders. They are light infantry; that it was light infantry does, they shoot and move like ‘Indians’. They might have some limited objectives, but their main purpose is to disrupt the enemy. Picking off officers and making people keep their heads down until the main force delivers it’s Sunday punch. If Santa Anna’s reserves were to the North and/or Northeast; that is where he wanted a breakthrough. I think Santa Anna had very good intel on how many defenders there were and their general physical condition. He also knew that he was not dealing with a polished, professional army, but a small group of rebels with questionable level of training, discipline and experience. With that in mind, I believe Morales mission was both to secure the main gate and to draw defenders away from the north wall - the area of the main attack. His unit also served to help move the defenders who survived or left the north wall either into the Long Barrack or out in the areas to the south and east, where Sesma's cavalry was awaiting them. By the way - this is a great discussion thread and, although you guys are way over my head in terms of military history, tactics and strategy, I'm learning from it. Allen
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Post by Chuck T on Sept 28, 2010 21:14:46 GMT -5
Allen: Come on. You understand this stuff better than most. We of course partially disagree on Morales but you have an extremely good handle on SA's objective. Read Liddell-Hart's "Strategy", still in print in paperback after almost 60 years. He posits the indirect approach and gives many examples from history. I think Morales at the southwest corner is one he must have missed.
Stough: I suppose then not having Hansen that I have you at a disadvantage. I will try with my limited art skills to reproduce it here
<<N Wall _________________________________________(12)
____________ ___________ ___________ West
Well I am trying to make this work. Move reserve line more toward center
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Post by Chuck T on Sept 28, 2010 21:54:19 GMT -5
Stough:
You have all there is from Sanchez in Hansen. Each line assuming between 300-400 under Cos, and making a wild guess from what measurements we do know looks like maybe each line being one deep. Each could possibly be two, but a clearer picture is way above my pay grade. This is a typical attack formation where the unit moves out of column and into line of battle to maximize firepower forward while still retaining a reserve to exploit success or cover your withdrawal should things go bad.
Each battalion was organized with a light infantry company. The primary purpose of that company was to act as skirmishers, primarily to guard against those unsettling moments of surprise. Today we would use our scout or reconnaissance platoons in each battalion for essentially the same purpose. I assume that Cos used skirmishers to quickly over run any Alamo sentry outside the walls. In short light infantry uses field craft and stealth to infiltrate the adversary. Also keep in mind the light infantry was often grouped together such as the provisional battalion of Morales for special operations.
Cos had under command the Aldama Battalion with six line companies and a light company, as well as the San Luis Battalion with three line companies. Using my screwed up drawing above one could speculate the Aldama provided the skirmishers and divided the line companies in two 3 company groups, using the very short of full strength San Luis for the reserve. Of course they could have shuffled the deck a little differently but there are only a few combinations that would make sense. Your up and over is exactly what they wished to do. They were allocated 10 ladders for 250 feet of wall.
I spent ten years of my adult life as a light infantryman and never once moved like an Indian. Nobody can move like an Indian, except an Indian.
Quinceymorris is the go to guy on how the Mexican Army was internally organized.
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