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Post by Chuck T on Sept 29, 2010 23:21:27 GMT -5
Stough: Given the choice between #1 and #2, I would take two every time. Fast and hard with as much combat power forward as possible, and spreading the defenders out as far a possible to increase my chances of achieving breakthrough. Yes I would initially suppress the defenders fire with my own, but there would come a point as more and more of your soldiers topped the walls where it would evolve into a no holds barred double slam death match. The wider your front the more soldiers you could get up there, and consequently the more decisive of a breakthrough you would have.
Our only point of difference is in frontal width. I want to get more deployed power forward fast. From what you describe I envision you are thinking in terms of Macedonian Phalanx, The Macedonians ruled the battlefield until they met the smaller but more agile Roman Legions who cut into and cut up their flanks
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Post by Chuck T on Sept 30, 2010 0:59:47 GMT -5
To ALL This post stated by one of our esteemed members asking if anyone had a handle on the garrison organization, It is contained as a footnote on page 13 of Huffines, Since I had lent my copy to a friend I could not produce it immediately, My wife returns from her Vestry meeting at church tonight book in hand so here goes
Captain William Blazeby's company of infantry (56 men) Captain William C.M. Baker's company of infantry (32 men) Captain William Carry's company of artillery ( 29 men) There will be absolutely no Sainted Virgins named Barbara being burnt in the tower while these stalwarts are around no matter what the king says. Captain John H Forsyth's Cavalry troop (21 men) Captain Juan Seguin ' cavalry troop (10 men) Captain William Harrision Tennessee Mounted volunteer Company (16)
Saint George had spread his protective wings over Forsyth's and Seguin's men until that rowdy bunch from the east coast showed up. Representations must be made and divine intervention may be requited
This is your program for opening day at Alamo Downs. There were subtractions, the number will probably never be conclusive. What was it some wag mentioned if all the messengers that left the Alamo had stayed the defenders would have held and then invaded Mexico for desert.
All the blue smoke, mirrors and my poor audition tape for Saturday Night Live notwithstanding this list is I am convinced is the best we are going to get barring the Cherabusco Tapes which will both give us the complete number of defenders and the gps coordinates where they fell, and that Santa Anna provided the guys for the Watergate Break In
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Post by stuart on Sept 30, 2010 1:12:00 GMT -5
Okay... couple of admin points to start off, for stough: As Chieftain mentioned earlier I'm British which is one reason why I have a head start on Napoleonic tactics, and also why I'm out on timing. It's currently 06:54 am over here and after posting this I'll be off to work.
Mexican formations were certainly based on French ones, but... theory still called for a three deep line, with the first two doing the shooting and the third acting as a casualty reserve and some reloading for them. In practise in Europe anyway (and I don't expect Mexico was any different) if numbers were down they preferred to operate in two ranks rather than blindly stick with three in order to maintain the necessary unit frontages.
As discussed, Sanchez shows them depoloyed in line for the actual assault. Reasoning is simple enough. They are not standing shooting it out with the guys sitting behind their walls - the more they spread out the more chance they have of actually getting over those walls because the defenders are stretched pretty thin. The guys doing the shooting are the second line companies giving covering fire over their heads and according to at least one account shooting down too many of their own guys in the process.
The point about the story of the Toluca guys is that they were caught in flank so that the canister round raked the company rather than just punching a hole in it as it would have done head on.
Finally, the man of the match, Colonel Morales: his orders were quite specific in directing him to take the main gate. We've had a lot of discussion here with me arguing that he did just that by a coup de main while most other folks reckon he did it by first taking the SW gun position. I reckon we've agreed to differ in the end but the point is that he had a defined objective which went way beyond pinning the defenders on the south wall. He was intended from the outset to assault the south wall and his doing so while the defenders was distracted by their troubles and woes to the north decided the battle.
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Post by stough on Oct 2, 2010 21:05:52 GMT -5
Sweet. Just got back from San Antone. Picked up the Hanson, Huffins and Nelson Books.
Stuart. I've reread your posts and I have to say that your description of the use of column with light troops is only half true. The half that is correct is the aggressive use of light troops (or light troop tactics) ahead of the column. The half you leave out is, as I mentioned earlier, with regard to the poor quality, yet enthusiatic nature of French troops during the revolutionary wars in and around France. And therefore, the extensive use of the column in attack.
I mention this, because every, and I mean every, book I have reread on the French revolution stresses the point on the use of column in attack was due to the speed of the formation in attack and it's usefulness with the experience level of the troops.
Perhaps (and I use perhaps because I am not well read on the close up tactics of this battle, yet I believe it might apply here) a good example would be Austerlitz. Where Davout is using light infantry tactics to hold down the advance of AUstrian/Russians on the right. Compared with the use of columns by the French to crush the Austro-Russian armies on the left.
It's not that I disagree with much that you have written; it's that I think we are presenting two halves of the same picture.
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Post by stuart on Oct 3, 2010 4:02:18 GMT -5
Well I find a lot of argument is only slightly out of phase with both sides getting charged up over fundamentally the same thing but telling it slightly differently, though I would say that just because an error or misconception is endlessly repeated it doesn't make it true.
Now so far as column formations go, yes they do indeed allow troops to move faster and more maneouvrably than in line, which is why the French spend a lot of the 18th century developing those tactics. They also, obviously, suited conscript armies as it was a whole lot easier to get them to move coherently on a two company front than trying to maintain alignment on a a six company front. However they didn't aim to fight on a two company front. As I've said they used the skirmish line to cover their approach and to cover their redeployment into line rather than try to batter through on a two company front.
The Alamo is different because it was a deliberate assault on a fortified position not a stand-up fight in the open. They therefore dispensed with the skirmish line and assaulted with the leading companies while the supporting ones provided covering fire over their heads.
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Post by stough on Oct 3, 2010 10:08:28 GMT -5
Well said on the use of the skirmish line to mask the redeploy into line. That helps to make more sense of it.
I'm still trying to wrap my head around these ideas and what it would look like up close.
I certainly agree that a mistake often repeated can become a percieved fact. On the other hand, it's difficult for me to dismiss these guys as they are pretty iconic when it comes to the Fr Rev and Napoleon.
The good news is that your arguements are presented soundly and seem well considered and supported.
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Post by Herb on Oct 3, 2010 13:15:45 GMT -5
Interesting discussion, but I think, when discussing Napoleonic Tactics, it's also important to remember that you're discussing almost a generation of warfare. The French conscripts of 1796 - 97 were raw and entusastic, and had to be formed in demi-brigades with the remanents of the French royal army, however the Grande Armee of 1805-1806 was professional and well trained and skilled (whether conscript or not). The constant warfare gradually eroded that professionalism (rapidly after 1812) until by 1814 the Army once more resembled the Army of 1796 (minus the enthuasim).
While tactics evolved what really changed is what we in the US call techniques and procedures, how commanders fitted the quality and quantity of troops to best accomplish the mission.
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