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Post by Jim Boylston on Dec 13, 2007 19:43:29 GMT -5
As promised on the Morales thread, here's a seperate heading to discuss Travis' behavior as commander. I've made no secret that I think Travis was negligent to the point of being derelict. I chalk a lot of it up to inexperience, some of it to arrogance, and some of it to not having the respect of his men, whether due to his youth or to factionalism. There were egregious errors made during his command. The most obvious one: being surprised twice by the Mexicans. Jim
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Post by marklemon on Dec 13, 2007 21:23:54 GMT -5
Jim, I agree with most of your points concerning Travis, with one exception. Having had personal and extensive experience with sleep deprivation, I can confidently assert that, after some 11 or 12 nights without sleep, Alexander the Great himself could have been in command of the garrison, and they'd have all, or almost all, still been alseep when the Mexicans let them have, at last, a quiet night of sleep. One of the great understated points of the siege, is just how badly sleep deprivation negatively affected the garrison. After just three nights without sleep, men begin to hallucinate. I have seen men, after four nights without sleep, fall into a deep sleep with a fork full of food halfway to their mouths, before being shaken awake by a buddy. Add into the mix the brutal cold nights, and the misery index goes off the scale. Travis can and should be severely criticized for being caught flat-footed on the 23rd, but the night of the 5th is another matter..IMHO.
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Post by bobdurham on Dec 13, 2007 21:24:21 GMT -5
I wonder how much influence Travis had over his volunteer army. I've been researching the Black Hawk War, which happened just four years before the Texas Revolution. The governor of Illinois made two calls for volunteers from Southern Illinois (mainly frontiersmen originally from Kentucky and Tennessee, the same material that were later well represented in the Texas Revolution). These men were a total disaster: elected their own officers and wouldn't even obey them, threw away their rations rather than carry them, left to go home at the most inopportune times, turned a peaceful Indian migration into a war by attacking a group of Indian negotiators with white flags, and the list goes on. When the war was nearly over and the Indians were attempting to escape west of the Mississippi (which is where everyone wanted them anyway), the volunteers caught up with them and turned two rear guard actions, to protect the women and children while they crossed the Wisconsin and Mississippi Rivers, into massacres. The U. S. Regulars had no choice but to use these volunteers because the Regulars were all infantry and they desperately needed horsemen. But none had any respect for them or expected a lot from them.
If the volunteers in the Texas Revolution were half as independent minded as those in the Black Hawk War, the Texian officers would have been hard pressed to get them to do fatigue duty, entrenching, picketing or anything else that an army has to do. I don't believe Travis was a very strong leader but perhaps he should be given a lot of credit (to share with Neill and Bowie) just for keeping them all together.
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Post by cantador4u on Dec 13, 2007 21:59:42 GMT -5
"In the land of the blind, the one-eyed man is king." Somebody quoted this on a different thread and it seems apropos here. I am flabbergasted by the excessive number of high-ranking officers there seemed to be at the Alamo. If you were in the Texan army (volunteers and regulars) you were either a private or an officer with a rank of Captain or above. Where are the NCO's? Did they really need a colonel to command 180 - 200 men? I'm thinking back to my 2 years in the army (all state-side duty), the total number of Alamo defenders amount to little more than two infantry companies of today.
Most likely I am trying to compare apples and bananas, and what does that have to do with the leadership abilities of Travis? I'm not sure how one person was selected over another to be made an officer. As I recall from Three Roads to the Alamo, Travis really had no military experience or any sort of leadership experience in general yet he fancied himself as the leader of a cavalry unit.
I don't think Travis was particularly good as a military commander. On the other hand, he was not grossly incompetent by the standards of the day. He never had time to get enough experience to grow to be a good leader. If we could put general Patton in the way-back machine and place him in charge of the Alamo the outcome would probably have been the same once the Mexican Army showed up and the Texans closed themselves in the Alamo.
They SHOULD have acted on the intelligence that they had regarding the location and ETA of the Mexican army, but few felt compelled to want to believe the information and it was easier to do nothing than work. Heck, the Texas government and politicians were not so effective at the time either. There was a lot of it going around.
I seem to be dancing all around the issue of Travis leadership abilities. There were so many missed opportunities and errors in judgment that seem glaring to us in hindsight. It's especially troubling when it also goes up against the Alamo myth. The biggest mistake was probably staying in Bexar, though in the end the damage done to Santa Anna's army and the delay it caused him probably made the formation the the Texas Republic possible.
Maybe it was "destiny".
- Paul Meske - Wisconsin
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Post by mustanggray on Dec 13, 2007 22:35:46 GMT -5
List,
There are far more knowledgeable gentlemen on this list than myself but I would like to add a my comments regarding Travis' leadership at the Alamo.
1. The Alamo was a structure(fortification?) that was never designed to defend against a trained, professional army. With all of the repairs, additions, work done on the compound the Alamo still was indefensible regardless. I've always wondered why the Texians thought they could hold Bexar and the Alamo against the Mexicans after they(the Mexicans) had lost it to the Texians earlier in the war. I know there was a good bit of arrogance regarding wha tthe Texians thought of the Mexicans but you have to wonder were they really THAT arrogant(Travis included)?
2. Travis did not have much in the way of experience but he had done alright as a scout and would have better served the Texians as such rather than being thrust into the situation he found himself in. He obviously showed some potential or why else would he have been promoted/commissioned/given a command? To take someone with no experience as a military officer or leader of martial minded men and expect him to hold as diverse a garrison together as was found at the Alamo and under the conditions those men were placed is asking quite a lot.
I'm not sure much of this is very useful to the discussion... just figured I'd throw it out there anyway! I do enjoy the topics and discussions here...
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Post by Allen Wiener on Dec 13, 2007 23:44:33 GMT -5
After reading Stuart's book I wonder if there wasn't a kind of avoidance of reality among the Texan forces in general. The government had broken down for all practical purposes, so there was no central authority to form a strategy or direct an army (had there really been one). This left various commanders and wannabes in several places forming their own strategies and trying to persuade troops to follow them. Most supported the Matamoros expedition, including Houston for a time, but he changed his mind and effectively derailed it by persuading enough troops to give it up. Grant went on with it anyway. Travis and Bowie (and earlier Neill) wanted to defend Bexar because they felt it was strategic. Houston, as Stuart has taught us, didn't really see that part of Texas in the future and didn't think it was worth defending, thus paid little attention to it and was not responsive when government finally did order him to act. There's some dispute over what he actually told Bowie to do in Bexar, but I believe his intention was to get the canon out and just abandon the place. His aim was to move east, not west, and do whatever he could to get the United States involved.
This doesn't tell us much about Travis's leadership abilities, but it does set the rather surreal, impossible backdrop to what played out at the Alamo. No, even Patton couldn't have changed the outcome once they had trapped themselves in the Alamo. But Travis alone was not responsible for creating that situation. Bowie and Neill also believed that it was necessary to defend the place. Where Travis and all the others badly miscalculated was putting their cards on the liklihood of being rescued by lots of other Texians. This flew in the face of the dispersed and disorganized (and leaderless) state of the Texian military. There was no large, organized force to rescue them, but they seemed either ignorant of that or in denial. Fannin's force was of fair size, it's true, but could he really have made a difference? He was as much on his own as Travis. What to do? As I recall, he may have had intelligence on Urrea being in the area and could not simply abandon his post. When he did try to send a relief force, everything went haywire. There's been discussion elsewhere about whether history has judged Fannin too harshly.
So, good leader or not, Travis's options were pretty limited. Having said that, I have to agree that there was both ignorance and arrogance in ignoring the intelligence about the oncoming Mexican army. That scene in Wayne's otherwise fantasy movie where Travis blows off the Seguin character when he delivers that message is not so unrealistic. The Texians had won some pretty easy victories pretty quickly and doubtless saw the Mexicans as paper tigers. Also, Bowie and Travis were preoccupied in a power struggle of their own. The posts above about the inability to actually get this kind of army to do what you wanted are very accurate. I've read a lot of stories about this kind of militia voting in its own officers, sometimes based on which ones could buy them the most liquor.
I don't think Travis was at all experienced or much of a commander either. Mark raises a good point about sleep deprivation and that could explain a lot. However, I'm still not convinced that Travis had any sort of defensive plan or strategy, or an idea of how to position his troops, or even an organized breakout plan. Travis was a firebrand and willing to take risks, as at Anuac (sp?). The idea of grandstanding seemed to appeal to him; he may have seen potential glory for himself in a gallant (and successful) stand at the Alamo and imagined everyone in Texas rushing to his aid as soon as they read his impassioned letters.
AW
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Post by Jim Boylston on Dec 14, 2007 0:01:51 GMT -5
Let me pick up on a point that virtually everyone has mentioned here: the men under Travis' command. Bob's comments about the men in the Blackhawk war are interesting, and may reflect the attitudes of many of the Alamo's defenders. I've always figured that the apparent lack of discipline during the siege (or any military command for that matter) was down to poor leadership, but could anyone have gotten the men more motivated? There's a romantic idea that Bowie could have, but he certainly didn't display a lot of restraint after the battle of Bejar (at least according to Travis' complaints), and Crockett (despite what many would like to believe) wasn't really an option either, due to his newcomer status. Houston had problems controlling his forces too and, as others have mentioned, the government was in a relative shambles. Is it unrealistic to expect that anyone could have really "commanded" these men? Jim
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Post by stuart on Dec 14, 2007 6:51:41 GMT -5
This is one of those questions which isn’t as straightforward as it looks.
The commandant at Bexar was actually Colonel Neill; he only went off temporarily and in theory command in his absence shouldn’t have been an issue – directly comparable with Major Spalding riding off from Rorke’s Drift with the parting words “nothing will happen”…
The well-known bickering which followed between Travis and Bowie over the “command” reflected this and Travis’ later assumption of full command came about simply because Bowie was by then too sick to argue and Travis got the job.
So far as the disregarded early warning goes this can’t be placed at Travis’ door alone for that very reason. At that point Bowie was still up and about and just as responsible. If anything he may have been more culpable because unlike Travis he knew Grant and had earlier tried and failed to prevent him taking the volunteers down to the Rio Grande. What’s always been overlooked is that the warning was sent not by one of Seguin’s men as depicted in the John Wayne film, but by Placido Benavides who was one of Grant’s men. I firmly believe that the warning wasn’t casually ignored but very deliberately disregarded and probably on Bowie’s advice because it came from a “tainted” source.
Ironically just as Houston would later try to dismiss reports of the Alamo being under siege as a political stunt by Travis, both Bowie and Travis may have dismissed Benavides’ warning for exactly the same reason.
So far as the actual defence of the Alamo is concerned I seriously doubt whether Bowie or Crockett could have done any better. It was, as I’ve argued, less a fortress than a lifeboat. The Texians didn’t choose to stand and fight there; they “forted up” in it simply because they had nowhere else to go. There I think is the real problem; “forting up” was something they all understood and some at least (including Bowie) had practical experience of. They knew they had to man all the loopholes – or equivalent – and fight hard when the attack came, but otherwise neither Travis nor anybody else had any real conception of doing anything more than sitting tight and hollering for help.
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Post by Jim Boylston on Dec 14, 2007 13:34:37 GMT -5
mustanggray worte:
Bingo. That's one reason why Stuart's point about the Alamo being seen as a place to hole up and wait makes sense. Even so, once in the situation one would expect defensive measures to have taken a priority. I think Travis repeated his initial error: he misjudged the timeline. I suspect that he read the movements by Santa Anna and expected a long siege. He didn't see any artillery capable of breaching his walls, and figured he had time to hunker down and wait for help. Add to that the possibility that he just flat out didn't know what to do, so he did virtually nothing. Jim
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Post by Herb on Dec 14, 2007 13:41:56 GMT -5
I'll go all over the place here.
First off, Travis was in over his head, but that is also only to be expected. There just weren't many men in all of Texas that had experience leading anything more than a company of men - to include Houston. They all had to learn OJT. IF Washington had been killed during the battles for Manhattan in 1776, we would all be talking about his incompetence and bungling, instead he and the army survived, learned and grew competent in their roles. Travis, never had that opportunity.
Bob, makes a good point about the men Travis had to work with, but effective leadership will overcome a lack of discipline and training. George Rogers Clark, William Harrison, and Mad Anthony Wayne, did a pretty good job with the same sort of men in their campaigns in the Ohio Valley.
Good Leadership can overcome a lot, but good leadership alone would not have changed the ultimate outcome at the Alamo.
Mark makes an excellent point about sleep deprivation, (btw, I once fell asleep while leaning on the side of a tank in mid sentence, giving an operations order to my subordinates). It's very hard for me to see how after the first couple of days, that Travis, could not see the necessity of dividing his men into shifts.
Personally, I can understand the surprise on the 23rd, it's the surprise on the 5th that to me is virtually unforgivable. How you could allow all but a handful of men to be asleep, when in close proximity to the enemy, when an attack should be expected? Again, personally, I know even among Regulars, men are going to fall asleep that aren't supposed to. The only way I know to prevent it is to check, by walking the perimeter on an irregular schedule. Given, the situation, IMO, Travis himself should have been up prowling the walls after midnight until the dawn himself.
Talking to the men standing guard in the cold, windy, night, sharing their hardship, and showing them he considered their job important - that's just a small part of leadership. Leaders must be visible in the trying conditions - not on the parade ground in the light and warmth of the sun.
Had Travis done all this would it have made a difference? Possibly on March 6th, but ultimately, no. A partially awake and alert garrison at their cannons when the attack commenced may possibly have inflicted enough causalities to repulse the attempted escalde. But, that would only mean a subsequent deliberate attack after the walls had been breeched by the heavier cannon.
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Post by elcolorado on Dec 14, 2007 16:39:17 GMT -5
This is a great discussion. Clearly we're all on the same page, here.
Most everything I believe in regards to Travis' leadership and combat preparations has been eloquently, and I think, accurately expressed. So I won't add too much more.
First, a brief look at the man himself. From my understanding, Travis was an intelligent, ambitious, no nonsense type of guy. He was a courageous man and had some leadership skills and abilities but not the experience to properly apply them. And I think it's fair to say he was direct, decisive, and a heck of a writer.
On the down side. He could be arrogant, abrasive, conceited, self-serving and self-absorbed. At times, he came across as a bit of a whiner when things didn't go his way. And he had the ability to rub most everyone the wrong way...especially Jim Bowie.
The troubles with Travis began long before he reached Bexar, an assignment he initially detested and fought. But as usual, the dysfunctional governments response was no response to Travis' plea's for re-assignment. So, like a good soldier he went off to Bexar... but with a chip on his shoulder and an attitude.
The next big problem I see in Travis' development as a leader was an attitude of complacency supported by the collective belief that Santa Anna (SA) would not or could not threaten Bexar until mid-March at the earliest. This sentiment I think reinforced a "do nothing" or "wait and see" approach from the governor right down to the youngest private. No one seemed to be in any hurry...accept of course, SA.
With the belief that a confrontation with SA was a long ways off, it was almost impossible to motivate the the mostly lethargic volunteers. But it was more then simple complacency. Recall if you will, the letters LTC Neill wrote to the governor describing the condition of the men. He wrote that the men in his command were sick, penniless, hungry, and naked. They had not been paid for several months and it appeared the government was indifferent to their privations. It's little wonder the volunteers were unmotivated to engage in even the smallest of tasks. Unfortunately for Travis, this is what he had to work with upon arrival in San Antonio.
As we know, the unexpected departure of Neil caused a number of problems. Neill was compelled to leave Travis in command which didn't set well with Bowie and the majority of the volunteers. Neill was an artillery commander who was respected, well-known and well-liked. His men were unhappy with his departure and even less happy about his choice of replacement. But he assured everyone he would be back in twenty days.
After serving twenty years in the Air Force, I can understand the feelings of the Alamo garrison after Neill left and Travis was given command. I've experienced several occasions in my military career where a likable and respected commander was re-assigned and his replacement was regarded as abrasive and detached. Initially, moral drops a little, but gradually the commander and the troops warm up to each other.
I think Neill's promise of return was yet another reason why nothing was accomplished in regards to combat preparations. I'd trade the billion dollars Mark Lemon is going to make off his incredible book to know what, if any, instructions Neill may have left behind for Travis. You know, a sort of "laundry list" of things to do. Maybe someday, some yet undiscovered piece of documentation will be found. I have to believe Neill, a responsible soldier, would have left some instructions behind for Travis to carry out. But on the other hand, taking into account the Texans "what's the hurry" attitude...maybe not. So do we hold LTC Neill partially responsible for the debacle at the Alamo??
So maybe Travis was instructed to do nothing more then "hold down the fort" until Neill returned. If so, then I think Neill is culpable, in part, to the state of unpreparedness in Bexar. Travis may have assumed, and others may have regarded the young lawyer as a "babysitter"...not to be taken seriously...even ignored. So Travis had little or no influence with the volunteers and the volunteers had little or no incentive to do anything more then sleep, eat, drink, get drunk, and chase senoritas.
So as the Mexican army marched north, the Alamo sat idle and neglected with the exception to a few modifications G.B. Jameson was able to accomplish.
My most severe criticism of Travis mirrors many others. And that is the poor intelligence gathering he conducted and being caught with his pants down on the 23rd of Feb. As commander, Travis was responsible for keeping tabs on SA's movements. Neill, while he was in Bexar, complained that he lacked the horses to conduct scouting operations, Travis did not suffer under the same handicap. He had no excuse. Even when locals brought him information on the Mexican army, he chose to disregard it. Sadly, the garrison would pay the price for Travis' inexperience and complacency.
Only when SA arrives on the outskirts of San Antonio does Travis get serious about making preparations. As it has been correctly pointed out, the Texans had no choice but to take refuge in the Alamo. The Alamo garrison was fortunate that they were able to secure some cattle and extra corn because no one took the time to insure the Alamo was adequately provisioned. Water, wood, and other essentials finally became a concern. But, as they say: "too little too late." Travis...and Bowie, too...blew it. It was now out of their hands. As Stuart says, there wasn't anything more they could do then sit tight and holler for help.
I wonder, did Travis and Bowie want Fannin to to just send men or did they want him to take command of the Alamo since he was senior in rank??
Oh my gosh!! Did I just write all this?? My apologies, guys. I didn't mean to get so wordy. ;D
Glenn
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Post by Jim Boylston on Dec 14, 2007 17:32:25 GMT -5
Good post, Glenn. This is a point that Stuart, Wolfpack and I talked about when we visited Goliad last March, and not something you see considered very often. Jim
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Post by tmdreb on Dec 14, 2007 23:42:53 GMT -5
Good question regarding Neill's instructions to Travis. I wouldn't have been surprised had they been little more than "make sure at least some men are left when I return."
I don't know if Travis' problem was lack of leadership or lack of willing followers. It cannot be forgotten that the Texian forces were not so much an army but a collection of small, independent bodies of armed volunteers who largely did as they pleased. Sometimes, this involved assembling in a large group and fighting a battle.
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Post by stuart on Dec 15, 2007 14:30:36 GMT -5
Good question regarding Neill's instructions to Travis. I wouldn't have been surprised had they been little more than "make sure at least some men are left when I return." That's certainly how I'd see it. As I said above I'm not at all convinced that Neill actually handed over command to anybody. He wasn't expecting trouble and probably just rode out with no more than a plea to everyone to stay put and behave themselves until he got back So far as a shopping list of instructions is concerned I really don't see it. Neill is another of these characters who has gained a popular reputation for competence based on nothing at all. He accomplished absolutely nothing during his tenure as commandant at Bexar so there was no "good work" for Travis or anyone else to keep up.
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Post by Allen Wiener on Dec 15, 2007 16:33:50 GMT -5
Well, without any real structure or chain of command in this so-called army, it seems to have been every "commander" for himself. Anyone who could scare up a reasonable number of followers could follow his own strategy -- Grant to Matamoros; Neill, et al, to hold Bexar, Fannin to command the Matamoros expedition, but then not; Houston to try and get them all to follow him. But I have to agree with Stuart re: Neill. Although I believe Neill did serve at San Jacinto, he doesn't seem to have accomplished much in Bexar other than keeping a tiny number of men there. If he really believed that Bexar should be held at all costs, why didn't he do something to prepare the place? Same goes for Bowie and Travis, who are famous for expressing the need to keep Bexar out of the hands of the enemy at all cost. Did anyone figure out how the heck they were going to do that? I'd also think you'd want to make every effort to get good intelligence on the enemy's movements, instead of just guessing and assuming all would be well until the spring.
AW
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