Travis's Leadership

[stuart]

That February 13 letter would tie in with Menchaca's account (Hansen 505) of the courier from Benavides coming up from Camargo on February 11 (or just possibly the early ours of February 12) with the very specific warning that Santa Anna had left Presidio Rio Grande and was marching on San Antonio.

Assuming Menchaca's recollection is correct - and he did speak with the messenger - it shows the extent to which Travis was discounting the intelligence from Grant's men.

[elcolorado]

Travis did make a serious error in not listening to the intelligence brought in by locals and had he taken heed this may have helped the garrison to some small degree but I doubt it would have much affected the outcome.

First. On page 142, Hansen, second paragraph. John Sutherland addresses the harsh criticism Travis received for not conducting a more effective scouting service. It's worth a look.

This is an interesting "what if" question. If Travis and Bowie were aware of Santa Anna's strength, position, destination, etc, Would it have made any difference?

Glenn

[Allen Wiener]

Once again I'll defer to the military experts here, but it seems to me that really good intelligence that told them some 3,000 or more troops were on their way and had crossed the Rio Grande might have narrowed the options quite a bit. Taking a look at the small force they had, their relatively unprofessional makeup, the condition of the Alamo, and the lack of good horses that's been discussed here lately, getting the heck out of Dodge looms large on the options list. They might have wanted to take the cannon with them, or at least some (Houston's idea), but how to do it with few, if any, work animals? Instead, spike the things and burn down the Alamo, take all the provisions you could and fall back.

Only a clear, definite indication that there was mucho help on the way should have altered this kind of plan. What must have weighed them toward staying was a belief that help would materialize from somewhere; that the Mexicans wouldn't arrive before March, maybe due to honest doubt about the intelligence. But absent any better intel., and given all the other factors in the worst case scenario, why not just pack it in and fight somewhere else later on?

Related to this, as I've asked many times, what gave them the idea that there were reinforcements to be had? From where?

AW

[elcolorado]

For starters, I think they put too much faith in the ability of the government. Just look at the letters that were directed at the Governor and the Council. Then the Bexar leadership petitioned Houston and later, Fannin. Plus, I think they honestly believed that the citizens of Texas would naturally rally to their call for assistance.

I often wonder... had the garrison not been surprised as they were, would they still have stayed and taken refuge in the Alamo. Or, knowing that they would be overwhelmed by Santa Anna's army, abandoned the Alamo and "bugged-out"?

They seemed to have the resolve to hold Bexar...to fight it out. Or do you think it was just a lot of macho bluster?

Glenn

[stuart]

elcolorado said:

Travis did make a serious error in not listening to the intelligence brought in by locals and had he taken heed this may have helped the garrison to some small degree but I doubt it would have much affected the outcome.

First. On page 142, Hansen, second paragraph. John Sutherland addresses the harsh criticism Travis received for not conducting a more effective scouting service. It's worth a look.

Glenn

That was exactly the point I was making about political prejudice warping their judgement. Referring to Herrera's warning via Seguin on February 20, Sutherland says it was disregarded because of earlier false alarms by "a degraded class of Greasers" and other similar reports - which included that very specific warning from Benavides. While Sutherland no doubt quite accurately sums up the mood amongst the Texians there's no getting away from the fact that all those reports were accurate and were being ignored simply because they came from Mexican Federalistas - and that apart from that one half-hearted scout by some of Bowie's men no attempt was made by the Texians to ascertain what was really going on.

[stuart]

elcolorado said:

For starters, I think they put too much faith in the ability of the government. Just look at the letters that were directed at the Governor and the Council. Then the Bexar leadership petitioned Houston and later, Fannin. Plus, I think they honestly believed that the citizens of Texas would naturally rally to their call for assistance.

I often wonder... had the garrison not been surprised as they were, would they still have stayed and taken refuge in the Alamo. Or, knowing that they would be overwhelmed by Santa Anna's army, abandoned the Alamo and "bugged-out"?

They seemed to have the resolve to hold Bexar...to fight it out. Or do you think it was just a lot of macho bluster?

Glenn

I'd say it was down to timing. It was quite unthinkable that they should just pack up and leave Bexar prematurely, especially when they were discounting all those reports about Santa Anna being on his way.

They held on to the frontier picquet post of Texas and naturally called for reinforcements and supplies and they probably reckoned that if Santa Anna turned up first they would have to pull out - but only when it became absolutely necessary.

The trouble is that because they discounted all the hard intelligence coming in from the Mexicans and at the same time failed to establish any listening posts or picquets of their own - far less scouts - they got themselves caught.

[Allen Wiener]

That sounds about right, now that I think about it. It makes sense. I wish there were some correspondence from Bexar indicated that the option of pulling back was at least on the table. I'm trying to think of any other incident in the war that presented a similar situation. Fannin at Goliad? Exactly what did he think he was going to do if/when the Mexicans landed at his door. Had he not ventured out and gotten caught, did he plan to hunker down, prepare for a siege and defense, hope for help?

Houston's vague instructions to Bowie are often brought into play when discussing this "moment." Lindley had a discussion of that and it seems that Houston's "instructions" may have been more of a request for Bowie to assess the situation and use his best judgment. Houston later insisted that he flatly ordered Bowie to abandon the place and haul out the cannon (but, again, how? With what animals?). Throw into the mix your own revelations about Houston's vision of a free Texas that did not include Bexar or Hispanics and you have quite an engine for misinformation, prejudice and bad judgment.

AW

[Herb]

Something that is very hard to adequately explain is how difficult it is to have the moral courage to make what could be a military or politically decisive, decision. This wasn't just a problem for the irregular Texas military, but for every regular military establishment. While calculated Risk Takers are needed as wartime leaders, a peacetime government bureaucracy, wants nothing to do with risk.

Houston probably did want to abandon Bexar and the Alamo, but he was unwilling to make that decision, instead he ordered Bowie to consolidate forces in the Alamo, and asked permission from the Governor to abandon the Alamo.

Travis as a temporary commander, no matter what his personal inclination, may not have felt that he had the authority to abandon the Alamo.

Which leads to the military risk takers' creed: "It's easier to get forgiveness than permission."

Ignoring the intelligence, is another matter that is sort of related. If you accept the intelligence, it requires you to take action, if all you to do is pass it on up the chain, you're waiting for somebody else to tell you what to do ie "It's not my fault, I reported, and simply followed my orders." Of course, we're also looking with 20-20 hindsight, we know that the intelligence from the Rio Grande was correct, but what if it wasn't? Weapons of Mass Destruction, anybody?

Now, upon receiving the intelligence, that Travis did, a good commander would seek to confirm or deny that intelligence, ie send out other patrols led by people you trust, to verify the intelligence, or at the very least, establish a screen line on the Medina, to prevent surprise. Travis did neither and was surprised.

[elcolorado]

Ignoring the intelligence, is another matter that is sort of related. If you accept the intelligence, it requires you to take action, if all you to do is pass it on up the chain, you're waiting for somebody else to tell you what to do ie "It's not my fault, I reported, and simply followed my orders."

I find it interesting that many of the communiques from Bexar contained warnings of an imminent attack. When asking for guidance, men, money, or materiel, the threat posed by Santa Anna was very real. While personally, however, the leaders in Bexar appeared to ignore the warnings.

You bring up an good point, Wolf...and it causes me to wonder. Did Neill, Bowie, and Travis truly ignore the intelligence solely out of political or racial bias or did it just appear that way. In other words, could it be they chose to do nothing because they were waiting for a higher authority to give them direction?? Did Travis and Bowie elect to take no action because they expected Neill to return or Houston to show up and take charge??

Don't take my question wrong. I'm not looking to absolve Travis or Bowie of responsibility.


Glenn

[tmdreb]

Here's a question for those who have more knowledge and research on the Texian communication than I do. We have examples of good intelligence reports that were disregarded, do we have examples of any that were just as wrong?

The Alamo commanders quickly dismissed reports that the Mexican Army was heading their way just as quickly as Sam Houston dismissed initial reports from the besieged Alamo as political posturing. If we know of other reports and rumors that turned out to be false, it could explain why the Texian leadership was always in a mind to disbelieve intelligence.

In the absence of such false information, the commanders naturally look like careless idiots who ignore good information.

[stuart]

The intelligence question deserves a thread by itself, but in the meantime Allen flagged up an interesting parallel with Fannin. Again there's a lot to go into here (and I really must send that article to Bill) but essentially in this context Fannin did everything that Travis and Bowie should have done but didn't.

He was getting a regular flow of information coming up from the Rio Grande and he had forward posts first at San Patricio and afterwards at Refugio. He had permission from the Council to act as he saw fit and although he saw his first duty to defend the frontier and dug in accordingly he was under no illusions as to holding on to Goliad against a serious attack. His retreat was initially delayed because he had anticipated Houston's orders to withdraw by sending a detachment down to Refugio to evacuate civilians there and so was still at Goliad when Urrea turned up. He then, as we know, managed to break out but for a variety of reasons not under his control was caught and defeated on the open prairie.

Again there's too much in this to discuss here without going way off thread but what is important is the fact that he nearly got away with it. Because he was listening to his intel and because he had advance posts out he was able to get away and despite having to march on foot for lack of horses he nearly succeeded. Now ok ultimately his execution (sorry) was faulty, but if Travis and Bowie had taken the same basic precautions they too could have gotten away if they started on the 22nd, rather than having no alternative but to fort up in the Alamo on the 23rd

[elcolorado]

Again there's too much in this to discuss here without going way off thread but what is important is the fact that he nearly got away with it.

The intelligence issue would make a good thread, as would a thread on Fannin.

I don't now as much about Fannin and the whole Goliad debacle as I would like to. I purchased William Bradle's book: "Goliad - The Other Alamo." but haven't had time to read it.

Glenn

[elcolorado]

Something we have yet to kick around is the possibility that Travis addressed the garrison and drew the line. While I feel one is probable the other rates only a possible.

When Bonham entered the Alamo on the third of March, he carried with him Williamson's letter - a letter of hope. This would not have passed unnoticed by the garrison, who by this time was hanging on by their collective fingernails. For ten days the garrison had been looking to the eastern horizon...hoping and praying for someone to come and rescue them. Bonham, as far as we know, was the only courier to breach Santa Anna's security net and enter the fort. No doubt the defender's were starving for information - "Where's Houston?", "Where's Fannin?" Where's Texas?" Travis, I believe, would have to address the men or run the risk of a revolt and being "strung-up."

So I believe Travis would have either summoned the garrisons officers and disseminated the information through them or called the garrison together and addressed them directly

As for the famous line, who can say. I don't put much stock into the Zuber tale but it does make a nice story. I will say this, I think Travis had it in him to do it. He was a romantic and had a flare for the dramatic. And if the story of Ben Milam drawing a line before the battle of Bexar is true, I could envision Travis trying to emulate him. Like I said, it makes a nice story.

Glenn

[stuart]

Its an interesting question as to which story begat the other. I'm inclined to agree that if the Williamson letter is genuine Travis would have assembled the garrison and read it to them by way of encouragement to hold on, but given the very fact that it was an encouragement that more help was on its way the line in the sand at this juncture would only make sense if the garrison had already agreed to surrender and Travis was now saying ok, help's coming, those who want to stand by me after all cross the line - and I really don't see that being the case. After all the Gonzales men had got in and now here's Bonham saying more are coming...

As for Ben Milam, I've a suspicion that story is equally problematic. I went into that particular incident pretty thoroughly when writing my book and don't recall a single eyewitness description of him drawing a line.

The question I'd ask therefore is did Zuber get the idea from a story about Ben Milam, or is the Milam story based on Zuber's story about Travis?

[elcolorado]

The question I'd ask therefore is did Zuber get the idea from a story about Ben Milam, or is the Milam story based on Zuber's story about Travis?

Now there's an interesting though I never considered, Stuart. I can't recall where I read about Milam drawing the line but I did read it not too long ago. I'll have to go through my library and find it unless someone else knows where to look.

If Travis did address the garrison I wonder if he would have offered the choice to stay or go? Something like: "Well boys, we did it! Help is on the way and all we have to do is hang on a bit longer before we're relieved. But if any of you have had enough and want out...this is the time to tell me." No line...but still offer a choice. Just a thought.

Glenn