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Post by Chuck T on May 17, 2010 14:53:14 GMT -5
Gary: The story about Custer being wounded at the aborted crossing of Medicine Tail Coulee has been the subject of much speculation. I don't think there is any doubt that someone wearing a buckskin jacket might have been wounded during this part of the action. What we do know for sure (perhaps - maybe) is that the attack was conducted by E and F Companies. That would make Yates, Reily, Smith, and Sturgis as possible candidates for the wearer of the buckskin.
I don't have my required references close at hand but if memory serves Porter's buckskin jacket was later recovered, but he was with Company I. I don't think that Sturgis' body was ever recovered. He would be my candidate for the jacket wearer. There was some business that I vagely recall about soft soaping Sturgis' mother about him. Also keep in mind that the elder Stuirgis was the regimental commander on detached duty from the regiment for many years during his tenure which was from 1869 - 1881. Therefore nobody wanted to upset the boss and his wife.
There is also a great deal of doubt that Custer was at the ford. If not he was on Nye-Cartright-Blummer Ridge with the Keogh squadron. There are also accounts I have see where Company C takes part in the attack. The order of march of I, L,C, E, F leaves this open to speculation. If so history has the squadron organization wrong, and this may be a clue to at least a partial answer to Wolfpack's question above about why T. Custer and 1SG Bobo were found on Last Stand Hill. Is it possible that only a portion of Company C perhaps under Harrington conducted the counterattack to relieve the surpressive fire from Greasy Grass Ridge.
Of course we will probably always have more questions than answers. That is why subject matter like this and the Alamo are so facinating, a quest to find and bring to light the unknown.
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Post by Allen Wiener on May 17, 2010 15:29:06 GMT -5
Chuck,
I received the archeological map from LBH that you mentioned and also maps showing the markers (past and present, I believe, as they have been moved several times) and the free NPS brochure map, which looks to be very helpful in locating the observation stops along Battle Road.
The larger archeological map takes some studying and I get the feeling will be very valuable once I'm actually at the scene.
I've also received Philbrick's new Custer book, "The Last Stand" and will start on it shortly.
As you this discussion, I'm not sure from what I've been perusing that the movements of Custer's companies is 100% certain, although there does seem to be general agreement on how he divided this force and where they moved. It does appear to have ended in a rout with many men scattering in several directions and the final group ending up on Last Stand Hill. Others were killed over what looks like a fairly large area of ridges and ravines, some at the river fords themselves. I think they faced a rapidly increasing number of Indians as the battle evolved at that end, far more than they anticipated, and warriors both angry and determined to fight, not run. A frequently expressed theory suggests that Custer had planned to capture women and children hostages and to use them to get the warriors to surrender. He may have located a large gathering of potential hostages at the north end of the camp and was moving to capture them, but was prevented from doing so by the large number of warriors who got to him first. That strategy may, in fact, make more sense than other theories and would explain why Custer was not overly concerned with the pounding Reno was taking, which he apparently knew about before moving forward with his own attack.
As you say, much to chew on regarding both battles, and most of us have been "chewing" for many decades!
Allen
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Post by Herb on May 18, 2010 13:31:39 GMT -5
Chuck,
Fox, I think, made the point that Yate's Bn according to doctrine, and earlier in the campaign when Custer had the 7th operating in two "wings" consisted of B, E, and F companies. McDougal and his men could be thankful, that because they were the last company ready for the march that morning, they were detailed to guard the pack train - otherwise they should have been with Yates.
As you probably know, we think we can follow Yates' movements because his battalion included Smith's Company E, the Grey Horse troop, and the Indain accounts repeatedly identify the movement of the grey horses.
The Curly accounts seem to definitly place Custer with Keogh's BN on Nye-Cartwright and not with Yates at the Ford.
I know the consenus, today, is that Custer was still conducting offensive operations with only two companies, when he moved west from Calhoun Ridge with Yates' Bn, but I personally don't find that plausible. I believe it far more likely that he took Yates' Bn as a personal escort while he conducted reconaissance for a futureoffensive operation by 8 or possibly 9 companies once Benteen joined him. At this time, Boston Custer, who had passed Benteen had joined Custer's main body, and Custer just knew that Benteen and possibly McDougal were only minutes away.
According to Jim Donovan (he cites Taunton, a work I'm not familiar with), that while Sturgis' body was never identified his head was found in the Souix camp after the battle.
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Post by terryandrews55 on May 18, 2010 14:32:08 GMT -5
well to give''hard knocks''its due,it is rich in the anecdotal history of deadwood.in fact the author was the barman the night wild bill hickock got killed.however his analysis of the little bighorn battle sounds like it came from some of his customers who had clearly been imbibing the electric soup.you take on board the musings of those fully refreshed with the falling down fluid as gospel at your peril!,,,,,anyhow the bottom line seems to me that custer ignores the fears of his indian scouts and unable to get a clear picture of what lies ahead owing to difficulties with the terrain splits his command and plunges on regardless,ignoring the lesson of washita when he came very close to being undone.my imaginery countryman mr flashman described custer as''a reckless firebrand''.i'm not going to argue with harry on that one.
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Post by Chuck T on May 18, 2010 15:43:14 GMT -5
Wolfpack: I had to go back and look up the appropriate refences in Phillip St. George Cooke Cavalry Tactics before I commented. According to Cooke who set the doctrine A cavalry regiment at the time was organized into twelve companies. Any two of these companies was expected to form a squadron under the senior company commander. Two squadrons would form a battalion under one of the three regimental majors, and three battalions complete the regiment. I got long winded here because I am wondering what doctrine Fox is refering to.
I have always assumed (a dangerious proposition) that Custer organized his force in the same manner we would organize a task force in the modern era, by allocating forces to the task at hand, and modify organization to meet the needs of the battlefield not the publisher.
I place no stock at all in Custer being at the Medicine Tail Coulee crossing. I first became aware of those reports in the fifties, and as I recall they were very quickly dismissed by all but the die hard.
It does seem unlikely that Custer was conducting "offensive" operations, and I think your recon theory fits more with what facts we do know for sure about his movements.
Custer would certainly be encouraged by what Boston must have told him. I have been told, but as it is on private land have no way of knowing for sure, that there is a notch in the terrain that would have allowed someone on Nye-Cartwright-Blummer//Luce Ridge(s) to see Benteen's approach to the Reno position. My map recon does not indicate where/how it would be, Sharpshooter Ridge keeps getting in the way. Have you ever heard a "good" explanation for all of the Springfield cartridge cases found on those ridges. I have heard several but all of them seem a little suspect to me. Not saying that any or all of them are not true. All I am saying is there is no way to be as definative as those who seem to offer only this one possible answer to the exclusion of others.
I am not familiar with Taunton either, but if Donovan accepts him then that is good enough for me at the moment, subject to something new being uncovered. It makes sense though in light of the blue smoke and mirrors act that someone gave mom about how Jack died.
I am darn glad that you are a cavalryman. Although we read the same manuals we see those things through a different lens and that is a very good thing.
Chuck
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Post by Herb on May 18, 2010 18:35:19 GMT -5
Have you ever heard a "good" explanation for all of the Springfield cartridge cases found on those ridges. I have heard several but all of them seem a little suspect to me. Not saying that any or all of them are not true. All I am saying is there is no way to be as definative as those who seem to offer only this one possible answer to the exclusion of others. Chuck There was some small skirmishing along Nye-Cartwright, but nothing to justify the number of cartridges found there. I read several accounts in Wawro's book about the Franco-Prussian War about rifle engagements at incredible ranges. I asked Stuart about this, and he explained that by firing as a unit at an area (vs the more normal point target), a unit could basically lay down an effective suppresive fire against bodies of enemy troops and that this had been incorporated into period doctrine. It might be possible that they used this technique against Indians moving up Medicene Tail Coulee toward Luce Ridge after Yates was driven from the ford. I don't know, distances still seem too long. Another possibility, though the timelines seem wrong is that it could have been the volley firing heard at Reno Hill, ie a signal for the Regiment to orient on. With the establishment of Fort Custer, it's also possible that some of these rounds are actually post battle contamination. ?
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Post by Chuck T on May 18, 2010 19:08:04 GMT -5
The distances seem very long to me too. The volley fire seems the most logical but does it fit inside the timeframe. That leads me to another issue time. The Army was on Chicago Time, which is a cautionary tale for meshing accounts.
I had not thought about Fort Custer. Can't remember when the battlefield came under control of the War Department. Fort Oglethorp in Georgia used Chichamauga for a training area up until after World War I. So this is certainly a possibility
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Post by Herb on May 19, 2010 12:32:33 GMT -5
FT Custer at the mouth of the LBH was active by the Nez Perce Campaign a year later.
Don't recall any specifics, but have read a number of accounts of soldiers/units "visiting" the battlefield from Custer.
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Post by Chuck T on May 26, 2010 23:54:28 GMT -5
Well, my new allotment of books arrived today coutesy of my new membership in the history book club. They asrrived just as I was returning home from visiting my wife in Evans Army Hostpital where she is being treated for a severe staff infection. Evidently it is quite serious and they are filling her up with antibiodiccs over the next few days. Quite a month for hospitals as out house during May.
Back to the books:
Valley of Death - Dien Bien Phu from prelude and aftermath, A quick scan and it seems to be quite good although it does not look like it will beat out Hell in a Very Small Place and Windrow's Into The Valley, Both are authoritative to bibilcal perportions in my view.
The Darkest Summer Summ -Early Fall 1950 in Korea. Just a quick lookb tells me in concentrates on the Marines. Read the first two chapters and there were more than a couple amatuerish mistakes
Philbricks "The Last Stand Good photo selection many in color.Editing looks tight. Can't wait to get into the scholarship. Still interested in the T.Custer/Bobo thing. Philbrich leaves Harrington in command of C and rides with Custer's immediate party as aide de camp. I am goint to have to check "Where Custer Fell" There is a picture in there of SGT Kenipe and Mrs Kenipe (SGT Bobo's widow) at the Bobo marker. Do that tomorrow and will report.
D-DAY The Battle For Normandy covers the Normandy Campaign so need no further explanation. Written by a Brit so that may have an unusual flair from the norm.
The final book is written by a professor here at Colorado College who happens to be a mentor of my John Ford fount of all knowledge John Simon. Simon is working on an introdution tofor me with this gentleman whose name is Dennis Shoalter. By the By Simon is going to do the John Ford Cavalry Trilogy in class this comming fall for his film students. He has invited me as a guest and given me permission to record. Going to consult some of the mavins and see if we can't get his lectures available to you (the sound portion) for any on this site intertested.
As time goes on I will give you my up or down on the favorite books thread Wolfpack stated a couple of weeks ago
Anyone interested in naval warfare and has not yet read Shattered Sword - The Japanese perspective of Midway, stop what you are doing, get out of bed and go directly to Amazon and buy it - It is simply the best -Far superior to Prange and Lord.
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Post by Allen Wiener on May 27, 2010 8:17:38 GMT -5
Chuck,
Let me know what you think of Philbrick; I just finished it and enjoyed it, but there are always points to debate in any Custer book. I think he did a good job and I'll try to post more later when I have time. He agrees that Custer left Keough and Calhoun on the ridge to signal Benteen and/or keep an eye out for him. Whatever plan Custer was improvising at that point relied on Benteen and the pack train getting to him. Custer himself moved further north (with 2 companies?) to scout for a crossing and to get a look at the camp from that end. Philbrick places heavy emphasis on Custer trying to repeat what he'd done at Washita -- to take hostages and basically use them as a shield to get the warriors to surrender, but says he needed more men to pull it off and thus waited for Benteen. He might actually have pulled it off, had he been able to strike before the warriors from the Reno fight moved against him.
Allen
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Post by Chuck T on May 27, 2010 10:54:53 GMT -5
Allen: The waiting for Benteen and the pack train (a very slow pack train) suggests that Custer must have thought that he had ample time. It would be interesting to speculate why he though this. He observed Reno during the valley fight and must have seen he was in some trouble. To reinforce Custer, Benteen's line of march would bring him very close to Reno's rear. It makes one wonder why he just did not wait on Blummer-Nye-Cartright Ridge, rather than consolidate the whole battalion on Calhoun Hill, at least for a few moments, before he proceeded north with E and F. B-N-C Ridge is a much tighter position, more suited for defense with excellent fields of fire, than Battle Ridge and higher than Calhoun Hill. Why also would he wish to increase the distance that Benteen had to cover. There is a reasoning disconect here and I am just not able to put my finger on a reasonable answer.
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Post by Allen Wiener on May 27, 2010 12:39:12 GMT -5
Chuck,
I think you have put your finger on what perplexes anyone who spends time trying to sort out the LBH battle. I won't spoil it for you, but Philbrick speculates about why Custer did what you describe and what he must/may have had in mind. I was very surprised by the amount of time that elapsed while Custer was roaming around, and often simply idle, at that end of the battlefield. At one point, Philbrick (and others, IIRC), estimate he spent at least 20 minutes observing the village from the north, ostensibly looking for a crossing location. Philbrick even cites one source who said Custer was scouting out the squaws, looking for one for himself when the hostages were secure. Apparently, this was common practice and what happened at Washita, where he selected the oft-mentioned Cheyenne woman, Monahsetah.
I think all credible Custer books agree on the basics of what happened (Well - we KNOW what happened), but the devil is very much in the details about what Custer was thinking and why he made the moves he did. One thing seems clear; he was improvising on the scene and scrambling to find a victory in a vague plan that had clearly gone wrong. By the time he was up there, Reno was retreating in panic, he had no idea where Benteen was, and assumed he would arrive "soon," and a very slow pack train that was far away. Custer is responsible for this situation and had moved to attack before he really knew the size of the village, the temperament of the enemy, or its actual numbers. As Herb has pointed out, he was also responsible for the knowing the capabilities of his main subordinates, Reno and Benteen, discipline and training within the regiment, etc., and obliged to plan accordingly. None of that seemed to matter to Custer; he appears to have never doubted that, whatever the regiment ran into that day it could win.
Philbrick speculates that, once he got the bad news about Reno and saw that neither Benteen nor the pack train were coming, he could have returned to the scene of Reno's battle and regrouped the regiment there. But, that would have meant a simply larger siege, still with considerable casualties, of the kind the took place there anyway -- and no victory. That wasn't what he'd been sent to do and (again, according to Philbrick's speculation), still thought there might be a way to turn the thing into a victory.
As I say, all the authors are forced to speculate somewhat about this phase of Custer's moves and they all suggest that Custer was either planning a supporting attack for Reno, a new attack that would pull Indians away from Reno, giving him a chance to renew his own attack, or a swift move into the village to seize hostages and force and Indian surrender. Unfortunately, no one will ever know exactly what he was thinking.
Regarding your point about B-N-C Ridge, Philbrick notes that the steep ravines, coulees, etc. that the soldiers were traversing, frequently cut them off both visually and audibly, so that Custer was not necessarily aware that Calhoun and Keough were under heavy attack during his scout to the north. Nonetheless, you have a point about the location. I'm still going over the archeological map you recommended and "Where Custer Fell," as well as some key texts (Gray, Stewart, Donovan, the Camp interviews, "Custer Myth") in prep. for the September trip. I'm already getting a better idea of what I'm going to see and what to look for.
Allen
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Post by Chuck T on May 28, 2010 8:59:17 GMT -5
Allen: I am up to the rereat from the valley in the Philbrick book. So far I find the treatment of both sides quite fair, Nothing that stirs my soul to chastise an outragious comment.. Also find that the treatment of the officers quite harsh but not undeserved. These guys were typical of most if not all 19th century armies. Certainly not the lovable and heroic stuff of the John Ford Western. Will file a final after-action report in a day or two.
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Post by Allen Wiener on May 28, 2010 10:57:27 GMT -5
I agree, Chuck. Let me know your final views when you've finished. You're right about the military at that time. How many guys were going to go out there and stir up Indians, not to mention all those freezing, rainy marches and bivouacs.
I posted a review of the book in the Book Club section.
Allen
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Post by Chuck T on May 28, 2010 23:00:02 GMT -5
Allen: SITREP- I find the Peter Thompson story believable. In the absence of evidence to the contrary what he says very well could have happened. It fits the timeline very well.
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