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Post by garyzaboly on May 16, 2010 6:44:32 GMT -5
I've never had any doubt that Reno's 134 men would have been inevitably swallowed, chewed up, and spat out, long before they had made any appreciable headway into the sprawling Indian village. The original sources---which I always prefer to modern interpretations---all agree in the estimation of "too many Indians" in their front. Only the most diehard Custerphile would insist that they should have ridden through anyway, whether death was inevitable or not. And many have!
Custer and his officers all made mistakes, and plunging into the unknown situation ahead of them was the biggest one of all, as the events of those two days bore out. But what really defeated the 7th cavalry were over 1,500 irate warriors, many armed with repeating rifles, who had been backed into a corner and were not about to flee the field. They had recently defeated Crook's much larger command (1300 men), and now that their feathered ranks had been reinforced they were all the more certain of victory.
It was just a bad combination of circumstances that led to one very bad day for the US military. "Stuff" happens. Even had Custer known the full situation ahead of him, it's doubtful he could have done any better without Terry's force.
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Post by Chuck T on May 16, 2010 8:32:44 GMT -5
Gary:
I am certainly glad you got the number of warriors about right. I think your 1500 is a little high but not much. Crook was ATTACKED by about 900. I highlighted attacked because of the make peace nonsense in Philbrick's new book which is on its way to me as I write. Considering the village(s) moved from its position of a week before, and considering the summer warriors were coming in in dribs and drabs, and considering some residual force was left back when they attacked Crook, I add the numbers up to be aproximately 1300, but could accept your figure. At least it is not the 4-5000 of lore, legend, and cover your butt.
Custer used a modification of the same tactics he used at the Washita. He went to the well once to often. What defeated Custer in my view was a unique combination of terrain and the fact that the tribes manned interior lines. Of the two the interior lines was the more important. Keep in mind that it was the same group of warriors who chased Reno to the bluffs that were able to shift mass and chase him away from Medicine Tail Coulee Ford up across Greasy Grass Ridge. and pin the three troop rear guard in the vacinity of Calhoun Hill and the south part of Battle Ridge. Custer's fate was sealed when another band under Crazy Horse beat him to the ford near what is now the cemetary and pushed him back onto Battle Ridge.
As I pointed out in one of these posts it is my belief that it was not the repeating rifle of which there were many (but still not enough), but the bow and arrow that was decisive. The indirect fire that the bow provided furnished surpressive fire, much like it had done at Agincourt. The terrain, with its rolling nature and knee high grass was made to order for this weapon which was used like a grenade launcher or light mortar. We also know that direct rifle fire from Greasy Grass Ridge was troublesome for its surpressive effect, because Troop C counterattacked to drive these people away from chewing up the rear guard on Calhoun Hill. It failed.
Knowing full well that unlike a John Ford western, Indians fight as individuals or at most in relatively small warrior societies. They have no chain of command or tactical formations (unlike the Zulus). The battle, at least as I see it, was surpress and slowly move forward from cover/concealment to cover/concealment. Once you are close enough the game is up.
Custer could have achieved his objective and perhaps without the loss of one life. He could have won. The overarching objective was to return these bands to the reservation. The immediate objective was to prevent the tribal circles from scattering. Had Custer made his presence known in the south that would have blocked one route to the Big Horns. Had they gone north they were walking into Terry, with Custer close behind. I doubt if they would have:
1) Split, lest one or two of these smaller bands were cut off and trapped by either of the two forces.
2) Left their families in the face of two large groups of soldiers in such close proximity
3) Moved anywhere in mass because of the slowness of such a move and their inability to secure themselves on the march.
Therefore if Custer had done nothing other than show the flag, I am reasonably certain that he would be just another regular army LTC with a civil war record which were a dime a dozen. Of course he would have met the mission requirements, "defeated" the Indians, and the campaign would have ended then and there, and Grant, Sherman, and Sheridan would have not been pissing in their Cornflakes on that wonderful Centenial Fourth of July
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Post by terryandrews55 on May 16, 2010 11:00:16 GMT -5
I've had an opportunity to look at''hard knocks''more thoroughly and it says that Custer disobeyed Genera lMileswho was in command on 2 occasions.Hence he formulated a plan to attack the indians with General Reno....er none too accurate then....I do feel though that like Chelmsford at Isandhlwana if reconaissance had been more thorough neither would have fatally split up their command.Chelmsford was certainly guilty of overconfidence and contempt for his foe.Given their superior weaponry the British Army was seasoned in what was known as''n----r smashing'',and this was anticipated to be just another day at the office.
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Post by Chuck T on May 16, 2010 11:21:06 GMT -5
I think that the only hard knock the author of you book ever knew about is the one he recieved when he fell off of his barstool. This guy must have graduated from Tucker Univ.
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Post by Chuck T on May 16, 2010 11:42:15 GMT -5
Terry: The problem is the bluffs and the river. Custer only had two choices if he was determined to attack:
A) Do what he did, modified only by a single rather than double envelopment.
B) Attack with the entire command the south end of the cluster of villages.
For Choice of Action A there are only four places to cross that river for at least six miles. The first is where Reno crossed to attack. The second is where Reno crossed to retreat to the bluffs (very difficult with no good avenue of approach from the bluff side). The third is Medicine Tail Coulee Ford which is very difficult and quite narrow. The fourth is near the present cemetary and quite good.
While I agree that lack of a through reconnaisance led to his defeat, he had very little chance of carrying it off without discovery. The area above the bluff is open and rolling where a man on horse can be seen for miles, and a man on foot could not accomplish the mission in a timely manner as the area is so very large. The same could be said for reconing the valley. Custer had little choice, again if he was determined to attack, but conduct a movement to contact. His scheme of maneuver has been debated, and will be until Kingdom come, and all to no avail.
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Post by Herb on May 16, 2010 13:12:27 GMT -5
There is no such thing as sufficient reconnaissance. Ask Wolfpack. He was in the reconnaissance business. A general that I had a great deal of respect for, used to say that "There is only one standard - perfection. " and followed it up with "But, perfection is the enemy of good enough." While you must always strive for perfection you will never have enough time or resources to achieve it, the "art" is knowing when you have accomplished "good enough". There are other competing demands that are also demanding resources and time is always the most critical. Given the tactical situation on the ground, I find it hard to fault Custer for not conducting a more thorough reconnaissance. Most people seem to look at what happened with the scouts at the Crow's Nest as Custer ignoring the intelligence that Custer's scouts had gathered. But, what they miss is that Custer developed a scheme of maneuver based entirely on that intelligence. That he modified it based on changes to the situation is irrelevant - he was acting on fairly accurate information. I think there was a degree of overconfidence, but not the type you are mentioning. The 7th, not just Custer, were overconfident in what they expected the Indians to do (ie mount a rearguard and scatter) and did not consider any alternatives. Given past experiences on the plains that was a legimate viewpoint. However, the 7th forgot, as do most armchair generals, that the enemy has a vote. The modern Army always talks about preparing for at least two enemy courses of action, the most likely course of action they might execute, and the most dangerous course of action that the enemy might execute. Clearly the 7th, was only prepared for the one they believed most likely. Their sole concern was preventing the enemy from scattering. A determined aggressive defense apparently was never remotely considered. It may not have been overconfidence per se, but it very clearly was a lack of imagination. I state it often, I don't like Custer, I consider him vastly overrated, as apparently did the US Army at the time. In the reorganization of the US Army in 1866, Custer was made a LTC in a newly established regiment, other Civil War division commanders were generally assigned as full Colonels and commanders of Regiments. While seniority played a role, the reorganization was primarily based on merit and in fact established the postwar seniority. Still, If you look at the key decision points for Custer on the 24th and the 25th (until he moved his command away from Reno), and simply look at two points at that time (without benefit of hindsight), what did Custer know?, and what were his orders? Every decision/order was militarily justifiable. As far as Custer disobeying orders its simply not true, except in one instance, Terry ordered Custer to send a scout down (north) Tullocks Creek to verify no Indians were located along it. As Custer had already located the Indian village that particular order was OBE. Even Custer's orders to Benteen were made in full compliance with Terry's orders to prevent the Indians from moving south. That Benteen "over"executed orders he disagreed with is another matter. To me, it is only after Custer, has made contact, on his movement to contact that his decision making truly becomes questionable. Committing Reno and promising him the full support of the Regiment and then turning aside and moving his troops out of mutual supporting distance, to me, is why disaster occurred. Had the 8 companies under Custer's immediate control attacked as a unified fist - they might well have still been defeated, but there would have been no "Last Stand".
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Post by garyzaboly on May 16, 2010 13:39:21 GMT -5
Chieftain,
I generally lean towards the first-hand accounts in CUSTER IN '76 and THE CUSTER MYTH etc. to try to make tactical sense of the engagement. Fox's book on the archaeology of the battle is another very useful study, and remarkably confirms many of the Indian accounts.
In reading the first-hand accounts, it's obvious that a combination of repeating rifles and arrows did Custer in, the arrows indeed often used like mortars: no argument there. Add to this the troopers' panic, the swift infiltration by the hundreds of Indians between the scattered companies, and you have a disaster in the making.
Plains Indians actually were known to move in pre-planned masses when they wanted to: the Fetterman massacre is a perfect example, the Arickaree River another, so too at the Wagon Box fight, and even Crook's defeat on the Rosebud, to name a few examples. The evidence tells us that warriors did not always fight as individuals ALL THE TIME at Little Big Horn, but often moved in masses to block, surround, and close in...even fire volleys. Certainly after the initial formations began to engage, things often degenerated into the individual fighters...but that could also be said about Custer's five troops. (I've always wondered how Custer himself, leading the 133-odd men of Reno's command, would have fared in an attempt to ride through the village from the south).
Let's not forget that, although a similar situation, Custer escaped disaster at the Washita by the skin of his teeth, since that village was just one in a long chain of tribal circles, and those other Indians were beginning to close in after Custer mopped things up. It was a dawn attack, too....big difference.
The Little Big Horn was a unique situation. The Indians were not going to run. This is exemplified by the fact that women and children were moved to the hills lining the western edge of the valley, while the men did the dirty work of combat.
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Post by Herb on May 16, 2010 14:15:35 GMT -5
Chieftain, I generally lean towards the first-hand accounts in CUSTER IN '76 and THE CUSTER MYTH etc. to try to make tactical sense of the engagement. Fox's book on the archaeology of the battle is another very useful study, and remarkably confirms many of the Indian accounts. I like Fox, but he makes what I consider three critical mistakes in his analysis. The first two of these is he considers the Springfield carbine a superior weapon to the Repeating Rifle mainly due to the much greater range that a Springfield is accurate. The two problems with this, is first while accurate fire is important, in combat, volume of fire has a suppresive value of its own. Very clearly repeating rifles are going to have more suppresive value than single shot carbines. The second problem with this is that while the Springfield maybe accurate out to 600 + yards, the average soldier is only accurate out to about 250 yards. Most of the combat in the last stand area occured at much closer distances. In this case the repeater is clearly the superior weapon. The apparent devasation wrought by the Indains from "Henryville" bears this out. One of the things I really like about Fox is how he went back and used the Cavalry doctrine and applied it to the physical evidence of the battlefield. But, the third problem and imo, a very critical piece that he missed is that doctrine is modified to the fit the terrain (ie at one point he says Calhoun's skirmish line is an example of panic because doctrine called for men to be five yards apart and some men were three yards apart some others were 4 yards apart and some were right next to each other). Well more modern doctrine called for tanks to be 100 meters apart, and in 25 years of service I never saw that except in deserts and other wide open spaces. In wooded terrain 15-20 meters seperation was not uncommon. Doctrine is written for ideal conditions it is always adapted to the actual terrain. In Fox's example of Calhoun the three and four yards to me is irrelevant, and two men close together can quite easily be explained as a Corporal or Sergeant being shot while checking on a wounded man. I think these problems can lead to some misinterpretations, but still a very valuable book.
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Post by garyzaboly on May 16, 2010 15:37:39 GMT -5
One of the problems in any historical area is that no one person can be a true expert in each aspect of the event in question. Some are strong on the weapons, others on the tactics, and still others on the uniforms, and so on.
Fox's main contribution is that he utilized evidence from the field combined with white testimony and, more importantly, the oft-dismissed Indian accouts. Fox makes, and proves, his case that Custer's battalion was on the OFFENSIVE when it arrived at Calhoun Hill and Custer Ridge; that Custer with E and F troops went forward, as the left wing, to seek a fording place well beyond Cemetery Ridge; that C, L, and I troops stayed behind as the right wing, L troop deploying in skirmish order when Indians began infiltrating the area; that C troop attempted a charge west over Custer Ridge to drive back increasing numbers of Sioux and Cheyenne, but were repulsed in some disorder, and counter-charged by Lame White Man; that L troop, on Calhoun Ridge, was being peppered with close counterfire, had many of its horse-holders shot and horses panicked; that L troop retreated north, carrying along the remains of C troop; that I troop was also swept forward towards Custer Hill by the momentum; and that most of these three companies were cut down in bunches by pursuing Indians.
So, an initial, fairly orderly deployment, and then a shattering of the defense lines. As the Indian accounts also had it, the initial defense was indeed organiized, but it swiftly fell apart into a "battle" of flight and uncertain flopping about of men in panic and utterly surrounded: a concept Walter Camp's notes had years ago convinced me of, thanks to consisent patterns in the Indian testimony.
Some of Fox's theories---e.g., having Crazy Horse's charge occurring up Deep Ravine rather than north of the hill---remain quite arguable; but his intelligent, carefully formulaed sequence of movement and events is largely, I believe, closer to the "reality" than anyone else had ever come before.
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Post by Chuck T on May 16, 2010 16:21:37 GMT -5
We should all go up there together sometime and do our own staff ride, over a day or two. That would be interesting.
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Post by Herb on May 16, 2010 17:45:16 GMT -5
One of the problems in any historical area is that no one person can be a true expert in each aspect of the event in question. Some are strong on the weapons, others on the tactics, and still others on the uniforms, and so on. True, that's what I like about this forum, that so many people with so many fields of expertise contribute to a discussion about the Alamo - and other topics. Back to the topic, the biggest mystery to me is what was going on with C Company. That the company disintergrated, and led to the collapse of Calhoun's and the swamping of Keogh and the reserve seems beyond question, but why? And more importantly why were the bodies of the C Company commander and first sergeant found on Custer Hill - so far away? Something just isn't right, here.
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Post by Herb on May 16, 2010 17:56:11 GMT -5
We should all go up there together sometime and do our own staff ride, over a day or two. That would be interesting. The History Department at the Command and General Staff College has a 3 day staff ride of the Fetterman Massacre, the Wagonbox fight, the Battle of the Rosebud and the Little Bighorn (beginning roughly at the Crow's Nest). It could be interesting.
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Post by Chuck T on May 16, 2010 20:13:38 GMT -5
WOLFPACK: Any drag I had at Leavenworth stopped when Doug Macgregor left to go to Europe to work for Wes Clark. He is still pissed off about that. BUT, the 3rd ACR when it was here at Carson did such a staff ride of the Custer fight. Don't know if it included the other three but would imagine it may have included Rosebud with the 3ACR connection. I think I may be able to get my hands on a copy of the paperwork, which I saw briefly on the museum curator's desk. It is the size of the average family bible. Will look into it.
Where Tom Custer' body was found has always been a mystry to me also. Did not know about 1SG Bobo. Some say he rode with his brother in some capacity leaving Harrington in command. I do know that SGTs Finley and Finckle were killed during the failed counterattack on Greasy Grass Ridge (See Where Custer Fell for details). Perhaps it was the loss of these two NCOs that contributed to the subsequent actions. That's anyones guess. The presence of Bobo with T. Custer seems to indicate that they may have eacaped the overuning of C Company.
When Custer formed the squadron (or wing) with C, I, and L, Keogh was senior and according to Phillip St. George Cooke's Cavalry tactics would have exercised command. I don't know how well T. Custer and Keogh were getting along in those days. Both were cut from the same bolt of cloth. Keep in mind that T. Custer challenged Wild Bill Hickcock to a gun battle while in his cups. So then it is possible that Custer took his brother with him to avoid any conflict. But that does not explain Bobo. You could speculate that he chose him as an acting SGM but Sharrow's body was also found with Custer on LSH.
The plot thickens, but as the great dectective said - "When you eliminate the impossible, what remains no matter how improbable must be the truth" Back to the S. S. James Bowie
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Post by garyzaboly on May 17, 2010 13:22:40 GMT -5
One very interesting, and often unrecognized Custer book, is CUSTER'S FALL, by David Humphreys Miller, published in 1957. Miller had the advantage of interviewing many Indian veterans of the battle in the early 20th century, and he wove their testimonies together into his narrative, which he subtitled "The Indian Side of the Story." And that story is unhysterical and unsensational---just a lot of individual Indian recollections, often describing personal confrontations with troopers, or their views of the battle in full or in part, that generally ring true because they are so candid and largely uncolored.
The chapter, "Afternoon: Custer," is one well worth reading. Miller has Custer getting wounded while attempting to ford the river, but aside from such theoretical moments---and the preliminary narrative he offers---there is a lot of solid info in the book.
I once tried to find out where the original Miller papers containing these interview transcripts had been deposited, but learned that they had been lost in a fire. A major loss.
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Post by Herb on May 17, 2010 14:20:11 GMT -5
Chieftan, same boat, at one time I was recruited for the History Dept, but all my contacts are long gone. I took the course while at Leavenworth, but our class missed out on the staff ride. I have a lot of the paperwork still, for the ride, however it doesn't include POCs - and much of the sites are on private property to include all of the Rosebud.
The Tom Custer, 1SG Bobo, thing disturbs me, it may very well have been a simple matter that they were among the few survivors from C Company that reached Last Stand Hill, but given the rapid collapse of C Company, I have to wonder if the possible absence of the two senior leaders didn't contribute to it.
Jim Donovan, in his book, claims that Tom was acting as an "aide" to Custer, but if there's evidence of that, I've missed it. I've seen other speculation that Custer was wounded early in the battle and Tom took over command of the two battalions, but as you point out Keogh was senior to Tom and iirc, Yates was senior to Keogh.
A possibly more reasonable speculation, is that Yates was the officer wounded trying force the ford, and that when the two battalions temporarily reunited at Calhoun Ridge, Custer appointed Tom to assume command of Yates' Bn, and that Bobo's ending up at Last Stand Hill was only coincidence.
Who knows, but given the rapid collapse of C Company it's an intriquing question - at least to me.
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