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Post by Herb on Jul 10, 2007 10:18:52 GMT -5
Thanks, Ed, that does add a lot of logic to the fight in the south.
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Post by Herb on Jul 10, 2007 22:23:49 GMT -5
I reread Potter today, and see how I missed it, as it was combined with an attack by Cos on the Church. But, I think the point that the attack by the southern column was repulsed and rallied at he Charli (?) House, where they then made their bold move and siezed the SW corner is indeed legimate.
I'm becoming more forgiving of Potter, it's very obvious that he was writing much of this from memory and didn't have Hansen to refer to. It really seems to me there are some great truths in this account that we all have overlooked because of the obvious errors,
The one thing that troubles me is his mentioning a breech. He talks about how intact the walls were and how little damage was done by the bombardment from his own personal observation. Did he simply conclude because the North Wall was probably pulled down when Andrade was ordered to withdrawl, that it was breeched?
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Post by elcolorado on Jul 11, 2007 15:15:01 GMT -5
I think Ed is on the right track. I think Santa Anna intended for Morales to attack the South but not to necessarily storm the wall(s). I strongly believe the main goal of Morales' small force was simply to keep the defenders on the South wall occupied and prevent the Texans from reinforcing the North wall or exiting out through the South gate. But also to be prepared to exploit any opportunities that arise, hence, the two ladders
I think DLP was confused or mistaken when he claimed that Morales' objective was to take "the entrance of the fort and the entrenchments defending it." rather then watching the "front door." An objective of capturing the South gate just doesn't make sense to me for a couple of reasons.
First, I feel that if Santa Anna wanted the gate taken as an objective he would have stated so in his orders. Secondly, that if taking the gate was deemed important to the success of the operation, Santa Anna would have allotted many more men and ladders to ensure that it was accomplished. Remember, earlier in the siege the Mexicans tested the strength of the South wall by attacking with a few hundred soldiers and found it to be rather formidable. I just don't think Santa Anna, a cautious individual, would commit such a small force to an objective he viewed as important.
I disagree with the theory that Morales and his men swarmed and stormed an unmanned lunette and then entered the Alamo through the South gate. Had the Mexicans gotten into the fort that quickly, I feel the battle would have been over much sooner then the 60-90 minutes reported and there would have been fewer Mexican casualties. Now, Travis was no military genius but I don't think he would have left two loaded cannon, outside the main walls, unmanned or unguarded. It's possible that there was only a skeleton crew assigned at the time when the Texans first realized they were being attacked, but I don't see the lunette as being unmanned. There is no doubt that the Texans were surprised by the attack, but the cheering Mexicans alerted them and, I believe, gave the defenders enough time to respond. In short, I think the lunette would have been fully maned by the time Morales and his men attacked.
This is how I believe Morales' attack on the South transpired. Once Santa Anna gave the signal to attack, Morales' men move forward from La Villita; utilizing the remaining buildings and jacales as protection. From this point they engage the defenders on the South wall, and in effect, keep them tied up. The Texans are probably unaware that the number of Mexicans attacking them is just over a hundred as the defenders are half asleep and it's still rather dark. As far as the men in the Alamo know, the size of the attack force outside the South wall could be in the hundreds or even thousands. As the fight at the North wall progresses in Santa Anna's favor, the Mexicans begin to spill over Travis' position. The Texans manning the 18 pounder swing the gun around to meet the most serious threat. Morales sees the gun being turned and now assumes that somewhere, the Mexicans have entered the Alamo and he perceives an opportunity. It is at this time that Morales makes, as called by Filisola, a "daring move", as if it were something unexpected and unplanned. Morales directs his men to rush forward with their two ladders to the Southwest corner of the fort. The Texans serving the eighteen pounder, have their attention directed to the North. Morales directs his men scale the wall and capture the big gun. The Texans quickly realize whats happening but react too late and are overwhelmed. Not one to be idle, Morales then has his men leap down into the compound and into the trenches for protection. From here, Morales' men engage the defenders along the South and West walls.
In his narrative, DLP states that when he got inside the Alamo he noticed that Morales' chasseurs were "just in front of us at a distance of a few paces..." I don't interpret DLP's statement to mean that Morales' force was inside the Alamo ahead of Cos, Romero, or Castrillon and I don't think DLP was implying that. Keep in mind that there were hundreds of Mexicans at the base of the North wall trying to get in...each waiting their turn to mount one of the few scaling ladders and proceed into the Alamo. Clearly, this was going to take some time to do. DLP, who was with the Sappers, may very well have been at the back of the pack, waiting for his chance to enter the fort. For all we know, he could have been the last Mexican to enter the fort...we simply do not know. Also, we need to remember just how bad the visibility was at the time. It was fairly dark during the attack and the hundreds of weapons being discharged in that confined area would have created a tremendous volume of smoke, thus, adding to the visibility problem. It was so bad that it was difficult to recognize friend from foe - Mexicans were shooting Mexicans. DLP said that he didn't see Morales' men until they were only a few paces away. It just may be that DLP couldn't see and didn't see Morales until the Mexican forces that had penetrated from the North got close enough, possibly in the vicinity of Travis' HQ. So, by the time DLP got to the southern end of the compound, where Morales was, I'm not at all surprised that he saw the chasseurs shooting from the trenches. I do concede that it is possible that Morales' soldados were the first to penetrate the Alamo's defenses, I just don't feel it is probable.
Well, my friends, thats my take on the Morales attack. Certainly, a lot of speculation on my part, but then, so much of the battle is. And, as always, I'm happy to be proved wrong.
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Post by Herb on Jul 13, 2007 17:16:35 GMT -5
Certainly, a lot of speculation on my part, but then, so much of the battle is. And, as always, I'm happy to be proved wrong. Well, that's what we're all pretty much doing. But, logical speculation trying to tie accounts together with military tactics and human nature into a coherent scenario, that just might be the truth versus putting Moorish Towers on the Long Barracks and Arches along the North Wall are two different things! The only obvious thing, I see in your scenario, is that DLP while a Zapadore Officer, was not serving with the Zapadores on March 6th. Instead he was acting as an aide-de-camp to Duque and was with the Toluca Battalion. The way I read Duque's statement and other mentions of DLP, DLP was also slightly wounded when Duque and apparently Duque's other aide were incapacitated. It seems it was DLP that went and got Castrillion to assume command of the stalled North Column. Perhaps, it was this, that also caused Santa Anna to commit the Reserve, the Zapadores and mass grenadier companies. IIRC, DLP does say something to the effect of witnessing the first surviving soldatos to scale the North Wall. Which certainly implies that he was still on the ground outside the Walls. The rest of his account though implies he got up there pretty quickly after that.
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Post by elcolorado on Jul 14, 2007 9:22:12 GMT -5
Right you are, Herb, and thanks for straightening out that particular wrinkle. The point I wanted to make was that a sufficient amount of time would have elapsed before DLP was in a position to see Morales' men. By the way, would anyone know how many casualties Morales suffered in the attack? I have Filisola's unit casualty list but it only lists casualties by regiment?
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Post by elcolorado on Dec 12, 2007 13:16:18 GMT -5
Ok...let's kick this around just a bit more.
DLP states that Morales was tasked with capturing the main gate and "the entrenchments defending it" (lunette). I strongly feel that DLP made an incorrect assumption and based his statement on observation rather then fact.
I contend that Morales' objective was two fold: Threaten the Alamo defenders along the southern defenses and keep them occupied. And act as a "blocking force" by preventing and intercepting any Texans who may exit out the southern gates and try to escape through La Villita. Clearly, this was a job for infantry as Cavalry is ill-suited to be running down enemy combatants in an urban environment.
The difficulty I continue to have with the "capture the gate" assertion is that I can see little or no benefit to the overall operation. Santa Anna didn't have any large force waiting to charge through the gate once it was captured. And given that the primary assault force (1400 men) were at the opposite end of the Alamo, the guns in the lunette were of little concern, so why attack them? And what would the capture of the main gate accomplish??
Glenn
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Post by stuart on Dec 12, 2007 13:25:28 GMT -5
Quite a lot actually and you're confusing two quite different but complementary accounts;
It was Sanchez Navarro who recorded what the various columns were intended to do and stated that Morales was to go for the main gate and lunette. He is very clear and unequivocal on this and later goes on to say that he executed his orders promptly.
Secondly, apart from Filisola's account of him taking the SW gun position by a "daring" move, we have DLP's account of finding Morales men taking cover in ditches inside the southern end of the compound.
Santa Anna had something of a penchant for feints of this kind; a big noisy demonstration against the north wall to mask the real attack from the south, which in turn brought about the collapse of the defence of the north wall and left the Texians nowhere to go but east to where the lancers were waiting by the fire house
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Post by elcolorado on Dec 12, 2007 14:11:13 GMT -5
Stuart
I'm looking on page 422 (Hansen) and the comments are clearly those of DLP and not Snachez-Navarro. It actually begins on page 415. The same wording can be found in "With Santa Anna in Texas."
We disagree on what attack was the feint and what was the real attack. One hundred-plus men and two ladders was the "real" attacking force?? And the fourteen hundred man force was the "feint"?? I'm fairly certain just the opposite is true. I could be wrong, Stuart...but I don't think so.
As far as the collapse of the north wall, I feel it had a lot more to do with overwhelming number of soldados attacking the north wall then any noise Morales was making. Actually, I believe Morales' entry into the Alamo was expedited by the capture of the north wall by Cos. Again, I may be wrong...but I don't believe I am.
Glenn
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Post by stuart on Dec 12, 2007 15:13:16 GMT -5
Right you are Glenn, it was DLP (my only excuse is I checked Hansen at 6am), however having clearly stated Morales was to go for the gate he then (Hansen p425) having described getting in, says "In the meantime Colonel Morelos with his chasseurs, having carried out instructions received, was just in front of us at a distance of a few paces, and, rightly fearing that our fire would hurt him, he had taken refuge in the trenches he had overrun trying to inflict damage on the enemy without harming us..."
In other words he was well established inside by the time DLP and the attackers were pushing down along the Long Barracks.
In my thread on Mexican numbers I pointed out that Morales probably had something in the region of 180 men - more than enough to take a gate when the total garrison of the whole Alamo amounted to about the same.
At the end of the day I've got to go with the evidence rather than a theory which contradicts it
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Post by Jim Boylston on Dec 12, 2007 16:14:08 GMT -5
I think a lot of these actions happened concurrently rather than in a linear sequence, and we don't really have an exact timeline in that regard. While I don't see Morales' assault as a feint, but rather as an integral part of the mission, I don't consider the north wall attack a secondary move either. I think our earlier discussions of the "squeeze play" to force the defenders toward the east and away from the perimeter is logical, and all attacking parties played important roles. Getting under the artillery and rendering it useless was, I think, a priority. Jim
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Post by Herb on Dec 12, 2007 17:20:54 GMT -5
I think a lot of these actions happened concurrently rather than in a linear sequence, and we don't really have an exact timeline in that regard. While I don't see Morales' assault as a feint, but rather as an integral part of the mission, I don't consider the north wall attack a secondary move either. I think our earlier discussions of the "squeeze play" to force the defenders toward the east and away from the perimeter is logical, and all attacking parties played important roles. Getting under the artillery and rendering it useless was, I think, a priority. Jim I quite agree. Even more so, about the artillery, now. Traditionally, when we look at the defenders, we try to man the artillery crews with the minimum manpower necessary, and assign the maximum riflemen to the walls. Looking at Mark's work, there are virtually no firing positions for infantry. I think we may need to rethink the defenders assignments, and maybe the artillery was fully manned, with only a very small body of infantry occupying the few rifle positions (think Potter's comment about Crockett being a sharpshooter with that one artillery piece).
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Post by elcolorado on Dec 12, 2007 18:46:31 GMT -5
Now, I can see the logic of a "squeeze play" however, I'm still uncertain that Santa Anna actually intended for a true "pincer-like" maneuver. The disparity in attacking forces is what really bothers me : 1300 to 1400 soldados attacking from the North and East and 100 to 180 soldados attacking from the South. It sure looks to me like Santa Anna was putting most everything he had into a coup de main from the North with the intent of pushing the defenders South...into Morales or East into Sesma.
Logically, and I believe, ideally, if Santa Anna wanted to employ a truly effective pincer movement he should have had his reserves, 400 soldados from the Sappers Battalion and Grenadier's, positioned to the South in La Villita. From there they could have exploited any breakthrough made by Morales.
However, one of the biggest problems with the "squeeze play" in such a small space is "friendly fire." This is a concern that DLP expressed. And although I don't think Santa Anna was a particularly good general, even he would have been aware of the dangers of having friendly forces blazing away on either side of the enemy. The potential for casualties caused by "friendly fire" is huge. This is another reason why I contend that Morales' objective was containment. If Morales had remained outside the Alamo and maintained a threatening posture the results would have been the same. The Alamo's defenders would still have been pushed out or killed where they stood. Morales' entry into the Alamo was unnecessary.
I honestly believe that if Santa Anna truly expected and counted on Morales to fulfill a vital role inside the Alamo then Morales would have been provided with additional men...or at the very least issued a few more ladders to ensure his entry.
Glenn
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Post by Jim Boylston on Dec 12, 2007 19:59:06 GMT -5
The "squeeze play" may have been an added bonus to disabling the artillery, which was, I think, an enormous concern. I think Santa Anna threw the bulk of his force at the fort's weakest position, the north wall, a position that was also the safest for his attacking force due to the inability of the defenders to deliver infilading fire along the north face. Once he got his troops under the guns, the biggest threat had passed.
Not neccessarily. If the 18 pounder was in the SW corner and operable, it still posed a potential threat. That's why I believe the SW corner was Morales' objective. Control of the SW corner effectively gave one control of the south end of the fort. Plus, there may have been a concern that the low barracks was another line of defense. For all SA knew, his forces coming over the north wall might have faced a barrage of fire from defenders in the low barracks firing into the compound, much like happened with the long barracks defense.
But it's important to note the type of troops that were with Morales. Good discussion! Jim
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Post by stuart on Dec 13, 2007 1:37:18 GMT -5
I think the answer to the question of containment versus serious assault can be found in a combination of the La Bastida map and DLP's account.
As I pointed out DLP unequivocally states he was to take the gate and lunette. We also know he took the SW gun position as well. Whether he took one before the other isn't germain to the present discussion, but once the gate was in his hands he would have fulfilled his instructions and thereby distracted the defenders of the north wall and cut off their most obvious escape route.
Where it gets complicated from Morales' point of view is that the La Bastida map doesn't show the gun position covering the gate from inside the compound. As Mark has pointed out this is probably the only new work the Texians actually built and the Mexicans, who were otherwise familiar with the defences may not have known about it until Morales took the gate and found it looking straight at him. At that point he will have had no alternative but to go beyond containing the defenders (by holding the gate) and assault that little battery within the compound if only to secure his position and this explains DLP's reference to his men taking "refuge in the trenches he had overrun".
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Post by Jim Boylston on Dec 13, 2007 8:25:46 GMT -5
There seems to be an assumption too, that Morales began his approach from the southeast, moving across the southern front toward the west. I don't know that this is based on any evidence. Couldn't Morales have just as easily approached from the SW? Jim
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