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Post by Paul Sylvain on Dec 21, 2008 6:49:14 GMT -5
Mark -- Where can I fin the LaBatista plat? I'm not having much luck connecting to a copy of it, but I figure it's around here somewhere.
Thanks
Paul
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Post by Herb on Dec 21, 2008 9:38:30 GMT -5
Paul,
There's copies in several of the Alamo books, Nelson's The Alamo An Illustrated History and Hansen's The Alamo Reader both come easily to mind. Probably the best copy. though is in the old Time/Life series the Old West The Texans volume.
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Post by Herb on Dec 21, 2008 10:24:08 GMT -5
Mark,
This certainly is significant, it's just a shame that Jake, or Bruce Moses couldn't have been involved! Other than Sanchez-Navarro, and the vague mentions in Filisola and DLP, this gives the first real evidence where the eastern column was.
Having thought of what you've been saying, and studying LaBastida, and your book, I think your theory that this column started out south attacking the eastern face of the church, moved down the eastern face of the corrals, pass the defenders, away from the cannon and into its kill zone, while possible is very improbable.
Here's why, iirc, Jake said that before flooding the eastern acequia was about 6 feet deep and about 20 feet wide, and that the current concrete goldfish filled acequia at the Alamo Compound today roughly marks the center of what was there in 1836. That makes the acequia, even without the ponds a significant obstacle to an infantry attack using Napoleonic tactics. When you look, at its location at the east (back) side of the Church it was extremely close to the Church walls - almost serving as a castle moat.
You say that the eastern column would not have attacked from the NE because of the 3 gun battery along the north wall could have taken them under fire (a battery that would in all probability be more concerned with the north column directly to their front), yet you're theorizing that the eastern column frontally attacked another 3 gun battery, that faced no diversions from other Mexican units, and had the additional protection of the acequia and the marshy ground in between the Church and the acequia.
You further state that the Mexicans would have done this because they were unaware of the significance of the acequia. Yet, Cos and others were present when they prepared the defenses. Skirmishes on the east side had been fought early in the current siege, and most importantly the Mexican Army had done significant engineer work in and around the same acequia North of the Alamo during the siege (cutting off the north and western acequia, and erecting their north battery). While they may well have missed the significance with all that activity it seems very unlikely.
IF they had attacked the Church battery frontally and been driven off, there is virtually no maneuver space between the acequia and the east side of the compound. This is significant because we're talking moving 300 plus men in a very confined space. During the High Holy Days, this same space is filled with 50 to 100 people looking at the Wall of History and its virtually impossible to walk in that area (yes the Gift Shop is there but that probably replicates the flooded area pretty well).
Again, IF, they proceeded this way when they reached the low walls of the cattle corral, there would have been roughly 300 men literally bumping up against the wall. As I understand it the wall was so low, a soldier carrying only his musket, bayonet and cartridge box, could have easily vaulted the wall. 300 soldatos in such close proximity would have simply swamped the defenders - there would have been no reason to continue moving north.
It seems to me, that for Mexican soldatos to have been vic of the present day History Shop and engaged by a cannon at the NE of the corral (the only one that could engage them at that point) there is only two avenues of approach that 300 men could have used to reach that point. The first is coming down the west side of the acequia from the NE (yes, they would still have crossed the acequia, but doing so from vic of the Mexican North Battery prior to the order to attack, removes virtually all danger from coming under the defenders fire while trying to cross this obstacle). The second way is coming from the due east and primarily using the road/trail you depict linking the Alamo to the Camino Real. Basically a force doing this would attack along the road in a close column just like they were doing an assault across a bridge eg Napoleon at Arcola.
Interestingly, if your depiction of where this trail/road was is accurate it seems that troops would deploy from it, about the vicinity of the History Shop. Irregardless, use of either of these avenues of approach, provides the Mexicans a much easier way to reach the point of the dig (and the more open maneuver space north of the corral)
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Post by texast on Dec 21, 2008 16:25:52 GMT -5
Paul the map as I am aware of it can be found here > www.tamu.edu/ccbn/dewitt/adp/archives/maps/labastida/labastida.htmlAccording to that map though the cattle pen and Convento are much smaller than what I think we know was there today, it is has a shorter east wall along the east side of the complex than most I think expect. I'm not sure exactly either although it was drawn supposedly by Ygnacio de Labastida, the commander of engineers for the Mexican Army how accurate some of the areas are in that regard as if he actually went around the complex to survey it before drawing it or if he was going off others descriptions. The drawing of course is worn in some spots also. Regardless of the length of the wall though looking at what appears to be the eastern acequia it looks like there is a spot (unsure how accurate the spacing is) that looks like a place where in the darkness the Mexican army could possibly slip through enough men to be positioned in approximately the right place of where the cannon shot and other articles were supposedly found. Granted the force would have had to be mostly (maybe not all but most) in place when the battle was started. When the battle alert happened the men on the back side of the church may have seen them also and fired directly into the middle of them which then would have forced them more in the direction of what Mark was suggesting. It could also be that the commander in charge of the attack from the east may have actually split his force sending some through the area between the acequia and some to the north and some even to the south trying to draw fire and focus defense away from other intended zones while others are making other advances. I do remember seeing one or more other drawings or plats somewhere (can't remember where atm) That showed an easterly attack on that area but I think it was from someone else's book. Sorry I don't remember atm and could be mistaken there. I'm just speculating on the plan of the commander of course also.
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Post by marklemon on Dec 21, 2008 21:02:24 GMT -5
Herb, I've just read your post and there are some areas of misunderstandings on your part, most likely caused by poor communications on my part. As I have just returned form a 10 hour surveillance and am exhausted, I'll have to reply tomorrow after I get some rack time. Mark
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Post by marklemon on Dec 22, 2008 2:54:00 GMT -5
Herb,
You wrote: Having thought of what you've been saying, and studying LaBastida, and your book, I think your theory that this column started out south attacking the eastern face of the church, moved down the eastern face of the corrals, pass the defenders, away from the cannon and into its kill zone, while possible is very improbable.
ML: I certainly never said, or meant to say, that Romero's eastern column "started out south." I believe that what I said was that I am of the persuasion that that column started out more due east, or just a "tad bit" south of due east. That is a whole other animal from "south." Now I am not sure where Jake got that information on a 20 foot wide acequia, whether from a dig, or elsewhere. The only section of the Alamo Madre Acequia I know that still exists is a restored section near the Witte Museum, and that section is 15 feet across, and 5 feet deep. A not-insignificant size, to be sure, but not insurmountable. The acequia would have been forded, at various points, especially near the mission proper, by small foot-bridges. In post-battle drawings, one can see one of these small foot-bridges in, I think, the Lee, and Eastman drawings , as well as one by James Gilchrist Benton. Granted, they were not very substantial, not more than a few boards, really, but you can be sure that along the acequia, especially near the Mission, there would have been more than one or two of these crossings. In addition, there may well have been a more robust bridge crossing the acequia on the trail leading from the Alamo to the Camino Real. If so, this would have allowed a force of men in column formation to approach the Alamo from the east. They would theoretically thus have been able to avoid the marshes, but once they crossed the "bridge," their formation could have easily been disrupted by artillery fire, and they could have then shifted en masse up towards the cattle pen. In addition, I think you must be looking at an earlier version of a bird's eye view of the mission than what ended up in my book, as the crossing to the Camino Real as I showed it in the book is more to the south than what you describe. But to be honest, this crossing is an unknown commodity, and I know of no real evidence for its location , so we may be wasting our time theorizing about its effect on the battle.
You wrote: You say that the eastern column would not have attacked from the NE because of the 3 gun battery along the north wall could have taken them under fire (a battery that would in all probability be more concerned with the north column directly to their front), yet you're theorizing that the eastern column frontally attacked another 3 gun battery, that faced no diversions from other Mexican units, and had the additional protection of the acequia and the marshy ground in between the Church and the acequia.
ML: I am not sure that the artillery played that much of a part in the assault's specific origin, as there was the potential to be under artillery fire from just about every quarter. But from the north, or especially the northeast, where you theorize them coming from, they would have farther to go, over more open ground, have had to cross a portion of the acequia with very few, if any, foot bridges, and been under fire from not only the three-gun northern battery, but the cattle pen gun, as well as at least one gun from the church. And having them come down from the north, they would not have any reason to go so far south (east) as to run in front of the gun at the cattle pen salient. All they would have to do is assault directly south against the 112 foot long north cattle pen wall, and easily scale the 4-foot wall there.
You wrote: You further state that the Mexicans would have done this because they were unaware of the significance of the acequia. Yet, Cos and others were present when they prepared the defenses. Skirmishes on the east side had been fought early in the current siege, and most importantly the Mexican Army had done significant engineer work in and around the same acequia North of the Alamo during the siege (cutting off the north and western acequia, and erecting their north battery). While they may well have missed the significance with all that activity it seems very unlikely. IF they had attacked the Church battery frontally and been driven off, there is virtually no maneuver space between the acequia and the east side of the compound. This is significant because we're talking moving 300 plus men in a very confined space. During the High Holy Days, this same space is filled with 50 to 100 people looking at the Wall of History and its virtually impossible to walk in that area (yes the Gift Shop is there but that probably replicates the flooded area pretty well).
ML: As far as I know, the "significant engineer work" was centered on blocking the interior-running portion of the Alamo acequia, and extending it, from a point near the outer NW corner, down along the outside of the west wall. Nevertheless, I did not meant to imply that the Mexicans did not understand the "significance" of the acequia. What I said, I believe, was that they may not have known just how deep the flooded areas were, and that some of the troops, as they headed west from the east (in the darkness), if they saw the water at all, ran into what they may have thought to be several inches deep, only to find that parts of it were several feet deep, thus causing them to bunch together in the dry ground between the flooded areas and the east walls. In the new book "Not One Step back" by Martin Windrow, (which I picked up last night at the mall) the author states that "Romero's troops had taken heavy casualties from the chapel guns, sweeping the east wall; his men, too, lost cohesion, and ran around the northeast corner to join the crowd under the north wall." To me, this statement is significant for two reasons. Romero's men "lost cohesion," meaning, as you well know, they broke their formation, and bunched into a mass. The other is that he describes them as moving "around the corner." Now, if as you say, under strict Napoleonic tactics, they had advanced from the east, they would not have been able to maneuver in the relatively small space outside the east walls. But bunched together, either from reaction to artillery fire, or water, or both, they would have been able to pass all along the eastern cattle pen wall, and also, around the corner either to the north wall, or to the north wall of the cattle pen....or ALL THREE, in a mob-like mass. Remember, these men had lost unit cohesion, and were under heavy fire, trying to avoid water soaked areas (if they did not cross a foot bridge) in the dark. This would have taxed even the most highly disciplined troops. It certainly did those men from the Matamoros and Jimenez Battalions.
You wrote: Again, IF, they proceeded this way when they reached the low walls of the cattle corral, there would have been roughly 300 men literally bumping up against the wall. As I understand it the wall was so low, a soldier carrying only his musket, bayonet and cartridge box, could have easily vaulted the wall. 300 soldados in such close proximity would have simply swamped the defenders - there would have been no reason to continue moving north.
ML: I think that here you are partly correct, in that many of the Mexicans probably DID gain entrance to the courtyard at the east wall of the cattle pen. (And now that you mention it, that has to change my theory of the defenders there being squeezed out from the north.) But remember the men are in a mass, and as they moved diagonally in a northwesterly direction from the E, or SE, they would strike that wall much as a wave in the water approaches a beach, if it strikes the beach in an angle, and not perpendicular, it "rolls" up the beach. The men at the front of the formation would be climbing over the wall to their immediate front, and the men behind them would tend to slide over to the north where the wall is clear, and the men behind those men would do the same, and so on, and so on. The effect is that the mass of men sort of rolls up the eastern wall, to the gun position, and even around the corner. Romero's men have become, not a strict military formation, but an organic thing, like a swarm of bees, changing shape as the situation calls for.
Good points Herb...this part of the battle is now in a state of flux, due to the new evidence unearthed, and discussions such as this are an important part of fleshing out what must have happened. Mark
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Post by stuart on Dec 22, 2008 3:36:47 GMT -5
A sketch map might be a good idea
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Post by Paul Sylvain on Dec 22, 2008 4:45:12 GMT -5
Texast --- Thanks for the map link. I guess I have seen that plat in at least one of the books I have here, although I need to get the Alamo Reader (don't know whay I don't have this volume, yet).
Stuart has a good idea, I think, in a sketch map. I think many of the arguments posted here have merit, but so much of what we're talking about is speculative at best. So maybe I'll speculate a little on one point.
Certainly Cos was present in Bejar for some time before getting chased out of town in December 1835. I don't see how he could have not known about the various topographic features around the Alamo, especially where he was involved in shoring up its defenses. This information surely would have been shared when planning the assault for March 6.
Additionally, the Alamo was under siege for 13 days. The Mexican troops and commanders certainly must have been aware of the acequia and (one would think) took it into consideration in planning for the assault.
Granted, often the best laid plans can go awry, especially in the heat of battle, begun in darkness, and with cannister and rifle shots coming at them. It stands to reason that the Mexicans attacking the east walls would try to bridge the acequia at its narrowest or most accessible points.
We all know that the Mexicans built scaling ladders before the assault. Any chance that the troops attacking from the east carried some means to bridge the acequia with them (boards or something)? Just a thought.
Paul
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Post by bobdurham on Dec 22, 2008 8:14:09 GMT -5
Isn't it possible that the archaeological cannon fire artifacts were deposited during one of the skirmishes early in the siege? Mark -- I'm assuming you've already considered that -- what was the quantity of those artifacts? Would they have probably been made by more than just a couple of cannon shots?
Also -- Mark -- mind posting some info on another thread about the Martin Windrow book? I try to keep abreast of new books on the Alamo and that one sneaked by me. From the little bit you quoted, it sounds like it might be a good-'un. Thanks.
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Post by Herb on Dec 22, 2008 10:47:20 GMT -5
Herb, I've just read your post and there are some areas of misunderstandings on your part, most likely caused by poor communications on my part. Mark Mark, I think I must be the one not making myself clear. I understand what you're saying about the attack coming out of the East and aimed at the Church/Sacristy (your words) to me that is the South end of the compound. I also understand your point that the eastern column lost its cohesion and was not moving as formed troops. My point is that even so the route you have them moving is too constricted for that number of men especially out of formation - you can see that every High Holy days when far fewer people make that route virtually impossible to navigate. I'm not saying an attack from the East using various bridges and winding around flooded areas isn't possible. Quite the contrary, I'm saying using the trail from the "east gate" of the Alamo to the Camino Real is a very real possibility. You keep discounting an attack from the NE because it would have to cross the acequia - this is a non issue. The troops could have crossed the eastern acequia to the north while moving to their attack positions the night before. As far as crossing the northern acequia, again according to Jake, this was smaller, only 12 -15 feet wide and shallower, and more importantly the water had been blocked from it earlier in the siege and presumably drained. Besides which, while it still was not an insigificant little ditch, both the Northern Columns and Western Columns we know crossed this same feature without mentioning anything about it. The chief problem I have with your theory, is that imo, you're ignoring the avenues of approach, and the maneuver space necessary for deploying 300 plus men. Attacking up against the Sacristy and Horse Corral makes only limited sense (it is a relative blind spot for the defenders and is probably relatively undefended) however, it is harder to break in/scale, and there is absolutely no maneuver space outside the walls (this would be an ideal spot for a small body of men - a company of cazadores for example, but a lousy spot for two battalions of line infantry). Attacking the back of the Church ie the gun battery, is certainly possible - but I'm not too sure that it gains the attacker much of anything - its a high risk attack with little payoff. The only place that provides maneuver space outside the walls on the East Side - and has avenues of approach to it - is the area around the Cattle Corral and to the north. The area where the artifacts were found. It simply seems to me that the Mexicans would have gotten there the most direct easiest route, then a far more complex route/maneuver that began with a failed attack further south on the Church/Sacristy. Now an intriguing point, that we've discussed before, is what texast brings up. Romero's Column was the only column with two battalions (and obviously two battalion cdrs and staff). While as there is no mention of him doing so (and precious little mention about him period), he could have used his two battalions to attack two different points at the same time (or simply attack along a wider front). This would seem more probable if he was mounting an attack coming across the eastern acequia. Also finding maneuver space for 150 men is obviously a lot easier 300.
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Post by stuart on Dec 22, 2008 11:49:21 GMT -5
Just a simple observation; in working out how much space is actually required forget about the drill books (heresy I know); for each man in the front rank you will require one metre (or yard if you prefer). Therefore a unit 300 strong drawn up in three ranks deep will require 100 metres of frontage - but that's just to stand still. For maneouvring there will need to be gaps between sub-units, and good clearance on either side of the formation if it is to move without bunching or losing formation. Once formation is vbroken, as Herb says, even more space is required and command and control becomes very problematic - as I was taught very early on; the basic purpose of drill is not to make a show but to move a body of troops from point A to point B without losing too many of them on the way
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Post by Paul Sylvain on Dec 22, 2008 16:38:45 GMT -5
Has anyone here taken a look in "The Texian Iliad" (by Stephen Hardin) at the drawings depicting the three phases of the assult that led to the fall of the Alamo? In my edition of this book, these drawings are on pages 140 (Phase I), 142 (Phase II) and 144 (Phase III).
Any thoughts about them, as they relate to this debate?
Paul
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Post by marklemon on Dec 22, 2008 18:33:31 GMT -5
This discussion clearly needs visual aids. I suggest that we suspend any more hair-pulling until such time (March?) as we can get together with a large map (I'll provide) and go over the possible scenarios. It is also clear that the History Shop location is not clearly being visualized, with regards to how the artifacts found there comport with possible Mexican movements. We'll have to literally stand there and look at the place to get the actual concept. Nothing beats on-site evaluation. Mark
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Post by Jim Boylston on Dec 22, 2008 23:14:02 GMT -5
Hey Paul, that's "Hardin". Better get it right, the man is on board here and you're sure to cross paths in Bexar come March. The doc's a big guy, too...
Jim
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Post by TRK on Dec 23, 2008 12:10:34 GMT -5
This discussion clearly needs visual aids. If I'm not mistaken, the first of the three screen captures of jrboddie's virtual Alamo that he posted on December 2, 2008 (at the bottom of the page at the link below) shows the scene in question, with the History Shop area above the gun emplacement at the northeast corner of the northern courtyard. alamostudies.proboards58.com/index.cgi?board=images&action=display&thread=432&page=1
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