|
Post by stuart on Dec 10, 2008 1:40:35 GMT -5
The strategy was a well-established one called offering your opponent a golden bridge....
However to return to Allan's point about the three groups described by Sesma, I don't think that this implies a concerted plan of any kind. As I demonstrated (with a map) on a different thread on another forum in a galaxy far far away the sequence of breakouts clearly indicates they were being squeezed out successively as the Mexicans moved down from the north wall.
The absence of any substantial exit points along the east wall is important, because while I still hold that the first "group" may have been able to get out the small gate, the second must have simply been scrambling over the relatively low walls.
The crucial factor then is the position of Sesma and his cavalry. In order for him to have been able to control the action he had to be reasonably far back; certainly on the far side of the ponds. Now while the Texians may have been happy enough to scramble over the walls any old how, once outside they are going to have avoided splashing straight through the black water. The "groups" Sesma saw were not pre-organised, but most likely the result of bunching as the fugitives crowded through the gaps between the ponds.
|
|
|
Post by Jim Boylston on Dec 10, 2008 6:48:03 GMT -5
Has anyone theorized that escapees wanted to attack some Mexican batteries, foolhardy as that may sound? --Evan-s I don't know about attacking batteries, but I think this new book (at least from the Amazon description) attempts to make the case that these defenders were taking a stand out in the open rather than just trying to flee. Sesma reports a fairly brisk resistance, which I've always assumed was an attempt to make the cavalry charge appear more daring. While I'm sure the fight was hard once the defenders realized they were facing cavalry, I'm not really ready to believe that they'd leave cover simply to fight elsewhere. I'm also of the opinion that if this was a planned exodus it was more likely a "one-two-three-go!" break than anything mapped out during the siege. Jim
|
|
|
Post by stuart on Dec 10, 2008 8:38:41 GMT -5
I like Glenn’s birds analogy myself, and I also think that Sesma’s account bears a closer look in figuring out what was really going on. Its really the middle breakout we’re concerned with; he states basically that a big, organised group came out, and were attacked by some cavalry, but put up such a fight that successive reinforcements had to be fed in.
There’s no doubt that there was a substantial fight because as I’ve pointed out before the reported one dead and half a dozen wounded gives a misleading picture in that comparison with other engagements suggests that up to 30 horses were also killed or wounded.
At first sight a fight of that magnitude doesn’t really square with the lack of an obvious exit point for that large group of Texians, but you have to remember that Sesma was writing with the benefit of hindsight. I’ve argued above that far from marching out boldly the Texians were tumbling over the walls any old how and only inadvertently coming together in a body as they were funnelled between the ponds. That scenario is in fact supported rather than contradicted by Sesma’s account. Remember again that the light is bad – a body of Texians appears and are promptly attacked by the nearest unit, but in reality they are only the lead elements of the fugitives and as more and more Texians come through, then the Mexican officers successively call for reinforcements to contain and deal with them.
What I’m saying in effect is that just because Sesma later wrote of encountering that large body, it doesn’t follow that they were initially identified as such.
|
|
|
Post by Jim Boylston on Dec 10, 2008 9:56:31 GMT -5
I tend to think that there wasn't much of an active command structure once it all hit the fan. As Stuart points out, everything became chaotic very quickly, and I expect that things devolved into an every man (or group of men) for himself scenario almost immediately once the perimeter was breached. I doubt there was much communication as sight lines between the north wall and the southern area of the fort were obstructed, even when the sun was shining. Herb can confirm this, as it became obvious to both of us at Brackettville when we stood at the NW corner and looked toward the palisade, and the Alamo had an even larger scale. Jim
|
|
|
Post by Allen Wiener on Dec 10, 2008 10:15:47 GMT -5
I'm also of the opinion that if this was a planned exodus it was more likely a "one-two-three-go!" break than anything mapped out during the siege. Jim That's what I had in mind regarding "individually planned" breakouts. When the Mexicans were coming over the wall, or already in the fort, many instinctively bolted, or may have formed small, ad hoc groups that formed randomly and did so. Stuart's scenario makes sense regarding the ponds; no matter how unorganized it may have been, they would appear to be a group as they tried to navigate around the ponds, with some merely following others who led the way. AW
|
|
|
Post by Paul Sylvain on Dec 10, 2008 16:13:55 GMT -5
I'm guessing the breakouts were mostly a matter of seeing an opportunity and taking that chance at hopefully living on to fight another day. I don't see an organized breakout as part of the planning. More than likely if one makes a break for it and you see him, you might try it, too, and so on, resulting in what might appear as a group attempt. It's like being in a traffic jam on I-35. A car seems to see an opening and maneuvers to take it. Others see him and follow suit. Maybe that oversimplifies what was taking place so quickly in the noise and confusion of the final moments of that fight, but to me it makes sense.
Paul
|
|
|
Post by stuart on Dec 10, 2008 16:55:53 GMT -5
There's also another point to bear in mind when speculating about the possibilities of a pre-planned exit - its very bad for morale. Any halfway decent commander will plan for a withdrawal just in case - even if its only basic stuff like checking that all the potential evacuation routes don't converge on a single bottleneck - but otherwise if the men get the idea that a breakout is uppermost in the commandser's thoughts they aren't going to be motivated to put up much of a fight. In replying to Mark's post I said that Bowie and Neill's "die in the ditches" declaration was a demonstration of their resolve to hold their ground. If the real intention is to bug out as soon as the neighbours appear, no-one is going to invest much effort on the defence. Digressing slightly to respond to Herb's war story on the other thread, it was a standing joke when I was serving in BAOR that the sealed orders to be opened in the event of the Russians crossing the Inner German Border contained a copy of the Channel Ferries timetable
|
|
|
Post by Paul Sylvain on Dec 13, 2008 7:56:12 GMT -5
Digressing slightly to respond to Herb's war story on the other thread, it was a standing joke when I was serving in BAOR that the sealed orders to be opened in the event of the Russians crossing the Inner German Border contained a copy of the Channel Ferries timetable As a further digression ... I was stationed in West Berlin from 1969 to 1973. We had all sorts of contingency plans in place, should the Russians decide to do something. Honestly, my take on the situation was that the Russians wouldn't even waste a shot. They'd simply close the barriers and hang a huge Prisoner of War camp sign, and that'd be it. Where the heck would be go, being 110 miles INSIDE East Germany?
|
|
|
Post by marklemon on Dec 16, 2008 15:20:32 GMT -5
Looking at the flow of the battle, we see that defenders on the north wall, along with many of those on the west and some perhaps from the south, drew back either into the long barracks or the church. But I wonder how things were in the eastern courtyards? Romero is said to have captured this position from the east, but this undoubtedly means the northeast (cattle pen) courtyard, with its walls of 4.5 feet in height. The southeast courtyard (horse corral) had walls perhaps ten feet or more tall, and since it was uncomfortably close to the eastern apse battery in the church, was no doubt given a wide berth from direct assault. But this also precludes the egress of a group of defenders, as there is absolutely no data to support interior firing steps or platforms here that could have helped them get out. So, what may have happened to allow for both the capture of the northeast courtyard, at the same time allowing some of the defenders to escape? here's my 2cents: As Romero's column approached the east front, they were, due to the flooded acequia nearby, and fire from the church battery, channeled, or funneled through a dry gap, just off the northeast corner of the cattle pen. As they approached, they were again diverted farther north, north west by hot firing from the 4 (or perhaps 6) pounder gun at the NE salient. We have proof of close range firing of this gun, as a result of very recent (4 months ago) digs in front of this position, in which cannister rounds, as well as bits of chain and scrap iron were unearthed. A fair number of .69, .72, and much smaller caliber lead balls were dug as well. (I actually saw these artifacts and held them in my hand. In addition, several Mexican Army buttons were located amongst them.) Romero's column then obliqued to the NW, towards the long barracks extension, or even perhaps the 6.5 foot wide space in the interval between the extension, and the north end of the long barracks. In any event, it may have been at this juncture that access was forced into the cattle pen, as elements of Romero's column flowed over the low wall near the north end of the long barracks. Here, they would be safe from the 4/6 pounder, as it could not be effectively turned and fired there lest it hit friendly troops. So I think that the wall was "breached" near its juncture with the long barracks, with soldados streaming over the low wall, and down into the pen, forcing defenders from the wall, back into the cattle pen's interior. Now where? South into the horse corral? Some defenders may have made their way to that gate, only to look in and see that Mexicans had passed through the porteria in the long barracks, and were already investing the horse corral. To enter here would have meant almost certain death, as there was no opening in the church to convento connecting wall in 1836. With Mexicans entering the south courtyard (horse corral,) and with no way out, the corral was in effect a death trap. The defenders at this moment had only three options: to fight to the death in the cattle pen, to enter and fight to the death in the horse corral, or or to go over the relatively low eastern wall of the cattle pen. Mark
|
|
|
Post by marklemon on Dec 17, 2008 2:23:40 GMT -5
This scenario does have a drawback, in that it seems to preclude any such breakout attempt coming from the gap (possible gate) between the long barracks and long barracks extension, as Herb has speculated, as this area would have been thick with Mexicans. Perhaps this then leaves us with the cattle pen (northeast courtyard), the palisade gate, and the lunette as points of egress. Mark
|
|
|
Post by stuart on Dec 18, 2008 4:52:51 GMT -5
In discussing the fight with the cavalry it occurs to me that the data I presented on casualties has been lost on the old forum, so...
Andrade's casualty figures cite 1 dead and 3 wounded for the Dolores Regiment. No casualties are recorded for the other cavalry units but there is the possibility that the presidiales weren't counted as regulars and so not included in Andrade's list. That's pure speculation however.
Similar casualty figures (lost in broadly similar circumstances)were reported by the British cavalry regiments at Culloden:
Cobham's Dragoons - 1 dead 0 wounded Kerr's Dragoons - 3 dead 3 wounded
However, very usefully, the number of horses lost were also recorded:
Cobham's - 4 dead 5 wounded Kerr's - 4 dead 15 wounded
Now we can't make a direct comparison, but Kerr's dead and wounded men are pretty close. What's interesting is that Cobham's lost only one man killed and none wounded, yet 9 horses were killed or wounded to knock the actual casualties up to 10, while Kerr's real casualty list goes up to 25. Now obviously most of these are not real casuaties in so far as most of the men lived to brag about their bruises afterwards, but it does mean that the Texians must have knocked down rather more of the lancers than Andrade's bare figures suggest and is consistent with Sesma's report of a stiff fight.
|
|
|
Post by elcolorado on Dec 18, 2008 13:21:09 GMT -5
As I recall from our previous discussions, we speculated Romero's column may have approached from the northeast - above the flooded area in order to avoid sloshing through the water. That would make sense since Santa Anna's attack plan incorporated the elements of both stealth and speed; difficult to achieve when moving through water and mud.
I'm unsure of Romero's initial point of attack; what was his target? Was it suppose to be the line of jacales, the northern courtyard, or both simultaneously?
Glenn
|
|
|
Post by marklemon on Dec 18, 2008 15:08:13 GMT -5
If Labastida is to be believed, the flooded area extended far to the north well above the east-west line of the north wall. For Romero to have approached in such a way as to avoid the north end of this flooded area, he would be literally attacking from the north, and just slightly north-east. And more significantly, there is hard archaeological evidence that clearly shows an attacking force at least passing in front of the northeast apex (corner) of the NE courtyard. In retrospect, I think that this archaeological evidence is more important than I had originally thought, as it almost gives a partial road map for part of Romero's movements.
|
|
|
Post by Herb on Dec 18, 2008 15:34:05 GMT -5
If Labastida is to be believed, the flooded area extended far to the north well above the east-west line of the north wall. For Romero to have approached in such a way as to avoid the north end of this flooded area, he would be literally attacking from the north, and just slightly north-east. And more significantly, there is hard archaeological evidence that clearly shows an attacking force at least passing in front of the northeast apex (corner) of the NE courtyard. In retrospect, I think that this archaeological evidence is more important than I had originally thought, as it almost gives a partial road map for part of Romero's movements. IF I understand what you're saying, it implies, to me, that Romero had to attack across the acequia almost a due east to due west orientation (on the extension?). This would further imply that the cannon at the NE of the cattle corral did do sufficient damage to cause Romero to shift his attack further north. As an aside, while I have no idea on what evidence, Tom Lindley, had to base his reasoning, he was convinced that prior to the assault that responsibilities were shifted and Duque's column came from the east and not the north. The single cannon shot that wiped out a Toluca company does seem to tie in with this new archaeological evidence. I'm not saying it's a fact, but perhaps we need to keep an open-skeptical mind? Mark, any idea when these findings are going to be published?
|
|
|
Post by elcolorado on Dec 18, 2008 19:37:31 GMT -5
Judging by your description, Mark, the location in question points to the area of the hotel across the street from the courtyard. An interesting place for a dig.
Glenn
|
|