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Post by Allen Wiener on Mar 9, 2011 15:47:45 GMT -5
I looked at Gray's "Custer's Last Campaign" and he does say that Boston passed Benteen very early on, around the Lone Tepee, around the time Benteen stopped to water the horses. Gray does not suggest that means Benteen could have reached Custer if Boston did, but he suggests that it could have been possible. Frankly, I found that a stretch. However, later on Gray says that Boston would have give Custer "good news" by saying that Benteen was not far behind him.
I'm a little unclear on the time frame here. Gray seems to suggest that Boston and Benteen met AFTER Custer had sent Martin with the order for Benteen to "come quick." I had thought Benteen was considerably further along than the Lone Tepee when he got that message; somewhere off on his scout looking for runaway Indians. If he and Boston passed AFTER he'd received that message, then his behavior is questionable at best. Gray also says that Boston could only have seen Reno still in the valley, fighting the Indians and holding out, perhaps in the timber. This, too, he says would have been encouraging news to Custer.
As to what Custer knew by the time he was around the time Boston got there or shortly afterward, Gray presents a scenario in which both Mitch Boyer and Curley saw, from Weir Ridge, how badly mauled Reno was, witnessed his retreat, and reported this to Custer (the story comes from Curley as told to Camp). At this point, Custer was at the mouth of Cedar Coulee, so if Gray is right, it's Custer's moves from here on that are puzzling.
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Post by Allen Wiener on Mar 9, 2011 16:03:30 GMT -5
In reviewing "Fox" I see that Boston first passed Benteen, then Maritni (aka Martin), who was soon to deliver the "come quick" order to Benteen. So it's conceivably (all things being equal) that Benteen could have run lickedy-split off to Medicine Tail Coulee and not worry about the packs; he could have sent an equally urgent message to the pack train to follow him just as quickly. In fact, Sgt. Kanipe had already passed Benteen and told him that he had a verbal order for Custer to tell Benteen to hasten up there.
However, Fox suggests a different interpretation of the Custer note. Rather than suggesting he was in serious trouble, it conveyed urgency about the village being in located and the need for Benteen to come quick before the warriors scattered. Possible.
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Post by Chuck T on Mar 9, 2011 16:27:12 GMT -5
Allen: Reference the pictomap you got in the mail from LBH (Little Bighorn-Reno Creek Area). Everything I have says that Boston passed Benteen when he (Benteen) was either at or very near the morass, after or in the final stages of his seven or eight mile long scout to the west. I think it is highly likely that B.Custer met Martin somewhere about the vacinity of the arrowhead marked at the tip of Custer's route. That makes the most sense to me in light of the brief conversation that B. Custer and Martin had - "just over the next ridge" . The one thing Martin was sure of is that he left Custer when he decended down Cedar Coulee. The very next ridgeline to the south which was Martin's direction of travel is Sharpshooter Ridge. My assumption is based upon this conversation alone, and if I am correct it would place the meeting somewhere in the vacinity of the Reno/Benteen site and about six or seven miles from where Benteen was watering his horses at the morass.
It may be so that Boston told Custer that Benteen was not far behind. I think that not far in this case was more like seven to nine miles. If this speculation is correct Custer may have been emboldened to act counting on help he thought was on the way. We will never know, for at sometime between when B.Custer and Martin passed each other and before Benteen could move past, Reno retreated from the timber, climbed the bluffs and was right in the middle of the area Benteen intended to advance through. Who knows. If Reno had held in the timber for another half an hour things might have been very different.
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Post by Chuck T on Mar 9, 2011 16:34:17 GMT -5
Allen: Reference your post 46. I don't think Custer thought he was in trouble when he sent the "Come quick. Bring Packs" note. I agree with what I think Fox is saying in that my interpretation has always been that Custer's intention was to consolidate his main force and make sure his logistics were in order before making his attack. If you will refer back to what Wolfpack has often said that Custer was doing reconnaissance for the best place to attack. Thus we have the two troop foray down to MTC Ford and all of that final hoorah up near the current cemetary. I am sure the Wolfman will chime in.
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Post by Allen Wiener on Mar 9, 2011 16:36:45 GMT -5
That sounds pretty dead on to me. Timing may have just been incredibly bad considering how things played out within the short time from Boston passing Martin, Martin reaching Benteen, and Reno heading for the hills.
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Post by Chuck T on Mar 9, 2011 17:46:22 GMT -5
Allen: I would like to get Wolfpacks views. Cavalrymen and the infantry are often a little out of whack about some things, but I think I am interpreting his previous post correctly.
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Post by Chuck T on Mar 9, 2011 18:26:36 GMT -5
Allen: Citing quartermaster records there were 162 civilians on the payroll of the 7th Cavalry in June 76. This includes Bloody Knife but not the remainder of the Indian Scouts. Some few of these were scouts and interpreters up forward with Custer or Reno. Presumably most if not all the rest were with the pack train on 25 June. When you add these numbers with the strength of Troop B (guarding the train, estimated at 50 or so) along with the 55 plus men detailed to the train (on a basis on 1 NCO and 4 troopers per troop), and the people from the forward line troops who were with the train for no explained reason, my math says the train alone had about 300 people assigned, attached, or hangers on. When you combine this with just Benteen's squadron, and Custer's two squadrons you are at about 600. These figures are somewhat higher than all of what I have read being between six fifty and six eighty in the entire command. These numbers at the right place could have made all of the difference. Maybe Sitting Bull's close run thing was more accurate than one might believe.
Sometime between now and the weekend I will attempt to do a name for name count of the rosters (eliminating those that were known not to be present, and I will see what I come up with.
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Post by Herb on Mar 12, 2011 12:02:20 GMT -5
Chuck, Allen;
Sorry, for the late reponse, but haven't been on the net for a awhile - still having the problem you know about.
From memory, Kanipe passed Benteen, told him what was going on and proceeded to packtrain where Boston learned from him the same and Boston rushed to the front passing Benteen watering his horses. As I recall he passed Martin before Martin reached Benteen - thus probably delivering two m essages to his brother Martin's message was afelt thay delivered and Benteen was not too far behind.
Most modern analysists, make a point that Custer was on the offensive up until just before the moment he was overwelhmened. It is only my personal opinion, but this is position I do not believe is supported by the known facts. IMO, Custer had actually taken an operational pause - once Keogh's and Yates' battalions reunited vic of Calhoun Ridge.
Again, imo, Custer left Keogh in a hasty defense/assembly area in the vicinity of where he expected Benteen to emerge. His intent were for these two battalions to unite for a future attack. Meanwhile, making the best use of the time made available by this pause, Custer took Yate's Battalion as a personal escort to recon where and how he would conduct this new attack with the now united regiment (- Reno). This recon of course, resulted in the actions vicinity of the western ford and the cemetary, and subsequent movement to Last Stand Hill.
Of course the rapid collapse of C Company, and the failure of Benteen to show up, rendered all this moot.
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Post by Chuck T on Mar 12, 2011 12:30:31 GMT -5
Wolfpack: I agree. An operational pause during which a reconnaissance is made makes very good sense. The movement to the ford near the cemetary and the action in and around Last Stand hill are being confused by some as being offensive. The fact that there were only two troops involved makes it far more logical that it was reconnaissance. When you attack, you do so with all the strength you can muster with a reserve located where it can both be controlled and easily committed if needed. Custer's actions, and the dispositions he made do not meet this standard.
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Post by Allen Wiener on Mar 12, 2011 13:42:13 GMT -5
That comports with my recent readings and IIRC Philbrick and/or Fox present essentially this interpretation. Custer may have thought he was on the offensive as he scouted for a crossing (Ford D). Philbrick thinks he was eyeballing the women and children and his objective became to capture them as hostages and force the warriors to surrender, but that he needed more troops to do it, hence his eager anticipation of Benteen's arrival (I agree Keough was left to signal Benteen and that Boston must have given Custer encouraging news about Benteen).
Meanwhile, we know that the folks up on Calhoun Hill were not on the offensive, that a lot more warriors than Custer expected were already arriving and pressing the attack. I'm really not sure that anyone is certain about the time frames that followed, but (in general), Calhoun and Keough got rolled up while Custer was at some point between Ford D and Last Stand Hill. What remained of Keough and Calhoun's men joined with Custer on LSH and many died there, while others made a run for it, or made a charge, and died between LSH and the river, many in Deep Ravine (although no bodies have been found to date there; maybe they were moved; didn't someone say the recovery party just through some dirt on them? Deep Ravine was a lot deeper than I expected when I saw it).
Some troops were either deployed by Custer somewhere below LSH (around the so-called South Skirmish Line, where Mitch Boyer's body was said to be found) or ended up there some other way. I don't know if they were there before Custer made his way up to LSH, having been deployed there by him, or were among those who bolted from LSH toward the end.
I also think the newer theories are correct that have no real "last stand" final rush by the Indians, as seen in many movies, but rather the Indians slowly and gradually picked off the soldiers from effective concealment, with arrows and bullets, after wiping out most of Calhoun and Keough's men. If there was a final dash onto LSH I think it was just to finish off the few remaining survivors and the wounded.
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Post by loucapitano on Mar 13, 2011 12:16:27 GMT -5
I've read enough about Custer not to confuse Boston Custer with Autie Reed. Glad you guys caught it. I really must commend you all on the wonderful discussion about Boston reaching Custer, but not Benteen. Every opinion seems plausible, and, of course, we'll never know. But it sure is fun to speculate. In 1976 I bought a book titled, "The Court-Marshal of George Armstrong Custer", by Douglas C. Jones, published by Scribners. It was a novel based on the premise that since the Horse Comanche survived the battle, so could Custer, although severly wounded. The Army chooses to Court-Marshal Custer for negligence for blundering into the worst defeat ever at the hands of the Indians. As you would expect, a novel is not history and there are several assumptions made that more recent scholarship has clarified and corrected. During the trial, Custer's defense attorney makes the point that Custer didn't arrive at the Little Bighorn on June 25th, a day early, but rather, General Terry arrived a day late, on the 27th. The inference was that Custer rushed his pace to get all the glory by defeating the Indians with just his 7th Cavalry. I'd love to see this debate played out. Any takers? The book was made into a TV movie which, like the book, left as many questions as it answered. Still, it preceded "Son of the Morning Star" which I think is closest Hollywood could come to what really happened. Best wishes to all, Lou (Custer fan since 1957 - Alamo fan since 1954)
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Post by Paul Sylvain on Mar 14, 2011 20:43:24 GMT -5
Y'know, the thought just struck me that we could almost do a "Little Big Horn Studies Forum", akin to the Alamo Studies forum here, with as much interest and the passion many of us seem to have for Custer and the battle of the greasy grass, as the Lakota called the event.
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Post by Chuck T on Mar 15, 2011 0:24:31 GMT -5
Paul: We could also do a side thread to your proposed LBH Studies Form for Dien Bien Phu to give this whole thing more of an international flavor than it already has. No I would probably end up posting and then answering myself.
Anyway, there already is a LBH Forum. If you think everyone on this forum is passionate, you ain't seen nothin.
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Post by Allen Wiener on Mar 15, 2011 4:39:49 GMT -5
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Post by Paul Sylvain on Mar 15, 2011 18:37:40 GMT -5
Gotcha! Thanks.
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