|
Post by Chuck T on Jun 1, 2010 15:08:34 GMT -5
Herb: Reference your last. It is my understanding that Custer was offered command of either the 9th or 10th, then (1866) being formed but turned them down in favor of his position in the 7th. The why is not important today to any of us , but evidently it was then to him. Grierson got one of them. Can't remember who got the other. Mackenzie turned out to be insane a few years later, but Custer was not fit to saddle Ranald MacKenzies horse.
|
|
|
Post by Herb on Jun 3, 2010 10:51:49 GMT -5
The condition of Benteen's horses may very well have been a factor, but I tend to doubt it, given the latter advance to Weir Point.
While there were no doubt Indians already between Reno and Custer when Benteen arrived, the way I understand it the major Indian movement from Reno's bluff to the Custer Battlefield was toward the immediate threat - ie along the river and to MTC ford.
Boston Custer's movement, to me, just really damns Benteen.
I did not realize you could see Custer's monument from Weir Point. If that is so, there can be no doubt that despite their testimony to the contrary, that the officers knew that a major battle was being fought (or had been fought) down there. The powder smoke, and dust may have obscured what exactly was happening - but in itself would have revealed that there was a fight.
|
|
|
Post by Chuck T on Jun 3, 2010 11:22:29 GMT -5
The movement was away from Reno to MTC Ford, and from there up on to Greasy Grass Ridge and into Deep Coulee (not ravine) as far as "Henryville".
I took a photo from Weir Point, in what is now the road cut (therefore not as high a the Point itself) which picked up the top half of the monument about two miles away. I don't think they could have seen Custer because of the smoke and such , but probably the last portion or immediate aftermath of the Calhoun Hill fight. There could not have possibly been any doubt in anyones mind that was on that position about 1800 hours that a large fight was either ongoing, or just had, taken place.
Weir, who I believe had the secret hots for Libby suggested as much in a letter to her after the battle. His words were something to the effect that I will tell you all when next we meet. They never did, nor is there any evidence that I am aware of the he ever put more in writing. He died that same December and was not a witness at the Reno Court of Inquiry.
We who enjoy the study of the Alamo sometimes get frustrated with certain aspects of the story, such as that expressed by our newest member. With the LBH the frustration comes in the fact that no one would speak the complete truth as long as Libby was alive. When she died in 1933 is was to late.
|
|
|
Post by Chuck T on Jun 3, 2010 12:12:47 GMT -5
Herb: I think B. Custer reached Custer before E and F went to MTC Ford. Martin did not pass through Reno on the bluffs so the Indians were still fully engaged down in the valley at the time. There must have been a few on the bluffs also because Martin's horse was wounded. I am not sure that the fact that B. Custer got through has any bearing on Benteen's ability to do the same thing later. Now if you want to argue that if Benteen had moved faster that is another matter altogether and you make a strong point. Any faster movement however would by necessity have been without the pack train.
Trying to defend Benteen, and I am not, is a loosing proposition. I am just trying to understand the sequencing of events, and not having a heck of a lot of luck in the trying.
|
|
|
Post by Herb on Jun 3, 2010 13:28:27 GMT -5
Any faster movement however would by necessity have been without the pack train. That's my problem, in places he blames the pack train, but he moved without it in any case. To be perfectly fair to Benteen he did face a hard choice when he reached Reno, kind of similar to D'Erlon at Quatras Bras, who to respond to? At least Benteen made a choice. I've tried to think what I would do in Benteen's shoes, and while I would completed watering of the horses at the Morass, after that I would have moved at a faster pace than a walk to join Custer (maybe alternating from a faster pace to a walk to keep the horses somewhat fresh). At Reno's position, I think I would have proceeded cautiously, (for by this time, I'd have an idea what it was the Regiment was facing) knowing that McDougal and the pack train would soon arrive (the number of the men with McDougal and the pack train was greater than Benteen's or Reno's Battalion) at Reno's position. I think I would then "try" to reach Custer, but I think, I'd have it in the back of my mind if I ran into determined opposition enroute to fall back and unite with Reno. I don't think I'd even consider moving the packs beyond Reno - other than the mule already with my column. But, that's just me! I'm finding it to be a greater problem too, as I'm beginning to question a lot of the reported times coming from the bluff. I think both Benteen and Reno were overly concerned with what happened to Elliot, and with their "dislike" for Custer and that colored their decision making. I think very obviously, that they no way considered that Custer would run into the trouble that he did and that they honestly expected to find Custer forted up on some other ridge or with Terry and Gibbon.
|
|
|
Post by Chuck T on Jun 3, 2010 14:59:55 GMT -5
Somewhere, and I believe I first read it in Godfrey, that the Army used Chicago time throughout the whole campaign. Chicago time, as I understand it was about two hours ahead of local time (position of the sun etc.) This was all before standard time zones.
All of this of course confuses the naratives from the two sides in that as far as the Indians were concerned the action started over the noon hour, but to the Army it was mid-afternoon.
I too wonder from time to time what actions I would have taken in Benteen's place. The answer is to probably seek detached duty, or take leave from 1 June onward. Now being serious,. You have again keyed in on the problem. The command climate in the 7th Cavalry sucked. You were either a Custer or an anti-Custer man. That was Custer's fault, and you know as well as I had that happened today he would have been relieved for cause. In those days few of Custer's superiors probably knew of it, or if they did, they did not care. There were a lot of folks in those days where the phrase - I have lost confidence in his ability to lead - applies.
|
|
|
Post by Allen Wiener on Jun 3, 2010 15:31:12 GMT -5
Herb - that occurred to me several times while reading Philbrick and then going back to Gray, Donovan, Stewart and others. Custer did not communicate his plans or thoughts very well with his subordinates, and all Reno knew was that Custer promised to support him. I think that's what Custer was trying to do, but he never realized how desperate Reno's situation had become. Even when he knew Reno had retreated back across the river, I think he believed that Reno could renew his attack if Custer could draw the Indians away from him.
By the same token, for quite a while neither did Reno nor Benteen knew what condition Custer was in or even where he was. As you say, their thoughts ran toward the abandonment of Elliott and Custer's habit of going off on his own. It's plausible that they thought Custer was just fine and holed up somewhere, or maybe even on his way to Terry, ditching them as they believed he had ditched Elliott.
However, once the shooting was heard from Custer's position and Weir began the effort to go go Custer, they knew where he was and what was going on. Nonetheless, I agree it was too late and they had no choice but to save themselves and retreat back to Reno Hill, ahead of the Indians who were advancing on them.
I don't think that lets Benteen off the hook. He said himself that he had no idea where Custer was and thus should have followed his orders and "come quick" to Custer. Once he passed Boston Custer, he knew where Custer was. He had also said that he'd have to go without the packs if Custer needed him to come so quickly. Nonetheless, he was faced with a choice in this regard once he saw the sorry shape Reno and his battalion were in. But, I think the least he should have done is to send a recon. mission out to see where the Indians who had attacked Reno had suddenly disappeared to. I think he should have realized that it was important to know what the Indians were up to and to be ready for a renewal of their attack, thus he should have had scouts find out where they were and what they were doing. Would that have changed anything? Hard to say.
Regarding the time factor, I think they were on Chicago time, thus the discrepancies in white and Indian accounts. Gray, of course, has gone as far as anyone is ever likely to in trying to track what happened when and where with his time/motion analysis, which is highly commendable but also uncertain. Gray admits this himself, but he has given us as good a picture of how things played out as we're likely to get.
Allen
|
|
|
Post by Chuck T on Jun 3, 2010 17:41:01 GMT -5
Allen and Herb: Two things to note:
I don't think we have any conclusive evidence that Custer knew that Reno had retreated back across the river. Reno had not retreated when B. Custer passed that position. Reno had not retreated when Martin passed that position. The only way he could have known is if Boyer and the scouts told him. I will leave it to Allen in his September visit to determine if you can see the retreat crossing from Weir Point, which Curley says is where they (Boyer and the scouts, not Custer) observed Reno from. I do not think you can. I believe the reason that Boyer and the scouts went to Weir Point in the first place was to take a look see at MTC Ford, while Custer and the column were decending Cedar Coulee and into MT Coulee. I believe Custer saw for himself only the skirmish line portion of the Reno valley fight and based his plan to support Reno accordingly.
Here I go "defending" Benteen again: B.Custer passes Benteen, not the other way around. B. Custer only had a vague idea where his brother was, and pointedly asked Martin - Where is the General?. The basis of my belief about the time lapse is that Martin answered - On the other side of the ridge you will find him. That ridge was most likely Sharpshooter's Ridge, which would place the meeting site at the approximate location of Reno/Benteen's defense position, probably near the knoll between these two locations.
This whole what can you see, what can't you see business would be so simple if 1) the NPS owned all the land in question. 2) The river had not changed course. 3) The timber was in the same place it was in 1876. And then there are those pesky critters, none of which I desire to have a close personal relationship with.
|
|
|
Post by Allen Wiener on Jun 3, 2010 19:24:49 GMT -5
The problem is that Curley is our only source for the story that Custer was aware that Reno had retreated back across the river. Curley says that Custer did not see that himself, that only he and Boyer saw it and that Boyer took Custer the bad news. Curley gave several interviews over the years; he mentions this in some of them, but not all of them. In his July 19,1910 interview he only gave this information when he was specifically asked (following from Camp's interview in Hammer):
Q: "How much of Reno's battle did Curley see? Did he see Reno's retreat?"
A: "Yes, saw retreat and Bouyer than gave signal to Custer. Custer and tom Custer returned signal by waving hats, and men cheered." [NOTE: This oft-repeated quote really confuses me!] "Bouyer probably told Custer Reno had been defeated, for Bouyer did a whole lot of talking to Custer when he joined him and kept talking while they were riding side by side."
In his interview of Sept. 30, 1913, Curley is quoted as saying:
"I had seen Reno defeated in the bottom and discussed it with Mitch [Boyer]. I saw Mitch say something to General custere when we met him and presumed tdhat he must have informed him about Reno's situation. On the battlefield, near Calhoun marker, I saw Mitch talking with the general. Mitch said that Custer told him the command would very likely all be wiped out and he (Custer) wanted the scouts to get out if they could."
He also mentions seeing Reno's command on Reno Hill from a distance, but he escaped in a different direction in order to find Terry and Gibbon, as Boyer had apparently told him to do. Curley's various interviews do appear to be consistent. Gray clearly believes him, but I'm not sure that Philbrick does; he discusses the accusations of the other 3 Crow scouts that Curley was the first to desert Custer, not the one who remained behind after they had left. So Curley's testimony may not be 100% reliable. I'm not sure it matters. After all, Custer was now stuck where he was and had to make the best of it and, even if he thought Reno had to retreat, he also might well think that a daring attack by him at the north end of the camp might be all Reno needed to renew his own attack. Regardless of what Custer knew of the extent of Reno's troubles, he had to follow a strategy something like this.
I've been going over a lot of different maps and descriptions the past few days and even photocopied some of the maps to enlarge them. I'd like to make my own "master map" that incorporates all of the key features and locations to take with me, along with annotation that summarizes what happened at each point. Each map includes some features, but not all, and some use different names for various points. I understand that the driving route is well marked with turnoffs and the free NPS map looks like a good summary guide to each of the stops on that route.
Chuck, you raise good points about the inability to walk over the entire area, and the change in the river's course, etc., so I'll have to keep that in mind. I have been told that it is possible to go down to the village area, or near it, at the post office (the Garryowen Post Office, I believe), where it might also be possible to see Reno's skirmish line positions and maybe the timber from ground level. I hope that is possible. And I've been warned several times about the rattlers and told to stay to the path.
Allen
|
|
|
Post by Chuck T on Jun 3, 2010 19:52:36 GMT -5
Allen: Garryowen Post Office is at the approximate location of the south end of the Hunkpapa Circle. The two skirmish lines are about 100 and 150 yards south respectively. The timber is slightly south and east of the skirmish lines. The problem for today is that the timber of today and yesteryear are somewhat different giving one some difficulty in locating it while on the ground. I think that is all in private hands. The Garryowen Post Office is really a gas station and book shop with a don't waste your money museum attached. You may be able to wander around in the rear of it an see something of the river. I did not try and do not know for sure.
The 1:24000 scale map that is available is way out of date. I think it was last updated in 1965 or theeabouts. Not to worry. The battlefield as depicted on the map has not changed. It is only in the valley portion of the map where it gives you problems. Consult your pictomap and make any changes required to your blow-ups and you should be fine.
I wish to God sometimes I had never heard of Curley. He is a fly in the buttermilk.
|
|
|
Post by Allen Wiener on Jun 3, 2010 21:47:04 GMT -5
Well, I'm finding enough flies to suit Renfield. Here's one from Gray's second book, Custer's Last Campaign (p. 354-55), including Gray's bracketed time estimates and corrections:
"Reno's command moved out of the timber [3:53] and was running back [until 4:00]; at same time, the [three] Crows were running back, driven by the Sioux [3:49 to 3:58]. I could see them (Reno's men) running, while the Crows were running. . . . Reno's men ran from timber about same time Custer's command turned from mouth of deep coulee [Cedar Coulee], and the same time [three] Crows ran back."
Gray never identifies who Lt. Roe is (although I found info on him elsewhere) and he has no footnote for the quotation. He prefaces it only by referring to it as "from Lt. Roe's interview with Curley (1881)." This is not in any of my other sources and I had to hunt through Gray's bibliography to find the following source reference:
Custer Engages the Hostiles, edited by Michael J. Koury (Fort Collins, CO.: Old Army Press, no date), which includes the article "Custer's Last Battle" by Charles F. Roe. Apparently, Roe's article contains info from an 1881 interview he conducted with Curley.
So at least 2 sources with interviews with Curley, done many years apart, contain this story. I agree that Curley becomes a problematic witness, given the criticism of him by the other Crow scouts, but they may have had their own agenda and sought to discredit him in order to conceal the fact they'd departed from Custer earlier, while Curley stayed behind with Boyer. There was nothing dishonorable in their leaving; Custer had told them to leave and they had signed on only as scouts. Boyer and Curley elected to stay and Curley (according to him) left at Boyer's urging. Once the Custer "massacre" became such a sensation, and Indian participants found themselves repeatedly being grilled by reporters and interrogators, the three Crow scouts may wanted to do the same sort of damage control that military participants did at the Reno Inquiry.
Allen
|
|
|
Post by Chuck T on Jun 4, 2010 6:42:57 GMT -5
Allen: Your last post contains a few flies of its own. On the face of it Curley must have had his own personal helicopter.
Where were the three Crows running from - to?
The mouth of Cedar Coulee is about a mile from the mouth of Deep Coulee (not ravine). Cedar Coulee is indeed deep and emptys into MTC from Weir Ridge. Deep Coulee starts on Calhoun Hill and intersects MTC very near MTC Ford. It was back up Deep Coulee that E and F retreated to the meeting on Calhoun Hill with C, I, and L
Everyone involved in this affair was playing CYA. I don't think the Crows including Curley were any different. What makes the Curley story suspect at least in part is why if he could escape by going east did not some of the other attempt the same thing when they saw the jig was up. That may be a little unfair, but recall that there was that unknown trooper thought by some to be Harrington who broke through, outdistanced his pursuit, suddenly stoped, pulled his pistol, and dispensed with his brains. That is one strange story in itself.
I have heard of Roe, but for the life of me I cannot recall in what context.
Don't know if your interested in WWII. Started a first rate book the other day by Antony Beevor "D-Day - The Battle For Normandy". It is a very good overview of the entire campaign up to the liberation of Paris. Written by a Brit - Very Balanced, by which I mean that he does not worship at the altar of Montgomery, gives the Germans a vote, and points out everybodies mistakes without favor. Good Read
|
|
|
Post by Kevin Young on Jun 6, 2010 7:05:43 GMT -5
|
|
|
Post by Chuck T on Jun 6, 2010 9:22:32 GMT -5
Brice C. W. Custer served as ciommander of the 7th Cavalry Regiment for a couple of short periods in the late 1940's while the regiment was stationed in Japan. I am sure that is the same Colonel that is refered to in the newspaper article. Positive image - Libby Lives
|
|
|
Post by Allen Wiener on Jun 6, 2010 10:25:39 GMT -5
Interesting. I guess the wagons were circled a long time ago.
|
|