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Post by Herb on May 29, 2010 15:06:06 GMT -5
In the review Philbrick's book Allen wrote:
Allen, here is part of the problem, most modern writers, don't fully grasp, military operations without modern communications, the effects of weather, fatique, and time-distance factors.
Taking "straight line distances" and not actual marching distances, here's the situation on May16th when Gibbon made contact with the Indian village at the Yellowstone and Tonque River (transferred to the East Coast for easier understanding)
Terry and Custer have not yet left Washington D.C. (Fort Abraham Lincoln), Crook is currently at Fort Fetterman (Charleston, WV). Gibbon left Toledo,OH, Fort Ellis) a MONTH and a HALF ago, marching through knee deep snow much of the way, and since leaving Akron Ohio, a month ago has been operating in hostile territory. When he makes contact, he has established a camp at Johnstown, PA.
Until, he makes contact, Gibbon (and for that matter Crook and Terry) only know that the Indians are operating somewhere in southern PA, eastern OH, WV or Maryland.
I hope moving the scene of the action to the east, gives an idea how difficult communicating with the other columns really was. Telegraph communications are located at Fort Ellis, Fort Abraham Lincoln, and Fort Larame (south of Fort Fetterman). Actual coordination of the columns is virtually impossible until they make physical contact.
The key point here, is that given these vast distances (and more importantly the virtually total lack of communications) these independent columns were operating in, the most important point was to make contact with the Indians and more importantly maintain contact until the Indain was defeated. Terry, Gibbon, and Crook, all broke contact once they had made it at least once during the campaign.
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Post by Chuck T on May 29, 2010 19:38:56 GMT -5
The Philbrick version of the Battle of the Little Big Horn may not be completely accurate, but it makes a heck of a lot of sense and will only be overcome by evidence yet to be discovered. Will all of you agree with me? No, I doubt it. But then, what has changed about that since 1876. He is balanced, and I did not discover one illogical conclusion.
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Post by Allen Wiener on May 29, 2010 22:01:37 GMT -5
Chuck, I am delighted to hear you say that, because the very same thoughts popped into my head repeatedly as I read Philbrick's book. His scenario that has Custer digesting the bad news about Reno, his apparent confidence that Benteen must be close behind, and his forming a strategy for a swift attack to take hostages really hit me. "It makes sense," I heard myself blurt out. In all the previous accounts, I had wondered what the deuce Custer was doing up there all that time and never found a really satisfactory explanation. Utley may have come close with the 4 scenarios he suggests at the end of Cavalier in Buckskin, but Philbrick's speculation makes perfect sense, and frankly it might have worked! Sitting Bull certainly seems to have thought so and later said he thought the Indians were toast when he saw Custer's battalion across the river, making its way north. If Custer can be faulted for anything at that point, it is for having too much confidence in Reno and especially Benteen.
Certainly every Custer/LBH book is going to resurrect many long-standing arguments and, as I noted in my review, all authors come to a point where they have to speculate about what happened to Custer, what he did, and why he did it. Philbrick's scenario makes sense and takes into account Custer's own track record and his need to improvise on the scene. In fact, improvising seems to have been a necessary evil in fighting Indians on the Plains.
Which leads me to Herb's points, all of which are important and often missed. I think we make this mistake a lot in studying history, including studies of the Alamo. It's important to try to recapture the time in which events took place. Herb's points about time, distance and the limits of communication, especially considering the need to rely on commanders to take initiative and swift action if they should find the Indians, actually supports Custer's actions at LBH. This is exactly the position he found himself in. He had broad authority, in fact instructions, to find the Indians. Regardless of the discrepancies between Terry's written and verbal orders to Custer, "finding the Indians" included a tacit order to attack them, if they were found. That is what he did, and his initial plan was sound and should have worked. Had he positioned his forces in the dark and attacked from more than one direction at dawn, the Indians would have been in total disarray, as they were at Washita. It would have been relatively easy to round up hostages and force an Indian surrender. It was when Custer learned he'd been discovered, and his primary fear that the Indians would scatter became uppermost in his mind, that he had to improvise a new plan on the spot. We will always wonder if that plan, too, might have worked had Benteen been a more responsive soldier, or if Reno had held out a bit longer in the timber. Philbrick also points out that, while the Indian attack on Reno was spirited, it could easily have been seen as a typical Indian delaying tactic designed to allow the non-combatants to escape the village. That may well be what Custer assumed and it would have encouraged his plan to take hostages further up the village, while Reno kept the warriors busy. In fact, most of the warriors where occupied with Reno or frantically gathering ponies, leaving most of the village defenseless for some time.
I also believe that the surprisingly long time that elapsed between the Reno attack, his fallback to the timber, and wild retreat across the river, and Custer's actions further north played a key role in the battle's outcome. I'm still not entirely sure why Custer took so long to locate a ford by which he could cross the river and bring on an attack to support Reno and quite possibly throw the village into panic. Maybe he was waiting for Benteen and expected him and the pack mules to arrive in a short time, after which he would conduct such an attack. Also, he wasn't seeing much resistance up there and may have thought Reno still had the Indians occupied at his end of the camp, leaving Custer time to find a crossing and also wait for Benteen.
Regarding Gibbon, the knock on him is that he did NOT do what Custer did when he twice located the Indians, but did nothing. In Philbrick's account, he actually observed the Indians' encampment at one point, but did nothing and then withdrew. Given his Civil War record, and the general understanding that the Indians should be pursued and attacked, his actions are puzzling. As to Crook, I think it was incumbent on him to communicate with Terry as soon as possible when he'd actually engaged the Indians and found them far more combative than in the past. True, the word may not have arrived in time to warn Custer, but Crook should have reported.
Philbrick also makes the interesting point that, toward the end on Last Stand Hill, the Indians were actually fighting in a way they'd never done before. All out attack and annihilation of the enemy was not the way they normally fought. One warrior recalled that it was only the daring charge by a group called the "Suicide Boys" that emboldened the other Indians to also charge the soldiers and finish them off. Would a timely arrival by Benteen and a stronger defense have discouraged the Indians from doing that? Who knows?
Allen
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Post by Herb on May 30, 2010 10:16:30 GMT -5
Regarding Gibbon, the knock on him is that he did NOT do what Custer did when he twice located the Indians, but did nothing. In Philbrick's account, he actually observed the Indians' encampment at one point, but did nothing and then withdrew. Given his Civil War record, and the general understanding that the Indians should be pursued and attacked, his actions are puzzling. Yeah, this is what I mean about doing more digging. Gibbon was on one side of the Yellowstone with 450 soldiers, across the river was the Indian camp with an estimated (at that time) 700 warriors. Gibbon, without boats, attempted to force a river crossing which was defeated by the Souix. There probably is no more difficult military operation than an opposed river crossing. Probably more importantly and almost totally ignored is while all this was going on Gibbon fell sick and was literally bedridden (with no bed )for the next week or so. Fatique, illness, etc., in the wet cold of a Montana spring, obviously sapped both his physical and mental energy and he responded with an uncharacteristic lethargy to the developing situation. Unfortunatly, unlike the other two much larger columns, he lacked an experienced subordinate capable of running the unit while he was incapacitated. It may not be dramatic, but battles often turn on these small details. Gibbon's second failure and a more legimate criticism, was he didn't report the action to Terry until much later. Though any messenger would have had to travel through the Indain controlled territory between Gibbon and Terry. Here's the problem, as I see it. This is a legimate criticism, but it's also superficial and irrelevant. Given the distances involved that communications had to travel, there is no way a timily report would have made a difference. Crook made many more far serious mistakes that more often go unnoticed and uncommented - especially the weeks he spent fly fishing after the Battle of Rosebud instead of doing his duty
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Post by Allen Wiener on May 30, 2010 16:24:53 GMT -5
Herb, you're right -- I went back and checked Philbrick and he pretty much brushes off the Gibbon business by saying he was, apparently, doing all he could to avoid the Indians, even though he notes that the Yellowstone was extremely swift and that even the Far West had all it could do to work its way upstream. While others, including Donovan and particularly Gray (Centennial Campaign) have plenty of criticism of Gibbon, they do describe the events pretty much as you have related them. He made a legit effort to cross the Yellowstone and got nowhere, lost horses, some of his men were killed, and he was low on rations and other supplies. He did send at least one communication to Terry, but as you note, it arrived quite late. This is the first real fault I've found in Philbrick's book and I wonder if it was the result of editing. His notes indicate that Lt. James Bradley's journal is his source for the Montana Column account.
Gray is very high on Bradley and notes that Gibbon ordered the move out as soon as Bradley reported the location of the village, with the clear intention of attacking it. Interesting to not the similarities with LBH re: the soldiers expecting to be outnumbered at least 2-1, but no concern about it, and the Custer-Washita-like plan to surround the camp in the dark and attack at daybreak. However, the Yellowstone proved impossible to cross, although Gibbon did try, and before long he learned that the Sioux had spotted him, thus eliminating the chance of a surprise attack. Gray criticizes Gibbon for failing to report to Terry at all about the large Indian village he'd locate, or his effort to cross the river. Bradley later located the same village again, which had moved from the Tongue to the Rosebud and grown larger, only 18 miles from Gibbon's location and immediately reported to Gibbon. Again, Gray does not criticize Gibbon for refusing to try another river crossing and attack on such a large village, but he does take him to task for, again, failing to even attempt to notify Terry. In fact, he accuses Gibbon of deliberately suppressing Bradley's report, never once ever mentioning it in his report or in a popular account he wrote later. Although he began a report to Terry as soon as he heard from Bradley, he specifically stated that NO camps had been seen. He mentioned only the small, scattered war parties that had been seen. Only in a P.S., as an afterthought, did he mention that "a camp some distance up the Rosebud was reported this morning by our scouts. If this proves true, I may not start down the Yellowstone so soon." Gray's mind is boggled by this report in the face of the numerous war parties that had been sighted, as well as the large village, noting that "Locating these Indians in order to whip them was the very goal of the campaign. Yet Gibbon had made no report of the first discovery, and after the second still reported that no camps had been seen, except for a doubtful recent claim! And later, he refused even to admit this much!" Gray wonders if Gibbon was preoccupied with logistics (rations and other supplies were low) or distrusted anything he hadn't seen for himself (doubtful, given his quick responses to other reports from his scouts). He further criticizes Gibbon for risking the lives of 3 men to carry such a worthless communiqué.
Gray also criticizes Crook for a poor performance at Rosebud and what he regards as whitewashing it, such as reporting that he'd routed the Indians, but was solidly contradicted by news correspondents who were with him. His own scouts were disgusted with him too. He also reported to Sheridan, not Terry. I don't think Gray is as critical of Crook's performance as he is of his attempts to inflate or glamorize it, and misrepresent what had actually happened. He notes that Crook was also low on rations and ammunition after the fight and had little choice but to withdraw.
Donovan’s version of Gibbon and Crook’s actions pretty much mirror Gray’s. He also mentions that Crook pretty much disengaged himself from the campaign after his withdrawal from the Rosebud, where the troops “spent much of their time fishing, hunting, prospecting, even playing baseball.” Lt. Bourke noted that “My note-books about this time seem to be almost the chronicle of a sporting club.”
Allen
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Post by Herb on May 31, 2010 8:00:12 GMT -5
Gray also criticizes Crook .... His own scouts were disgusted with him too. He also reported to Sheridan, not Terry. Allen Again, to me the reporting stuff is superficial, Crook has no idea where Terry is, and any report has to travel back to Fort Larame and be telegraphed to Fort Abraham Lincoln and then travel forward to Terry. By the time Terry got the information it would be irrelevant. And while Terry is senior to Crook, they are both commanders of seperate Departments. Until and unless they unite forces, their mutual superior officer is the Division Commander, Sheridan. Crooks' reports are very properly going to Sheridan. It is Sheridan's responsibility to coordinate the forces of the two departments (though somebody more concerned about winning a campaign than Crook apparently was, would have at least tried to have kept his fellow commander informed). Where Crook really shows his stuff, is later in the campaign, when Terry and Crook join forces on the Rosebud. After a very short time, without informing Terry who very properly is now in command of the joint forces, Crook sneaks his troops away to regain his role as an independent commander. There is a whole subscenario, worth exploring here, and that's comparing the commanders and their actions after the summer of 76 with those who mounted the campaign in the winter and into 1877. Why the big difference? and what does it say about the peacetime management of the Army vs wartime (by both civilian and military heads)? Of course all this is ignoring the Souix, for on any battlefield the enemy has a vote on what happens.
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Post by Allen Wiener on May 31, 2010 10:20:10 GMT -5
Thanks Herb. That command structure is something that's never really been made clear to me in the various books. Some of these guys were real pieces of work. I have to wonder why this particular group of officers were put in command. Terry had no real experience fighting Indians and Crook seems unreliable. I guess this was the best Sheridan had. I think you have a point about the management of the army in wartime vs. peacetime, but the nature of Indian warfare itself, as well as the terrain in this particular theater, seem to have been important factors in the way the officers acted. And it's certainly true that the Indians had a lot to say about the way things played out.
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Post by Chuck T on May 31, 2010 11:03:29 GMT -5
Allen: You and Herb have both hit on some very important points. I think the best of them all were MacKenzie and Miles, both of them almost forgotten figures in "popular" history, but that is another story. I have mentioned "Yellowstone Campaign" before. This is an important book for anyone interested in this period. It follows the 5th Infantry under Miles from the time of the Little Big Horn until the end on the campaign in mid-1877. It also explores some of the ill feeling that existed between the players at the time. Good Read.
I think Crook found that fighting the northern tribes was quite a bit different than fighting the Apache in Arizona.
The more I think about Philbrick the more I am convinced that the movement by E and F on Medicine Tail Coulee Ford was a recon, as was the movement toward the ford near the present National Cemetery. MTCF is not very good, one bank being much higher than the other. The one near the cemetery is much better. These are my views based upon a long distance view as both of these fords are on private property. I think my view will stand up to close inspection though. MTCF is also much more narrow, and as such not very good for the crossing of mounted men in anything but a column formation, which is hardly one a commander would choose for a deliberate attack. There is an interesting roadside painting of E and F deployed in line moving toward the ford that is one of the stops on the tour.
It is well worth remembering in any fight the enemy always has a vote.
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Post by Allen Wiener on May 31, 2010 11:35:49 GMT -5
Chuck, is there any way that visitors can get permission to get down into that area? It's all on Crow Reservation land, so I guess the tribe would have to approve.
I've been rereading a lot of this stuff and I keep wondering why Custer was taking what looks like a lot of time while Reno is fighting the Indians, and Custer had promised to support him. I'm sure that, at some point, Reno felt Custer had abandoned him there as he never showed up. However, Custer went into this thing with little-to-no recon and may have thought the river would be easier to cross than it turned out to be. Was his delaying the result of finding there were no easy crossings easily found, and his belief that Benteen would arrive quickly, as ordered? There seems to have been a fairly long period of quiet where Custer was and he may have believed he had sufficient time to stage the second attack, supporting Reno, once Benteen arrived. This is the impression I had after reading Philbrick, which is why I thought his speculation makes more sense than others I've read.
I agree that the E & F move was probably a recon that fits the idea Custer was looking for a suitable ford in order to be ready to move as soon as Benteen arrived. And you're probably right about the ford further north near the National Cemetary; Custer was still scouting that (and possibly eyeballing the Indian women) even after Keough and Calhoun had come under fire. It may be that Custer clung to this plan, believing Benteen would arrive, only to find himself abandoned and fighting a desperate, losing defense.
Allen
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Post by Chuck T on May 31, 2010 12:28:15 GMT -5
Allen: I am sure there is a way to get down to the fords but you would have to ask permission of someone. I am not sure that it is all Indian land. There may be some portions that are privately held by others. I would call or write the battlefield. I am sure they would know.
I think the answer to your question about Custer and Reno revolves around just what phase of the Reno fight Custer observed and what may have been reported to him by his scouts, particularly Boyer. If he knew Reno was in the timber, with good cover in what he thought to be a reasonable defensive position, Custer taking his time would make some sense. If on the other hand Custer knew that Reno had lost his head and started a retrograde stampede to the bluffs that is another matter altogether. My assumption, and it is only that, is that he must have thought Reno was holding his own, therefore thinking that he has time for recon followed by a deliberate attack. The other alternative borders on the criminal. In fact there is no border about it.
Benteen takes a lot of blame in the Philbrick book. I am not sure that he could have cut his way through to Custer. Recall that Reno was on the bluffs when Benteeen arrived. Benteen was ordered by Custer to stay with and bring forward the pack train. Those two factors alone lead me to believe that there were a large number of Indians between Reno/Benteen and Custer, the same Indians that had drawn off of Reno and were at that time either engaging or about to engage the rear guard under Keogh.
Again it all about terrain and timing. The fact that they did move toward Weir Point after getting their act together says to me that these Indians that were in between used that time gap to fully engage Keogh. What Benteen and company saw at Weir Point may have just been the end of that part of the action. It is speculation but the Indians that turned toward Weir Point from the southern portion of Battle Ridge could very well have left quite enough of their friends behind to clean up Custer about three quarters of a mile away to the north. You can see the monument of Last Stand Hill from Weir Point but I highly doubt you could have seen anything that day due to the smoke of battle.
Let me know what you find out about getting permission to visit the fords. Watch out for them critters.
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Post by Allen Wiener on May 31, 2010 19:52:08 GMT -5
Chuck, I think those are the key questions that we can never fully answer decisively; how much did Custer know, and when did he know it re: Reno. I think Philbrick has done a good job of guess-temating what probably happened, and what Custer was most likely thinking/planning, and so do Gray and Donovan. There really isn't a lot of disagreement here on what the possible scenarios were. The only real source we have as to what Custer knew is Curley, as he survived, saw much of the battle, and was with Boyer, observing the Reno fight. I think all the books say that Boyer saw Reno's collapse and retreat, and reported it to Custer, but it is possible that Custer thought Reno was being hard pressed by the Indians, but not in total disarray and capable of regrouping if Custer launched his own attack. If so, he may have thought a supporting attack by him was still feasible and could result in a victory.
I find it very hard to cut Benteen any slack at all. I think he was the equivalent of several chronic malcontent employees I worked with over the years. He bitched about all of his commanders and was very quick to criticize them, but he declined to command himself and had, in fact, urged Sheridan to restore Custer to command after Grant had removed him. I don't think any author suggests that Benteen would have made a difference in the Custer fight, except to add more casualties, and the fact that his path took him by Reno's position mitigates in his defense, as well as the points you raised re: the Weir effort. However, although Benteen might not have been able to save Custer, there is no excuse for his dawdling and failure to follow orders to "come quick," which he received more than once. At one point he was heard to say that he could not wait for the pack train if Custer needed him so urgently, but later said he had to wait for the packs. There was also a considerable lull between the time the Indians withdrew from Reno Hill (to attack Custer) and any movement at all by Reno or Benteen. Others urged them to reform and move to Custer as fast as possible and clearly heard the firing from Custer's position, including what may have been signaling volleys, but although many others clearly heard it and commented on it, Reno and Benteen insisted they heard nothing. Although Benteen gets credit for organizing and leading on Reno Hill, he took his time about that, too. When the pack train arrived, the company commander expressed shock at what he saw. He thought nothing was being done to either assist Custer or to prepare for a return by the Sioux. This lull and inaction weighs heavily against Benteen, not to mention Reno, who was boozing continually at this point. Nonetheless, the timing may not be as clear-cut as it sounds, and it may have been too late to help Custer in any case. There were still a few Indians left to keep an eye on Reno Hill, and convince those still hiding in the timber with Herendeen to stay put, and I'm not at all sure how many may have been between the forces on Reno Hill and those with Custer. I agree that, by the time Weir got moving, followed by the others, it was probably too late and clearly they could not have cut their way through the Indians who moved toward them.
I've spoken to the folks at LBH about this and there may be a way, but they are highly cautious about the rattlesnakes and strongly advise that you stay to the marked paths. If I can get a look at the coulees from Battle Ridge, that might suffice.
Allen
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Post by Chuck T on May 31, 2010 21:52:33 GMT -5
Allen: Check your pictomap. You can see Ford D from the service road enough to size it up pretty well. MTC Ford is the one that you can't see the difficulty of at a distance. As least I could not.
Benteen deserves no slack. The fact is that I don't think he could have accomplished the link up even if he had used all deliberate speed. It was not the Indians that stayed behind to keep Reno in check, but rather those that had drawn off to go after Custer that would have presented the problem.
I checked the map and from what I remember of being there and what I assume was Boyer's point of observation I am not sure that Boyer could have seen the stampede from the timber. He should have been able though to see the withdrawl from the second of two skirmish lines into the timber. The timber has changed since 1876 as has the course of the river (slightly). It was my impression that Boyer was watching from Weir Point as Custer & Co were going down Cedar Coulee and spliting half going to B-N-C Ridge and the others on their first recon to MTCF. I think I am correct in this but you never know.
As a sidebar, for the same reasons that I would think it would be impossible for Benteen to link up with Custer, I think it would be equally impossible for Custer to retrograde and link up with Reno/Benteen. As E & F withdrew from MTCF to rejoin at Calhoun Hill I think it was already to late although Custer had no way of knowing this. He had one avenue of retreat B-N-C Ridge to Luce Ridge - Staying east of MTC and Weir Ridge and working his way south and then west to join Reno or link with Benteen as he did not know (presumably) that Reno was there. Hindsight here is not valid though in that Custer did not know just how critical his situation was and retreat probably never entered his mind.
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Post by Herb on Jun 1, 2010 13:58:30 GMT -5
Reference Benteen, remember that there was more than one messenger, sent to hurry Benteen, Martini was simply the last. Also, don't forget that Boston Custer traveling with the Pack Train, passed Benteen at the Morass and caught up wit the five companies.
I'd also point out that there were a few men (I don't remember offhand how many) with the five companies whose horses broke down and travelled back and linked up with Reno's command. (if you look at the surviving post battle muster roll and subtract the men each company had with the pack train, you'll find a handful of additional survivors from the five companies).
I honestly think if Benteen would have executed his orders the way we expect a cavalry commander to do, and marched to the sound of the guns - he would have arrived in plenty of time. Whether it would have made a difference for Custer, or even if by marching to join Custer it would have meant the total destruction of Reno's men is another matter.
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Post by Herb on Jun 1, 2010 14:17:28 GMT -5
Here's a sidebar, that I find interesting, at the time of the LBH, the age of the various commanders were:
Terry 49 Gibbon 49 Crook 47 Custer 36
The two commanders that eventually avenged Custer:
Miles 36 MacKenzie 35
Worth noting, is that MacKenzie was a junior at West Point when Custer graduated, and had considerably less experience in the Civil War than Custer, yet by 1876, Mackenzie was a full Colonel and the commander of one of the prewar cavalry regiments (the 4th) while Custer was still a light Colonel and actually the 7th's XO.
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Post by Chuck T on Jun 1, 2010 15:02:39 GMT -5
Herb: I did just what you suggested. "Of Garryowen In Glory" has a complete roster by company as an appendix. In Company C as of 30 June 76 there were 29 enlisted soldiers and NCO's including 3 on detached service at Fort Lincoln, 2 in confinement at Fort Lincoln and 1 sick in hospital at Fort Lincoln. The remaining 23 were at Little Big Horn and survived including Thompson and Watson. Company C incurred 36 NCO and enlisted casualties during the battle, meaning that roughly 40 percent of their NCO and enlisted strength participated in the battle and survived. The other four companies have a similar story to tell.
If anyone on 25 June 1876 acted in a manner that we would expect of a cavalry officer it must be a well kept secret. Godfrey seems to have handled Company K quite well on the retrograde and delay back from Weir Point. I suppose if I thought for a few moments that another couple of officers would come to mind, but all in all the lack of soldierly conduct and standards is quite appalling.
Kanipe of Company C was the first messanger, but I believe the message was directed to MacDougal of Company B escorting the pack train. Not sure if Benteen read the message or not although I believe he talked to Kanipe when they passed each other. B. Custer passed Martin (Martini) well north of Benteen somewhere between the ultimate Reno defense position and where Cedar Coulee decends into Medicine Tail Coulee. Martin's answer to B.Custer's question - "Where is the general" - was - "Just on the other side of that ridge you will find him". I take that to mean they were quite close when they met. My area of speculation as to where that meeting took place is based upon that conversation and the testimony of Martin saying he left the column as it decended into Cedar Coulee. I don't think Benteen would have gotten Custer's message for another 15-20 minutes. Remember also that Martin's horse was wounded indicating the presence of some Indians and B. Custer was on a fresh horse as opposed to the tired old nags that Bentween's troopers rode. All these points are minor but taken together they build up to that point - for want of a nail the shoe was lost.
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