Post by stuart on Nov 17, 2007 12:52:01 GMT -5
There seems to be a fondness in some quarters to play up the apparent organisational chaos in the Texian armies and to dwell on the apparent readiness of men to switch from one unit to another.
Its therefore worth analysing why most of these transfers actually took place, but first a little clarity as to how the armies were supposed to be organised and run might be helpful. In theory there were a bewildering variety of classes; regulars, permanent volunteers, auxiliary volunteers and so on, but in practice there were just three.
In the early part of the revolution the so-called “Army of the People” was a very temporary ad hoc organisation of volunteer militia who turned out under their elected local leaders, and stayed out only for so long as the perceived danger to their community outweighed the inconvenience. Individually they were brave enough but they were not soldiers. Given the right leadership they could rush into battle, but they only fought effectively if placed in a reasonably secure position and expected to stay there, rather than manoeuvre and fight in the open.
After the commencement of the Runaway Scrape many of these same men turned out again but were more or less forcibly formed by Houston into one of two properly organised and trained regiments along with the volunteers arriving from the States. Although very different in character, both armies are quite straightforward to understand.
The interesting army is the one that served from the fall of Bexar to the disaster at Goliad, which for the sake of convenience can be termed the volunteer army since it was overwhelmingly made up of volunteers from the United States. Some of those units, such as the New Orleans Greys obviously overlapped with the Army of the People but were significantly different in character. The various distinctions between regulars and the various classes of volunteers were bureaucratic ones of no relevance to what was actually happening in the field; far better to simply distinguish between established companies and march or transit companies.
The first speak for themselves, while the latter were more or less ad hoc “units” temporarily formed as a means of conveniently forwarding individual volunteers to the front. If the man conducting the unit sufficiently impressed his charges they might well elect to stick with him from there on in, but on the other hand if having once reached Bexar or Goliad or wherever they then decided to join one or other of the units they found already serving there that is not necessarily an indicator of poor leadership or organisation since their transit unit was intended to be a temporary one.
What did complicate matters obviously was the split, largely precipitated by Grant, between the Federalists and the Patriots, but paradoxically this did not really affect unit organisation inasmuch as in the re-organisation of the army which necessarily followed the fall of Bexar and the dissolution of the Army of the People, certain units signed up to go to Matamoros while other units saw it as their duty to stay put and defend what would shortly be an independent Texas.
Where it does appear to get messy is afterwards, first when Houston did his best (which wasn’t quite good enough) to stop the Matamoros expedition at Refugio, and then later at San Patricio just before Grant set out for the Rio Grande for the last time.
What happened at San Patricio is worth analysing in a little detail. Originally Grant went down there with about 60 men, belonging to Lewellen’s and Pearson’s companies, although both had been reinforced by a few individuals from one of the units wrecked by Houston. Although these are conventionally represented as being the only men who would follow him it actually appears that they were all he could find horses for. Subsequently two more of the companies from Bexar were sent down to join him, but once again when he set off for the last time he only took those men who had good horses (and even then half of them broke down while he was out), leaving the rest behind without regard to the units they actually belonged to. Thus although the majority of his men on this raid still belonged to Lewellen’s and Pearson’s companies, the surviving roll for Lewellen’s reveals a few men from other units, while conversely those who afterwards went back to Refugio with Cooke included some of Pearson’s who were consequently transferred to other units.
The point of this being that while concentrating on the service records of individuals can give the impression of a considerable amount of mobility, that mobility normally proceeded from quite specific reasons, such as in this case the simple question of whether a man’s horse was fit to be ridden, rather than from the endemic instability suggested by some historians.
The subject is, obviously, a complicated one and can’t be covered adequately in a single posting, but your discussion is invited.
Its therefore worth analysing why most of these transfers actually took place, but first a little clarity as to how the armies were supposed to be organised and run might be helpful. In theory there were a bewildering variety of classes; regulars, permanent volunteers, auxiliary volunteers and so on, but in practice there were just three.
In the early part of the revolution the so-called “Army of the People” was a very temporary ad hoc organisation of volunteer militia who turned out under their elected local leaders, and stayed out only for so long as the perceived danger to their community outweighed the inconvenience. Individually they were brave enough but they were not soldiers. Given the right leadership they could rush into battle, but they only fought effectively if placed in a reasonably secure position and expected to stay there, rather than manoeuvre and fight in the open.
After the commencement of the Runaway Scrape many of these same men turned out again but were more or less forcibly formed by Houston into one of two properly organised and trained regiments along with the volunteers arriving from the States. Although very different in character, both armies are quite straightforward to understand.
The interesting army is the one that served from the fall of Bexar to the disaster at Goliad, which for the sake of convenience can be termed the volunteer army since it was overwhelmingly made up of volunteers from the United States. Some of those units, such as the New Orleans Greys obviously overlapped with the Army of the People but were significantly different in character. The various distinctions between regulars and the various classes of volunteers were bureaucratic ones of no relevance to what was actually happening in the field; far better to simply distinguish between established companies and march or transit companies.
The first speak for themselves, while the latter were more or less ad hoc “units” temporarily formed as a means of conveniently forwarding individual volunteers to the front. If the man conducting the unit sufficiently impressed his charges they might well elect to stick with him from there on in, but on the other hand if having once reached Bexar or Goliad or wherever they then decided to join one or other of the units they found already serving there that is not necessarily an indicator of poor leadership or organisation since their transit unit was intended to be a temporary one.
What did complicate matters obviously was the split, largely precipitated by Grant, between the Federalists and the Patriots, but paradoxically this did not really affect unit organisation inasmuch as in the re-organisation of the army which necessarily followed the fall of Bexar and the dissolution of the Army of the People, certain units signed up to go to Matamoros while other units saw it as their duty to stay put and defend what would shortly be an independent Texas.
Where it does appear to get messy is afterwards, first when Houston did his best (which wasn’t quite good enough) to stop the Matamoros expedition at Refugio, and then later at San Patricio just before Grant set out for the Rio Grande for the last time.
What happened at San Patricio is worth analysing in a little detail. Originally Grant went down there with about 60 men, belonging to Lewellen’s and Pearson’s companies, although both had been reinforced by a few individuals from one of the units wrecked by Houston. Although these are conventionally represented as being the only men who would follow him it actually appears that they were all he could find horses for. Subsequently two more of the companies from Bexar were sent down to join him, but once again when he set off for the last time he only took those men who had good horses (and even then half of them broke down while he was out), leaving the rest behind without regard to the units they actually belonged to. Thus although the majority of his men on this raid still belonged to Lewellen’s and Pearson’s companies, the surviving roll for Lewellen’s reveals a few men from other units, while conversely those who afterwards went back to Refugio with Cooke included some of Pearson’s who were consequently transferred to other units.
The point of this being that while concentrating on the service records of individuals can give the impression of a considerable amount of mobility, that mobility normally proceeded from quite specific reasons, such as in this case the simple question of whether a man’s horse was fit to be ridden, rather than from the endemic instability suggested by some historians.
The subject is, obviously, a complicated one and can’t be covered adequately in a single posting, but your discussion is invited.
