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Post by Allen Wiener on Jun 14, 2010 20:25:58 GMT -5
Guys, I'm in the midst of reading the most recent book by Fox on the archeology at the Custer battlefield: www.amazon.com/Archaeology-History-Custers-Last-Battle/dp/0806129980/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1276564793&sr=1-1I have a ways to go, but this is the second book by Fox that I've consulted and I note that he is used by Custer authors who came later, including Donovan and Philbrick. Although I'm not done, I begin to see Philbrick's point when he says that Fox's "no last stand" hypothesis is largely a matter of semantics. I don't see any major differences here with what Gray suggested, and in a very long footnote, Fox pretty much agrees with Gray. I think Fox's work has largely established and/or confirmed the most current thinking of what most likely played out in the Last Stand area and what Custer was most likely planning or thinking while he was formulating strategy up there (by the seat of the pants). I'd love you hear other views on Fox's work and what it has or has not contributed to the analysis. Allen
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Post by Paul Sylvain on Jun 16, 2010 19:12:42 GMT -5
I will have to read this book as well, but I did go over the written comments from the link you posted to make sure the author's take was what I suspected.
From the written comments, the author and this book seems to hold the same core position and belief I've had for many years regarding the lack of a "last stand" by Custer and the last group of soldiers who fell with him in the waning moments of the battle. I have a couple of books written from the Lakota/Cheyenne perspective by a couple of authors, including one who grew up on the Pine Ridge Rez hearing the oral tales as they had been handed down. Supporting those stories, and apparently the earlier referenced book by Fox, I caught a documentary that pretty much covered the archaeological work done at the LBH battlefield after the fires.
It has always amazed me that throughout time since the battle, we have seemingly accepted a version of the battle as told by people who did not witness the fight first-hand. None of Custer's immediate command -- those who remained with him after he split it -- lived to tell the tale. By the same token, few people wanted to listen to the story from those who did live -- the Lakota and Sioux warriors from the camp. The image of a buckskin jacket-clad, long-haired leader, fighting valiantly to the end, with his troops around him, was much preferred by the white folk of the time.
From the readings I've made, and from the stories I've seen as handed down from the Lakota, I have no doubt that the last stage was a brief fight that amounted to a rout. I believe the battlefield evidence supports that as well. It was a running battle at that stage. There was no "last stand" in the manner we've come to believe.
It appears that Keough's command did form skirmish lines and held n for a bit, until finally being overrun by Gall and his warriors. A second group of soldiers (under who, I forget) fell next without much in the way of a formal line. The archaeologists tracking cartridges after the fire were able to track specific weapons, and there wasn't much evidence of a real organized defense by this second group of soldiers. Once overrun, all the attention was clearly on Custers group, at which point it was a total rout.
I have to say that this, in no way, should lessen the bravery of these men who fought and died with Custer, no more than the bravery of the men who surrenders or who were involved with the breakouts at the Alamo should be questioned. At some point, though, with men falling and dying, amidst screaming and whoops, and the realization that your situation is hopeless and certain death is moments or seconds away, you can't blame anyone for cutting and running and trying to survive.
At least that's my take on the battle.
One last aside unrelated to the "last stand" issue:
A couple of years ago, I check the muster list for the 7th Cavalry and found it interesting see there were men who died that day from all but one state in New England. I believe there were three or four from New Hampshire, for example ... and many, many men from Massachusetts. Then as now, the military was an opportunity to make some money. It seems like in any major tragedy, there always seems to be a local connection. Somebody from your town or state is among the victims in a plane crash, or terrorist attack, and so on. The LBH was a major tragedy in its day, and the soldiers who fell that day came from throughout the United States, even from seemingly unlikely places as Vermont, Maine and New Hampshire.
Paul
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Post by Chuck T on Jun 16, 2010 23:04:45 GMT -5
Paul:
You make some good points, however I don't want to completely disagree with the body of your comments, because the fact is I just don't know. I think the length of time from the reuniting of the two squadrons under Keogh and Yates respectively on what became Calhoun Hill to the end of the Custer portion of the battle is in the neighborhood of an hour and a ha;f.
The critical questions are as follows:
1) How long did Company L, the rear guard, hold on Calhoun Hill?
2) How much time was consumed by Company C's counterattack on the axis Battle Ridge to Greasy Grass Ridge?
3) How long did Company E hold its skirmish line between Last Stand Hill and the present cemetary?
4) Did any of the above actually happen, save Number 1, or are there other explanations for the evidence.
The one thing we are in complete agreement about is how the country accepted the news of Custers' defeat. It was a feel good time with the Centenial only days away. The idea of a regimeent of United States Cavalry being mauled by those considered savages just did not sit well. Therefore the reason must have been overwhelming numbers, and the whole image of the gallant last stand was off and running.
A couple of things come to mind. I don't believe the Indians had anywhere near overwheming numbers in terms of warriors. I think they had somewhere between a one and a half and two to one advantage in numbers. The buckskin jacket and long hair was another myth. Custer had a buckskin jacket, says Martin, tied to his saddle roll, like any sensible man would do in 90 plus degree weather. As for long hair, he was going bald and had it cut quite short for this campaign. You can't accept anything from either side as absolute truth by itself. Everyone, including the Indians, had an agenda of some sort.
One final though, which is actually my son's who as it turns out get paid for being a historian. He made this comment after reading Fox: Fox follows the action by following the cartridges. theefore the weapon. We assume that the Springfields and Colts were the Army weapons and the others, with few exceptions belonged to the Indians Who says who was firing any given weapon at any given time ?
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Post by Paul Sylvain on Jun 17, 2010 5:52:02 GMT -5
Actually, I never carried on further with the hair and jacket comment, but I do know those to be myths. In fact, even those the plains tribes hated Custer because of the raping of their sacred Black Hills and because of events such as the Washita several years before, I have heard Native accounts saying they didn't know they were fighting "Yellow Hair" until after it was over (or at least until near the end). Given he had his hair cut might be one reason. One other myth you see in the old Westerns is the charge with sabers in air. I believe Custer had these boxed up before the battle so there would be no clanging noises to alert the "enemy".
I dont know about Fox beyond his using the catridge evidence, but I have red elsewhere that the warriors picked up weapons from the fallen soldiers and used them against their wasicu enemies so, yes, the cartridge trail only confirms the movement of a given weapon, but does not establish who was carrying it or firing it on the run.
My sense of the length of the battle has always been that it was something much less than the times some suggest, especially when reading the Native accounts. Like you say, neither of us knows with any certainty. Those that do are long dead. If you consider the initial attack on the camp, and the subsequent scramble to survive the counter attack, then, yes, perhaps an hour or so is right. I can't help but think that once the Lakota and Cheyenne had that under control and turned their full attention on Custer, it was over relatively quickly, with Custer's command caught between Gall on one side and Crazy Horse at the other. We will never know, though.
I love this discussion. Like all things of this nature, keeping an open mind is important.
Paul
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Post by Allen Wiener on Jun 17, 2010 8:54:08 GMT -5
I'm not quite done with Fox, but i find the work fascinating and convincing, knowing, of course, that many aspects of this battle will remain uncertain.
Fox uses more than just the bullet casing evidence; he also factors in the locations of the bodies, as per the markers, and Indian accounts, which he does a pretty good job of sorting out. He also uses the absence of cartridges in some areas to interpret what likely took place, noting that some Indians had weapons taken from Reno's dead as well as the Custer dead. Also, casings on Greasy Grass Ridge and Henryville are virtually all from Indian weapons. Once the fighting became hand-to-hand and frenzied, Indians undoubtedly seized weapons from soldiers and used them, but by that time it was really all over. A mix of cartridges matches Indian accounts of fighting the soldiers hand to hand and a smaller number of casings matches accounts of Indians using clubs, hatchets and knives at that point.
Fox's theory is not much different from the general consensus, which is that the 7th held pretty well for a while but collapsed after increasing numbers of Indians were able to get close to the soldiers through the coulees and ravines without being seen and went on the offensive. Company L held pretty well and remained orderly for most of this period before being overwhelmed, the survivors moving north toward the other units. Fox says that, from this point on, there was no more orderly defense and the fight became a "running one" and pretty much a rout with the Indians overwhelming the soldiers. As Philbrick says, Fox's take may simply be a matter of semantics and everyone agrees the 7th was badly outnumbered and overwhelmed.
The Indians more likely thought they were again fighting Crook's troops, whom they had fought a week or so earlier on the Rosebud. There was no time to sort out who was among the soldiers, nor did they particularly care. They were under attack (again) and their families were threatened. I'm not sure about the buckskin jackets, although Philbrick makes a point of noting that the "Custer inner circle" (Tom Custer, Cooke, Custer himself, etc.) did wear them, but that Custer had taken his off, as I'd guess anyone would have in that heat. Custer's hair had been cut short.
Regarding the time of the battle, Fox notes that several Indian accounts say it was over pretty quickly, but he thinks they distinguished between the early part of the battle, when firing was light and the two sides maintained their positions, and the latter phase, when the fighting was frenzied and at close quarters. During the earlier, calmer period (again, according to Fox), L Company (Calhoun) was deployed on Calhoun Hill to keep the Indians at a distance, while the other two right wing companies were held in reserve, probably below the crest of Custer Ridge, near Calhoun Hill. (Philbrick suggests all 3 companies were there to signal Benteen, if he showed up as ordered). No serious threat was perceived at this point. Once the fighting became intense and large numbers of Indians attacked, the fighting did not last much longer and that is likely the period the Indians were talking about. At this point, Calhoun was overrun, survivors retreated toward Keough, where the panic spread and that sector was quickly overrun, and the action moved to the final battle scene around Custer Hill.
The 7th did leave their sabres behind, along with Gatling guns that were offered to Custer. He thought they'd impede his march, which was over pretty difficult terrain. The pack mules had difficulty as it was.
I don't see much significant difference in the various accounts of the battle; only differences in interpretation regarding Custer's intentions during this phase, what he thought the situation was and what he planned to do. The idea seems to have been to attack the village at a point where hostages could be taken and warriors drawn away from Reno, who might then renew his attack. He also expected Benteen to show up. With the full regiment, he anticipated success. Although there is some evidence that he knew about Reno's collapse and retreat, he may not have realized just how bad the situation was at Reno Hill; only that Reno had to fall back under pressure.
I think the odds must have been at least 3 or 4 to 1 in the Custer Sector. If we use the low estimate of warrior strength of around 1,500, assume at least half of them attacked Custer's roughly 225, you come up with something like 3 to 1 and it could have been more. Fox thinks it became a disorganized rout after Calhoun Hill fell, that there is no evidence of an organized defense after that, and the end came pretty quickly. Like someone else we've been discussing here, Fox seeks to counter the "last stand myth," which suggests a brave, organized defense to the last man, ala Hollywood. But, as Philbrick says, that may be a matter of semantics; one way or another, orderly or disorderly, the 7th was overwhelmed by superior numbers that fought aggressively. Whatever Custer was planning didn't work.
Allen
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Post by Herb on Jun 17, 2010 10:00:57 GMT -5
Be careful about relying too much on the marker locations.
I don't remember exactly when the markers were emplaced but it was well after the army established Fort Custer at the mouth of the LBH. The officer (Lieutenant?) sent out to place the markers received markers for all the 7th Cav's losses, not just those men with Custer. For some reason, no attempt was made to locate markers at Reno's various fights, and all of the markers were emplaced at the Custer site. At the Custer site, after the passage of time, weather and predators, a number of the graves could not be located, so the officer did the most logical thing and placed the markers - that graves could not be located for (to include Reno's men) - to show a general sense of the battlefield as he perceived it.
As Philbrick points out Tom and George were buried together. When their bodies were disinterred later for reburial at West Point (George) and Fort Leavenworth (Tom) only a few disturbed intermixed bones remained. Where Tom fell in relationship to his brother, who really knows? Likewise the bodies of the Grey Horse Troop that reached the ravine were not marked where they fell. Other than officers and a few identified NCOs most of the bodies received far less care some only being covered with brush) than George and Tom. The markers can only be used for a general sense - not an accurate portrayal.
Fox's take on "Last Stand" is I agree with Philbrick, semantics, and I think naive. Despite his outstanding archelogical work, I don't think Fox ever truly grasped the nature of combat. I'm not too sure that Fox's definition of "Last Stand" has ever truly exsisted, anywhere.
On timelines, this comes down to how you personally define the limits of the battle. If like me, you define it beginning with Keogh firing from Nye-Carwright and Yates moving toward MTC ford, the battle HAD to have last 60 - 90 minutes (just to accomplish all of the known movements). If you see the real battle as only beginning with C Company's counterattack, you're probably talking 30 minutes or less. It really is a matter of personal perspective and how you personally define it
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Post by greatbigmike on Jun 17, 2010 10:20:33 GMT -5
Did you eve hear this story of Custer's tie to the Santa Anna? His friend Frank Huger was a colonel in the Confederacy, and was captured at Saylor's Creek in April of 65 by Custer, he then lent his spurs to Custer for safe keeping. These spurs were given to him by his father who got them from Gen. Scott, who had received them from Santa Anna during the Mexican/American war. He continued to use them after the war and had them at the Little Big Horn. One was recovered returned to his wife Libby, who returned it to Frank Huger.
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Post by Allen Wiener on Jun 17, 2010 12:11:33 GMT -5
Ah! That explains the Little Big Horn! The curse of Santa Anna's spurs!
Seriously, that's a great story! Small world!
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Post by Allen Wiener on Jun 17, 2010 12:27:35 GMT -5
Herb,
Cant' recall where, but I've read quite a bit on how those markers were placed, the bodies identified & located, the slipshod burials and then the reburials where the monument is now. Some men who died in Deep Coulee, I believe, were not even retrieved and they just shoveled some dirt over them. Some locations were identified by Reno's men during the initial burials (June 27?), but I have no idea how many. You are quite correct; it's a very inexact source of evidence and I think what Fox is doing is to match that as best he can with the pattern of shell casings and the Indian accounts.
I think what Philbrick means by "semantics" is something like what you are saying about Fox not understanding combat and being too focused on his archeological work and methodology. In fact, for those who haven't seen this book, be aware that much of it reads like a college lecture or text on archeology and how it can be meshed with history. I think he did good work, but I found myself often thinking that he was relying too much on the physical evidence (the shell casings), emphasizing it perhaps too much, and staking overly-definitive interpretations from it.
The better Custer books (and we've had several in recent years) need to be taken together and seen as varying interpretations of what everyone generally agrees on. Taken together, books like Fox, Gray, Brust (et al), Donovan, and Philbrick give us a good idea of what very probably happened and why, but we are never going to "know" for sure. We are free to form our own interpretation and best guess.
I do think that all of the reading I've been doing is going to make my visit to LBH 100% more meaningful and enjoyable. There's nothing like being on the ground itself to evaluate these scenarios and accounts.
Allen
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Post by Chuck T on Jun 17, 2010 14:04:39 GMT -5
Paul: I was refering to the myth the country built up around Custer. It was one of those "Print The Legend" moments.
Herb is quite correct about the markers. With some exceptions they cannot be counted on with any degree of accuracy.
Allen: Orient your Harold Von Schmidt picture on the NPS handout with the pictomap. See how the terrain lines up. You have confusted Deep Ravine with Deep Coulee which are about three quarters of a mile apart. Come back after you have oriented the picture to the map and I think I can give you a better appreciation of where "we think" the latter part of the action took place useing both as tools. I wish everyone interested in the subject had both of these valuable tools readily at hand. It is my understanding that Von Schmidt toured the battlefield and eithr took pictures or made sketches before he started the work. Beats the hell out of the Budwiser fantasy., but the latter sold more beer. By the way the Budwiser painting was destroyed in the late forties when the headquarters of the 7th Cavalry Regiment caught fire in Japan.
The two to one numbers I cited were total force vs. total force. Overwhelming numbers were mustered by the Indians at the decisive time and place due to interior lines where they could better shift forces to meet the new threat of Custer. I think Custer faced upwards of five or six to one.
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Post by Allen Wiener on Jun 17, 2010 15:38:54 GMT -5
Chuck,
I've been confusing some of these names, including Deep Coulee and Deep Ravine. I've begun matching the notes I've taken from all these books with several maps from different sources and will rely mainly on the pictomap. I hate to mark that map up and I've blown up another map of the battlefield that I can write on & make notes. Using the Von Schmidt painting is a great idea. I'll bet he did visit the site and took notes. When we were researching "Music of the Alamo" we came across his written lyrics to his Alamo song, which also had detailed notes about the Alamo painting filed with it.
I'll try your idea of using the painting with the pictomap and get back to you. I think the way the final action played out in the Custer sector began with the fighting on Calhoun Hill, which escalated after C Company charged the Indians down what I THINK is Calhoun Coulee, but were driven back, emboldening the Indians, who then pressed their attack (Gall, White Man Runs Him, and Crazy Horse). The fighting then moved roughly north along Custer Ridge, encompassing the Keough Sector and ending up on Custer Hill, with events on Cemetary Ridge, the South Skirmish Line, and (I think) Deep Ravine, where some soldiers ran toward the end. I may have some details wrong, and Gray's counter-clockwise theory (which Fox seems to accept) is a useful way to follow the action.
Allen
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Post by Chuck T on Jun 17, 2010 17:51:56 GMT -5
Allen: I think you are correct that the Company C move to Greasy Grass Ridge was the thing that broke everything loose in the southern portion of a very large (for 210 troopers) position. I characterized it as a counterattack and strictly speaking it was not. It was either an attack with the objective of taking th ridge and thereby removing the Indians base of fire, or a spoiling attack to break up a concentration of Indians before they attacked. What makes this problematical in my mind, and the reason I think the battle lasted longer than others do, is that "Henryville" is much closer to Company L's position than Greasy Grass Ridge. Therefore you would think that Henryville would pose the more immediate danger.
Perhaps it went this way: Company C attacks. Company C retreats after being driven off GGR. The Indians more closely invest Company L. Company L is overrun. The Indian attack moves further up the ridge taking on Company I and the remnants of Company C. This is where it becomes a route of the Keogh Wing simply because of the lower positioning of these two companies in Horse Holders Ravine and the incredible number of Indians (perhaps six or seven hundred) as compared to sixty troopers or so. The survivors flee to Last Stand Hill further up and north on Battle Ridge.
Meanwhile Custer has deployed E and F. E is in Cemetery Ravine., F on what became Last Stand Hill. The Indians gradually apply increased pressure on E foring them to consolidate with F. At some point they look behind them and realize their goose is cooked.
I posted on the Exodus thread how I feel about revisionists in general. When you get to Last Stand Hill, even realizing that the markers can fool you, you will see a tight group over fifty or more. It is obvious that at some point they stood back to back and fought for their lives. In anybody's definition that constitutes a last stand. It may not be heroic or pretty but it was a last stand by definition.
Got a new book in the mail today, "The War in Korea" by Allan Millett. It looks promising.
Chuck
PS: Contemplation Question: Why would Company C move on GGR if they saw the great number of Indians who obviously must have been there? Battle Ridge, Company C's line of departure, is higher than GGR. I think the only answer is that the majority of the Indians were on the reverse slope nearest the river, and the fire was coming from only a comparative few. Keeping in mind my above comments about Henryville, I think the georgaphy alone points to the conclusion that this portion of the battle developed more slowly than others think.
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Post by Allen Wiener on Jun 17, 2010 21:34:36 GMT -5
Chuck,
I think that timing is the key to this puzzle, although it's inevitably at least partly guess work. I think the first large group of Indians (Lame White Man's group) approached Calhoun Hill through the ravine (Calhoun Coulee?) and were able to get close by remaining hidden in that ravine, and possibly in tall grass. Fox & others describe the Co. C charge as a move to break up that concentration of Indians. It also possibly could have been intended to extend to GGR, as they were already coming under heavy fire from there. Co. C never got that far and was turned back from the ravine. Meanwhile Gall had been working his way around to the southeast and got behind or on the flank of Calhoun Hill, so that by the time Co. C was retreating, Calhoun Hill was also under attack from there. Around this time, as the survivors migrated to Keough's location (which does seem to have been on the east side of the ridge with the horse holders), Crazy Horse had worked his way to the east of that position and slammed into it from there. This would have been somewhat similar to the Alamo's north wall being hit by an overwhelming number of Mexican troops from 3 sides. In other words, the Indians did not occupy or attack from all three positions at the same time. Co. C was more concerned with the growing concentration of warriors in the coulee and on GGR than Henryville at the time the charge was ordered, but soon found itself just as threatened from that quarter.
The momentum quickly had swung to the Indians and they were emboldened to push their attack, while the soldiers became increasingly disorganized and ran to the north, where the survivors were received on Custer Hill.
I think you're right; the battle did last longer than may have been thought and consisted of two phases. Initially (and for some time) there was light firing and skirmishing, with both sides holding their positions. But this changed rapidly and radically with Co. C's charge and retreat. After that, it may have been less than 30 minutes before the entire unit was wiped out.
I still have a way to go in Fox, but thus far I see the general outlines of the battle being similar in all the books, with differences only in interpretation. Again, the description of the last stand on Custer Hill may be a matter of semantics. We'll never know the degree of order and/or chaos, but that group does appear to have fought and died together, probably in a short time. A few others do seem to have made a dash for the river out of desperation, but to no avail. It's like the breakouts at the Alamo, or the way Crockett may have died; you can spin it however you like, but they all died fighting as best they could.
Allen
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Post by Chuck T on Jun 17, 2010 22:29:51 GMT -5
Allen: I think we are in general agreement. We may differ on a few details but they are minor. I think the attack by Company C probably reached a little south and west of where the Finkle-Finley makers are on your pictomap. If you look at the lazy U configuration of cartridge markers on GGR a lot of them are probably from rounds aimed at C. The location of Henryville suggests two things to me. 1) That position was occupied during or immediately after the Company C attack. Had they been there before some of Gall could have easily surrounded or cut off C and destroyed them before the troopers that survived made it back to Battle Ridge. 2) The number of cartridge cases indicate either a heck of a lot of Indians, all well armed (which probably was not the case), or a more prolonged period of firing. As many of these Indians were on foot, I wonder how long it takes to walk or jog, while trying to remain concealed, from MTCF to Henryville? I would think some time which would account for a slower build up of pressure against L while at the same time accounting for the harrasing or supressive fire from GGR. Most if not all of Crazy Horse's people were mounted and I think the final attack on the entire position started shortly after he arrived. His courage runs and their location are to well documented and are tied in with Gall's final assault on the southern position. One final thought. I am and always have been troubled by the Deep Ravine story at the very end of the fight. I know it is a painting but look at Von Schmitd and tell me if you were trying to save your life if you would deliberately run with fifteen or twenty of your nearest and dearest into that cut of land immediately to the left of Custer's personal guidon bearer, with hope of reaching the timber along the river and supposed safety, which by the way is right across a fifty foot wide rather shallow river from one hell of a lot of Indians (I hate run on sentances as you can see) ?? I think the reason that no bodies were found or at least marked there is because they were not there. People have been confusing Cemetery Ravine and Deep Ravine for years, possibly since 27 June 76. I mentioned the new Korea book earlier. If you read many of the accounts of isolated rifle companies that because of terrrain occured many times during that war, keeping in mind that a KW rifle company had about the same strength as Custer, it is amazing how similar the stories are.
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Post by Chuck T on Jun 17, 2010 22:49:16 GMT -5
Allen:
Another thing about the Deep Ravine story is that as you can see from the painting and the map Deep Ravine was a covered and concealed avenue of approach to LSH.
Unlike the Alamo where it looked like someone had left the back door open, there was no back door at LBH. When the Alamo defenders decided to live and fight another day they due to darkness and the apparent absence of Mexican forces in that sector had at least in their minds a reasonable chance of success. Of course it was not open and the Mexican cavalry lay dorment by design. It is much easier to kill your enemy in an open area that to go building to building room to room.
I will withhold further comment on this aspect until you get a chance to see the ground.
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