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Post by cantador4u on Jan 27, 2010 10:54:10 GMT -5
The accounts of the defenders who left the Alamo during the breakout seem to indicate they did a respectable job. They had to be reinforced, only one KIA but about 20 horses wounded, and I don't know about wounded lancers.
Seeing how well a relatively small group of men did against mounted troops, in the open, with no element of surprise, led me to think along the lines of "could'a, should'a, would'a", into the land of alternative history. What if...
What if the defenders had smuggled the noncombatants out of the Alamo and then made a nighttime sortie to the Alameda and attacked the lancers' camp. The lancers were probably more disciplined than the common soldier and would likely have put up a determined defense. The Texians could have captured horses on which to escape, crippled the ability of the lancers for future fights due to lack of horses, and caused confusion and mayhem.
It's all a moot point I know, but none the less an interesting thought.
I have a feeling that one reason the Alamo defenders didn't try to escape was because of the families and other noncombatants. If there had been just soldiers within the Alamo there may have been more aggressive tactics.
- Paul Meske, Sun Prairie, Wisconsin
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Post by Paul Sylvain on Feb 2, 2010 19:37:29 GMT -5
Interesting speculation, Paul. The presence of non-combatants certainly must have been a concern, but in the heat of a pitched battle against certain death, I think the average combatant was more concerned about the enemy at hand. The non-combatants there on the morning of March 6 chose to stay. Consider also that one defender was only a few scant feet from tossing a torch into the powder magazine in the final moments of the battle. The magazine was close to the women and children, and had it been blown, what would have become of them?
I'm not so sure the presence of non-combatants played into the final plans. What did play into the planning seems to be the hope of expected reinforcements from Goliad and elsewhere. It wasn't until late in the siege that it became clear to all inside the walls that they were on their own.
Read the excellent article in the new Alamo Journal about Santa Anna's actions through March 3rd. Clearly the fate of the defenders seemed to have been sealed in the final days before the assault.
Paul
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Post by cantador4u on Feb 3, 2010 19:12:48 GMT -5
Paul, I have a real approach/avoidance sort of thing going on with regard to the normal (Whatever that is) Texian soldier. They could fight very effectively in wooded terrain. I'm pretty sure that if Fannin had made it to the wooded area they could have held off the superior forces of the Mexican Army. But out on the prairie they seemed to pretty much suck. The Mexican were better cavalry, and the lancers were justifiably feared when encountered on open level ground. I think if someone were to look at the various Texan defeats or losses, they would pretty much be all on open level terrain.
The rest of the Mexican Army seemed to be geared to fighting a Napoleonic type war. In some respects it was sort of like the US Army in Vietnam trying to fight a theater type war but the Vietcong choosing to NOT fight by the same rules because they knew they would get slaughtered.
On the other hand, Texians didn't seem real good at following orders. The saying "Every man is a General" comes to mind. Given that they elected officers and deposed them if they didn't like them, it's a miracle that they were as successful as they were.
Paul Meske, Sun Prairie, Wisconsin
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Post by Herb on Feb 4, 2010 13:37:19 GMT -5
I think if someone were to look at the various Texan defeats or losses, they would pretty much be all on open level terrain. San Jacinto? the Grass Fight?
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Post by cantador4u on Feb 4, 2010 14:50:12 GMT -5
Woldfpack, I did not mean to imply that there were never any Texan victories on open flat terrain. Heck, San Jacinto was frontal charge (on foot no less) over open terrain not a wooded area. I obviously haven't listed all the skirmishes to analyze them but I suspect the large majority of losses occurred when they were caught in the open. Could I be wrong? Heck yea!
If my analogy with the Vietnam war was incorrect, inaccurate, or in some way offensive, I apologize. My point was that each force had certain strengths and weaknesses, and when a force with weakness "A" opposes a force with a corresponding strength of "A", all things being equal, (and they never are) the a favorable outcome will probably go to the force with the strength. Could I be wrong? Heck yea! I would appreciate knowing how the situation really was.
Is it fair to say that in general, the Texan forces were better at using available cover and more effective use of small arms (i.e. better firearms, better powder, better marksmanship)?
- Paul Meske, Sun Prairie, Wisconsin
Info from US Army FM 100-1
The Army formally adopted a set of Principles of War in 1921 that endure today. Briefly stated they are:
Objective. Direct every military operation toward a clearly defined, decisive, and attainable objective.
Offensive. Seize, retain, and exploit the initiative.
Mass. Mass the effects of overwhelming combat power at the decisive place and time.
Economy of Force. Employ all combat power available in the most effective way possible; allocate minimum essential combat power to secondary efforts.
Maneuver. Place the enemy in a position of disadvantage through the flexible application of combat power.
Unity of Command. For every objective, seek unity of command and unity of effort.
Security. Never permit the enemy to gain an unexpected advantage.
Surprise. Strike the enemy at a time or place or in a manner for which he is unprepared.
Simplicity. Prepare clear, uncomplicated plans and concise orders to ensure thorough understanding.
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Post by Herb on Feb 4, 2010 18:22:22 GMT -5
If my analogy with the Vietnam war was incorrect, inaccurate, or in some way offensive, I apologize. Nah, I deleted that portion of my post simply because what I said could have been taken as offensive. This is off topic, and my apologies, but IMO, our modern wars (post Korea) are by the far the most misunderstood wars in our history. Because most of us have watched major events on TV, we tend to think we know what happened and in a lot of cases the small part of truth being showm on TV is just the opposite of what is in fact the larger truth happening on the ground. A classic case is Desert Storm read what General Franks the battlefield commander had to say in Into the Storm (cowritten with Tom Clancy) and compare that to Gen Schwarzkopf's famous press briefing. Most people saw the press briefing, few people have read what was really going on. At the time Schwarzkopf was briefing the press he was and had been out of ccommunication with Franks, who was fighting the largest tank battle in history. When it comes to Veitnam, its even worse as a whole Hollywood mythology has developed. Harry Summers wrote the best book available on why we won every battle in Veitnam and lost the war. It's called On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War.
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Post by Paul Sylvain on Feb 4, 2010 19:04:05 GMT -5
Oooh -- Wolfpack, you piqued my interest. I might have to check that book out myself.
Paul
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