|
Post by stuart on Jun 6, 2009 11:19:19 GMT -5
True, but there we're getting into hypotheticals. If, for the sake of argument you were to assume an assault in daylight against defenders who were ready and waiting as depicted in the John Wayne version, then yes the Mexican casualties would have had to have been higher.
What we've actually got are all those negative factors and yet somehow those outnumbered, disorganised defenders supposedly achieved a kill ratio far higher than anybody had a right to expect even in ideal conditions.
Although its going a little off-topic this also bears on Santa Anna's decision to attack. He's criticised for it because of the headline casualty figures, but if those figures turned out to be far higher than anyone could have predicted beforehand, he can hardly be criticised for callously launching an attack which could so very easily have succeeded with minimal losses.
|
|
|
Post by Herb on Jun 6, 2009 11:24:04 GMT -5
Stuart, I guess my point was, Breed's Hill may have had more similarities to the Alamo than Chippawa, and that Mexican casualties may well have been much higher had the Alamo had more competent leadership. Greg I'm not too sure about that, anymore. The biggest, difference is the element of surprise. Had the garrison, not been surprised, and had the Mexican Army had to assault through all of the artillery fire - they should have it could have been very different. While, I still believe that as commander, Travis, still bears the ultimate responsibility for being surprised on the 6th. I don't think, he is quite as culpable as I once believed. The mythic story of the Alamo, holds that Santa Anna, deliberately ceased firing on the night of the 5th to lure the defenders to sleep, which instead should have been a red flag to Travis of a pending attack. Instead when we go through Almonte's Journal and other accounts we find that the Mexicans ceased fire every night of the siege (except the first). There were no red flags the night of the 5th. Were there things that Travis and the junior leaders should have done differently - most certainly. I guess the difference in my eyes now, is inexperience instead of incompetence.
|
|
|
Post by Allen Wiener on Jun 6, 2009 11:39:56 GMT -5
Herb,
A while back we discussed this at some length and someone raised the issue of siege practices at the time, which called for maintaining a siege until a wall was breached, and not attacking until then. At that point, it would have been likely that the besieged would surrender, as defeat would have been conceded.
Santa Anna and the Tornel Decree may have been something of a joker in the deck, however, if SA's insistence on blood and no quarter (no prisoners) was not typical in those situations. For him, at least in the Texas War, there was no such thing as honorable surrender or surrender terms. He considered the Alamo defenders a bunch of criminals, or "pirates," who were not entitled to the same consideration as soldiers.
AW
|
|
|
Post by gregl on Jun 6, 2009 12:08:39 GMT -5
"I guess the difference in my eyes now, is inexperience instead of incompetence."
Wolfpack
Better said than "incompetence". Still, I can't understand why Travis did not have the men operating in shifts. Getting back to my Breed's Hill comparison, indeed, the Militia at Breed's Hill were led by several officers with military expereince gained while fighting for the British. It paid off.
Greg
|
|
|
Post by pff on Jun 24, 2009 7:19:21 GMT -5
Of about 1200 Mexican in the Assaults: Andrade reports 60 KIA/251 WIA total 311 San Anna report 70KIA/300 WIA total 370 With a difference of 10 and 49 more in Anna report-possibly it includes those who were reported as wounded-later DOW and those not reported but also died of wounds. Even at a loss of 311 to 370 this was just over 3 % of the attacking forces. With the texas Garrison at least 189 total-this means that every one of the Alamo garrison only accounted for 2 Mexican casualties apiece!
|
|
|
Post by Allen Wiener on Jun 24, 2009 7:52:03 GMT -5
It's also not clear how many Mexicans were killed by friendly fire, which would lower that average.
AW
|
|
|
Post by pff on Jun 24, 2009 8:07:29 GMT -5
I beleve it was Lord who wrote that the Alamo garrison had 5-6 rifles apiece which at 189 x 6 would come out to 1134 firearms. If all these guns had fired just 1 shot-the Mexican forces would have been left with an effective strength of 66! The Alamo didn't lose because of ammo shortage {Mexican reports of captured stores}. Rather it confirms that the Alamo fell because there simply was not enough men to repeal an all out attack on all points at the same time! Had Santa Anna tried a piecemeal attack by a quarter of his forces on only one section of the Alamo at a time-the garrison just might have been able to hold out but only prehaps by mustering all its strength to repeal local attacks.
|
|
|
Post by Herb on Jun 24, 2009 12:41:31 GMT -5
Of about 1200 Mexican in the Assaults: Andrade reports 60 KIA/251 WIA total 311 San Anna report 70KIA/300 WIA total 370 With a difference of 10 and 49 more in Anna report-possibly it includes those who were reported as wounded-later DOW and those not reported but also died of wounds. Even at a loss of 311 to 370 this was just over 3 % of the attacking forces. With the texas Garrison at least 189 total-this means that every one of the Alamo garrison only accounted for 2 Mexican casualties apiece! According to Mexican sources there were around 1500 men in the assault (counting the reserve) and about 290 cavalry (I'm not computing them). Using Andrade's numbers of a total of 311 casualties that computes to losses of 20.7% . A very significant loss for any military force in any battle. The reason I use Andrade's numbers is his report was made after the dust had settled, and is collaborated by the various muster reports that Filisola documented. Santa Anna's report was made immediately after the battle and of necessity was based on preliminary reports - there is an old saw in the military, that the initial report is always wrong - based on my limited experience that's is one of the truest cliches ever uttered. Roger Borrel who provided the translation of the Mexican Surgeon's Report that is listed on page 378 of Hansen's The Alamo Reader is convinced (and for what's it's worth I agree) that the dead the Surgeon reports are the men that died of wounds. The problem with this is that the report goes back to December and includes the men too severely wounded from the Battle of Bexar to accompany Cos on his retreat. So while we probably have an upper limit of 75 men DOW as the Surgeon reports, we simply don't know how many of them are the result of Concepcion, the Grass Fight, the Battle of Bexar, etc. As Stuart as pointed out in other posts, the wounded reported are only those that required Medical Attention. In most cases what we call RTD (returned to duty) would not have been reported. We probably shouldn't think in terms of ratios comparing the defenders to the Mexican casualties - remember this was a battle not Hollywood. We have no way of knowing how many defenders were wounded and were executed (coup de grace). Something else to consider - there's a number of reports from the various wars how many rounds are fired to produce just 1 causality, again this is something we just have no way to know.
|
|
|
Post by gregl on Jun 29, 2009 10:50:40 GMT -5
As much as I hate to say this, if we accept Andrade's report, it seems that the battle of the Alamo was a seriously one sided affair. I am sadly coming to accept the Alamo as a terrible tragedy for a small group of poorly led and ill prepared colonists, who were not very capable in their time of need. I believe that their being caught by surprise to be an almost unforgiveable and unexplainable (except by gross negligence) error. I don't mean to offend anyone here, the history and mysteries of this event are still of utmost interest. I just don't think that we can get around the fact that they were simply ineffective on that fateful morning, especially when compared to other storied battles, ie. Breeds Hill.
|
|
|
Post by Herb on Jun 29, 2009 11:57:52 GMT -5
As much as I hate to say this, if we accept Andrade's report, it seems that the battle of the Alamo was a seriously one sided affair. I am sadly coming to accept the Alamo as a terrible tragedy for a small group of poorly led and ill prepared colonists, who were not very capable in their time of need. I believe that their being caught by surprise to be an almost unforgiveable and unexplainable (except by gross negligence) error. I don't mean to offend anyone here, the history and mysteries of this event are still of utmost interest. I just don't think that we can get around the fact that they were simply ineffective on that fateful morning, especially when compared to other storied battles, ie. Breeds Hill. One of the problems we're dealing with is that so much of what we learned originally has no substance in the primary documentation, for example there is no record of any assault on the palisade, and there is no evidence of the Mexican cannon ceasing their nightly bombardment the night before the assault - there was no nightly bombardment (for a discussion see: alamostudies.proboards.com/index.cgi?board=alamohistory&action=display&thread=83&page=2 ). The truth of the matter is we almost need to "unlearn" everything we know and go back and question everything. The other thing that corrupts our thinking is we tend (and this isn't just the Alamo) to look at battle histories as one side ("our" side) doing something right or wrong that determined the outcome. When obviously the truth is that the actions of both sides must be considered equally. While there is no excuse for being caught by surprise on March 6th, I have come to think it is more to the credit of Santa Anna's planning (see the link above for a greater discussion) then Travis's folly. Given the close proximity of the forces, Santa Anna knew what was going on inside the Alamo - his attack plan used that knowledge to lull the defenders into continuing the routine that they had developed, and then Santa Anna used that against them. There is no real documentation of any attack indicators. Travis, imo, reacted like most inexperienced leaders do, and didn't "see" the more strenuous, but obvious things that needed to be done to prevent being caught by surprise. It's an incompetence and negligence - but it was probably due to ignorance and lack of experience.
|
|
|
Post by Allen Wiener on Jun 29, 2009 12:03:27 GMT -5
You're not offending me; although I think the element of surprise was the key factor in the quick and decisive victory, as well as the lopsided difference in the size of the two forces. The defenders were nothing close to a trained, professional army and, given the militia mentality of many of the men, Travis may have been limited as to how much he could actually get them to do. Poor planning, a totally dysfunctional Texas "government," and the failure to organize any coordinated, sizable relief force all played a role too. I don't think that Travis or Bowie thought they would end up in that situation when the chose to hold Bexar; they banked on help coming and on Santa Anna arriving a lot later. As Stuart has said, once they found themselves with their butts in a crack, the Alamo was their only resource and served as a kind of lifeboat. With no real help, a badly outnumbered, fatigued, ill-trained force facing a far larger and more professional army, the outcome of the battle could not have been much different. Had they all been standing at their posts, armed to the teeth, cannon at the ready, ala John Wayne's movie, there would no doubt have been far more Mexican casualties and perhaps a more prolonged battle. That is the image we have long held of the battle; not the one more accurately represented in the 2004 movie; a sudden, surprise attack in the dark that caught the defenders by surprise. Either way, the defeat was instantly turned into a battle cry and portrayed more like Wayne's version than Hancock's.
Either way, the Alamo was a place where a small group of defenders held out as long as they could and also did the best they could under the circumstances. The details do not negate their sacrifice. If they had been a larger, better trained, more professional force, things might have been different. But history isn't about what might have been, but rather what really happened and why.
Because of the image we have always had of the desperate stand at the Alamo, against overwhelming odds, the battle has been far better remembered and revered than the slaughter of far more men, all helpless prisoners, at Goliad, or the stunning upset victory of the Texians at San Jacinto. Perhaps if that battle had been more contentious and closely fought, rather than the lopsided debacle that it was, it would be better remembered.
I'm also becoming convinced that the Alamo is better remembered and more revered than the other battles for another reason -- the fact that Crockett, a very famous and revered American by that time, died there, heightening the media attention to the battle considerably. Of course, that works both ways; Crockett's legend is inextricably tied to his martrydom at the Alamo. The downside of that is that the legend has eclipsed and obscured the real man (at least up till now).
But I think I've strayed way off topic here.
AW
|
|
|
Post by Allen Wiener on Jun 29, 2009 12:07:13 GMT -5
Travis, imo, reacted like most inexperienced leaders do, and didn't "see" the more strenuous, but obvious things that needed to be done to prevent being caught by surprise. It's an incompetence and negligence - but it was probably due to ignorance and lack of experience. I have to agree. One thing that's often overlooked is that Travis was well aware of the large reenforcement the Mexicans had received on March 3. That alone should have (could have?) raised the alert level in the Alamo to the possibility of an attack. AW
|
|
|
Post by Kevin Young on Jun 29, 2009 14:07:38 GMT -5
You're not offending me; although I think the element of surprise was the key factor in the quick and decisive victory, as well as the lopsided difference in the size of the two forces. The defenders were nothing close to a trained, professional army and, given the militia mentality of many of the men, Travis may have been limited as to how much he could actually get them to do. Poor planning, a totally dysfunctional Texas "government," and the failure to organize any coordinated, sizable relief force all played a role too. I don't think that Travis or Bowie thought they would end up in that situation when the chose to hold Bexar; they banked on help coming and on Santa Anna arriving a lot later. As Stuart has said, once they found themselves with their butts in a crack, the Alamo was their only resource and served as a kind of lifeboat. With no real help, a badly outnumbered, fatigued, ill-trained force facing a far larger and more professional army, the outcome of the battle could not have been much different. Had they all been standing at their posts, armed to the teeth, cannon at the ready, ala John Wayne's movie, there would no doubt have been far more Mexican casualties and perhaps a more prolonged battle. That is the image we have long held of the battle; not the one more accurately represented in the 2004 movie; a sudden, surprise attack in the dark that caught the defenders by surprise. Either way, the defeat was instantly turned into a battle cry and portrayed more like Wayne's version than Hancock's. Either way, the Alamo was a place where a small group of defenders held out as long as they could and also did the best they could under the circumstances. The details do not negate their sacrifice. If they had been a larger, better trained, more professional force, things might have been different. But history isn't about what might have been, but rather what really happened and why. Because of the image we have always had of the desperate stand at the Alamo, against overwhelming odds, the battle has been far better remembered and revered than the slaughter of far more men, all helpless prisoners, at Goliad, or the stunning upset victory of the Texians at San Jacinto. Perhaps if that battle had been more contentious and closely fought, rather than the lopsided debacle that it was, it would be better remembered. I'm also becoming convinced that the Alamo is better remembered and more revered than the other battles for another reason -- the fact that Crockett, a very famous and revered American by that time, died there, heightening the media attention to the battle considerably. Of course, that works both ways; Crockett's legend is inextricably tied to his martrydom at the Alamo. The downside of that is that the legend has eclipsed and obscured the real man (at least up till now). But I think I've strayed way off topic here. AW Good points! As Frank noted in his book on Dade's, why is it that the destruction of 100 odd US Regulars at the hands of the Seminoles in Decemember 1835 is so less remembered than 189-250 citizen-soldiers who died less than three months later in the Alamo. Is it because the Alamo garrison is remembered as fighting for freedom? Is it because Americans would always react more strongly to citizen-soldiers than the regulars? Or is it personality: add a Crockett and a Bowie and you get immortality? I don't know if we need to forget and relearn. I do think we need to be able to look at everything with fresh eyes. I tend to see trends with Alamo studies where research moves forward, then seems to grind to a halt and go back to the "traditional" view again. This has to do with people becoming comfortable with the traditional view. I have always felt that visitors come to the Alamo with some interest of the truth, but that is always out weighed by wanting to reinforce values-good and bad--about the Alamo historical experience.."This story shall the good man teach his son..." Enough getting off topic...and my editorial.
|
|
|
Post by Jim Boylston on Jun 29, 2009 14:47:03 GMT -5
I think it has to do with personality more than anything else. Dade wasn't a celebrity, Crockett certainly was. Both the Dade massacre and the Alamo were last stand scenarios where brave men fought and died. The Alamo tragedy though, had a "hook"...David Crockett, one of the most famous men in the country, died there. It's strange too, that after the Seminole War, the "celebrity" that emerged and was romanticized was Osceola. He benefited a lot from the "noble savage" mythology considering he was responsible for at least a couple of cold blooded murders, including that of a Seminole leader that didn't buy into Osceola's radicalism.
I agree, Kevin. I think you make a very valid point that teaching "values" sometimes supersedes teaching truthful history. I'm of two minds about this practice. I don't really have a problem with children learning our great national myths; truth doesn't necessarily have to be factually accurate. The problem, as I see it, arises when we hold on to our childish points of view rather than attempting to understand the realities of situations as we get older and are more able to understand nuance. Jim
|
|
|
Post by Allen Wiener on Jun 29, 2009 15:29:03 GMT -5
Very good thoughts, all. I think our history does serve as a valuable resource in early education, without getting down in the weeds about specifics, as long as it doesn't seriously distort the truth. In general, students should be taught that the way we live has been paid for many times over in blood. Nonetheless, not everything our political leaders have done is admirable, including some of the wars they've waged (sounds better if I say "political leaders" rather than "our country," although it comes to the same thing in the end).
What I find lacking in our education system, aside from a real appreciation for our history and a basic understanding of how the government works, is the lack of emphasis on critical thinking. The phases of research that Keven mentions can only come about through critical thinking about what's been routinely accepted in the past. That, too, needs to be taught from an early age, otherwise kids are prone to grow up believing whatever they're told by authority figures, and that's dangerous in a democracy. Teaching critical thinking early on also prepares kids for more serious reading and learning later on, as well as how they'll do their own research as adults.
AW
|
|