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Post by TRK on Feb 20, 2009 15:19:27 GMT -5
I'm curious to know if any muster rolls of the Mexican Army exists. I don't believe I've seen a list. I'm not aware of any muster rolls that were ever published, but there may be some returns or lists of total strengths, KIAs, and wounded in the Mexican military archives in Mexico City. Joe Musso would be the one to ask.
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Post by gregl on Feb 20, 2009 15:22:26 GMT -5
I see Santa Anna's later estimate of 1000 total casualties on the list. I wonder why he gave this much different number later in life. Also, the "Mexican Citizens'' messengers, must be Bergera and Barsena again, given as 521 killed and as many wounded. I still wonder what is the story on these guys. These two sets of numbers support each other, but certainly don't "jive" with the Mexican officers reports, or the revised thoughts on the flow of battle. I know some disagree, but I think the 60 to 70 KIA number points to a rapid collapse and rout of the Texan defense. Certainly supporting the contention that they were totally surprised. Which is a whole other question. Why?
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Post by stuart on Feb 20, 2009 15:40:09 GMT -5
I've not come across actual muster rolls either, but there are certainly plenty of returns breaking down numbers (and casualties) by unit, which is where the Mexican casualty figures come from.
Just to complicate matters a little, while a dead man is obviously dead and some wounded men subsequently die, there is no standard definition of what constitutes a wound.
I am aware of a number of references to both British and American units in the 19th century where it was a matter of regimental pride that an officer (and perhaps this also applied to the men too) would not be returned as wounded unless he needed to be carried off the field, even if he was bleeding like the proverbial stuck pig. Conversely of course the very fact that such units made a point of this clearly implies that other units were equally if not more prone to returning the slightest nick or scratch as a wound.
This sort of thing is impossible to quantify with the bare figures available to us, but while there is, as I say, no quarrelling with that 70 dead or the likelihood that a fair number of wounded didn't make it; I would on the other hand reckon on a high proportion of the 200-odd being walking wounded with a good number needing only minimal treatment, but nevertheless officially recorded as "wounded".
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Post by Herb on Feb 20, 2009 15:42:28 GMT -5
Is there a place where one can find each Mexican unit's figures for KIA, wounded, deserted, death by illness, etc? I'm wondering what the overall attrition rate was for the entire 1836 Texas campaign, by both sides. I don't know but here's some before and after numbers for the entire campaign. MEXICAN ORDER OF BATTLE: [15 Jan 1836/ 14 May 1836] The third number under the unit is what Andrade said they lost in the attack on the Alamo. Matamoros Battalion (272 men/ 48 men) *# 7 dead, 37 wounded Jimenez Battalion (274 men/ 250 men) * % 9 dead 25 wounded San Luis Potosi Battalion (452 men/441 men) * % 9 dead 37 wounded Dolores Cavalry Regiment (290 men/ 269 men)* 1 dead 3 wounded Aldama Battalion (390 men/72 men) * # 11 dead 51 wounded Tolucca Battalion (320 men/83 men) * # 20 dead 74 wounded Zapadores Battalion (185 men/171 men) * 3 dead 24 wounded Guerrero Battalion (400 men/15men) # not at Alamo Guadalajara Battalion (420 men/304 men) #(part) not at Alamo Yucatan Battalion (300 men/239 men)% not at Alamo Cuatutla Regiment (180 men/216 men)% not at Alamo * at the Alamo % at Goliad # at San Jacinto The Mexican Army began the campaign with approx 6050 and ended it with approx 4500. Given that the losses at San Jacinto were approx 1300. Total losses in all other battles (plus disease, desertion and accidents) were 250 men. Both Before and After numbers are based on Filisola. Before numbers are listed in Nofi and After numbers in Dimmick. NOTE: This list doesn't include the complete Mexican Order of Battle, only the units that participated in the major actions. (see the Mexican Army thread in Miscellaneous Reference Aids for a complete listing). One Final Note: The 14 May numbers include the wounded, recovering in San Antonio from the Alamo (interesting to compare the strength of the battalions at San Jacinto to the men Andrade reported wounded at the Alamo).
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Post by Jim Boylston on Feb 20, 2009 16:13:18 GMT -5
I think that's accurate, Greg, but then the whole battle, mop-up included, probably only lasted 90 minutes. Consider too, that the longest part of the fight was probably the taking of the long barracks. I think the assaulting force was most vulnerable on approach. Once they were at/over the walls, they held the advantage, if only in sheer numbers. If you accept that maybe as many as 20 defenders were in hospital, some likely never got to the walls before the perimeter was breached, some went over the walls to the east, that's a lot of firepower that's missing. Jim
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Post by stuart on Feb 20, 2009 17:13:37 GMT -5
And also, as I'm sure I've mentioned before... the longer the fight goes on, the fewer Texians are left capable of inflicting casualties, whether because they themselves have become casualties or because they are trying to break out
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Post by Herb on Feb 24, 2009 17:53:41 GMT -5
Is there a place where one can find each Mexican unit's figures for KIA, wounded, deserted, death by illness, etc? I'm wondering what the overall attrition rate was for the entire 1836 Texas campaign, by both sides. I don't know but here's some before and after numbers for the entire campaign. MEXICAN ORDER OF BATTLE: [15 Jan 1836/ 14 May 1836] The third number under the unit is what Andrade said they lost in the attack on the Alamo. Matamoros Battalion (272 men/ 48 men) *# 7 dead, 37 wounded Jimenez Battalion (274 men/ 250 men) * % 9 dead 25 wounded San Luis Potosi Battalion (452 men/441 men) * % 9 dead 37 wounded Dolores Cavalry Regiment (290 men/ 269 men)* 1 dead 3 wounded Aldama Battalion (390 men/72 men) * # 11 dead 51 wounded Tolucca Battalion (320 men/83 men) * # 20 dead 74 wounded Zapadores Battalion (185 men/171 men) * 3 dead 24 wounded Guerrero Battalion (400 men/15men) # not at Alamo Guadalajara Battalion (420 men/304 men) #(part) not at Alamo Yucatan Battalion (300 men/239 men)% not at Alamo Cuatutla Regiment (180 men/216 men)% not at Alamo * at the Alamo % at Goliad # at San Jacinto The Mexican Army began the campaign with approx 6050 and ended it with approx 4500. Given that the losses at San Jacinto were approx 1300. Total losses in all other battles (plus disease, desertion and accidents) were 250 men. Both Before and After numbers are based on Filisola. Before numbers are listed in Nofi and After numbers in Dimmick. NOTE: This list doesn't include the complete Mexican Order of Battle, only the units that participated in the major actions. (see the Mexican Army thread in Miscellaneous Reference Aids for a complete listing). One Final Note: The 14 May numbers include the wounded, recovering in San Antonio from the Alamo (interesting to compare the strength of the battalions at San Jacinto to the men Andrade reported wounded at the Alamo). Here's some other Mexican numbers I've dug up: Yucatan Battalion: 6 soldatos died due to exposure From Urrea's operations: San Patricio: 5 killed and wounded Aqua Dulce: unk Refugio: 13 killed 43 wounded (probably underreported) Coleto Creek: 33 killed 100 wounded Losses during Alamo Siege ( prior to the battle): 4 killed, 6 wounded, 1 drowned. MINIMUM
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Post by historicalwhimsey on Jun 5, 2009 16:33:52 GMT -5
Hello, everyone. I am new to this forum, though not to the subject of the Alamo. I think that the explanation of the seemingly low Mexican casualties is this: First, the Mexicans got in close to the walls before the Texans were awake and fighting. Second, once the Mexicans were inside the walls, the defense of the Alamo was untenable. There was no way for the Texans to win. Being imminently practical, they decided to try to live to fight another day. I do not criticize this at all. So a lot of the defenders stopped fighting and started trying to escape, and during this time they were in the business of escaping and not fighting. So the escapers were killed without doing much killing in return. These two facts caused lower casualties than might be expected.
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Do this mean what I think it do? It do.
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Post by Jim Boylston on Jun 5, 2009 17:14:21 GMT -5
No argument from me! Welcome to the forum, by the way. Jim
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Post by Paul Sylvain on Jun 5, 2009 21:46:21 GMT -5
Let me join Jim in welcoming you aboard.
And I agree with your assessment.
Paul
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Post by stuart on Jun 6, 2009 3:32:38 GMT -5
A lot of the debate over casualties comes from sheer wishful thinking, or at best misconceptions fuelled by Hollywood imagery and lack of appreciation of what artillery and musket fire could do in real terms. We’re familiar for example with that blast of canister fire carrying off half a company of the Toluca. Whether exaggerated or not (and I suspect it was) and a pretty horrific experience for the other half of the company, how typical was it? If it was singled out you can be pretty sure it was exceptional and, and hey, lets not be sentimental about this, in the great scheme of things if that’s all there was then that’s not a huge loss.
By way of a comparator lets look at the battle of Chippawa in 1814
It’s a good one to go with because the numbers involved were relatively small; it was fought in daylight, and apart from skirmishing in the woods on one flank it was fought out on an open field with no dramatic cavalry charges or other flashy manoeuvres to unduly affect the casualty ratio.
In the grey corner: 2109 officers and men, including some 300 native warriors (in the woods) and 110 artillerymen and 7 cannon.
In the red corner; pretty close to the same, an estimated 2000 officers and men, again including 300 native warriors (in the woods), about 70 artillerymen and 6 cannon.
The crucial bit was 1500 American regulars against 1360 British regulars, so we’re still pretty evenly matched.
The battle lasted a total of about three and a half hours, but that was from the moment the first British skirmishers were discovered moving through the woods, to the time the Americans decided the British were gone. The main engagement however commenced at 4:45 and was all over by 6:30, so in terms of timing we’re pretty close to the Alamo.
Total casualties were initially reported by the respective commanders as:
British 148 dead and 321 wounded, excluding native warriors but including 12 dead and 16 wounded belonging to the Lincoln Militia fighting in the woods
American losses totalled 58 dead and 241 wounded.
In fact more detailed research provides a total of just 93 British dead, including 19 militia but exclusive of wounded men who may have died more than a week later, while actual American loses totalled 53 dead.
Now if 1300 British regulars could only kill 53 Americans in broad daylight with both sides standing up in the open, while 1500 American regulars were killing 74 British regulars, then the 70 fatal casualties returned by the Mexican army at the Alamo assume a different complexion entirely.
Why, in 1836, did slightly less than 200 Americans, ill-trained, exhausted, surprised, disorganised and fighting in the dark, managed to inflict exactly as many casualties as 1500 superbly trained and led American regulars fighting in broad daylight had achieved 20 years before?
I would venture to make two points; first any suggestion that the real Mexican casualty figures “must” have been higher, is simply laughable.
Secondly, I’d suggest its very likely that exclusive of men initially returned as wounded but dying afterwards, the reported Mexican casualties of 70 dead may actually be too high.
Remember that at Chippewa the British commander initially reported the loss of 136 regulars killed in action, when the true figure as verified by muster rolls and other evidence was only 74 - not shy of half the original report - and that as I keep stressing was in a battle fought on open ground in broad daylight, while the Alamo was fought over in the dark and in part in broken ground and built-up areas.
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Post by gregl on Jun 6, 2009 9:47:18 GMT -5
Stuart
Another Revolutionary period battle, Bunker Hill, more correctly Breed's Hill has an almost opposite scenario. It also has some similarities to the Alamo, an untrained, outnumbered undersupplied militia, facing off against the world's premier military force. The fought from a crudely constructed fortification and withstood a ferocious cannonnade from ships batteries that would put the Mexican army to shame. The battle, like the Alamo, ended with their walls being breeched and a vicious hand to hand struggle. Here is where the similarities end, however. The men of Breed's Hill were incredibly well led and the battle occurred in daylight. The casualty figures were astounding, the British suffered a casualty rate of nearly 50%! The Americans sufferred 30% themselves, mostly while trying to retreat after their ammunition ran out.
It makes one wonder what the men of the Alamo could have accomplished had they been similarly led. I am left wondering why the Alamo has attained such a high level of interest, while Breed's Hill gets none. No big Hollywood renditions for them. There were no greater heroes at the Alamo than at Breed's Hill. No less either, just, I believe a difference in leadership.
Greg
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Post by stuart on Jun 6, 2009 10:32:18 GMT -5
Ah well, the point about Chippawa is that it provides a base-line; as I said, the forces were evenly matched in numbers, equally well trained and fighting on an open field in broad daylight. When the British commander decided he was losing, he disengaged and marched off, leaving the Americans in possession of the field but declining to pursue him.
Thus all of the casualties suffered/inflicted by either side came from that stand-up fight without any complicating factors.
It's easy to find and cite examples of higher or lower, or more disproportionate casualties, such as Breed's Hill/Bunker's Hill, but you then need to examine the various factors which led to that imbalance.
Using the Chippawa baseline and looking at the published figure of 70 Mexican KIA at the Alamo, the question isn't whether the Mexicans were secretly suppressing a higher total, but rather how, given all the negative factors, the tiny American garrison was able to kill so many - and whether its likely that the true casualty figure wasn't higher but lower
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Post by gregl on Jun 6, 2009 10:59:57 GMT -5
Stuart,
I guess my point was, Breed's Hill may have had more similarities to the Alamo than Chippawa, and that Mexican casualties may well have been much higher had the Alamo had more competent leadership.
Greg
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Post by Herb on Jun 6, 2009 11:12:24 GMT -5
Using the Chippawa baseline and looking at the published figure of 70 Mexican KIA at the Alamo, the question isn't whether the Mexicans were secretly suppressing a higher total, but rather how, given all the negative factors, the tiny American garrison was able to kill so many - and whether its likely that the true casualty figure wasn't higher but lower You're probably familar with the old adage, "that first reports are always wrong", which is probably true here. The difference here is that we also have a follow up report, Andrade's, that is probably very close to the mark - and does seem to be supported by other military reports of Mexican strength. And while it varies some from the initial reports of Santa Anna and Almonte, it bears out the substantance of those accounts. The strength reports, that Mark Lemon shows in the recent Alamo Journal when compared to the earlier report made by Cos in Hansen, shows again a remarkable consistency with only the slight discrepancies, one, should expect of snapshots taken of a unit on the march on different days. Except for one very significant exception, there's an intriquing difference (shortage) in the company grade officers in the Toluca Battalion as reported by Cos and those in the reports found by Mark.
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