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Post by Herb on Dec 9, 2008 23:43:43 GMT -5
A question was asked on Wade's site, on how were the men of the garrison placed on the walls. This came up for discussion on the old site fairly often, but I never really gave it much thought. Thanks to Mark's book, I felt like giving it a try this time, and so here's my speculation and what I posted on Wade's site:
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Post by stuart on Dec 10, 2008 2:10:13 GMT -5
Well it is as the title says, just speculation, but its certainly the most sensible one I've seen so far and certainly better than dividing the length of the perimeter by the number of defenders. There had to be some kind of defence plan like this; nothing cunning, just a straightforward question of assigning each man a post where he was initially to go in case of an alarm.
That's not to say they were then to be fixed in place. Not knowing where an attack is to come from you need initially to cover the whole perimeter but once the attack actually develops then you thin out them out where you can to reinforce the threatened sector.
So far as the Alamo goes this opens up a wide range of speculation. Doing that was the post commander's job and all that we do know is that he was killed pretty well right at the beginning. As he went straight to the north wall he may have been shouting to others to do the same, Joe's account however suggests had had very little if any opportunity to send for more men once he was up there. Many however may have rushed there as spontaneously as he did - naturally responding to the point of danger, and that in turn probably helped Morales get in at the south end.
Another traditional - and quite pointless speculation - is the identity of the man who took over after Travis was killed. We don't and can't now know the answer, but the most likely one is that no-one did. The common theme throughout military history is the length of time it takes for the 2IC to be advised that he's in charge. In the first place, because Travis was fighting as an ordinary soldier when he was shot, as opposed to running a battle headquarters, its highly likely that no-one, other than Joe, realised he was dead.
Even if it was known, there are then two options: An officer immediately on the spot takes charge without question of rank or status, or else he does it temporarily while sending someone to inform the actual designated successor - and at this point I'll throw in a curve ball, because the most likely candidate was probably Bowie. We're accustomed to think of him lying a dyng in his bed, but as I suggested in my Alamo Journal article, from what we do know of Typhoid Pneumonia (assuming that's what it was), since he hadn't died, by day 13 he was actually recovering.
Anyway the point I'm making is that once Travis went down the command structure evaporated because - even on the assumption that the north wall battery commander wasn't himself killed at the outset - there was no-one immediately available to take overall charge and no time for anyone to be found, informed that he was now in charge, let alone take charge of a situation literally falling apart by the minute.
I know this is slightly hijacking Herb's initial post, but the point I'm making is that while it's sensible to assume that each man or group was assigned an alarm position before the assault began, that planning is unlikely to have survived beyond the initial minutes if at all
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Post by bobdurham on Dec 10, 2008 8:26:24 GMT -5
Herb & Stuart,
Two excellent posts. I especially like the way Herb's speculated plan of defense takes into account the different companies. Too often, the Alamo defenders are seen as an homogeneous mass of 182-250 men; in reality, they were each assigned to a company, with individual command structures. I agree with Stuart that dividing the defenders by the number of wall footage doesn't work, although that's what I initially tried to do in my Alamo Journal article a long time ago. I agree with Herb that they would most probably have manned the cannon with a full crew rather than a minimum. One thing that Mark's model really brought out to me was how little room there would have been on the gun platforms for riflemen.
Stuart's speculation about Jim Bowie being the second-in-command is one I hadn't considered. Too often, I've seen speculation that Adjutant Baugh would have taken over but he would not have been in the chain of command -- if he even knew of Travis' death, his responsibility would have been to inform the actual second-in-command. Personally, I think that may have been Crockett -- or perhaps Dickinson. I don't think it really matters though because the defense collapsed so rapidly, I think things were very chaotic once the North Wall was pierced. The captains of the companies probably did the best they could to direct their men to the points needed but the situation was changing so quickly, I doubt there was much effective resistance -- the men probably retreated into the barracks for a last stand or were forced over the walls.
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Post by stuart on Dec 10, 2008 11:03:49 GMT -5
The company assignments are another reason why I find Herb’s argument convincing, but on the question of the Alamo’s last commander, while retaining a healthy scepticism as to whether anybody took command after Travis’ death, I wouldn’t rule out Baugh at all.
Certainly, as adjutant, there was no question of his being next in line, but I very much doubt if anyone was standing on ceremony that morning. We know (?) that he roused Travis, and unless he had been specifically sent off elsewhere (or already dead) he would then most likely have been standing next to Travis when he was shot. He would therefore have been the man actually on the spot to take charge, even if his first order was to send a messenger to seek out Bowie or whoever to inform him that Sunray was down and would he kindly get himself up to the north battery instanter. This is very much speculation; as I said above we don’t and never will know, I just wouldn’t rule out Baugh simply because as Adjutant he was theoretically outside the chain of command.
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Post by Herb on Dec 10, 2008 11:50:13 GMT -5
I don't think a 2IC ever took effective command of the Alamo after Travis fell either. I have thought in the past, that when looking at DLP's account, that the officer he thought was Travis was probably Baugh, but in thinking of the company assignments, there are plenty of other possibilities.
With Dickinson at the Church Battery, it would seem to me that Carey would have personally supervised the other three gun battery ie the North Battery. His LT, it would seem to me would either be with the NW Battery of two guns or the SW Battery and the 18 pounder.
In addition, it would seem that at least one other company commander and his officers would also have been at the North Wall (Blazeby in my example). Travis we know went to the North Wall as probably did Baugh his adjutant. So even after Travis fell, there were still probably numerous company grade officers at the North Wall to direct the immediate fight at the North Wall and the retreat to the Long Barracks that DLP witnessed. However, any possible central command of the Alamo probably disapppeared with Travis' death.
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Post by Herb on Dec 10, 2008 12:23:25 GMT -5
Forgive a "war story" from long ago, but reference Stuart's point about the difficulty of the 2IC taking charge in the middle of the battle, the following happened at the National Training Center a number of years ago.
At the National Training Center, they deliberatly stress the various battlefield systems through force on force battle simulations using a sophiscated from of Laser Tag that the military calls MILES. Every tank, fighting vehicle and man is equipped with target sensors , and evey weapon with a laser transmitter. The sensors are smart enough to determine if the laser transmitter that fired at the target is powerful enough to kill the target ie no rifle is going to "kill" a tank while virtually every weapon will "kill" a man. The opposing forces were a US Battalion Task Force ( about 1000 men and 30 tanks) vs a "Soviet" Motorized Rifle Regiment ( a tank battalion, 3 infantry battalions and an artillery battalion).
Before the battle took place, the "controllers" decided they were going to "stress" the US command system during this battle. Under US doctrine the Battalion commander, and his Operations Officer operate forward with the line companies providing immediate command and control. The XO or 2IC is back at the command post supervising the staff and orchestrating support for the line units.
On this day when the "Soviets" began their artillery prep, the controllers immediatedly "killed" the operations officer, with his death, the XO began preparing to move forward to assist the commander, within minutes as the "Soviet" forces closed with the US forces, the controllers "killed" the commander. The staff informed the XO who was already enroute, and almost immediatedly the XO became pinned down by enemy troops and was fighting for his individual survivial and could not reach the "front" or direct anything. The staff then informed the senior company commander, that he was now in charge and was responsible for taking command of the battle. Again, within minutes that company commander radioed that he and his company was decisivily engaged and that he could not direct the task force. He asked the asst operations officer, a lieutenant back at the battalion headquarters to take command of the battalion!
Despite, having a well established chain-of-command, and a published and well understood succesion of command, and the advantage of radio communications, the "death" of the commander and the operations officer early in the battle resulted in probably 30 minutes of chaos, before command was effectivily restored, and the battalion began fighting as a battalion again, and not as seperate groups of men doing their best to survive.
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Post by texast on Dec 10, 2008 15:06:17 GMT -5
Thanks for bringing the topic over here wolfpack. The search engines both at several places including this one have a lot to be desired. Beyond that I do agree with what was posted here and at Wade's place in this regard. For those who haven't seen it, the conversation at Wade's actually the original question asked was I would like to see a drawing/painting(s) that would accurately show the distribution of men at their posts around the alamo during the siege. I would want to get a realistic idea as to what the defense of the Alamo would look like with first 150 men and then when the 32 reinforcements arrived, how is distribution might have looked like. This has lead to the reopening of this discussion as it has come about which is great for everyone. It was my initial intent over there to show how that dividing the defenders by the number of wall footage doesn't work, and I think most who first start looking at the battle and the compound (especialy those not familiar with battle and defense planning) will often make the mistake trying to figure out placements. What you all have pointed out here makes more sense both logically for preplanning and emotionally during the actual heat of battle when the chain of command tends to break down especially in a very quick time frame. I believe also that it was referred to but maybe not really clarified well or I have just missed the one thing that is usually the case in battle as far as I am aware of and others can correct me if I'm off base here. In preparation for the defense and although each company would have it's chain of command within the company and there was really not much time between attacks that were repelled initially, the first attack repulsion would have been the only real time for any runner to be able to notify the second, third and so forth of the fact that Travis had fallen. A runner may have been able to get around the fort inside at least to notify each company position initially. If this happened as it should have each Company would have been informed by such a runner on the runners way to inform the second in command. Not everyone would have been notified of course due to the location of Travis at the time and where the second in command would have been. Once informed though of course the second in command would have probably sent the runner on to inform the rest he was now in charge and to continue giving orders if they could as the situations arose. After that I doubt very seriously any runners where able to notify anyone of any other chain of command break due to the intensity of the battle and the fact also that the noise level and the concentration of each companies defense along with the probable confusion of battle. More than likely the news was spread down the walls/positions by word of mouth so to speak as it could be but probably very little got transmitted effectively this way as there probably very little noise breaks since the battles were forming in the various locations around the perimeter so quickly. They did not have radio communication or anything else as we do today for any faster communication during battle. Getting back to what I was thinking is that within each company of course there was one in charge of their area and within those areas each cannon position would also have its individual commander so to speak. These individual gun commanders would of course be looking to their company commander before looking at the upper chain of command for guidance when needed. If for some reason they could not see or get their commanders input they would then take charge of their men accordingly at least until chain of command could be re-established (which we know probably never really happened once the battle broke out into the breach and everyone realized it). The individual company/gun commanders if still alive themselves had to asses the situation on their own and by looking around quickly would have then ordered their men to take cover or retreat back to the buildings closest to their positions as they could. One more thought is that we know that Travis had set up his chain of command and also had set up the smaller chain of command for each area of defense such as Dickinson had command of the church and Crockett supposedly had command of the Palisade, etc. We know from some of the reports of Mrs. Dickinson that her husband had been running back and forth during the battle and had relayed to her some of the situation outside the church itself. Although it was dark still at least for a small time frame and there was a lot of smoke too no doubt that each company commander including the individual gun commanders were probably trying to purvey the situation on the fly so to speak. As daylight started to rise they would have been able to see not far maybe but to see the other men scrambling for safety of the buildings and they no doubt would have heard a few that might have thought about yelling down the lines as they were running or saw others the situation something like maybe "their over the walls take cover or retreat or everyman for himself". There was a plan no doubt for every company and placement of men to retreat if needed to one or more areas for better defense. The cannon inside the center of the compound was only able to get off one shot at best before being over run or those defenders being killed themselves. For those able to see the action around the one cannon inside the compound and the fall of potential fall of that position, I don't feel there was actually much time once the breaches were made and had progressed that far, the man were mostly only able to retreat to the closest locations they could find which for many were either the long barracks or the other buildings closest to their primary defense areas. While some tried maybe to cross the compound for the church it was too late for many other than those closest to the church such as the palisade and a couple of other positions. Thanks for the war story scenario also. Oh for a time machine to go back in time or for more records to be found
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Post by Paul Sylvain on Dec 10, 2008 15:58:41 GMT -5
There is a lot to be said about the suggestions here. The emphasis of men assigned to cannon defenses makes sense for the reasons already stated above. I just can't help but think that once the walls were breached and positions overrun, it was pure chaos, especially in darkness and the smoke. Things indeed unfolded quickly. Some defenders fell back to pre-determined "last stand", but others apparently attempted to break out. I can't envision much of an organized defense or fight once the Mexicans were inside the walls, but that's just pure speculatrion on my part.
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Post by stuart on Dec 10, 2008 16:46:29 GMT -5
Just to inject a quick note of realism into all this; whilst we can speculate in circles over who may or may not have taken command and how, I still reckon there's a pretty lively possibility that no-one ever realised Travis was dead in the first place.
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Post by elcolorado on Dec 11, 2008 2:05:05 GMT -5
I tend to agree, here. It would have been, as Paul suggests, "pure chaos." The garrison was abruptly awakened from a near comatose sleep to the sudden and horrifying realization that they were being attacked. Add in the deafening screams, cannons booming, hundreds of muskets discharging, smoke, the pre-dawn darkness, and you have a recipe for utter confusion. I feel whatever organization, discipline, or unit cohesion that existed prior to the attack, quickly dissolved shortly after the assault began.
When we talk about the Texians, it's hard for me to visualize men who were well organized. Lets remember, the defenders of the Alamo were largely untrained, undisciplined, marginally motivated, and inexperienced. They tended to resist authority and reject most things military. The companies they were attached to may have provided them with a meager dose of structure but I just don't see them responding in an orderly or coordinated fashion once the Mexicans got inside the compound. And when that occurred, I think it was mostly every man for himself - everybody became their own General. As a result, one third of the forts garrison went over the wall and died on the Texas prairie.
As for Travis, I'm inclined to believe his death went largely unnoticed. With the exception of any defenders that may have been fighting beside him, I think the vast majority of Texians on the north wall were focusing all of their attention on the huge threat that was fast approaching. Once the defenders engaged the soldados the whole chain of command or command structure became irrelevant due to the rapid deterioration of the situation. With a few exceptions, the men defending the Alamo fought more as individuals and less like a cohesive garrison. Even if Travis had not been killed so early in the assault, I don't think his presence would have altered the events that occurred.
The Texian volunteers were mostly unskilled as soldiers. Certainly, a few tasted battle prior to the siege, but nothing they may have experienced in the past could have prepared them for the ordeal that awaited them on that dark morning on March 6th. It must have been a hellishly frightening and surreal moment.
Glenn
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Post by Paul Sylvain on Dec 11, 2008 8:00:40 GMT -5
Exactly. I didn't mention thge points you made (so the post wouldn't be too long), but when you look at who these men were, what they were before coming to texas, etc., you discover a group of ordinary, everyday kind of men, with little fighting experience. Farmers, Lawyers, maybe a school teacher or two. For most of the men, military training would have been minimal at best.
I also agree that few men would have known that Travis was dead.
While most of the defenders were "ordinary" men, they left us an extraordinary legacy. Nothing too ordinary about that.
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Post by marklemon on Dec 11, 2008 9:50:31 GMT -5
Glenn, Great, perceptive points...I think you nailed it exactly as it most likely happened. mark
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Post by Herb on Dec 11, 2008 11:11:14 GMT -5
I wouldn't disagree with what, Glenn says, except that it is possibly too extreme. Army companies become remarkably cohesive in a very short time - and though the surprise, confusion, and absence of leadership from above would all have impacted their ability to put up an effective fight as a garrison, I think it is a grave mistake to imagine a panic stricken mass from the first minutes.
The facts are they did halt/stall the initial attack, and that at least according to DLP the survivors of the North Wall made a somewhat organized retreat to the Long Barracks, and of course the continued resistance from there.
While some individuals may have never been effective - there would have been core elements of virtually every company (the Gonzales 32 may be questionable) that would have put up as an effective fight as possible under the circumstances.
The point here is it was a disjointed effort, and with Travis' death any possibility of a joint effort was probably lost. The fact that Santa Anna achieved surprise and reached the walls before the initial attack stalled, makes the point that even had Travis survived, his ability to exercise the command was already irrelevant.
Further once the retreat began to the buildings what organization remained broke down as whatever leaders (not necessarily officers) remained became isolated from all but the men they were personally with.
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Post by Paul Sylvain on Dec 11, 2008 12:05:48 GMT -5
Just my two cents, but we have to remember that this was not a daylight assault. The Mexicans were already at the walls, and had probably already overrun the outside posts. The defenders were in a deep sleep and were behind the eight-ball from the first alarm. It was dark, which means it would have been almost impossible for the scattered groups of men to see beyond their immediate position. Whether Travis had lived to the end of the fight, or died at the outset, the likelihood of a unified command would have been pretty small.
Even a well-trained army would have its back against the wall if thrust in the situation the mem at the Alamo found themselves in.
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Post by elcolorado on Dec 11, 2008 18:05:52 GMT -5
Don't get me wrong, Herb. I strongly believe that, although surprised, the garrison put up one hell of a fight. They were tough, courageous men - admirable men. I agree that it would be a tragic misconception to view the defenders as a "panic stricken mass."
The point I was attempting to get across was when you expose inexperienced and untrained men (essentially green recruits) to sudden, violent, and confusing circumstances, the likely result is the loss of organization.
Unlike true Army companies (ones that actually drill), where unit cohesion is typically solid and reliable, the so-called "companies" that made up the Alamo garrison were little more than loosely formed groups of civilians. They would not have responded to a crises as well as trained, professional soldiers and its unrealistic for us to expect them to.
IMO, the breakdown or loss of organization, command structure, and unit coordination occurred when the Mexicans secured the north wall. It is at this juncture where I see cohesion degrade into confusion. But in spite of the chaos, the defenders still managed to bloody an overwhelming and professionally led enemy. As inexperienced as the Texians may have been, they were all extraordinary men. The label of "Hero's" is not wasted on them.
Glenn
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