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Post by Tom Nuckols on Apr 6, 2012 4:39:57 GMT -5
I often wonder if things would have been significantly different if the Texans had anticipated an attack that morning, and Travis had everyone on alert with most of the men at their posts, even if they were dozing there during the night, with those loaded rifles and charged cannon. Are you suggesting Travis' commandancy was imperfect? Oh, you heretic!!! Dare you suggest that some guy who writes a hell of a letter is not necessarily a military genius?
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Post by Allen Wiener on Apr 6, 2012 8:09:36 GMT -5
It's possible, Tom! However, he was an improvement over Fannin, who had been designated commander-in-chief by the Lieutenant Governor and council and had comnmand at Goliad, but repeatedly asked to be relieved and kept telling the government that he was totally unqualified for his job, couldn't command and didn't want to command. So, they told him to command. Meanwhile, the governor, Henry Smith, designated Houston commander-in-chief at the same time. The council moved to impeach Smith, but Smith refused to be impeached and moved to dissolve the council, which refused to be disolved. Quite a mess all around!
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Post by Chuck T on Apr 6, 2012 15:21:03 GMT -5
You could gather up all of the military genius present in the Alamo and fit in a shot glass with plenty of room to spare. Genius however was not what was required. Basic competence was all that was necessary, for as Allen points out stand to before dawn and dusk is automatic.
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Post by Hollowhorn on Apr 6, 2012 16:22:42 GMT -5
to stand to before dawn and dusk is automatic. Chuck, I'm not so sure about that given the mental & physical state of the defenders by that stage.
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Post by Chuck T on Apr 6, 2012 17:08:01 GMT -5
I suppose it has a lot to do with how hard you want to stay alive. The mental and physical state of the command is the responsability of the commander. I would argue that Travis had no idea of how to preseve that state of well being any more than he posssesed the fundamental knowledge of how to be a commander. I suppose I should have added - stand to before dawn and dusk is automatic "for professionals". It does not matter how tired, scared, or depressed, if you want to stay alive and keep your people alive you obey the basics.
You of course make a good point, but before you carry it to far, may I suggest you read "The Last Stand of Fox Company" and the defense conducted by Captain William Barber and Company F, 7th Marines at Toktong Pass, a situation similar in most respects to The Alamo and Thermopylae. Barber conducted a successful defense against greater odds because he stuck to timeless basics. There is all the difference in the world between professional performance and amateur hour.
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Post by Hollowhorn on Apr 6, 2012 17:20:28 GMT -5
There is all the difference in the world between professional performance and amateur hour. I agree with that view, but remember that Travis (an amateur) was every bit as emotionally & physically drawn as his men. He was, if you remember, sleeping when the assault began
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Post by loucapitano on Apr 6, 2012 17:38:40 GMT -5
The Disney's Fess Parker Alamo had three attacks. That may be where the Robbins Ballad got the "fatal third time." Holding up against three seperate attacks was certainly more heroic, but does not stand up to historical scrutiny. Author James Michner's chapter on the Alamo in his masterful historical novel "Texas" has Santa Anna observing the fort froma distance and concluding that the North Wall was an exposed flank that could easily be overwelmed with the massing of his troops. Consequently Morales holds down the south wall defenses and three columns attack from the Northwest, North and Northeast. Apparently some well placed cannon fire broke the ranks of the Northern force and they retreated (charge #1) only to find their ranks augmented by the Romero's Northeast column and Cos's Northwest troops. They reached the base of the wall (charge #2) These columns seem to be briefly stalemated at the base of the wall as Cos's Northwest column worked their way around to the North end of the West wall. Perhaps, at this moment SA grew impatient and ordered in the reserves. They probably did as much harm as good as some of their bullets hit the soldados now clambering over the walls (charge #3.) In my opinion, 19th century and early 20th century historians developed this idea from the after battle reports of people like General Filisola and the testimony years later of Sargent Becerra. Thus, one grand assault was perceived as three seperate attacks by eager historians looking to further glorify the battle. Allen, as usual, I think you have it right. Tom, I hope the above discussions help explain how the three attack idea developed. But I have to admit, for the sake of drama, three attacks would have been cool. As John Ford said, "When fact becomes legend, print the legend!" Great epic pictures, but he was no historian. Lou from Long Island
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Post by loucapitano on Apr 6, 2012 17:52:19 GMT -5
Looks like I was a few days behind in my recent posting. Just had my first Granddaughter on the 3rd and things got a bit celebratory. Travis, genius or gifted amateur? Or, just another ordinary human stuck in an extraordinary situation no one could predict and all could second guess. This man of passion was willing to put his life on the line. And when the chips were down, 185 men stood by him. "Speaks well..."
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Post by Paul Sylvain on Apr 6, 2012 18:06:43 GMT -5
just too many of the enemy and not enough of you. And that is what it always comes down to, for me. All the "what ifs", such as "what if Goliad's 400-plus me reinforced the Alamo ... " usually wind up equating to buying some additional time in some way, but ultimately the end result always is the same. Too many of them and too few of us. Paul
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Post by bobster021 on Apr 6, 2012 18:39:17 GMT -5
just too many of the enemy and not enough of you. And that is what it always comes down to, for me. All the "what ifs", such as "what if Goliad's 400-plus me reinforced the Alamo ... " usually wind up equating to buying some additional time in some way, but ultimately the end result always is the same. Too many of them and too few of us. Paul I don't see how Fannin could ever have gotten through. It's one thing for 30 or so men to slip through. But a force of 400 would have been met head on by SA's forces as they neared the Alamo. Even if smaller groups could have broken off and snuck in, the main force would have to camp somewhere. Can't see SA leaving them alone. Not to mention, as stated earlier, Fannin was admittedly incompetent. IMHO, Fannin's only chance was to retreat from Goliad when ordered. Once he delayed, he was a goner. But I don't see how he could have made through the Mexicans to reinforce te Alamo. And just for the sake of argument, had he gotten through to the Alamo, it would only have delayed the inevitable. If the defenders could have then repulsed attacks, the Mexicans could have systematically knocked down the walls with artillery.
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Post by bobster021 on Apr 6, 2012 19:02:52 GMT -5
At that point, it's similar to Last Stand Hill once the Indians had begun to roll up Calhoun, Keough, and then Custer; just too many of the enemy and not enough of you. Another of my favorite subjects. The Alamo defenders were doomed from the start. Custer might have avoided disaster with better planning. Interesting though, just as Travis hoped for Fannin to reinforce him, Custer sent for Benteen and positioned Keogh and Calhoun to keep the path open for the reinforcements tro arrive. In both instances, the hope was in vain. Fannin decided it was logistically impossible. Benteen met up with Reno and decided it was ill-advised to advance, given that Reno had wounded who should not be moved. (Although that was questionable, considering that Reno and Benteen did finally make an effort to advance too little too late after Weir went on ahead without them.)
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Post by Chuck T on Apr 6, 2012 19:19:36 GMT -5
Hollowhorn: That is the point. Experienced commanders know how to deal with these things including their own fatigue and mental state (to a point). Take a close look at what was going on inside the garrision (as much of it as we know). The work schedule would break any man no matter how fit. When one includes everything else that was going on it adds up to a leadership challenge that Travis was ill equiped to cope with.
Considering that the man had no military training to speak of I think he did remarkably well, but the absence of adequate security was ultimately his downfall.
Barber at Toktong Pass had these same pressures applied, plus intense cold weather. He was trained and had experience in both Korea and World War II. That training and experience was the difference.
Lou: "Speaks well" War is about winning. Second place finishers, no matter how glorious or valorous, are still losers. Tactics are the practical application of common sense. My beef is not with Travis. My beef is with the idea prevelent at the time that all American males can ride a horse and shoot a gun, and after all that's what battles are all about. That is the type of attitude that places evidently competent lawyers in command of a garrison of militia, in a broken down pretend fort a bazillion miles from nowhere, even against a third rate army commanded by a third rate general, and expects them to hold. My beef is against such nonsense, and those that foster the notion of such rubbish.
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Post by Jim Boylston on Apr 6, 2012 19:41:43 GMT -5
Not to "thread-crap," but let me offer a quick congratulations, Lou! Grandkids are a real gift.
Best, Jim
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Post by Paul Sylvain on Apr 6, 2012 19:54:17 GMT -5
And that is what it always comes down to, for me. All the "what ifs", such as "what if Goliad's 400-plus me reinforced the Alamo ... " usually wind up equating to buying some additional time in some way, but ultimately the end result always is the same. Too many of them and too few of us. Paul I don't see how Fannin could ever have gotten through. It's one thing for 30 or so men to slip through. But a force of 400 would have been met head on by SA's forces as they neared the Alamo. Even if smaller groups could have broken off and snuck in, the main force would have to camp somewhere. Can't see SA leaving them alone. Not to mention, as stated earlier, Fannin was admittedly incompetent. IMHO, Fannin's only chance was to retreat from Goliad when ordered. Once he delayed, he was a goner. But I don't see how he could have made through the Mexicans to reinforce te Alamo. And just for the sake of argument, had he gotten through to the Alamo, it would only have delayed the inevitable. If the defenders could have then repulsed attacks, the Mexicans could have systematically knocked down the walls with artillery. I agree fully. I didn't even "go there" as far as whether Fannin could get through. SA had the roads leading into Baxar pretty well covered. He would have probably been intercepted and routed before he eve made it to the Alamo. I don't see Fannin making it in, either. But, had he, it would have just delayed the inevitable. It might have taken longer (perhaps SA would have opted to keep a holding force in place and starve out the larger force of defenders, while he set out after Houston), or cost the Mexicans a few more casualties in a larger assault, but the end result would have been the same. Paul
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Post by Herb on Apr 6, 2012 19:55:45 GMT -5
The three attacks go back much further, one of Dickinson's accounts mentions three separate assaults, but it is important to remember that from her vantage point, the only way this could be determined was by sound. There are numerous possible reasons for her misinterpretation of what was happening.
As far as the massing the attack of three columns along the northern portion of the Alamo, much as Jim said given the nature of Napoleonic tactics this was the only area with enough space to mass this number of troops. The only other spot that allowed enough space was further south along the eastern perimeter. However am attack on the church area, made/makes little tactical sense.
As far as stand to is concerned, Chuck is absolutely right, it was a well established practice, Bowie even used it at San Saba. Travis' failure to practice better security may have been due to ignorance or contempt for the enemy, but no matter what it was, it was a failure of command and led to the swift fall of the north wall.
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