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Post by Hollowhorn on May 16, 2012 14:52:13 GMT -5
There is an axiom in urban warfare that goes, the more you bombard urbanized terrain, the more defensible it becomes. The Alamo was urbanized terrain. The worst thing Santa Anna could have done was rely on those big guns to reduce it by fire. David, the 'urbanized terrain' as stated in the axiom surely refers to a city or town, not to a couple of buildings that could be bombarded from all sides at close range? The defenders would have been easily destroyed with little or no casualties suffered by the Mexicans.
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Post by Chuck T on May 16, 2012 16:12:45 GMT -5
Hollowhorn: By chance, completely by chance, I as an infantryman commanded a field artillery battalion for a short time, very short. I was far from a gunner, meerly a placeholder. Given that I make no claims to being an artilleryman, I would invite Mr Penrod to personally occupy his citadel, under the exact conditions he outlined above (i.e. The Disney Alamo) and I will take two twelve pounders and two small period type howitzers, and see how long he lasts inside.
Remember, I have all the time in the world, and he has no place to go.
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Post by daverothe on May 16, 2012 17:05:31 GMT -5
Chuck, I totally agree. I was a Bradley commander in Iraq and I can relate about the pounding you could do to walls and buildings with the munitions they used back then. To say that the worst thing that SA could do is to reduce by fire is not practical.
If I were in the same position as SA, I would have just let lose all my ordinance and reduce the Alamo to rubble. The Alamo defenders would have nowhere to go and they would be shelled out of any cover they had. I have fired all types of explosive rounds, both at demolitions ranges, and at mechanized infantry ranges and the ability to reduce by fire is EXACTLY what you want to do. Protect the troops from unnecessarily having to assault. If you cant climb it, then knock it down!
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Post by Allen Wiener on May 16, 2012 18:20:03 GMT -5
My understanding is that Santa Anna did not have the kind of guns he'd need to do serious damage to the walls, although they were on the way and actually did arrive a day or two after the battle. One theory discussed elsewhere on this forum is that he was waiting for the guns to breach the walls and force a Texan surrender or make for an easy attack and entrance to the Alamo. Another is that, while that may have been in his mind, he also understood the necessity to have X-number of assault troops to take a fixed objective like the Alamo, which was manned by X-number of defenders. Once Mexican reinforcements arrived on March 3, Santa Anna had the men he needed and saw no reason to wait any longer for the large siege guns. Although several of his staff officers would later criticize his decision to attack on the 6th, only one or two (IIRC) actually opposed it when it was discussed.
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Post by Chuck T on May 16, 2012 18:22:03 GMT -5
Dave: That's the way I see it. They don't call field artillery the King of Battle for nothing. Alamo books, including this latest by Donovan are chock full of tales of damage inflicted upon the "big" Alamo by those little pop guns in the Vanguard Brigade. The often told tale of Santa Anna being advised to wait for the bigger guns, is in nearly every Alamo book too.
As far as counterbattery goes, how close was the northern battery from the north wall , somewhere between one and two hundred yards, and they stayed there with no problem whatsoever. Stay out of scrap iron throwing distance, behind earthworks that could be built overnight and who is going to stop Mexican guns until the Disney Alamo is as level as a tennis court?
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Post by Chuck T on May 16, 2012 18:28:08 GMT -5
Allen: They were not seige guns on the backtrail. They were 12 pounders mounted on field carriages, similar to what you might see at Gettysburg or Antietam. Those there are a more modern version of course. Siege guns are big hummers, and not easily transportable. I doubt if there were any or many in the Mexican Army.
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Post by davidpenrod on May 16, 2012 18:40:35 GMT -5
Well, talk is cheap, of course, but history is on my side. Its replete with commanders who thought they could win a battle by pummeling the enemy with artillery and air power only to discover to their horror that infantryman are far more resilient than mere steel. Also, turning a city to rubble is the worst thing you could possibly do to it - just ask Paulus and the Germans.
As a former light infantry officer, myself, in the Berlin Brigade, I would be more than happy to set up in the Long Barracks and church and let you shoot 12 pounders at me all day long - all week long, if you even have that much ammo. And even if you do and the walls come tumblin' down, I'll still be there, alive and kickin', in all that nice rubble and you'll still be outside with empty caissons and a funny look on your face - because now your infantry can't even get to me because of all that nice rubble.
But let's get specific. Where exactly would you propose to set up your guns? On the river bank? La Vallita? To the north or to the east of the Alamo? How do you propose to even hit the Long Barracks with your fire when the west wall of the Plaza, the east wall of the convento courtyard, and the main gate are blocking your guns?
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Post by Chuck T on May 16, 2012 19:28:47 GMT -5
Davidpenrod: I refer you to your own Reply #14 where you say in essence that you would defend essentially the area that is presently in existence and you would remove all other structures to clear fields of fire, and not provide any cover and concealment.
I refer you to my own Reply # 18 where I reviewed the bid, giving you ample opportunity to rebutt or correct me if I was in error as to your views. No such correction or rebuttal was forthcoming. Therefore, absent such rebuttal/correction, I must assume that I have restated your opinion correctly.
Assuming now that you do not wish to backtrack, correct or quibble the point, I would first construct four or five battery sites using my infantry battalions as a labor force, supervised by engineers. Those sites would be for direct fire guns only. These positions would be constructed at night approximately two hundred yards away from the reduced sized Alamo and one or more of them would be in each cardinal direction from the Alamo. Because the mobility of my guns is so poor, I would move them only by night.. I would postion the guns only in battery, and never as individual pieces. I would direct my gunners to fire at the same aiming point and continue that fire until I told them to stop. When the guns in this position had the desired effect I would move them to another one of the locations and repeat the process.
Meanwhile my howitzers would be located in dead space, most likely just on the other side of the river along Potrero Street. While all else was happening these howitzers would continue to fire into this reduced compound.
All of these emplacements would be protected by infantry. Infantry would preclude any breakout as would the various cavalry squadrons.
And I have all the time in the world and you are not going anywhere.
As far as ammunition goes, do you think I would start out on campaign without an ammunition train? Do you not think I would have access to even more ammo should it be needed, even if I have to send back to Mexico City to get it? Time is on my side, not yours. Yes I am also giving time for Houston to organize, but do you think he is going to come to me? I would welcome him to do so. Then with my army concentrated I would give him battle on my terms and beat him. The last thing Houston would do is march on San Antonio, the very last thing. Time is on my side, not yours. I can stay there until March 1837 if need be, and you can't do a thing about it.
The reduced sized Alamo, your reduction, your setting the standard, is not Berlin, and those defending it were not the Berlin Brigade, or the 3rd Infantry Division, or the Vermont National Guard. They were 189 tired, hungry, scared out of their wits because they know they are going to die militia and gentleman soldiers.
Do you realize just how small an area you are talking about there? About an acre and a half I would say. Now I don't wish to box you in a corner here. If you were talking only rifleman to rifleman, I would be in your corner. But that is not what we are talking. The convento courtyard walls are very thin and not so high. The chapel walls are about four feet thick and they would present some issues. The long barracks has openings . Those not in use as gun ports I would assume to be filled with loose rubble. Loose rubble makes very fine shrapnel when blown inward. Have you considered the noise levels inside those buildings? How are you going to defend those portions of this compound that are topless with howitzer shells bursting in your midst evry few moments for as long as I wish it to happen? You only have one building with a roof and the portion of another building also with a roof. How thick do you think those roofs are? What are you going to eat? What are you going to drink? No well, dead cattle. Hell I just may wait long enough to let disease kill you. But you were an infantry officer and I am sure you have thought of these things too, so I will await your response.
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Post by loucapitano on May 18, 2012 11:41:14 GMT -5
Thanks David and Chuck for really making this thread a humdinger. Earlier, I felt the point of the shrunken Alamo was moot because the Texans had only a finite number of ways to accomplish their mission and defend the Bexar terrain. Holding up in a fortified position at the time probably made the most sense. The "shoulda, woulda, coulda's" never happened, which led to massacre, martyrdom and glory. Or, they might have surrendered and hoped for the same mercy they afforded Cos. Perhaps they should have realized that living to fight another day was a better strategy. But, I find it hard to believe these amateurs would think that way. I agree with the urban warfare axiom. It certainly worked at Monte Cassino in WW II. But a determined enemy will eventually dig out the defenders from the rubble as the Soviets and Germans both did in Stalingrad to each other. Santa Anna had far more choices as is usually afforded the attacker. As Chuck said, he could just wait. But that was not in his character. I think the mass attack at dawn was probably not contemplated until he lost patience with the siege and the stubborn resistance. The March 3rd reinforcements probably helped. He got the victory he desired at the cost of a mauled infantry and the intangible effect of Texan martyrdom on the Anglo population. Yeah, he shoulda, and they coulda, but it didn't happen that way.
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Post by Chuck T on May 18, 2012 12:49:55 GMT -5
Lou: Your welcome. It is all in how these things are viewed. That is why there are no two commanders, no two historians, no two critics alike. We all see different things based on our experience and perspective. David has light infantry experience, which is mine also, so it would seem ours would be mirror images of one another. My experience also includes my short sojourn to the Dark Side, the world of the gunner, a place I never found completely comfortable, as well as leading medium and heavy mortar platoons. So perhaps I bring more of an appreciation of fire power to the discussion than he does, but I don't know that to be a fact. I take a backseat to no man in my love of infantry, and what good infantry is capable of including stout defense of a Berlin, a Stalingrad, or the Little Sisters of the Poor Retirement Home. Where he and I differ here is that I look at a Berlin and conclude the same things he does about the advantages of post bombardment battle-scape. I just don't see how that same concept applies in the reduced/tiny battlescape of an acre and a half.
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Post by davidpenrod on May 18, 2012 14:22:08 GMT -5
Lou, I didnt mean to give the impression that the Texans could have won the battle of the Alamo, only that by defending a smaller portion of it they could have made a more profound impact upon the Mexican Army, i.e., killed and wounded a hell of a lot more of them.
But I think Col. Sanchez-Navarro summed it up best when, in the key to his diagram of the Alamo, he described the Long Barracks and church complex this way:
"Two-story barracks with its gate and hallway; this building was in reasonable condition; because of its construction and because it was supported by the church, it formed a high "cavalier" position in the most important part of the fort - if the enemy had made a second line of defense here, more soldiers would have died than those that died as a result of attacking it."
Sanchez-Navarro, of course, participated in the final assault 'Nuff said.
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Post by Hollowhorn on May 18, 2012 16:40:17 GMT -5
if the enemy had made a second line of defense here I was under the impression that they had, no?
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Post by Chuck T on May 18, 2012 17:56:53 GMT -5
The first thing we all have to realize is that with the situation that existed in the early morning hours of 6 March 1836 the Alamo was going to fall. As David points out by quoting Sanchez-Navarro the long barracks was a formidible position to take by direct infantry assault, with no other assistance. He also, along with others including myself, point out that the garrision was far from a trained competent military force. Don't think there will be one bit of disagreement there.
Now I pose this in support of what David has had to say, and I am speaking of an assault here even supported by the guns on hand on 6 March. Had they been a trained force, the garrison guns would possibly be sighted to fire inside the plaza, not outside - big Claymore mines. The garrision could have outposted the walls with very few to provide warning and give the illusion the walls were intended to be defended, and that the Mexicans caught the defenders curled up with their teddy bears. Meanwhile the bulk of the defensive force is divided, thirty or so in each of the west wall buildings, fifty or more in the long barracks, forty or so in the chapel, and another thirty in the low barracks. Each of these positions has been adequately loopholed. What is then created is a no mans land of fire traps inside the plaza.
There is no doubt, at least in my mind that these would have been eventually overcome, but the cost would have been two or three times greater. An intelocking strongpoint defense, the supporting point scratching the back of the supported.
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Post by Jim Boylston on May 18, 2012 21:09:38 GMT -5
I agree. There's no way the Texians could have won this thing over the long haul, but they could have inflicted a lot more casualties with some better planning.
Jim
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Post by stuart on May 19, 2012 5:50:56 GMT -5
I have to disagree with the suggested defensibility of a knocked about Alamo. The examples cited, such as Stalingrad and Berlin involved both a much larger area and more crucially the use of automatic weapons and radios and field telephones to co-ordinate the defence.
I can recall a wide ranging survey of multiple engagements in the 18th century and Napoleonic period involving assaults on villages used as battlefield strongpoints. These fell into two categories; actual walled strongpoints - the most famous being the Hougoumont farm complex at Waterloo and the similarly formidable Marengo farm, and then the second category were hastily improvised strongpoints in villages.
Those walled strongpoints sich as Marengo (and the Alamo) could be effectively defended for prolonged periods providing they were adequately garrisoned and there was no serious artillery preparation for the assault. Conversely if there was artillery preparation or the defences comprised barricades and shuttered windows then the average tenure was a very consistent 20 minutes. I use the word tenure because in large engagements there was an equally consistent pattern of one side attacking the place and taking it within 20 minutes, only to be tumbled out again by a counter attack 20 minutes later.
So far as the Alamo goes the speed with which it was taken is consistent with a Napoleonic era assault on a barricaded village and proper artillery preparation would have made it even quicker, not more difficult.
That being said, for the resons discussed I'd be inclined to think that Santa Anna not unreasonably considered an assault feasible with his existing artillery and that he would have assaulted earlier had be not been waiting for the news that Grant had been defeated and that he need not fear a Federalist uprising in his rear.
He had already delayed too long and its significant that the preparations for the assault began immediately Urrea's despatch arrived. In other words if he had delayed the assault to wait for his heavy guns why did he then launch it just a few days before they arrived?
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