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Post by Herb on May 15, 2012 12:29:36 GMT -5
Houston ordered Bowie to destroy the Bexar fortifications and withdraw into the Alamo. Houston REQUESTED permission from Gov Smith to abandon the Alamo, too. Permission that was never granted. It's in Houston's letter to Gov Smith drs Jan 17th (?) in Hansen.
There were ditches at the Alamo, that have been verified archaeologically, these include around the tambour and extending roughly half way down the palisade, as well as trenches in the cattle corral. The only position disproved (and that point is argued by Zaboley and others) is the sw corner lunette. Other possible locations for ditches/trenchs cannot be confirmed or denied based on physical evidence, there have been no digs and in some cases there never will be.
Imo, there simply is no evidence that Neil, Bowie or anybody else thought to fight in Bexar AFTER Bowie arrived with Houston's orders. Before that yes, after that no.
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Post by Allen Wiener on May 15, 2012 13:19:11 GMT -5
Herb - does the recent discovery of the location of the SW corner inside the Ripley building alter any of this? I gather that any chance of archeological digging over there is nil, as with the west wall, due to construction of basements there.
I guess my problem is in not understanding fully how you defend a town, which you say must be defended at all costs, by abandining it and holing up in a makeshift fort. I'm gathering from this discussion, particularly from Herb's point, that it doesn't really matter if you've got a strong position nearby that the enemy cannot ignore and from which you can both bombard and harass the town or even launch larger offensives directed at the enemy in the town. This could have been the case had the Alamo been manned by an adequate force, but the defenders would still have been in a siege situation with limited food and ammunition, so this couldn't have been very long term strategy. In this scenario I think the objective would have been to receive sufficient reinforcements to engage in serious attacks on the Mexicans in an effort to resolve the situation and break the siege from their (the Alamo's) side.
It's true that Smith and nearly everyone else did get sold on the idea that Bexar had to be defended, but I don't think Houston ever thought so. He wasn't in the strongest position as he was a commander-in-chief with no army and pretty much at the mercy of the individual volunteer units and their commanders at the time. He did what he could in that difficult situation, like using his powers of persuasion to talk most of the men out of the Matamoros expedition. He was in a particularly tough spot there as Smith, Robinson and the Council all had approved that in their usual bizarre way, appointing at least two different people to lead it (Fannin, Houston and IIRC even Bowie at one point). Johnson also may have been appointed somewhere, then resigned, was replaced, then changed his mind and assumed he was still in charge; I may have a few details wrong here, but it was that kind of war!
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Post by Jim Boylston on May 15, 2012 13:34:50 GMT -5
Defending a small part of the Alamo would have been easy. It would have included the Convento, the Courtyards, the Church and the campo santo. A nice little tight spot. And it allows for further compression of your position as the enemy clears a room or position. You then knock down any structure on the inside of the Plaza, such as along the west walls, so the Mexicans could not use them as cover. Defending this position doesn't mean that they would have not initially defended the perimeter of the plaza. By doing so, they would have kept the Mexicans at bay, deceived them about their intentions, slowed them down during an assault, and given time for the gunners, after a volley or two, to get the few guns still on the walls into the MDP. The five doors of the convento would not have been blocked by hide-bound dirt but by five cannons inside the rooms. As Sanchez-Navarro pointed out, if the Texans had properly prepared the 2 story convento, the result of the fight would have been much different. A study of the defense of Rorke's Drift offers a good example of a very similar type of action. Jim
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Post by Chuck T on May 15, 2012 13:55:56 GMT -5
Allen: What Penrod is talking about is a Disney Alamo, where the existing south, west, and north walls, along with the northern most of the east wall being torn down, and I would suppose the rubble being removed to strengthen what remained. This would be essentially what we have there today, what Disney presented as his Alamo.
Now compactness of position would have been achieved. Slightly less than 200 defenders would have had absolutely no problem defending this citadel as SN called it. It was certainly better in some respects then spreading your resources around a larger outer perimeter.
Now for the down side. A compact defensive position is also a compact target. The Mexican Artillery in general was misterable, but it was not in their gunners where the faults lay. It was in general the obsolete equipment and mobility. Now if you will for a moment keep in mind that there was in this reduced sized position very little in the way of mounting the defending guns high. Yes there are exceptions but for the most part they would have to be mounted at ground level or up to six feet off the ground with the aid of platforms built behind the courtyard walls. In addition these were direct fire weapons, that had some means of elevation, but vey little in means of depresssion. Also be aware that the most of the Alamo was on higher ground and that height plus the fact that this reduced compound would sit further back from the river created a dead space where the Mexican Army in particular a couple of howitzers they brought along with the Vanguard Brigade could pound this reduced sized target with impunity. Life would have been a living hell inside this reduced compound, and it is all a matter of gunner mathmatics.
Texian artillery from within the compound also suffered from little or nothing in the way of proper artillery ammo. Cut up horse shoes and scrap iron would/could be very effective in repelling infantry assault, much like a huge Claymore mine. It had little, probably no value in counterbattery fire.
Now when the follow on forces reached San Antonio about what the 8th or 9th of March, they would have blown the damned place away with direct artillery fire. Santa Anna had all the time in the world. He would not have assaulted on the 6th of March if he did not think he would win. If the reduced citadel had been a fact it would be a very tough nut to crack by direct assault rifleman to rifleman, but childs play for a combination of howitzers and 12 pounders.
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Post by davidpenrod on May 15, 2012 14:36:08 GMT -5
I think it really all comes down to what you believe Bowie meant when he wrote of defending Bexar. Did he mean Bexar or the Alamo? Was he being figurative or literal?
Here is something to ponder: Crockett supposedly approached Travis after the garrison had absconded to the Alamo from Bexar and asked Travis where he wanted to place Crockett and his men (of course this may be apocryphal). If the Texans had given any thought at all to defending the Alamo before Santa Anna arrived, why would Crockett not know his battle position before hand?
It may be that the we are arguing about details here when in fact Travis and company didn't actually have a detailed plan in mind (and certainly not in writing). Instead, the command group had a generally nebulous idea about defending "Bexar" but they really hadn't thought it out. After all, Santa Anna wasn't due until the Spring.
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Post by davidpenrod on May 15, 2012 14:55:21 GMT -5
In other words, if we don't know what their intentions were, maybe they didn't know either.
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Post by Allen Wiener on May 15, 2012 15:09:34 GMT -5
Part of the answer (or the reason they ended up as they did) is that, whatever they were going to do, they counted on a lot more men being there to do it, and a later arrival of Santa Anna, although not all that much later. Some of the correspondence from this period in Hansen does show serious concern about Mexican troops already near or at the Rio Grande, as well as scouting reports we've discussed before indicating the Mexicans were closer than expected.
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Post by Chuck T on May 15, 2012 15:40:07 GMT -5
Allen: As you know I am not a great fan of Santa Anna's generalship. His march to San Antonio is the exception to the rule. He took one heck of a risk. He drove them under miserable conditions and the gamble payed off. Had that creek not been high, he would have bagged half of them in town. Why pray tell is it so surprising, when someone gets surprised?
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Post by Herb on May 15, 2012 16:06:39 GMT -5
Chuck, the surprising thing is they were surprised. I was going to write an article for the Alamo Journal, about Neil's efforts in the security area (as in recon & security). He had active scouts and was well informed about Mexican strengths and movements. He was worried about a sudden lunge by Sesma. And he desired the early arrival of Travis and his cavalry to aid in the security mission. Neil wanted Travis to burn the bridges on the Camino Real between the Rio Grande and Bexar. Neil was fully aware that there was nothing preventing Sesma from swooping down on the Alamo.
This is all fact, we know it from Neil's letters. We also know from Almonte's diary that Neil succeed in burning down the bridges. And we can pinpoint the first part of February as when it happened. What we can't determine is exactly when and who exactly did it. There are three possibles, Bowie led his men out on a recon during this time frame, and there is a very short but doable period when Travis and his men could have done it. What seems most likely is Deaf Smith operating as one of Neil's scouts observing Sesma was the responsible person.
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Post by davidpenrod on May 15, 2012 16:15:33 GMT -5
Herb, what about Juan Seguin and the Tejanos? Wouldn't they have known that country and its people the best?
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Post by Herb on May 15, 2012 16:36:02 GMT -5
They normally get the credit, but quite honestly I think it was Smith and some Tejanos. Travis is the intriguing one, for that's who Neil wanted to do the mission, and there are just enough days from when Travis arrived until his first correspondence from Bexar for Travis to do the mission.
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Post by Herb on May 15, 2012 16:56:32 GMT -5
The argument against Travis is that he never mentioned it and given his personality that seems unlikely. Likewise Seguin never mentioned it either. It just seems to fit what we know about Smith.
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Post by loucapitano on May 16, 2012 11:20:52 GMT -5
I've often thought the Texans should have defended an inner perimeter from the Long Barracks, Church and Corral for all the reasons David listed. Ultimately, I determined the point was moot because the Texans had no way of knowing what Santa Anna's intentions were and no idea if and when reinforcements would arrive. I don't think any of the commanders seriously thought to defend the town and the Alamo with only 200 men. And, I don't think SA took the defense of the mission seriously once he knew how few defenders there were. After a tough 12 days, and the arrival of fresh troops, he determined to reduce the fort by direct assault and issued a battle plan that can only be faulted in its details and unintended consequences. But he obtained his objectives, tactical victory and the psychological terror that he would massecre all resistance. By the way, I think the use of the phrase "die in these ditches" was metaphorical. Like Lincoln saying "four score and seven" instead of 87. Bowie's and Neil's words have high impact today and I expect they had an even higher effect in those Dickensonian times of 1836. This thread turned out to be fun. Keep it up! Lou from Long Island
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Post by Allen Wiener on May 16, 2012 12:35:50 GMT -5
Well, there certainly were ditches and trenches all around the place and "die in these ditches" certainly carries a dramatic and emphatic ring. It underscored the message Bowie and Neill were trying to convey: holding Bexar was essential; they would try to do it no matter what; they needed help -- lots of help and quickly.
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Post by davidpenrod on May 16, 2012 14:32:27 GMT -5
Lou, I don't think the point is moot. The men in the Alamo were defending themselves, not the Alamo. They didn't understand that fact. They were the key terrain in Bexar, not the old mission. The Alamo was nothing more than terrain that gave them, or should have given them, an advantage over Santa Anna's forces. It had no influence over Bexar or Santa Anna's forces. Clearly, Santa Anna, his staff, and soldiers moved in, out and around Bexar without hindrance from the Alamo's guns. By failing to defend themselves by defending the "key terrain" within the Alamo (i.e., the Long Barracks and church complex), the garrison was easily annihilated.
The argument against this is that Santa Anna's big guns arrived in Bexar on March 6 and they would have easily destroyed the Alamo's walls. There is an axiom in urban warfare that goes, the more you bombard urbanized terrain, the more defensible it becomes. The Alamo was urbanized terrain. The worst thing Santa Anna could have done was rely on those big guns to reduce it by fire.
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