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Post by Jim Boylston on May 18, 2007 11:26:45 GMT -5
The DLP memoir mentions that according to Santa Anna's intel, Travis had told the garrison that if no additional aid had arrived by March 5, the defenders would attempt to escape under cover of darkness that evening. I've wondered if that may not have been the reason the bombardment stopped on the evening of the fifth. This runs contrary to the idea that Santa Anna was attempting to lull the garrison into sleep. By discontinuing the bombardment, perhaps he hoped to give the defenders a more enticing opportunity to escape, albeit into the arms of Sesma's cavalry, thus avoiding an all out assault while achieving the same end. Some time ago Wolfpack ran the numbers on ordinance, and found that the "continual bombardment" of which Travis wrote might not have been so continual after all. This may lend credence to the story of the Mexican offer of a truce during the siege. Perhaps it was during the alleged truce, when the comings and goings from the compound may have been a bit more fluid, that SA gathered the intel about the escape plan. Thoughts? Jim
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Post by Herb on May 18, 2007 14:00:35 GMT -5
This is really two different subjects to me.
The amnesty offer/armistice I believed is mentioned by Esparza in one of his accounts and while questionable does make some sense. As Jim mentions the ordinace numbers just don't match up with reports, but if there indeed was a cease fire for three (?) days, the rates of fire appear more consistent. Also, neither Santa Anna nor the Texians had the strength to anything anyway so a ceasefire is not inconsistent. The three days seems problematic though, as some sort of firing is reported on every day but, Feb 24, 29, Mar 2, and possibly the 4th.
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Post by Herb on May 18, 2007 14:25:32 GMT -5
The Escape issue is an entirly different matter.
It's pure speculation on my part, but I believe the "evidence" points to Travis indeed planning an escape.
Besides DLP, we have Filisola's account that on March 5th Travis "...through the intemediary of a woman, proposed to the general in chief that they would surrender arms and fort with everybody in it with the only condition of saving his life and that of all his comrade in arms. However, the answer had come back that they should surrender unconditionally without guarantees, not of even life itself, since htere should be no guarantees for traitors." This seems to be substantiated by Dickinson in that she claimed that the night before the garrison was betrayed by a Mexican woman.
We know from Travis final letters, that his outlook was far gloomier than before. With the Mexican reinforcement on March 3rd, no significant reinforcements for the defenders and with Bonhams news, Travis may very well looked at the situation as doomed an attempted an honorable surrender. If he indeed reached that conclusion and attempted to do so as related by Filisola only to be rejected, it would seem only realistic that he would NOW plan an escape. However, as the negotiations happened the evening/night of March 5th, Travis has lost valuable preparation time and more importantly the needed darkness to execute an escape. I'd suggest that Travis planned an escape for the night of March 6th. Which may also help explain why nearly the whole garrison was asleep when the attack did come. DLP may have heard of this plan after the battle and simply got times wrong.
Speculative, but I believe the evidence tends to support it.
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Post by Jim Boylston on May 18, 2007 14:40:02 GMT -5
Why do you think the sleeping garrison ties in? I'm following the rest of your logic, but I'm not sure I understand the corellation. Jim
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Post by Herb on May 18, 2007 15:12:22 GMT -5
If, he planned on an escape the night of March 6th, the bulk of the day would be taken up with preparations, than moving as fast and as far as possible during darkness the night of the 6th/7th. Then he probably would have continued the march throughout the day on the 7th to place as much distance as possible between his men and the Mexican Army. So Travis may have been looking at 36+ hours minimum of continuous operations and who knows how many possible battles/skirmishes. He might have figured that he needed to rest as many men as possible before attempting all that. He might also have figured that Santa Anna might be waiting on a response to the unconditional surrender demand, related by Filisola, as the cannons did not resume firing after the negotiations concluded the night of March 5th.
Or of course none of this happened and he just seriously screwed up.
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Post by stuart on May 18, 2007 15:29:54 GMT -5
Seems pretty doubtful to me. The various versions of Joe's account are pretty clear that the reason why everybody was sleeping so soundly was that they had been working late into the night repairing the defences.
I'm also unconvinced by the often repeated story that the guns fell silent that night, lulling the defenders into a false sense of security. The only explicit reference to this comes from the dubious Rose account. No-one else I can find mentions this. I've no doubt the guns did fall silent, but judging by the low ammunition expenditure they probably fell silent most other nights as well. I don't think there was anything out of the ordinary in the silence
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Post by Allen Wiener on May 19, 2007 11:08:58 GMT -5
I'm not sure where (maybe Davis?) it was suggested that this was, in fact, the pattern. Mexican shelling was confined to the daylight hours, doing increasing damage to the north wall. At night, the Texans were kept awake with frantic attempts to repair that damage, while the Mexicans moved their artillery ever closer. The result was still the same for the defenders -- no sleep, night or day.
Regarding the possibility of a truce, according to Almonte's diary, the defenders fired canon shots at the Mexicans on March 2 & 3; heavy Mexican firing on March 4, with no return fire from the Alamo, except for a couple of shots late in the day. On the 3rd, Mexican reinforcements arrived and news of Urrea's victory at San Patricio was received. Also on the 3rd "The enemy attempted a sally in the night at the Sugar Mill, but were repulsed by our advance."
On March 5 the Mexicans opened a brisk fire from the north battery, which by now was within a pistol shot of the fort, according to Almonte, again without answer from the Alamo "except now and then." At some point during the day Santa Anna decided to make the assault. He had held a council the previous day and there was general agreement that the assault should be made, the only significant difference of opnion being whether or not to wait for the 12 pound siege guns. In the end, it was decided to muster the troops at midnight and commence the assault at 4 a.m. But in his March 6 entry he says the troops were in position at 5 a.m. with the attack beginning at 5:30 a.m., which continued until 6 a.m. "when the enemy attempted in vain to fly, but they were overtaken and put to the sword...."
AW
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Post by Herb on May 19, 2007 11:12:56 GMT -5
If there were a truce, it was either of a very short duration - a matter of hours - or it looks like only one day, the 29th.
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Post by Jim Boylston on May 19, 2007 11:13:03 GMT -5
I'll offer the possibility that these cannon shots weren't meant to be offensive actions, but might rather have been the signal shots that Houston mentions in his letter after the fall. Jim
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Post by Allen Wiener on May 19, 2007 11:15:37 GMT -5
Could be, but at least one of them hit a building in Bexar, while a second shot missed hitting anything. Almonte seems to indicate that the Alamo responded with a few canon shots each day, one of which could have been the daily signal. I'm wondering why some of that fire wasn't aimed at the ever-closer north battery that was doing so much damage.
AW
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Post by stuart on May 19, 2007 11:34:16 GMT -5
It may again be one of those glaringly obvious points but if the Mexicans did break a habit of lobbing the odd round at the Alamo on the night of 5/6 March it probably had nothing at all to do with any cunning plan to lull the defenders into a false sense of security and everything to do with the fact that the assault troops were moving into position between the guns and the Alamo
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Post by Jim Boylston on May 19, 2007 11:51:45 GMT -5
It may again be one of those glaringly obvious points but if the Mexicans did break a habit of lobbing the odd round at the Alamo on the night of 5/6 March it probably had nothing at all to do with any cunning plan to lull the defenders into a false sense of security and everything to do with the fact that the assault troops were moving into position between the guns and the Alamo I'll buy that. The simplest explanation is often the most reliable. Jim
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