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Post by Herb on Dec 19, 2010 11:43:12 GMT -5
In terms of alerting them by radically changing tactics the night before, I've read stuff that makes me buy into the theory that the nighttime harrassment ended with a "truce" that started 3 nights before the attack, not the night before. That's a less radical shift and would, by your theory, result in a more relaxed group of defenders. Thoughts? There are stories about a truce, a three day truce in the middle of the siege (from Esparza), and stories of Travis supposedly negotiating to surrender at the end of the siege (from Filisola and DLP), but some sort of documentation that they actually occured is lacking. Almonte's Journal records fighting or at least artillery firing nearly every day - so that tends to argue that there was no truce. But, still the stories are there which makes me inclined to believe that something did in fact happen, maybe just not exactly what the participant remembered. Again if we look at Almonte's Journal he does not record any firing or fighting from the night of the 28th until the afternoon of March 1st, a period of about 36 hours. No firing is recorded for March 2 or March 3rd. However brisk fire is recorded for March 4th or 5th. Now, not mentioning fire, does not necessarily mean that there was no firing, but very clearly there was not a three day period where there was a cease fire as Esparza claimed. Looking at all that was going on, I think if there was cease fire it most likely occured on the 29th and 1st, when Santa Anna sent out Sesma with the cavalry and an infantry battalion to intercept Fannin. It would have been to Santa Anna's advantage to negotiate a cease fire at the Alamo, while he detached a major portion of his then available forces to move on Fannin. No other point offers a truly military justifiable reason for Santa Anna to even consider a truce. IF Santa Anna offered a 3 day truce beginning the 29th, then notified the Texians the very next day as Sesma returned, that the cease fire was cancelled, the Texians firing on Santa Anna's headquarters the afternoon of March 1st, gains even more significance.
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Post by Herb on Dec 19, 2010 12:07:30 GMT -5
One thing, that I think is being overstated is that the Texians were not expecting to be attacked until Spring. While that was no doubt, Houston's thoughts - it was not what the commanders of the Alamo thouhgt. Neill was remarkably well informed of Santa Anna's and Sesma's movements (seperate forces until February) see Neill's January 28th letter (Hansen, pp 664-666).
Travis wrote on Feb 13th that: "Our Spies have just returned from the Rio Grande - The enemy is there one thousand strong & is making evey preparation to invade us. By the 15th of March I think Texas will be invaded ...." (Hansen. p 23) and on Feb 14th Travis and Bowie sent a joint letter saying "From all the information we ave received , there is no doubt but the enemy will shortly advance upon this place & that this will be the first point of attack." (Hansen, p25).
While Santa Anna did steal a march, it was a matter of a couple weeks not months.
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Post by garyzaboly on Dec 19, 2010 15:56:41 GMT -5
One thing, that I think is being overstated is that the Texians were not expecting to be attacked until Spring. While that was no doubt, Houston's thoughts - it was not what the commanders of the Alamo thouhgt. Neill was remarkably well informed of Santa Anna's and Sesma's movements (seperate forces until February) see Neill's January 28th letter (Hansen, pp 664-666). Travis wrote on Feb 13th that: "Our Spies have just returned from the Rio Grande - The enemy is there one thousand strong & is making evey preparation to invade us. By the 15th of March I think Texas will be invaded ...." (Hansen. p 23) and on Feb 14th Travis and Bowie sent a joint letter saying "From all the information we ave received , there is no doubt but the enemy will shortly advance upon this place & that this will be the first point of attack." (Hansen, p25). While Santa Anna did steal a march, it was a matter of a couple weeks not months. Wolf, it was definitely what Travis thought, and what he was conveying. And what he wrote to Governor Henry Smith from Bexar on February 13 is proof of it: "The enemy is there [at the Rio Grande] and is making every preparation to invade us. By the 15th of March I think Texas will be invaded & every preparation should be made to receive them." March 15 was the date Travis expected the enemy to INVADE Texas, not necessarily for the the Mexicans' entry into San Antonio. Since Spring usually begins on March 20, it was likely Travis didn't expect the Mexicans to show up until much later in March. Bowie and Travis both used the nebulous word "shortly" to describe their expectation of the enemy's ADVANCE, but how long they thought the enemy would take to reach Bexar---or even if Bexar was Santa Anna's primary object of attack---was never specified. At any rate, as we all know, Santa Anna arrived in Bexar a full three three weeks before Travis estimated he would even "invade Texas"!Something of a corroboration of Travis's timeline for invasion was made almost 70 years later, in a memoir by J. M. Rodriguez, son of Ambrosio, who recalled how Travis dismissed his father's warning about 7,000 Mexicans being about to march north: Travis "could not believe it, because General Cos had only been defeated less than three months, and it did not seem possible to him that General Santa Ana could organize in so short a time as large an army as that." Like Travis, Neill did indeed know about the Mexican army organizing at the Rio Grande--but not that it had already begun its march north. In Neill's letter which you mention, dated January 28, he simply states "I expect the Enemy to be on the point of commencing their march." Bowie, in fact, in writing to Smith on February 2, noted that "very large forces are being gathered in several of the towns beyond the Rio Grande" and others were "on the point of marching." By February 14, however, Alamo garrison member David Cummings wrote to his father that "the Enemy have not yet crossed the Rio Grande 180 mi. distant. Nor are they expected to make any movement this way until the weather becomes warm or until the grass is sufficiently up to support their horses we conceive it however, important to be prepared as a heavy attack is expected in the Spring."
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Post by Herb on Dec 19, 2010 17:10:00 GMT -5
March 15 was the date Travis expected the enemy to INVADE Texas, not necessarily for the the Mexicans' entry into San Antonio. And just what was Texas in Feb 1836? Very clearly the Texians did not consider the Rio Grande as the demarcation point at that time. As far as San Antonio all three commanders, Neill, Bowie, and Travis considered that as the objective ... on Feb 14th Travis and Bowie sent a joint letter saying : "From all the information we ave received , there is no doubt but the enemy will shortly advance upon this place & that this will be the first point of attack. " (Hansen, p25). - and when Sesma moved from Laredo to vicinity of modern Eagle Pass and Santa Anna moved the mass of his column in that direction, there was no place but San Antonio as a possilbe objective. The Intelligence that Neill gathered up to his departure is remarkable for its accuracy and Neill considered that the garrison could be attacked (from an earlier letter) within ten days from the forces at Eagle Pass. Cummings letter is interesting but also remarkable - he states the enemy is 180 miles distant (in reality 140 -150 miles) and it will take them a month or six weeks to reach Bexar (a march of less than 4 miles a day). In reality, Sesma covered the ground in 11 days departing the Rio Grande on the 12th and arriving on the 23rd - pretty close to what Neill expected. Now, whether Neill effectivily conveyed those expectations to Travis, or whether Travis was expecting a more timily warning from spies left to observe the Mexican Army (according to Sutherland the Tejano who interrupted the Washington Fandango the night of the 22d, was one such spy) is another matter. Very clearly Neill, if not the garrison was aware of where the Mexican Army was and how rapidly, they could reach Bexar. And, it would seem from Travis' own letters that he was aware of that possibility. The way I read the letter of Feb 13th, march 15th is Not Later Than date, not a Not Earlier Than one. Neill had taken steps (more on this later) to delay Santa Anna and probably believed that he had an effective spy system in place to provide early warning to believe that it was safe for him to depart Bexar for about 2 weeks. Neill apparently anticipated a descent on Bexar around March 1st (if he was expecting Santa Anna to reinforce Sesma before moving - it seems his thoughts were again remarkable accurate given that the advance elements of the 1st Bde did not reach Bexar until March 3rd).
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Post by garyzaboly on Dec 20, 2010 6:19:20 GMT -5
March 15 was the date Travis expected the enemy to INVADE Texas, not necessarily for the the Mexicans' entry into San Antonio. And just what was Texas in Feb 1836? Very clearly the Texians did not consider the Rio Grande as the demarcation point at that time. As far as San Antonio all three commanders, Neill, Bowie, and Travis considered that as the objective ... on Feb 14th Travis and Bowie sent a joint letter saying : "From all the information we ave received , there is no doubt but the enemy will shortly advance upon this place & that this will be the first point of attack. " (Hansen, p25). - and when Sesma moved from Laredo to vicinity of modern Eagle Pass and Santa Anna moved the mass of his column in that direction, there was no place but San Antonio as a possilbe objective. The Intelligence that Neill gathered up to his departure is remarkable for its accuracy and Neill considered that the garrison could be attacked (from an earlier letter) within ten days from the forces at Eagle Pass. Cummings letter is interesting but also remarkable - he states the enemy is 180 miles distant (in reality 140 -150 miles) and it will take them a month or six weeks to reach Bexar (a march of less than 4 miles a day). In reality, Sesma covered the ground in 11 days departing the Rio Grande on the 12th and arriving on the 23rd - pretty close to what Neill expected. Now, whether Neill effectivily conveyed those expectations to Travis, or whether Travis was expecting a more timily warning from spies left to observe the Mexican Army (according to Sutherland the Tejano who interrupted the Washington Fandango the night of the 22d, was one such spy) is another matter. Very clearly Neill, if not the garrison was aware of where the Mexican Army was and how rapidly, they could reach Bexar. And, it would seem from Travis' own letters that he was aware of that possibility. The way I read the letter of Feb 13th, march 15th is Not Later Than date, not a Not Earlier Than one. Neill had taken steps (more on this later) to delay Santa Anna and probably believed that he had an effective spy system in place to provide early warning to believe that it was safe for him to depart Bexar for about 2 weeks. Neill apparently anticipated a descent on Bexar around March 1st (if he was expecting Santa Anna to reinforce Sesma before moving - it seems his thoughts were again remarkable accurate given that the advance elements of the 1st Bde did not reach Bexar until March 3rd). Nearly every letter written in San Antonio in January and February 1836 point to the Rio Grande as being the line that, when finally crossed by Santa Anna's main body---irrespective of any advance unit he might send forward--- would constitute his fully-mounted, official invasion of "Texas." Neill's absence from Bexar is a good example of the attitude about time shared in Bexar by the garrison: he left Travis in command, but fully expected to be able to return before the Mexicans showed up. (Nor was the Texian "spy system" at any stage of adequacy, since proper horses were in short supply, if available at all, as Neill himself bemoaned). The Texians' misjudgment, and inability to believe that Santa Anna's army could reach Bexar before the Spring, is a key factor in the Alamo story, irrespective of mistakes they made in geographical calculations, or in determining how many miles and days it would take for that army to reach it. Even if he expected the Mexicans to arrive "soon"---whatever "soon" meant to him---none of Travis's letters of mid-February---nor any letter written by any other Texian in San Antonio at the time---contains any panic over their IMMEDIATE approach. "I have nothing of interest to communicate that has transpired since my last," Travis wrote Governor Smith on the 16th. To be sure, he again stressed that the post would be a key object of the Mexican invasion, and reiterated the need for reinforcements and supplies, but he remained confident that his urgent appeal would allow the latter to reach Bexar in time to meet the expected threat. Little could he realize that in only six days he would be besieged by that invading army. On Feb. 2 Bowie had written to Smith of the gathering enemy forces: "we remain yet in doubt whether they entend [sic] an attack on this place or go to reinforce Matamoras. It does however seem certain that an attack is shortly to be made on this place." So while the attack on Bexar was fully expected "shortly," since Bexar was considered by many the Texians' major frontier post, there was doubt as to exactly when "shortly" meant, and just where the enemy would FIRST strike. One of Neill's letter dated Jan. 23 noted that he had received intelligence that "it was the intention of Santa Anna to attack Copano and Labahia first and send but a few hundred cavalry against this place at the same time." The officers of Bexar were, in effect, sending out mixed signals regarding the emergency that was unfolding. In fact, in early February one Texian naval officer opined that "the general supposition in Texas was, that there would be no fighting until the summer was far advanced"! As late as 16 February Fannin wrote to J. W. Robinson that Santa Anna had not yet crossed the Rio Grande---note again how important that river loomed in the mind of the Texians--- but that he "designed to enter our country in Three Divisions." Travis's noting, in his letter to Smith of February 13, that "by the 15th of March I think Texas will be invaded" did not help his situation. Nor did such letters as Cummings' ("we conceive it however, important to be prepared as a heavy attack is expected in the Spring"), which fully agreed with Travis. But there you have it---right from the horse's mouth as it were. We can make assumptions and guesses about what he and others were "apparently" thinking, but we cannot change what Travis had so precisely put on paper, 174 years after he wrote it---no matter how much we realize he was wrong.
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Post by Herb on Dec 20, 2010 9:15:20 GMT -5
Gary, you are ignoring the differences in the military situation, over time - that the Texains knew - yes when Sesma was in Laredo, the probability of other points being attacked first was probable -as in Neill's letter pointed out. Once Sesma moved upriver, that was no longer a consideration and ALL correspondence from Bexar after that fact was learned, is strident about reinforcing Bexar, and that Bexar was the initial objective.
As has been pointed out, I will not transcribe the letters, the Texians had a remarkably accurate Intellignece picture of the Mexican Army dispositions even while on the Mexican Army was on the march (something that points out the error in your assumption that the Texian spy system was totally inadequate).
Once Sesma reached the Eagle Pass vicinity, he spent the next few weeks practically inert. There is evidence that he wasn't even conducting routine patrols. While Neill was intially concerned about Sesma reaching San Antonio in 10 days, given Sesma's inactivity over time, it HAD to appear to Neill, that Sesma was waiting for Santa Anna's army to reach him before continuing his advance. Doing a little bit of analysis, would have showed Neill that the earliest possible time that Santa Anna could reach Bexar was the first week of March. Thus Neill thought he had time to make personal appeals to the government for reinforcements, money, and supplies and to return to Bexar before the crisis.
Given what happened historically, with Gaona's Brigade, Neill's analysis was on track. BUT, he misjudged Santa Anna's intentions (and it would be interesting to see exactly when in fact that Santa Anna communicated to Sesma to stop farting around and advance on Bexar).
The Texians knew, where the Mexican Army was, they knew they could reach Bexar in ten days, they knew Bexar was the objective, and they had spies out to provide them early warning - which in fact happened on the 22d .
Their misjudgement was viewing Sesma's inactivity and assuming from that, that he would remain inactive until Santa Anna's Army of Operations from the interior of Mexico had linked up with Sesma.
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Post by garyzaboly on Dec 20, 2010 15:35:40 GMT -5
Gary, you are ignoring the differences in the military situation, over time - that the Texains knew - yes when Sesma was in Laredo, the probability of other points being attacked first was probable -as in Neill's letter pointed out. Once Sesma moved upriver, that was no longer a consideration and ALL correspondence from Bexar after that fact was learned, is strident about reinforcing Bexar, and that Bexar was the initial objective. As has been pointed out, I will not transcribe the letters, the Texians had a remarkably accurate Intellignece picture of the Mexican Army dispositions even while on the Mexican Army was on the march (something that points out the error in your assumption that the Texian spy system was totally inadequate). Once Sesma reached the Eagle Pass vicinity, he spent the next few weeks practically inert. There is evidence that he wasn't even conducting routine patrols. While Neill was intially concerned about Sesma reaching San Antonio in 10 days, given Sesma's inactivity over time, it HAD to appear to Neill, that Sesma was waiting for Santa Anna's army to reach him before continuing his advance. Doing a little bit of analysis, would have showed Neill that the earliest possible time that Santa Anna could reach Bexar was the first week of March. Thus Neill thought he had time to make personal appeals to the government for reinforcements, money, and supplies and to return to Bexar before the crisis. Given what happened historically, with Gaona's Brigade, Neill's analysis was on track. BUT, he misjudged Santa Anna's intentions (and it would be interesting to see exactly when in fact that Santa Anna communicated to Sesma to stop farting around and advance on Bexar). The Texians knew, where the Mexican Army was, they knew they could reach Bexar in ten days, they knew Bexar was the objective, and they had spies out to provide them early warning - which in fact happened on the 22d . Their misjudgement was viewing Sesma's inactivity and assuming from that, that he would remain inactive until Santa Anna's Army of Operations from the interior of Mexico had linked up with Sesma. Wolf, the consensus of most Alamo historians agrees with me (see, for instance, Walter Lord)---mainly, that Travis and his men didn't expect the Mexicans to arrive in Bexar until well into March. It's as simple as that, and that's the only case I am making here. The documentation says it in plain language, no matter how much we try to counter-explain things. We can analyze what Neill might have been thinking, but where is the evidence that he expected the Mexicans to reach Bexar by March 1? It's a purely speculative assumption. Indeed the San Antonio garrison wanted help, and they wanted it ASAP, because they KNEW the place would eventually be invaded---what they didn't know was that the invasion would occur three weeks prior to the enemy's estimated time of arrival! I never said the Texian spy system was "totally inadequate"---I said it was inadequate due to the shortage of good horses. Neill himself complained that it was. There is no denying that the garrison in San Antonio knew of the forces being collected along the Rio Grande and adjacent areas. My contention is that neither Travis nor any of his men, by all the available documentation that exists, expected the main body of the Mexican army to arrive at Bexar until mid-March. It's often interesting to speculate, but in this case the facts speak for themselves. Even San Felipe's TELEGRAPH AND TEXAS REGISTER of February 27--already 4 days into the Alamo siege!---noted that 1,000 Mexican troops were preparing to march into Texas and attack Goliad, while Santa Anna would drive "for the heart of Texas, with that part of the army under his command, while the other two divisions make a simultaneous attack on Bejar and Goliad." Intelligence from the west had informed them "that in March, we may expect to be invaded by the whole Mexican force."
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Post by Herb on Dec 20, 2010 17:23:44 GMT -5
Wolf, the consensus of most Alamo historians agrees with me (see, for instance, Walter Lord)---mainly, that Travis and his men didn't expect the Mexicans to arrive in Bexar until well into March. It's as simple as that,.... Gary, that is about the weakest arguement anybody can advance, we all know that the "consenus" changes every couple of years based on new finds and new anaylsis. Once again the facts as spelled out in mutiple correspondence, the Texians knew the dispositions of the Mexican Army, they knew, the Mexicans could reach Bexar in ten days and the commanders in Bexar (what others thought, elsewhere is not relevant when trying to determine what was going on in Bexar) knew they were the initial main objective. This is simple. To deny it is to deny the facts. The Texian mistake was a simple one, they apparently viewed Sesma's inactivity and assumed he would not move until Santa Anna and the lead elements of the main body joined Sesma on the Rio Grande. This is far less about Santa Anna achieving some great surprise, and more about the Texians growing complacent with a standing threat and losing sight of the "possible". How much of this is due to the transition of command from Neill to Travis is something that has been inadequatly explored. But, it does seem to me that Travis did not have the same focus on gathering intelligence and observing Sesma that Neill did. BTW, the "horse" arguement is totally false by the first week of February. While the garrison as a whole was still inmobile due primarily to a lack of draft animals, with the arrival of Bowie and his men from Goliad, and Froysth's cavalry company under Travis there are over 60 horses known to be in the garrison. More than enough to equip scouts/spies. The lack of horses on February 23rd was due to their being grazed on the Salado. In fact we know of at least three mounted movements by portions of the garrison into No Man's Land west of San Antonio in February alone.
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Post by Paul Sylvain on Dec 20, 2010 19:04:08 GMT -5
Maybe it was more matter of ignoring, or giving credibility to, reports that Mexican forces had already crossed the Rio Grande and nearing Bexar. I seem to recall several accounts where the Mexican movements were observed and attempts made to inform the defenders in San Antonio. I don't see how it could have been a total surprise. However, I will agree that the Mexican's actual arrival was sooner, by days or a week, than anyone anticipated, given that Santa Anna was poised to attack while most defenders were still in town, but the weather foiled the plan.
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Post by Herb on Dec 21, 2010 7:01:12 GMT -5
Maybe it was more matter of ignoring .... Complaceny, Paul. Routine dulls attention, it was complaceny that allowed Sesma to approach within a mile or two of Bexar undetected on the 23rd. It was complacency that allowed Santa Anna to reach the walls on March 6th undetected. Both were preventable by energetic leadership. While Santa Anna and the Mexican Army performed competently, these two events are more about failures in Texian command (Travis) and less about Santa Anna's "brillance". Even after being warned the night of the 22d by one of Tejano spies of Sesma's immediate approach, the only action Travis took was to call a council of war, and then to post a sentry in the church bell tower. At the very least, the horses should have been brought in from pasture, and a small mounted security force should have been posted to the west of Bexar to provide early warning and the garrison should have had "stand to" at first light on the 23rd.
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Post by garyzaboly on Dec 21, 2010 7:46:01 GMT -5
Wolf, the consensus of most Alamo historians agrees with me (see, for instance, Walter Lord)---mainly, that Travis and his men didn't expect the Mexicans to arrive in Bexar until well into March. It's as simple as that,.... Gary, that is about the weakest arguement anybody can advance, we all know that the "consenus" changes every couple of years based on new finds and new anaylsis. Once again the facts as spelled out in mutiple correspondence, the Texians knew the dispositions of the Mexican Army, they knew, the Mexicans could reach Bexar in ten days and the commanders in Bexar (what others thought, elsewhere is not relevant when trying to determine what was going on in Bexar) knew they were the initial main objective. This is simple. To deny it is to deny the facts. The Texian mistake was a simple one, they apparently viewed Sesma's inactivity and assumed he would not move until Santa Anna and the lead elements of the main body joined Sesma on the Rio Grande. This is far less about Santa Anna achieving some great surprise, and more about the Texians growing complacent with a standing threat and losing sight of the "possible". How much of this is due to the transition of command from Neill to Travis is something that has been inadequatly explored. But, it does seem to me that Travis did not have the same focus on gathering intelligence and observing Sesma that Neill did. BTW, the "horse" arguement is totally false by the first week of February. While the garrison as a whole was still inmobile due primarily to a lack of draft animals, with the arrival of Bowie and his men from Goliad, and Froysth's cavalry company under Travis there are over 60 horses known to be in the garrison. More than enough to equip scouts/spies. The lack of horses on February 23rd was due to their being grazed on the Salado. In fact we know of at least three mounted movements by portions of the garrison into No Man's Land west of San Antonio in February alone. Wolf, it's the consensus of historians because the documentation purely and simply tells us what happened, and what Travis and his garrison thought. I offer such facts and all I get in response is a denial of their validity, or that Travis, his men, and others may have just had bad days, or ulterior motives, when they wrote what they did. You want to instead "explore" abstract ideas about command transition and what you think were the "apparent" and unspoken views held by the the Texians. But don't listen to me. Let the voices of those days again speak: *"Such was the universal distrust of Mexican authority that, no report coming from it ever received due consideration...Many persuaded themselves, that Santa Anna would never attempt to conquer Texas, and the most general reply to any argument, to the contrary was that, he was afraid to meet us... Until Col. Neill's departure Deaf Smith had been a regular scout, but they too entertained the common belief, or they would have never left their post."-------John Sutherland, Narrative. *"Col. Travis had no idea that Santa Anna with his army, would venture to approach the city of Bexar, and for this reason, only a watch was kept on the church tower." -------Juan Seguin, 1890 *[Referring to the night of the Crockett fandango, and the arrival of the Tejano courier noting that Santa Anna had just begun his march from the Rio Grande]: "Travis then said, it will take 13,000 men from the Presidio de Rio Grande to this place thirteen or fourteen days to get here; this is the 4th day. Let us dance to-night and to-morrow we will make provisions for our defense." -------Antonio Menchaca, Memoirs. *[J. M. Rodriguez on his father Ambroisio informing Travis that a Tejano messenger had arrived with news that Santa Anna had already started his march]: " Colonel Travis told my father that he could not believe it, because General Cos had only been defeated less than three months, and it did not seem possible to him that General Santa Ana could organize in so short a time so large an army as that."-------J. M. Rodriguez, memoir. *"There is Still a powerful force at Rio Grande Say 2000 certain the last accounts we have is that they were preparing Ferry Boats to March against us we know not when they may come."-------Green B. Jameson to Henry Smith, Feb. 11, 1836 *[On the Mexican Army's arrival in Bexar]: "Santa Anna is there himself and in this vicinity at least six thousand troops--- Contrary to the expectation of every one he has invaded the Country when least expected."-------Burr H. Duval, letter, Goliad, March 9, 1836 *"It is however fully ascertained that we have nothing of the kind to apprehend [viz., fears of "a sudden attack...on our Garrison here"] before a month or Six weeks as the Enemy have not yet crossed the Rio Grande 180 m. distant from this place nor are they expected to make any movement this way until the weather becomes warm or until the grass is sufficiently up to support their horses we conceive it however, important to be prepared as a heavy attack is expected from Sant Ana himself in the Spring."-------David Cummings to his father, Feb. 14, 1836 *" The general supposition in Texas was that there would be no fighting until the summer was far advanced."-------Information from an officer of the Texian Naval Service, Feb. 8, 1836 *"The country is now free from Mexican troops, but Santa Anna is expected in the Spring with a powerful army."-------Information from Texas transmitted in a letter written in Randolph Tennessee, March 1, 1836 *[Santa Anna] "will arrive with part of his army at Bejar, or St. Antonio, he will make his appearance in March in due season to miss the spring buds of his prospects.."-------Tom Find, American in Matamoros, early Feb. 1836 * [Santa Anna would drive] "for the heart of Texas, with that part of the army under his command, while the other two divisions make a simultaneous attack on Bejar and Goliad." [Intelligence from the west advised] "that in March, we may expect to be invaded by the whole Mexican force."TELEGRAPH AND TEXAS REGISTER, February 27, 1836 * "Our campaign will commence next month, and we may have some warm work. Until the grass rises the Mexicans cannot advance, unless it is by sea---the Mexicans only advance on horses or by water."-------Sam Houston, Nacogdoches, Feb. 19, 1836 *"Our Spies have just returned from Rio Grande---The enemy is there one thousand strong & is making every preparation to invade us. By the 15th of March I think Texas will be invaded & every preparation should be made to receive them."-------Travis to Henry Smith, Feb. 13, 1836 And so, without resort to endless babble about what MIGHT have been thought, or what MIGHT have been done, I have offered here the plain unvarnished FACTS as they were recorded by men who had been in San Antonio and other parts of Texas during the first two months of 1836. Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, I rest my case.
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Post by Herb on Dec 21, 2010 10:38:05 GMT -5
One thing, that I think is being overstated is that the Texians were not expecting to be attacked until Spring. While that was no doubt, Houston's thoughts - it was not what the commanders of the Alamo thouhgt. Neill was remarkably well informed of Santa Anna's and Sesma's movements (seperate forces until February) see Neill's January 28th letter (Hansen, pp 664-666). Travis wrote on Feb 13th that: "Our Spies have just returned from the Rio Grande - The enemy is there one thousand strong & is making evey preparation to invade us. By the 15th of March I think Texas will be invaded ...." (Hansen. p 23) and on Feb 14th Travis and Bowie sent a joint letter saying "From all the information we ave received , there is no doubt but the enemy will shortly advance upon this place & that this will be the first point of attack." (Hansen, p25). While Santa Anna did steal a march, it was a matter of a couple weeks not months. Funny, Gary, how you now accuse me of ignoring the facts, when the above was my baseline statement. The basic facts that the Texians knew where the Mexicans were, andhow long it would take to march from the Rio Grande to Bexar are indisputable. I don't know why you continue to argue this point as virtually every quote you cite verifies these facts. That the Texians were caught in town unprepared was not brillance on Santa Anna's part, but mistakes made by Travis. Travis for whatever reason ignored the known facts. It's that simple.
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Post by stuart on Dec 21, 2010 12:51:39 GMT -5
I think that perhaps this argument is missing the point a little. Whether Travis was expecting Santa Anna in a week or in three weeks is neither here nor there. The fact of the matter is that he completely neglected the most elementary security precautions and allowed Santa Anna the luxury of tactical surprise.
He apparently had no standing patrols out and in fact on the morning the Mexicans arrived his horses were out at grass and he had to borrow one from John Sutherland to send for them. Whatever way you look at it Travis wasn't expecting Santa Anna or Sesma to turn up that early.
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Post by Herb on Dec 21, 2010 12:56:43 GMT -5
I think that perhaps this argument is missing the point a little. Whether Travis was expecting Santa Anna in a week or in three weeks is neither here nor there. The fact of the matter is that he completely neglected the most elementary security precautions and allowed Santa Anna the luxury of tactical surprise. He apparently had no standing patrols out and in fact on the morning the Mexicans arrived his horses were out at grass and he had to borrow one from John Sutherland to send for them. Whatever way you look at it Travis wasn't expecting Santa Anna or Sesma to turn up that early. Exactly.
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Post by Chuck T on Dec 21, 2010 14:46:40 GMT -5
Stuart: You have hit the nail on the head in just one sentence. Travis neglected what can only be termed elementary. The answer as to why is equally simple. He was no soldier. He was a lawyer playing at soldier. He was lucky that he faced the Napoleon of the West rather than the Wellington of the West. The latter would have eaten his breakfast for him on the morning of 23 February, while his corpse laid out on Commerce Street.
I am still wondering where all of those gallant yeoman farmers in sufficient numbers along with adequate logistical support, who Gary thinks would have come to the front lines (the Alamo) in the spring, were coming from. How many men could Houston scrape together when everyone knew the fat was in the fire? Less than a thousand if memory serves. Where were the supplies coming from. Where was and who controled the transportation assets to get them to the Alamo. Unless someone has answers to these questions, then the whole issue of re-inforcement is pie in the sky woulda-coulda-shoulda.
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