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Post by garyzaboly on Dec 17, 2010 15:36:33 GMT -5
I have not forgotten that Travis and others made the assumption that Santa Anna would not march north until spring. Assumptions though have a way of becoming fatal assumptions. Travis himself made the mistake of communicating that he had provisions enough for thirty days. One Texas official misinterpreted that as meaning he could "hold out for thirty days"!
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Post by Chuck T on Dec 17, 2010 17:38:25 GMT -5
Gary: I cannot account for the lack of articulation on the part of Travis. Nor can I account for the lack of understanding of the English language on the part of this Texas official. There is the fog of war, where even the most simple thing suddenly and for a variety of reasons becomes so very complicated.
What I can comment on is the following. Santa Anna stole the march on the Texian Army or what passed for one. This was possible, and the results predictable because the Texians devined intentions as opposed to accessing capabilities. In other words they thought it could not be done so they dismissed the idea of a winter march and concluded that Santa Anna would never have such an intention.
Each year at this time when the snow begins to fly and the wear of a sweater, even in the house, becomes more of a rule rather than an option, I pull down a selection of one of my fairly good collection of World War II books. This year I added a new one about the fight around the tiny village crossroads of Losheimergraben. The action of which I speak occured 66 years ago yesterday.
I do this each year on purpose to once again re-learn this lesson of intentions and capabilities. Bradley and the rest of the Allied leadership in Europe never believed that the Germans could reconstitute themselves and even if the could would never attack in the dead of winter over probably the worst ground for offensive operations in Western Europe. They were reading the tea leaves of intention, and overlooking or neglecting the coffee grounds of capability. As a result for about 10 days during a very cold December they had their butts handed to them, by a German Army that not only could but did resurect itself and attack where all conventional wisdom said it would (notice I did not say could) not be done.
This is the same lesson Travis and the others learned the hard way. This is also an easy trap to fall into. In trying to get inside the head of your opposite number you often see things your way based upon your own training, and pre-conceived notions, and not his.
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Post by Tom Nuckols on Dec 18, 2010 4:28:43 GMT -5
On March 26. 1836, the citizens of Nacodoches, lamenting the loss of their fellow Texians on March 6th, passed a resolution that included the statement "Capt Jamison is said to have discharged the artilery under his command thirty times." Green B. Jameson died a single man. His sister was my gggg-grandmother and received his bounty and donation land grants. My gg-grandfather inherited her grants and immigrated to Texas from Alabama c.1875 to settle on them. As I understand it, Uncle Green was just a lawyer and had no particular qualifications either to figure out where to point cannons or where to dig ditches. But God bless him for doing it anyway.
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Post by garyzaboly on Dec 18, 2010 4:35:12 GMT -5
Along this line, there's one thing to be said for Santa Anna: he never dawdled. His biography reveals a continual stream of quick, often decisive actions, at least in his earlier years. His swift response to the Spanish invasion at Tampico is a perfect example, as is of course his capture of the Alamo---despite the sad result of the sufferings of his men both on the march and in battle. It was a characteristic that also spelled his doom at San Jacinto.
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Post by Chuck T on Dec 18, 2010 11:16:13 GMT -5
gbj: I know nothing about Jameson's skills as a lawyer, or as a gunner. What I do know, at least from his drawing, is that he had a natural eye for ground and some talent for the fortification of that ground. His efforts materially aided in the defense of the Alamo. Jameson did the best he could with what he had to work with and that is all that need be said about any soldier or man.
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Post by Chuck T on Dec 18, 2010 11:28:16 GMT -5
Gary: In truth I know little about San Jacinto. What little I do know however leads me to believe that Santa Anna fell into the same sort of mental trap that I described above - I've got them pinned. They can't escape. They would never attack. Intentions trumping capabilities in his mind.
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Post by Allen Wiener on Dec 18, 2010 12:08:19 GMT -5
How much of a factor in Santa Anna's mind was the fact that, since he arrived on the scene, the Texians hadn't shown much in the way of military preparedness or ability? What, me worry? About this bunch of clowns?
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Post by TRK on Dec 18, 2010 12:39:24 GMT -5
Along this line, there's one thing to be said for Santa Anna: he never dawdled. His biography reveals a continual stream of quick, often decisive actions, at least in his earlier years. Consider his attempted surprise attack on Taylor's army at Buena Vista / La Angostura, one day shy of eleven years after his surprise entry into Bexar in 1836. He had marched his army across desert in the winter from San Luis Potosi to Encarnacion, from which point at 1 pm on February 21, 1847, he led that army of approximately 18,000 men on a forced march across more desert and mountains, almost 40 miles in 24 hours, to La Angostura, where he hoped to surprise and bag Taylor's much smaller army. One can debate whether that move was daring, impetuous, or plain stupid, since Santa Anna's force carried with them from Encarnacion enough water and rations for only a couple of days, and his plan was to reprovision his army from US stores once he'd defeated Taylor. Talk about putting all your eggs in one basket.
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Post by Chuck T on Dec 18, 2010 12:49:13 GMT -5
Allen: Alfred E. Neuman not withstanding, I am not sure if you are talking about the Alamo or San Jacinto. I think that he made the same mistake in both instances. He got a bloody nose at the Alamo and a severe thumping at San Jacinto. I believe both could be attributed to the fact that he underestimated the Texian abilities.
The Alamo should have been a walk in the park for him, or so he believed. When it was not he failed to take the lesson to heart.
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Post by garyzaboly on Dec 18, 2010 14:17:56 GMT -5
Along this line, there's one thing to be said for Santa Anna: he never dawdled. His biography reveals a continual stream of quick, often decisive actions, at least in his earlier years. Consider his attempted surprise attack on Taylor's army at Buena Vista / La Angostura, one day shy of eleven years after his surprise entry into Bexar in 1836. He had marched his army across desert in the winter from San Luis Potosi to Encarnacion, from which point at 1 pm on February 21, 1847, he led that army of approximately 18,000 men on a forced march across more desert and mountains, almost 40 miles in 24 hours, to La Angostura, where he hoped to surprise and bag Taylor's much smaller army. One can debate whether that move was daring, impetuous, or plain stupid, since Santa Anna's force carried with them from Encarnacion enough water and rations for only a couple of days, and his plan was to reprovision his army from US stores once he'd defeated Taylor. Talk about putting all your eggs in one basket. As Patton would say, "L'audace, l'audace. Toujours l'audace!" Or would you prefer Chief Dan George in LITTLE BIG MAN: "Sometimes the magic works. Sometimes it doesn't."
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Post by Allen Wiener on Dec 18, 2010 16:42:04 GMT -5
Consider his attempted surprise attack on Taylor's army at Buena Vista / La Angostura, one day shy of eleven years after his surprise entry into Bexar in 1836. He had marched his army across desert in the winter from San Luis Potosi to Encarnacion, from which point at 1 pm on February 21, 1847, he led that army of approximately 18,000 men on a forced march across more desert and mountains, almost 40 miles in 24 hours, to La Angostura, where he hoped to surprise and bag Taylor's much smaller army. One can debate whether that move was daring, impetuous, or plain stupid, since Santa Anna's force carried with them from Encarnacion enough water and rations for only a couple of days, and his plan was to reprovision his army from US stores once he'd defeated Taylor. Talk about putting all your eggs in one basket. As Patton would say, "L'audace, l'audace. Toujours l'audace!" Or would you prefer Chief Dan George in LITTLE BIG MAN: "Sometimes the magic works. Sometimes it doesn't." That's about it, Gary. I just get the impression that Santa Anna wasn't impressed with the Texian military and thought (incorrectly) that mopping them up would be a piece of cake. The Alamo, Goliad, Aqua Dulce, San Patricio all seemed like easy victories over an outclassed and fractured military. And Santa Anna came very close to nabbing the fledgling Texian government and hanging the lot of them.
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Post by Rich Curilla on Dec 18, 2010 21:12:16 GMT -5
As Patton would say, "L'audace, l'audace. Toujours l'audace!" Or would you prefer Chief Dan George in LITTLE BIG MAN: "Sometimes the magic works. Sometimes it doesn't." That's about it, Gary. I just get the impression that Santa Anna wasn't impressed with the Texian military and thought (incorrectly) that mopping them up would be a piece of cake. The Alamo, Goliad, Aqua Dulce, San Patricio all seemed like easy victories over an outclassed and fractured military. And Santa Anna came very close to nabbing the fledgling Texian government and hanging the lot of them. I recall that Santa Anna even contemplated returning to Mexico after the Alamo -- in Almonte's carriage -- and Almonte (I think) convinced him to stay till the end.
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Post by Tom Nuckols on Dec 19, 2010 2:57:40 GMT -5
gbj: I know nothing about Jameson's skills as a lawyer, or as a gunner. What I do know, at least from his drawing, is that he had a natural eye for ground and some talent for the fortification of that ground. His efforts materially aided in the defense of the Alamo. Jameson did the best he could with what he had to work with and that is all that need be said about any soldier or man. I've got a 4 year old son and sometimes think about what to tell him in advance of his 7th grade history class, so I appreciate that remark.
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Post by Tom Nuckols on Dec 19, 2010 3:17:28 GMT -5
While popular mythology, has insisted that Santa Anna halted his 24 hour a day bombardment the night of the 5th, to lull the defenders to sleep, tactically it would have done just the opposite. Whenever the enemy radically changes his behavior it always alerts the other side. Besides, historically, we know from Almonte's journal that there was no bombardment at night. Instead, Santa Anna followed very fundamental tactical prinicipals, and did nothing out of the ordinary to alert the defenders that an attack was coming. That there were troops encamped on the north makes sense. I scratch my head at the thought that that many troops could encircle the Alamo without anyone inside noticing. In terms of alerting them by radically changing tactics the night before, I've read stuff that makes me buy into the theory that the nighttime harrassment ended with a "truce" that started 3 nights before the attack, not the night before. That's a less radical shift and would, by your theory, result in a more relaxed group of defenders. Thoughts?
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Post by stuart on Dec 19, 2010 6:20:17 GMT -5
I just get the impression that Santa Anna wasn't impressed with the Texian military and thought (incorrectly) that mopping them up would be a piece of cake. The Alamo, Goliad, Aqua Dulce, San Patricio all seemed like easy victories over an outclassed and fractured military. And Santa Anna came very close to nabbing the fledgling Texian government and hanging the lot of them. Its also worth adding that Santa Anna had gained a very straighforward victory at Zacatecas in the previous summer; that Mexia's Norteamericano filibusters were thrashed at Tampico and Monclova retaken without a fight. Granted Cos had to surrender at Bexar in December, but that was at least partly down to Grant and Gonzales persuading part of the garrison to defect. How much difference those defections made to the eventual outcome is at least questionable but it provided a plausible explanation for the only real blip in an otherwise unbroken record of success against the rebels. Santa Anna had no reason to suspect that the Texians and their filibuster friends were going to be any different, especially given the ease with which he retook Bexar. We know with hindsight how it all finished up, but right up to the day of San Jacinto I doubt if anybody sensible rated the Texians' chances. When Richard Pakenham reported the fall of the Alamo and Grant's death at Agua Dulce to Lord Palmerston he was in no doubt that the rebellion was on its last legs.
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