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Post by Herb on Jul 22, 2010 14:43:02 GMT -5
Chuck, check your PMs.
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Post by marklemon on Jul 22, 2010 15:45:56 GMT -5
Granted again. One factor to consider however about the Almonte covered road, and that is the one in question here, is why should it be a DISCOVERY on Day 9 when it had been used on Day 3 by the same forces the ultimately used it again to attack on Day 13. One would have to assume that Santa Anna would have either formulated the plans for the attack on 25 February or at least been privy to them. One must further make the assumption that he would have received a report after the fact, and to routes, methods, counteraction, and results or lack thereof. I would ref you to Gary's drawing in Huffines of the meeting on the bridge. Look in the background, you can clearly see the avenue of approach used by at least some of the assault party. Even the fact that it is a drawing and not a photo, it is based upon, I am sure, dilligent research. This is why I said in an earlier post, that this avenue was in plain sight from the Mexican perspective. I am not locked in stone in my own viewpoint. I do reject the southern approach as being the Almonte covered road. I do not reject any other possabilities at all. I used only logic in my analysis, based upon the written word and the known order of events. The only area where the concrete is starting to harden around my feet is that the Almonte Covered Road is to the north somewhere. My conclusion is based totally upon the deployment and attack position of the Jiminez Battalion. We have a known fact here. All we have to do is work backwards to draw certain conclusions. I believe these conclusions, while not having the weight of cold hard fact, should be accepted as highly probable until proof comes along that they are in error. Don't necessarily disagree with any of your points, however, until more concrete data becomes available, I will continue to maintain that we don't have enough data to be in any way sure about this location. By the way, although I very much admire Gary's drawings in "Blood," it should be noted that, in 1836, the steep rise from the river at most points, including the Potrero Street bridge, would have blocked the view of the Alamo, as well as the row of houses, and they could not have been seen from there. Being an artist myself, however, I realize that certain corners can be occasionally rounded, (called "artistic license") for clarity's sake.
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Post by marklemon on Jul 22, 2010 15:49:29 GMT -5
Gary, check your PMs.
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Post by Chuck T on Jul 22, 2010 16:25:28 GMT -5
Mark: All I am doing here to find a probable location for Almonte's covered road is what you used to do for a living - detect and deduce.
As to the slope along the river: I does not matter if Gary's drawing is 100% correct or not. It does not matter if the slope is steeper. It does not matter if the view of the Alamo or even some of the houses may be obstructed when viewed from the bridge. What does matter is that Mexican soldiers, and in particular officers, would have passed this way each and every day of the siege. Being trained they would appreciate the characteristics of the terrain, and conclude that if you are going to attack the south wall of the Alamo this is one heck of an avenue of approach to do it .
Therefore if you make the safe assumption that many Mexican officers including Santa Anna and his senior leadership passed that way why would Santa Anna have to discover it on 2 March, and by extension why would anyone assume that a terrain feature that they passed would have been left uncovered if in fact it needed covering at all.
You may disagree with where Almonte's covered road was and that's certainly OK. I am not certain that my location is exactly correct. The fact that I have a trained cavalryman (Herb) in "general agreement" with me gives me more confidence that my conclusions are correct, but no not absolutely positive enough to state catagoricly that it is here in this place to the complete exclusion of all others.
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Post by Herb on Jul 22, 2010 18:26:57 GMT -5
Chuck, I would not say that we can conclusivily say where Almonte's covered road was, though I think the evidence does lead one to the most reasonable conclusion.
But, the evidence is very conclusive where it wasn't.
As you have shown, the action of the 25th (especially the action on the 25th), and simple daily observation from the River Battery, bridge, etc. very clearly show that any covered route in the south would have been discovered much earlier in the siege. Saying it wasn't is assuming a level of incompetence by the Mexican Army that NEEDS to be proved.
That Almonte's said that the Jimenez Bn, was deployed to cover the route proves that it wasn't in the south. There simply wasn't the battlespace to tactically deploy that number of troops (Jimenez, Matamoros, and San Luis Potosi Bns) in that limited amount of space. You could literally deploy that many men at close order in a firing line at least 4 ranks deep.
Considering that this deployment would use ALL of the line infantry in Santa Anna's possesion on only one side of the Alamo, (until the reinforcements arrived) and leave him no tactical flexibility, very clearly shows that this did not happen.
Sometimes, determining historical facts is not based on finding evidence of what happened, but what did not happen. Very clearly we have that here.
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Post by Chuck T on Jul 22, 2010 19:15:32 GMT -5
Agree on all counts. We have not proven where it was , but I think we know where it was not.
As I told Mark it could be anywhere up north. It could even be on the east side but a little further to the south than Gary's drawing put it. I think the west is probably out of the picture altogether.
There is one thing in Hansen that I remember reading either Sunday or Monday,a tale oabout one of the couriers who went out through the main gate, turned left past the pailisade, and the chapel itself though left unsaid, and rode to Gonzalez. The story said that he hald kept his horse to a walk (did not say mounted or dismounted) until he had passed by the Mexican outposts, and then speeded on. The narrative gave me the impression he was navigating over open terrain at night, probably somewhat north of the Alameda.
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Post by marklemon on Jul 22, 2010 19:52:22 GMT -5
You fellow make a persuasive case, and as I have repeatedly said, I don't necessarily disagree with your points, I only will demur when it comes to the certitude with which you rule out ANYTHING relating to this business of the covered road. When one is involved in the Alamo long enough, one sees how quickly some issues thought to be a "lead pipe cinch" (even negatives) prove to be wrong. I'm only advising a bit of caution so that words like "we KNOW where it was not," may be replaced with "we know where it was least likely to have been." But in the end, and here's the most important point, we DON'T have to agree on everything, or even ANYTHING, and Lord knows, we usually don't. Sometimes it's just better to agree to disagree, and call it a day.
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Post by Chuck T on Jul 22, 2010 20:57:42 GMT -5
Mark: Let me re-state my views for the record:
We are talking only about the Almonte covered road. In that circumstance:
The west side is POSSABLE BUT NOT VERY PROBABLE.
Anywhere outside the north wall is quite POSSIBLE.
The east side, is not only POSSIBLE but MOST PROBABLE
The south is to me out of the picture for the simple reason that Santa Anna, his staff, his senior officers as well as battalion and company commanders deployed on that side would ALL have to be complete incompetents, to have had been there for nine days and discovered a covered road on the ninth day and say gosh I think we ought to cover this. This is particularly true for the officers of the battalions that used this very same ground in their attack on the morning of the 25th of February. It would be beyond comprehension for them to have not seen this route to the southwest corner. They would be worse than incompetents. They would be military buffoons
Nothing is certain. We are not certain here. We have anaylized the evidence. We have analyzed the lack of evidence. We have analyzed the persons involved. We have looked at hidden meanings, and taken things out of context and placed them back into context. We have analyzed the things that we know that happened, and also the things that did not happen, and asked why.
I am not prepared to think of Santa Anna and the leadership of his army that was on the field prior to 2 March as incompetent. Therefore it is my opinion based upon experience, and as much of this partcular aspect of the defense of the Alamo that I can cram into my head over the last four days, that the road that Santa Anna discovered, the one that Almonte reported, and the one that the Jiminez Battalion covered is not to the south of the Alamo in the area from the river to the end of the Alameda - west to east, and from the present Commerce Street to the south wall of the Alamo compound - south to north
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Post by marklemon on Jul 22, 2010 21:31:09 GMT -5
While I appreciate your views, and (again) repeatedly have said so, I'm a little unsure as to why you then feel the need to go ahead and restate them again. I have said that I don't necessarily disagree with you, I just don't choose to be as dead certain about where it was not, as you are. The last time I checked, we can still disagree in this country, and that's OK. Enough said on the matter, I'm thinking.....
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Post by Chuck T on Jul 22, 2010 22:10:07 GMT -5
MarK: I have given an opinion which you are perfectly free to appreciate and/or disagree with. I am perfectly willing to listen to and evaluate anything you wish to put forward that would make a case for the Almonte road being in the south confined to the area that I laid out. I laid it out in detail this last time to review the bidding so to speak. If tomorrow I am proven wrong then I am wrong.
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Post by marklemon on Jul 22, 2010 22:39:18 GMT -5
Here's my take, now, and for the last time, as this is getting repetitive: I think there is a debatable case that can be made for the covered road being to the south, as well as to the north, or northeast, or virtually anywhere. Some areas are stronger candidates than others.
I was leaning previously more towards the south than I am now, but not so much anymore, mostly due to your persuasive case repeatedly put forth. It's a strong case, but a circumstantial one.
I've been involved in supposedly "certain" cases both in Criminal Law, as well as mysteries of American History long enough to know that we need to be careful in our statements of absolutes. This, and ONLY this, is my point. It's all about the "absolutes."
"Probably not " to the south? Yes, "More than likely not to the south?" Sure. But " DEFINITELY NOT" to the south, I won't go that far. Not without more than circumstantial evidence, which is all that is against it. All the talking and spilled ink will not change that fact. It's all circumstantial.
What others choose to believe is perfectly fine with me. I am not in the online forum persuading business.
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Post by Chuck T on Jul 22, 2010 22:46:36 GMT -5
Mark: I would remind you of something I am sure you already know. People have been hung on circumstantial evidence. Sometimes it is all we have to go on.
I would also disagree with you not being in the business of persuasion. You write, you make models, and I believe you paint. All of that is the persuasion business. Not online perhaps. Your views are important, and people take them quite seriously. I know I do.
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Post by marklemon on Jul 23, 2010 0:26:02 GMT -5
Mark: I would remind you of something I am sure you already know. People have been hung on circumstantial evidence. Sometimes it is all we have to go on. I would also disagree with you not being in the business of persuasion. You write, you make models, and I believe you paint. All of that is the persuasion business. Not online perhaps. Your views are important, and people take them quite seriously. I know I do. Exactly my point. Many men have been hanged on circumstantial evidence. But this does not mean that our conclusions, based on circumstantial evidence, are necessarily correct, just "all we have to go on." There have been many, many men hanged who were innocent. Hence, my caution against absolutes, lacking hard evidence to the contrary. As for the latter point, I am reminded of my good friend Alan Huffines, who was recently asked by a third party why he did not participate more in these online discussions. His answer, a paraphrasing of Lord Nelson, was as succinct as it was powerful: "Publish, or be damned." While I do not take quite the same hard line as he, I do see his point, and am myself trending in that direction.
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Post by stuart on Jul 23, 2010 0:51:10 GMT -5
As for the latter point, I am reminded of my good friend Alan Huffines, who was recently asked by a third party why he did not participate more in these online discussions. His answer, a paraphrasing of Lord Nelson, was as succinct as it was powerful: "Publish, or be damned." Actually the original was Wellington, who responded to a blackmail threat (presumably relating to one of a number of ladies to whom he was not married), with the words "Publish and be damned"
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Post by garyzaboly on Jul 23, 2010 4:44:06 GMT -5
Stuart: As I am sure you know mortars and howitzers also have a minimum range. Travis having an H or M would depend on where such a weapon was positioned within the Alamo and the range from the walls to the North Battery. Were it to be positioned anywhere that precluded direct observation, by the gunners themselves to compensate for the minimum range requirement, then this brings into question what method would be used for the direction and adjustment of fire. Accurate mortar fire on an entrenched position couples the ability to make fine adjustments to fire and a weapon capable of doing it. An infantry trench is narrow and guns are closely entrenched for this very reason. I doubt if period weapons had this very refined capability. It is even more doubtful that Travis' gunners had the required skills. Gary: Herb and I are both in agreement with the idea that Morales used a combination of the terrain and the houses, or what was left of them, on the west side of the PdV to cover the movement to sieze the 18 pounder. That is a typical light infantry break and enter operation, a sort of Normandy Pointe du Hoc on a much smaller scale. Where we differ is with Mark, by pointing out that the Almonte covered road and Morales' avenue of approach are two different areas. Herb has made a very good case on this subject, and the one factor that clinches his conclusion for me was where he enumerated the number of personnel already committed to the south side and further the comment about avoiding a night movement. Almonte all but tells us directly that this was the case, when he mentions that the commander of the Jiminez battalion, to use his words, was on commission when the commander's conference of 4 March was held, and therefore absent. One can conclude from this remark alone that this officer was engaged in the movement, positioning, and supervision of the hasty entrenchment of his battalion. Almonte had stated earlier that when Santa Anna discovered this covered road he ordered the Jiminez Battalion into position to cover it. We know for sure where the Jiminez Battalion attacked, so it is quite reasonable to conclude that the covered road that they were ordered to cover was on the northeast quadrant of the fort, in approximately the location you have it in Huffines. The only question remaining then is the semantics of "within a pistol shot". Does he mean that the road ended within a pistol shot of the walls? Or, does he mean that the Jiminez Battalion was posted within a pistol shot. I would suggest it is the former. Exposing your battalion to the potential of receiving that much direct small arms fire from the defenders for no real purpose makes absolutely no sense. There is also no mention of a continuing firefight on the 4th and 5th. More than likely they were posted out of effective small arms range in a position where they could take advantage of the covered road as they approached the objective. Remember we have no reason to suspect that Jiminez was in anything but a pre-attack assembly area, probably outposted forward, preparing for the upcoming attack, while at the same time blocking an avenue of potential entrance and egress. Chieftain, No argument from me re: tactical approach of Morales and his light troops. I even drew them, back in '97, using that stone building as cover during their advance, assuming that that is what even Mexican elite soldiers would have done. His assignment was to capture the south gate, but that didn't necessarily mean a head-on assault. Good point about the Jiminez commander being too busy to attend the battle conference! Like I said, I don't see the battalion being posted WITHIN pistol shot of the walls either, although, again, it was not an uncommon thing to do for advancing artillery positions in the warfare of its time. And you're right, there's no definite record of such a close position established by Jiminez.
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