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Post by marklemon on Jul 21, 2010 19:31:20 GMT -5
The row of houses leading north right up to the SW corner, simply could not have gone unnoticed by him. Here was ready made cover which allowed his men, especially in darkness, to literally walk right up to the SW corner, and, after a four or 5 second dash (a "daring move,") he'd be right at the strategic 18-pounder position. Don't know whether this solves our Jimenez "hidden road" problem, but it certainly resonates with a theory I've had for a long time. Same with the assault of February 25 with Travis' report of the enemy approaching "under cover of some houses." Also, I believe we will find that there were more jacales to the southwest of the Alamo than just that row fronting on Plaza de Valero. Why would Bexarenos not take advantage of the acequia flowing down to the San Antonio River from the Alamo's SW corner? A row of houses backing on this acequia and facing south would have eventually become Crockett Street. Another row of houses backing down to the river bank and intersecting with this row would have also been natural and would later have become Losoya Street. All of these rows would have had roads and trails and ruts. Think of Travis' words (italics mine): "...two or three hundred Mexicans crossed the river below and came up under cover of the houses until they arrived within point blank shot, when we opened a heavy discharge of grape and canister on them, together with a well directed fire from small arms which forced them to halt and take shelter in the houses about 90 to 100 yeards from our batteries." (Not the same as "point blank range" -- I think these refer to two different locations.) Visualize them leaving the river bank and moving up to jacales along "Losoya St." and then to the jacales -- and Charli House -- fronting on the plaza. There it gets too hot for them and they fall back to perhaps more durable structures at the south end of the plaza along Camino de las Misiones, which is about 90 to 100 yards away. Excellent points, Rich. I concur. Mark
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Post by Herb on Jul 21, 2010 19:44:23 GMT -5
The evidence, I think is very clear that Almonte's coverd route is not in the south. That doesn't mean that Morales did not use a covered route to attack the SW corner on March 6th, in fact I have argued that point usually alone for the last several years.
As has been pointed out the Jimenez Battalion was posted on this newly discovered approach. In the South you already had the Matmoros Bn, 272 men, and the San Luis Potosi Bn of 452 men for a total of 724 men covering a frontage of only about 300 meters. Adding another 274 men to cover an additional route in this area doesn't make one bit of military sense. As I posted earlier if Almonte's route was in the south either the San Luis or the Matamoros Battalions would have received a change of orders, directing them to outpost this new route as an additional task.
The fact that a whole Battalion was moved into sector to cover this new route, very clearly shows that it was in an area that was not already covered by Mexican forces and required a force that was reasonably self sufficent. This had to be the northern half of the Alamo. While we can't rule out a route to the NW from the Alamo to say the vicinity of Zambrano Mill, the highest probability from a tactical sense is somewhere in the E to NNE sector from the Alamo.
Another point to look at, is the attack order for March 6th. Any smart commander is going to minimize movement at night. The attack order itself strongly suggests that the Jimenez Bn was already located to the NE.
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Post by Chuck T on Jul 21, 2010 19:55:19 GMT -5
Mark: I have no problem with the existence of the house. None at all. Gary referenced Potter in Huffines, and I inquired if there were more than that. On 18 and 19 of Nelson you can clearly see a house there in the 1873 drawing by Koch. There is also the photo on page 79 clearly showing a house in that location. There are at least two plats in the same book that show property lines.
So it was not the house, it was the continued existance of the house which provided the cover and concealment we are at least in part talking about, and the obstruction of the defender's field of fires. The question then become why was this allowed to happen.
I realize that the Jameson plats are suspect in some regard. He does not show this house in the drawings that he sent to his higher. Perhaps the intent was to tear it down and use the material for other construction, and time ran out. Another option would have been to entrench to it on both sides, which could have happened even after the siege began. It would at least have provided an obstruction for those making a close assault. Would have made a decent outpost also if you provided a point of exit.
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Post by Chuck T on Jul 21, 2010 20:00:26 GMT -5
See Herb, the cavalry and the infantry can come to the same conclusions. Makes me think you must have at least stopped by the PX at Fort Benning once upon a time.
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Post by Chuck T on Jul 21, 2010 20:15:51 GMT -5
Just looked out the back of the house from the second floor, just about the same height as a standing defender on the Alamo's wall. The land looks completely flat as you drive by. I saw a horse from the neck up about two hundred yards away. I saw the top of a van drive by about double that distance.
In the pre-dawn hours you could have a company of infantry out there and I could not detect them unless they made noise.
May be a little bit different in the winter, but I don't think it would be that much.
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Post by Herb on Jul 21, 2010 20:18:23 GMT -5
See Herb, the cavalry and the infantry can come to the same conclusions. Makes me think you must have at least stopped by the PX at Fort Benning once upon a time. Task, and Purpose, Chuck, Task and Purpose.
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Post by Chuck T on Jul 21, 2010 20:28:51 GMT -5
Herb: I had lunch in the Brick Mess at Knox once does that count.
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Post by stuart on Jul 22, 2010 1:04:04 GMT -5
Wolf, it would have been possible for a Mexican detachment to be posted within pistol shot---a la the artillerymen of the north battery, as Sanchez-Navarro informs us---if they were properly entrenched. (Travis had no mortar that would have precluded such a position). Of course I agree it was most unlikely. Just by the by, one of the two guns which Grant took away from the Alamo with him was a howitzer or mortar which would indeed have been able to do just that.
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Post by garyzaboly on Jul 22, 2010 4:46:16 GMT -5
Mark: I have no doubt that the route you suggest was indeed a covered road, but I don't think it was the covered road in Almonte. He specificly says that Santa Anna posted the Jiminez Battalion to cover it. Later he goes on to say at an officers call on the 4th of March the commander of the Jiminez Battalion was absent being "engaged in a commission" We know where the Jiminez Battalion attacked. It would not make sense therefore to post them on the south side, and then move them around to the other side of the perimeter, when Morales' route was so plain to see from anywhere on the south side (from the Mexican point of view). Why not, were your route uncovered give the additional tasking to a southside battalion, if the Morales route was indeed uncovered at all. Gary: Mark does make a good point about Morales' route Why in the name of heaven would any defender let that stone hut stand. Is there any evidence other than Potter that a stone hut stood that close to the walls or was there a stone hut somewhere along the west side of the Plaza de Valero, exact location unknown? Chieftain, That Morales took advantage of the houses south and southwest of the fort is documented in Filisola and less than twenty years afterwards, independently, by R. M. Potter. Of course Travis' men were notoriously lax about the necessity of "being prepared," although Jameson himself was tireless in his pre-siege work. Tearing down a mortared stone building was no doubt a prospect few of them wanted to consider until they were sure Santa Anna was nigh. By then it was too late.
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Post by garyzaboly on Jul 22, 2010 4:53:55 GMT -5
PS: Also according to the Herald, Almonte's journal was picked up on the battlefield of San Jacinto by Dr. Anson Jones, and then sent on to the paper "via Galveston island." Is there a possibility that it was agreed by the Herald that, when all was said and done, the journal would be returned to Dr. Jones? Perhaps a search through his papers... Who can say, Rich, where it ended up? Anything is possible. But if it was sent to Jackson as a "gift," we would have to assume it resided, and possibly still resides, in his papers, or in some other collection of White House papers. He may have given it away to someone entirely unrelated to the Texas Revolution, too. It's one of those Great Unknowns.
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Post by Chuck T on Jul 22, 2010 9:26:41 GMT -5
Stuart: As I am sure you know mortars and howitzers also have a minimum range. Travis having an H or M would depend on where such a weapon was positioned within the Alamo and the range from the walls to the North Battery. Were it to be positioned anywhere that precluded direct observation, by the gunners themselves to compensate for the minimum range requirement, then this brings into question what method would be used for the direction and adjustment of fire.
Accurate mortar fire on an entrenched position couples the ability to make fine adjustments to fire and a weapon capable of doing it. An infantry trench is narrow and guns are closely entrenched for this very reason. I doubt if period weapons had this very refined capability. It is even more doubtful that Travis' gunners had the required skills.
Gary: Herb and I are both in agreement with the idea that Morales used a combination of the terrain and the houses, or what was left of them, on the west side of the PdV to cover the movement to sieze the 18 pounder. That is a typical light infantry break and enter operation, a sort of Normandy Pointe du Hoc on a much smaller scale. Where we differ is with Mark, by pointing out that the Almonte covered road and Morales' avenue of approach are two different areas.
Herb has made a very good case on this subject, and the one factor that clinches his conclusion for me was where he enumerated the number of personnel already committed to the south side and further the comment about avoiding a night movement.
Almonte all but tells us directly that this was the case, when he mentions that the commander of the Jiminez battalion, to use his words, was on commission when the commander's conference of 4 March was held, and therefore absent. One can conclude from this remark alone that this officer was engaged in the movement, positioning, and supervision of the hasty entrenchment of his battalion. Almonte had stated earlier that when Santa Anna discovered this covered road he ordered the Jiminez Battalion into position to cover it. We know for sure where the Jiminez Battalion attacked, so it is quite reasonable to conclude that the covered road that they were ordered to cover was on the northeast quadrant of the fort, in approximately the location you have it in Huffines.
The only question remaining then is the semantics of "within a pistol shot". Does he mean that the road ended within a pistol shot of the walls? Or, does he mean that the Jiminez Battalion was posted within a pistol shot. I would suggest it is the former. Exposing your battalion to the potential of receiving that much direct small arms fire from the defenders for no real purpose makes absolutely no sense. There is also no mention of a continuing firefight on the 4th and 5th.
More than likely they were posted out of effective small arms range in a position where they could take advantage of the covered road as they approached the objective. Remember we have no reason to suspect that Jiminez was in anything but a pre-attack assembly area, probably outposted forward, preparing for the upcoming attack, while at the same time blocking an avenue of potential entrance and egress.
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Post by marklemon on Jul 22, 2010 10:48:11 GMT -5
In any event, if this route was not THE "road" referred to, I have no doubt that this is the route taken by Morales. As noted above, I was never dogmatic on this point, and allowed for the possibility of its being elsewhere.
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Post by Chuck T on Jul 22, 2010 11:01:27 GMT -5
Mark: Granted, but the line above that which contains the dollar to a donut comment seems to contradict that.
There very well might have been more one or two, used in the attack. I do not particularly look upon the Morales avenue of approach as a covered road by strict definition. I think it was more akin to taking advantage of available concealment, and perhaps some degree of cover. In the end though both serve the same purpose.
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Post by marklemon on Jul 22, 2010 11:58:12 GMT -5
True, but I'll wager a dollar, or even a donut any day, and if I lose, have lost only a dollar, or a donut... I do not disavow any possibility, and still feel that the south MAY have been the location of the road. Remember, this was on day 9. Units were moved frequently from point to point, and who's to say that a unit, or a detachment of a unit, which was otherwise not gainfully employed at the moment, wasn't detailed to watch a newly discovered route? I may bet a dollar, but not my life, and this applies to just about any issue regarding the Alamo. The northeast, or even the northwest MAY have been the location, or even the southwest. We can allow ourselves to have strong inclinations, and even bet donuts, but should steer clear of becoming entrenched in our belief systems, lest we be outflanked by some newly uncovered facts when they decide to finally show up.
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Post by Chuck T on Jul 22, 2010 13:29:53 GMT -5
Granted again. One factor to consider however about the Almonte covered road, and that is the one in question here, is why should it be a DISCOVERY on Day 9 when it had been used on Day 3 by the same forces the ultimately used it again to attack on Day 13. One would have to assume that Santa Anna would have either formulated the plans for the attack on 25 February or at least been privy to them. One must further make the assumption that he would have received a report after the fact, and to routes, methods, counteraction, and results or lack thereof.
I would ref you to Gary's drawing in Huffines of the meeting on the bridge. Look in the background, you can clearly see the avenue of approach used by at least some of the assault party. Even the fact that it is a drawing and not a photo, it is based upon, I am sure, dilligent research. This is why I said in an earlier post, that this avenue was in plain sight from the Mexican perspective.
I am not locked in stone in my own viewpoint. I do reject the southern approach as being the Almonte covered road. I do not reject any other possabilities at all. I used only logic in my analysis, based upon the written word and the known order of events. The only area where the concrete is starting to harden around my feet is that the Almonte Covered Road is to the north somewhere. My conclusion is based totally upon the deployment and attack position of the Jiminez Battalion.
We have a known fact here. All we have to do is work backwards to draw certain conclusions. I believe these conclusions, while not having the weight of cold hard fact, should be accepted as highly probable until proof comes along that they are in error.
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