Post by Allen Wiener on May 27, 2010 15:54:14 GMT -5
The Last Stand by Nathaniel Philbrick
Like most Custer books, Philbrick covers much familiar ground, but adds a greater depth to his portraits of the major figures than most studies do. This helps in his analysis as he is able to draw some conclusions based on the track records and personality traits of these people, particularly Custer and Sitting Bull. Both emerge as more nuanced, multi-dimensional figures than is often the case in studies of the battle.
The Last Stand retraces familiar ground regarding the Plains Indian War of 1876, including the corruption of the Grant Administration, its decision to violate U.S. treaties and attack the Indians, while trying to make it look like their fault, and the ugly relationships among key players. Grant disliked Custer, Terry was shifty, Gibbon irresponsible, Reno drunk and disgruntled, and Benteen, who despised Custer and had little regard for most senior officers, is, once again, the ultimate villain of the piece. Once Custer is sent up the Rosebud to find the Indians, all bets are off and no one is certain what will happen. While it’s clear that Custer was charged with finding the Indians and attacking them, and given considerable leeway, Terry was cagey in issuing written orders that differed from his verbal carte blanche to Custer.
Custer finds the Indian village, but can’t tell how large it is or how many warriors it holds. Although his scouts tell him several times that it is the largest ever seen and too big for Custer’s command, he either disbelieves them or doesn’t care. Philbrook finds evidence that Custer actually visited the Crow’s Nest area twice and, although he failed to see the village the first time, did see it the second time, when he borrowed a pair of more powerful binoculars. In this telling, the Lone Tepee is the remnant of a smaller village, similar to the one Custer had attacked on the Washita in 1868, but which had quickly disbanded and moved to the main village after the Indians had spotted the soldiers. Custer may have originally planned to attack this smaller village, round up hostages, and forced an Indian surrender, but he was too late getting there.
Once he knows he’s been spotted, Custer orders Reno to attack, promising to support him, although he is still unsure about the size of the village or the number of warriors. He further divides the forces by sending Benteen off on a scout to the west to look for Indians or stop any from escaping. Meanwhile, he moves to the north, apparently to find a suitable crossing where he could launch a supporting attack. From this point on, things become increasingly speculative. Custer is aware that Reno has halted his charge and formed a skirmish line, and then retreated into the timber, even as he continues his move north. By the time he reaches the vicinity of Medicine Tail Coulee, he is informed that Reno has retreated to higher ground across the river. He also has sent two messengers to Benteen ordering him to hurry to his position and to bring the ammunition packs. He is also joined by his brother, Boston Custer, who had passed Benteen not long before, and was thus able to assure Custer that Benteen was likely on his way.
After that, matters become far more speculative and are based on Indian sources, including Custer’s Crow scout, Curley. While Philbrick notes that both Indian and white testimony is often contradictory, he has pieced together what he believes most likely happened. He has clearly reached the point that all LBH scholars reach, where some speculation is unavoidable. Philbrick does a credible job here, although there will, unavoidably, be much discussion and disagreement over details. Heavy emphasis is placed on the Washita model and the idea that Custer was trying to follow that, even after he knew Reno had folded, and was convinced that he could still pull off a victory if Benteen got there quickly. This could be accomplished by a quick thrust into the northern end of the village and the seizing of hostages, but it could not be done without more men, hence the critical need for Benteen. However, by the time Custer formulated this plan, both Keough and Calhoun were under increasingly heavy fire from the Indians, whose numbers were increasing exponentially. From this point on, any plan Custer may have had went down the tubes and it became a losing battle for survival by the vastly outnumbered soldiers. It’s interesting to speculate on what might have happened if Custer had simply bagged the plan and hurried back to support the retreating Reno, reforming the entire regiment on Reno Hill. But that, apparently, never entered Custer’s mind as he still thought he could bring about a victory.
In Philbrick’s retelling, the outcome remains in doubt for some time and he quotes Sitting Bull as saying that he thought the Indians were whipped when Custer’s unit was first spotted making its way north, across the river. This was after the Sioux had sent Reno packing, so maybe a lot swifter action by Custer might have caught the Indians unprepared or pushed them into panic and defeat. Philbrick’s notes are interesting in themselves and worth reading to see what sources he relied on. He lends considerable credibility to the tale of Pvt. Peter Thompson, who has (apparently) been routinely brushed off as not credible, although he clearly survived the fate of C Company simply because his horse gave out and he was sent back.
Custer is portrayed as a distant, somewhat unpleasant, often petty and irresponsible officer, who was good at fighting, but who often took rash chances and believed in his own luck and destiny. He really did believe he could beat anyone he faced and did not appear to learn from earlier close calls, including the Washita, which is described here as a near-fiasco. Philbrick mentions the old rumor that Custer wanted a big victory that might bring him the Democratic Presidential nomination, but it is presented as, at most, a fantasy Custer may have harbored. Similarly, he relates an account of Sitting Bull sending his nephew toward the oncoming Reno with a shield and tells him to see if the soldiers have come to negotiate. As preposterous as this sounds, it is possible since these Indians had bloodied Crook only days earlier and might have thought the soldiers had come to seek peace. But the idea vanished instantly when the soldiers opened fire and Sitting Bull's horse was killed. Unfortunately, too much was made of this incident in the excerpt that appeared in American Heritage magazine.
Benteen comes off as he does in virtually all Custer studies - underhanded, self-serving, bitter and resentful, and a man who hates Custer. His dawdling at LBH stands out, and the reader is given the impression that, had he pressed forward with urgency as ordered, he might have saved Custer. That is clearly speculation and open to interpretation, but there’s no question that he was obliged to follow his orders.
Philbrick's book is no more likely than others to settle the many debatable points about this battle, but he has shown that even a familiar story can be retold in an entertaining, enlightening way.
Allen
Like most Custer books, Philbrick covers much familiar ground, but adds a greater depth to his portraits of the major figures than most studies do. This helps in his analysis as he is able to draw some conclusions based on the track records and personality traits of these people, particularly Custer and Sitting Bull. Both emerge as more nuanced, multi-dimensional figures than is often the case in studies of the battle.
The Last Stand retraces familiar ground regarding the Plains Indian War of 1876, including the corruption of the Grant Administration, its decision to violate U.S. treaties and attack the Indians, while trying to make it look like their fault, and the ugly relationships among key players. Grant disliked Custer, Terry was shifty, Gibbon irresponsible, Reno drunk and disgruntled, and Benteen, who despised Custer and had little regard for most senior officers, is, once again, the ultimate villain of the piece. Once Custer is sent up the Rosebud to find the Indians, all bets are off and no one is certain what will happen. While it’s clear that Custer was charged with finding the Indians and attacking them, and given considerable leeway, Terry was cagey in issuing written orders that differed from his verbal carte blanche to Custer.
Custer finds the Indian village, but can’t tell how large it is or how many warriors it holds. Although his scouts tell him several times that it is the largest ever seen and too big for Custer’s command, he either disbelieves them or doesn’t care. Philbrook finds evidence that Custer actually visited the Crow’s Nest area twice and, although he failed to see the village the first time, did see it the second time, when he borrowed a pair of more powerful binoculars. In this telling, the Lone Tepee is the remnant of a smaller village, similar to the one Custer had attacked on the Washita in 1868, but which had quickly disbanded and moved to the main village after the Indians had spotted the soldiers. Custer may have originally planned to attack this smaller village, round up hostages, and forced an Indian surrender, but he was too late getting there.
Once he knows he’s been spotted, Custer orders Reno to attack, promising to support him, although he is still unsure about the size of the village or the number of warriors. He further divides the forces by sending Benteen off on a scout to the west to look for Indians or stop any from escaping. Meanwhile, he moves to the north, apparently to find a suitable crossing where he could launch a supporting attack. From this point on, things become increasingly speculative. Custer is aware that Reno has halted his charge and formed a skirmish line, and then retreated into the timber, even as he continues his move north. By the time he reaches the vicinity of Medicine Tail Coulee, he is informed that Reno has retreated to higher ground across the river. He also has sent two messengers to Benteen ordering him to hurry to his position and to bring the ammunition packs. He is also joined by his brother, Boston Custer, who had passed Benteen not long before, and was thus able to assure Custer that Benteen was likely on his way.
After that, matters become far more speculative and are based on Indian sources, including Custer’s Crow scout, Curley. While Philbrick notes that both Indian and white testimony is often contradictory, he has pieced together what he believes most likely happened. He has clearly reached the point that all LBH scholars reach, where some speculation is unavoidable. Philbrick does a credible job here, although there will, unavoidably, be much discussion and disagreement over details. Heavy emphasis is placed on the Washita model and the idea that Custer was trying to follow that, even after he knew Reno had folded, and was convinced that he could still pull off a victory if Benteen got there quickly. This could be accomplished by a quick thrust into the northern end of the village and the seizing of hostages, but it could not be done without more men, hence the critical need for Benteen. However, by the time Custer formulated this plan, both Keough and Calhoun were under increasingly heavy fire from the Indians, whose numbers were increasing exponentially. From this point on, any plan Custer may have had went down the tubes and it became a losing battle for survival by the vastly outnumbered soldiers. It’s interesting to speculate on what might have happened if Custer had simply bagged the plan and hurried back to support the retreating Reno, reforming the entire regiment on Reno Hill. But that, apparently, never entered Custer’s mind as he still thought he could bring about a victory.
In Philbrick’s retelling, the outcome remains in doubt for some time and he quotes Sitting Bull as saying that he thought the Indians were whipped when Custer’s unit was first spotted making its way north, across the river. This was after the Sioux had sent Reno packing, so maybe a lot swifter action by Custer might have caught the Indians unprepared or pushed them into panic and defeat. Philbrick’s notes are interesting in themselves and worth reading to see what sources he relied on. He lends considerable credibility to the tale of Pvt. Peter Thompson, who has (apparently) been routinely brushed off as not credible, although he clearly survived the fate of C Company simply because his horse gave out and he was sent back.
Custer is portrayed as a distant, somewhat unpleasant, often petty and irresponsible officer, who was good at fighting, but who often took rash chances and believed in his own luck and destiny. He really did believe he could beat anyone he faced and did not appear to learn from earlier close calls, including the Washita, which is described here as a near-fiasco. Philbrick mentions the old rumor that Custer wanted a big victory that might bring him the Democratic Presidential nomination, but it is presented as, at most, a fantasy Custer may have harbored. Similarly, he relates an account of Sitting Bull sending his nephew toward the oncoming Reno with a shield and tells him to see if the soldiers have come to negotiate. As preposterous as this sounds, it is possible since these Indians had bloodied Crook only days earlier and might have thought the soldiers had come to seek peace. But the idea vanished instantly when the soldiers opened fire and Sitting Bull's horse was killed. Unfortunately, too much was made of this incident in the excerpt that appeared in American Heritage magazine.
Benteen comes off as he does in virtually all Custer studies - underhanded, self-serving, bitter and resentful, and a man who hates Custer. His dawdling at LBH stands out, and the reader is given the impression that, had he pressed forward with urgency as ordered, he might have saved Custer. That is clearly speculation and open to interpretation, but there’s no question that he was obliged to follow his orders.
Philbrick's book is no more likely than others to settle the many debatable points about this battle, but he has shown that even a familiar story can be retold in an entertaining, enlightening way.
Allen
