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Post by billchemerka on Feb 22, 2010 19:29:00 GMT -5
South Carolina came very close to seceding over the issue of nullification during Jackson's administration. Although S. Carolina's argument was framed as a states' rights issue, it was clearly motivated by the implicit threat to slavery that federal authority carried. Allen Perhaps this needs to be rethought. Unless I taught this lesson incorrectly for 30 years, South Carolina's nullification threat had little to do with slavery; it had eveything to do with rising tariff rates, particularly the Tariff of 1832. The 1832 tax-on-imports legislation was a compromise of sorts since it reduced the dreaded Tariff of 1828 ("Tariff of Abominations") rates to the more moderate Tariff of 1824 rates. Although the House vote in the South was split 27-27 (Tennessee and Kentucky, notwithstanding) because of its "moderation," South Carolina reacted with palmetto-embellished protests of significance. The Compromise Tariff of 1833 did more to curb the South Carolina threat than Jackson's Force Bill. The only slavery issue connection to all of this was the concern of South Carolina's planters over the Denmark Vesey's plan of 1822, the low country 1829 revolt, the publication of David Walker's infuential Appeal to the Colored Citizens of the World and Nat Turner's rebellion in 1831. And with British abolitionism sentiment gaining momentum in the West Indies, South Carolina needed to stand firmly against all potential threats to its traditional economy. But South Carolina's nullification's threat in 1832 was primarily related to the tariff.
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Post by Paul Sylvain on Feb 22, 2010 19:37:45 GMT -5
Exactly, Bill. I believe this is addressed in the article I linked a couple of posts back, and pretty much agrees with your points.
Paul
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Post by Hiram on Feb 22, 2010 19:59:07 GMT -5
Thanks Bill!
Your explanation of the Nullification Crisis is right on point.
Andy "By God" Jackson was a pro-slavery Unionist, as was his protege, "Old Sam Jacinto" Houston. Calhoun miscalculated Jackson's reaction to the Nullification Crisis and was rebuked (or was that chastised? ) by Jackson as a result.
And for Paul, thanks for bringing up the name of Amos Pollard, the origination of this thread. I think its important to note all the interest which is still out there, in terms of us as Americans (and the occasional Scot, that's you Stuart), who are still trying to define the most definitive event in the history of the United States. This is the "why" behind my reason for being on this forum. I like to hear well-informed opinions and there are plenty to be had at the ASF.
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Post by Herb on Feb 22, 2010 20:22:12 GMT -5
Tariffs were a much more emotional and explosive issue in the south, than what most today, don't even consider. The funding of New England industrialization by forcing the more agrarian sections of the country to buy New England goods by putting huge duties on the cheaper and better quality goods available from England became a huge issue of the day. This was an economic threat to the south, that was technically constitutional. The loss of political power, by losing the equal ratio of states in the Senate, met the south no longer had the ability to stop tariffs at all. Remember, slavery was constitutionally protected - requiring a constitutional amendment to eliminate and the super majorities that amending the constitution required.
Some would argue, that the spur of immediate secession upon Lincoln's election had more to do with the economic platform of the Republican party and less to do with the threat the Republicans met to slavery.
During the nullification crisis in the 1830s, a very large portion of the old north states still were slave states themselves.
Not arguing that slavery was not the most devisive problem, but there are other factors that get overlooked. And the Civil War was far from Holy Crusade by the north- the desertion rate in the Union armies skyrocketted when the Emancipation Proclamation was announced/took effect.
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Post by Hiram on Feb 22, 2010 20:35:48 GMT -5
The Mason-Dixon line is political, cultural, social, and physical. In terms of the first three, it is the divide between the "North" and the "South". Physically, it is the line that delineated the land grants of the Penns with those of the Baltimores, hence the future states of Pennsylvania, Maryland, Delaware, and what later became West Virginia.
Maryland and Delaware are obviously N of the Mason-Dixon line but were "Southern" in temperament during the War Between the States, i.e., they were slave states. So I think it's clear that initially, slavery was not the overriding issue that it later became.
I think its interesting that the one thing both North and South were in agreement with, was their opposition to conscription. Finally, a point both sides could agree on!
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Post by Allen Wiener on Feb 23, 2010 0:42:54 GMT -5
The immediate cause of the nullification crisis was opposition to the federal tariff and was partly settled when Jackson actually backed down, at Van Buren's urging, and proposed to lower the tariff. But Jackson had threatened to use force if South Carolina attempted to interfere with collection of the tariff or to secede. He even got legislation through Congress authorizing the use of force. A debate over the tariff was permissable, but not a threat to secede. Polk, for example, backed S. Carolina on the tariff and nullification, but broke with the nullifiers over the threat of secession.
While there was no overt reference to slavery, the issue was always bubbling just beneath the surface. Many in the north and south were suspicious of expanded federal authority, regardless of the slavery issue. But for the south, which possessed most of the country's slaves and whose economy relied on slavery, growing central government power, the expanding northern economy, and western expansion were threats to the region's political power, and thus a threat to slavery. Jackson's threat to use force during the nullification crisis was not quickly forgotten (if forgotten at all). It did not take a lot of imagination to foresee a scenario in which federal force could be brought to bear as easily over slavery as it was over nullification -- a scenario that came to pass less than 30 years later.
Jackson was both a unionist and a states' rights advocate, but a unionist first, as was Polk and many others. While Jackson expanded presidential power, he opposed big government. He was a dedicated slave owner and believer in slavery, so he saw no threat to that institution in what he did regarding nullification, but others did.
The issue also involved the debate over internal improvements and western expansion. The north opposed expansion and the cheap sale of public lands in the west because it led to a loss of population, and thus work force, as well as abandoned farms in the north. The south opposed it because an increase in the number of non-slave states threatened its political power. For much the same reason, federal funding of internal improvements was opposed as another unjustified expansion of federal power, which would facilitate further western expansion and increase the population and political clout of new, non-slave states.
There also was a serious disconnect regarding the tarrif, the sale of public lands, and the funding of internal improvements. The only real sources of federal revenue were the tariff and the sale of public lands. Many who routinely opposed the tariff clamored for more spending on internal improvements (Crockett was among these). But, Jackson's priority was paying off the public debt, not spending money on internal improvements. He asked those who bugged him about if they would approve of new taxes to pay for these projects, and they went ballistic over that. They wanted to have their cake and eat it too.
Lincoln used Jackson's response to the nullification crisis as his template for responding the southern secession. While slavery was never far beneath the surface, the crucial issue was preserving the union.
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Post by Allen Wiener on Feb 23, 2010 10:49:08 GMT -5
The only slavery issue connection to all of this was the concern of South Carolina's planters over the Denmark Vesey's plan of 1822, the low country 1829 revolt, the publication of David Walker's infuential Appeal to the Colored Citizens of the World and Nat Turner's rebellion in 1831. And with British abolitionism sentiment gaining momentum in the West Indies, South Carolina needed to stand firmly against all potential threats to its traditional economy. This is the "background noise" I was referring to. There were increasing threats to slavery and to the south's political standing. The south, particularly Virginia, had been a major power in the formation of the country and during its first half-century; 4 of the first 6 presidents were from Virginia (the other two were the Adamses - father and son - from Massachusetts). By Jackson's term, the south could see its influence ebbing in proportion to its relative size and clout, compared to that of the growing country. The threat of federal force being employed to subdue states was alarming as it could just as easily be used to curtail or end slavery. Even though Jackson had no such intention, and there was not a strong abolitionist movement underway at that point, many in the south thought they saw the writing on the wall.
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Post by billchemerka on Feb 23, 2010 11:50:08 GMT -5
The distinguished co-author of Music of The Alamo is placing too much emphasis on slavery as a cause of the nullification crisis in 1832. South Carolina was not the only slave state in 1832, but the only one to threaten nullification. The issue was the Tariff of 1832. As Kenneth Stampp noted in The National Experience: "The majority of white South Carolinians had a simple explanation for their plight. Not soil depletion, nor the competition of the Southwest, but the high tariff...."
However, as time went by, some of the more radical planters believed that the manifestation of federal usurpation vis-a-vis the Force Bill could one day justify emancipation. But after 1832.
[The initial Pollard post has generated thoughtful, non-congruent debate. Perhaps, another thread somewhere would be more appropriate. Of course, Ernie's is a rather good location for debates of this sort.]
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Post by Allen Wiener on Feb 23, 2010 11:56:16 GMT -5
That's essentially true; the tariff was the issue that brought on the nullification crisis itself. But I think many in the south saw threats to slavery that early; not a crisis, to be sure, but I think it was always there. My most recent reading on this are bios of Jackson, Polk and Van Buren and this is the impression I came away with.
However, this was a time when there were still very strong concerns about central government, regardless of the slavery question. It may be difficult to assess what the mindset really was at that point. But I'll defer to the other co-author of "Music of the Alamo," who has actually taught and dwelled on this a lot more than I have.
Now - if you want to talk about the Tennessee land issue!! I'm your man!
Allen
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Post by Paul Sylvain on Feb 23, 2010 13:02:27 GMT -5
[The initial Pollard post has generated thoughtful, non-congruent debate. Perhaps, another thread somewhere would be more appropriate. Of course, Ernie's is a rather good location for debates of this sort.] Well, I initiated the Pollard thread, and it has taken on a life of its own. However, I'm enjoying the ride and have no problem seeing this discussion evolve here. Paul
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Post by Kevin Young on Feb 24, 2010 16:39:03 GMT -5
I think this comment may be true--to some extent--about Texas Revolution studies. Mexico's instability would not allow for its governement to make a stand one way or the other on what its policy was going to be, allowing the fears of the Texan colonists who owned slaves continue. Even before the Republic of Texas Constitution addressed the issue, the Council did with an law restrcting free negros or mulattos from entering the territory. The agreement between Santa Anna and the Texas Government (which became the Treaty of Velasco made sure to address the problem of negro slaves or indentued persons who had fled to the Mexican Army.
In the end, I always tend to defer to Randolph Campbell, who authored, An Empire for Slavery whose final word on slavery and the Texas Revolution were "Protecting slavery was not the primary cause of the Texas Revolution but it certainly was a major result." (pg 48-49)
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Post by Herb on Feb 25, 2010 13:56:26 GMT -5
In the end, I always tend to defer to Randolph Campbell, who authored, An Empire for Slavery whose final word on slavery and the Texas Revolution were Protecting slavery was not the primary cause of the Texas Revolution but it certainly was a major result" (pg 48-49) I haven't seen this before, but it appears to me to be the most accurate quote, I've yet to see about slavery and the Texas Revolution.
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Post by pawbear on Feb 25, 2010 22:35:21 GMT -5
I agree. There were confusing issues affecting people and the move west. First, we must remember that the Spanish then the Mexicans invited setters into their territories (one being a D. Boone). Second, they turned a blind eye towards the religious issue towards the end (consider the fact that this was a Masonic Mexican government, not a pro Catholic group). Third, all of the northern states were in revolt or disaffected (there was outright slaughter in Coahuila by Federal troops). Fourth, the American concept of a central government at this time was federated with a great deal of power to local entities. Fifth, the move west had as much to do with land and the lingering affects of the Panic of 1819 and that of '36 and '37. But, sixth, a good deal of a sign of wealth and fortune was the ownership and use of slaves to a significant portion of those who did enter Texas (and this was played in the states as a local issue by southern representatives versus a national one by northern/eastern leaders). Yet, seventh, not all Texans owned slaves. And eight, whether slavery existed or not, Mexican government was unstable & the country in turbulence (strongly stroking the concept of local rule). And, unfortuantely ninth, not every Texan loved every Mexican and vice versa.
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Post by stuart on Feb 26, 2010 2:07:24 GMT -5
As to point six; just how significant was slavery in Texas prior to the revolution?
Moral issues aside there were basically two levels of slave use; domestic with the number of slaves owned and used by families equating to little more than a few hired hands, and industrial level slavery with large numbers of slaves either directly controlled by a family or company and employed on what might be termed a commercial scale on either plantations or other labor intensive business.
What I'm asking is whether the continued retention and use of slaves by colonists really was a significant factor - at the domestic level they could easily be replaced by real hired hands - or whether Texas was more important as a conduit for the clandestine importation of slaves to the United States.
The British government certainly considered this to be the case.
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Post by Paul Sylvain on Feb 26, 2010 6:46:04 GMT -5
What's interesting to me is that, while the Mexican government did not endorse slavery, it's ironic that he had a "domestic servant" who accompanied the Alamo survivors. Sometimes it's a matter of semantics when trying to decipher policy.
Paul
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