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Post by Hiram on Jan 22, 2010 0:38:51 GMT -5
Beginning on 22 January 1879, in Kwazulu/Natal, South Africa, on the Buffalo (Mzinyathi) River, 139 British soldiers (80 able-bodied men) held off 4,000 to 5,000 warriors of the Zulu Nation. Eleven Victoria Crosses were eventually awarded. Chard & Bromhead were the officers, Dalton the acting assistant commissary, the physician was Surgeon Major James Henry Reynolds. The Battle of Rorke's Drift has entered into the lexicon of heroic stands, standing beside such battles as Thermopylae, Cameron, and the Alamo.
And what about Isandlwana? Was it truly the disaster many historians have labeled it? Or was it an inevitable result of a flawed strategic plan?
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Post by rriddle3 on Jan 25, 2010 18:15:14 GMT -5
I feel Isandlwana was flawed both strategically and tactically, combined with a lack of respect for the Zulu warriors.
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Post by Seguin on Jan 25, 2010 18:35:00 GMT -5
Whatever the cause, it certainly ended in a disaster with 1329 British soldiers and members of various Natal volunteers (including native troops) getting killed at Isandlwana. Only 80 managed to escape. That´s less than 6%.
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Post by marklemon on Jan 25, 2010 20:24:58 GMT -5
First and foremost, the British underestimated the Zulus and their overall fighting ability. Second, the Brits should never have split their force without knowing where the main impi was. Third, the colonel in chjarge of the Isandlwana camp (Pulleine?) improperly prepared for defense of his camp. Fourth, the British supply officer refused to freely give out boxes of ammo (this is shown in the film, and I remember reading that that actually happened), and fifth, there should have been many more mounted scouts thrown out in all directions from the camp. Other than Durnford and his Sikalis, I don't think there were any others tasked to do this, IIRC.
It was a tactical disaster for the British, but ended up as a strategic blow to the Zulus, as it lead to their destruction....much like Pearl harbor ended up being a strategic defeat for the Japanese.
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Post by steves on Jan 26, 2010 5:21:18 GMT -5
Recent works seem to agree the single biggest factor was the British infantry were just spread over too wide a frontage...There's no evidence for them having ammo problems,and Durnford's men couldn't have used ammo from regular stores anyway as they had Westley-Richards carbines...It was other mounted troops who 'stumbled' on the Impi....Mounted Police or Carbineers ?(Been a while since I read up on it)....Cetywayo's comment on the victory 'A spear has been thrust into the heart of our nation' shows how Pyhrric it was......... Steve
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Post by Kevin Young on Jan 26, 2010 21:16:25 GMT -5
While Washing on the Spears is still one of the classic works on the entire Zulu War, more recent scholarship has pretty much disproven the ammunition theroy. The size of the battlefield and how spread out the British were seems to be the major failure. A fellow Zulu War buff recently posted some great modern pictures of the battlefield, including showing where various key points took place. You suddenly become aware of just how thin the old "thin red line" was in relation to the camp and the forward positions.
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johnk
Full Member
Posts: 67
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Post by johnk on Mar 1, 2010 14:43:53 GMT -5
As brave a action as Rorkes drift was it was a knee jerk reaction to the loss at Ishanwanha......As there as been many braver events since then that have merited VCs and gone unrecognised. A good piece of Victorian face saving spin doctoring. 11 VCs in one action
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Post by ajdrake4 on Aug 26, 2010 16:11:12 GMT -5
I understand that argument and agree with it for the most part, but a few of those Victoria Crosses were well earned, Victorian spin or not. Private Hook and Williams definitely come to mind
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