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Post by Jim Boylston on Jan 9, 2010 0:14:11 GMT -5
I know of at least 4 forum members currently reading Jon Meacham's "American Lion: Andrew Jackson in the White House."
I think it'd be fun to post our thoughts about the book here, and hope that some others would join us in an informal reading group.
Whaddya think?
Personally, I'm enjoying the read. Meacham is an engaging writer and not a Jackson apologist...he's very even handed in his assessment of Old Hickory.
Jim
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Post by TRK on Jan 9, 2010 6:30:57 GMT -5
I'm only up to p. 40, but so far Meacham is painting Jackson in a favorable, or at least sympathetic, light. I'd forgotten, for example, that Jackson had such a religious streak. Meacham stresses Jackson's devotion to Rachel, and there's some discussion on Jackson's extended family, particularly the Donelsons, whose role in Jackson's development can't be underestimated. The book's subtitle makes it clear that it's about Jackson as president, so it is sketchy about his pre-presidential life (just a paragraph or two, for example, on the Battle of New Orleans). Thus far, Meacham seems to be setting the stage by explaining some of the the background of Jackson's fierce devotion to the union, his manner of dealing with people, and his stubborn politics.
I wrangle words all day for a living, so it's hard for me to concentrate for long on reading for pleasure these days, but I'll try to keep at it with American Lion.
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Post by Allen Wiener on Jan 9, 2010 10:32:58 GMT -5
I like this idea and would like to see more discussion of books on the forum. Ironically, there's a history book club that meets at my local Borders and the next book on their list is American Lion.
I'm halfway through it and find it well written and interesting. Meacham creates a parallel between Jackson's youth as an orphan and his need for family and affection with his attachment to the Donelsons and his vision of the U.S. In Meacham's view, Jackson saw the country much as he saw his family; essential, despite differences within each. The comparison extends to Jackson's policies where states' rights conflicted with the need for central government and national unity, which superceded the views of individual states for Jackson. The seeds of the Civil War are clearly seen in the nullification crisis and the debate over the relative power of states and the central government have resonated to this day.
Toward the middle of the book there is discussion of Jackson's approach to Calhoun and the nullifiers, with Jackson standing firm on the need for the survival of the union above all else. The South saw federal authority on the issue as the foot-in-the-door to abolition and the ensuing fight became vitriolic. Meacham cites several leaders of the period who noted how the issue had caused a deterioration in civil discourse, including some who observed that giving way to passions that focused on narrow, partisan issues, to the exclusion of the "bigger picture" of the national good, was self-destructive. The situation was similar to much of our partisan political discourse today. Although he could be quite passionate and explosive, Jackson was among those who placed the national good and survival of the union above all else. He had fought and bled for the country and, like the founders, saw it as the best way for men to live, thus would not compromise where its survival was at stake. We might not agree with Jackson's vision of what was best for the country, but in his mind (again, according to Meacham) that was his objective.
Jackson remains a mercurial figure. There are serious inconsistencies in his policies. He bowed to Georgia states' rightists on Indian Removal, but opposed South Carolina on nullification, insisting in that case that federal authority (in the form of the tarrif) superceded the desires of individual states. This is partly explained by the fact Jackson was the major force behind Indian removal and wanted Georgia to drive the Indians out. It also reflects a realistic assessment of things by Jackson, who did not want to push states too far and needed to sustain a balance between survival of the union and his own belief in states' rights on most issues. He was as much a slave owner and southerner as Calhoun, but he saw the bigger picture.
Jackson's single-mindedness and unbending views are troubling. He not only thought he knew what was best for the country, he never considered the possibility that he didn't. Once he set his mind on a policy, there was no compromising with him. I think that blinded him to the consequences of some of his strongest actions and actually hurt the very people he said he was trying to protect (for example, the Bank War destroyed vital credit sources to farmers and small businesses; Indian removal resulted in horrific suffering, disease and death for thousands of Indians who were not hostile). Meacham acknowledges this and explains it as Jackson's way of moving the country forward despite a lot of unpleasantness that Jackson may have seen as necessary and unavoidable (again, whether we might agree with him or not). It may have been a rough road, but Jackson moved the country along it, just as he persued his earlier military objectives.
Jackson also clearly reshaped the presidency by expanding the power of the office and, in many cases, placing it above that of Congress for the first time. Jackson's view was that the president was the only official elected by the entire country at large and, thus, was the only one who directly represented the will of all the people. His use of the veto and his congressional majority, as well as his continuing popularity, enabled him to do that, but it caused serious concerns by many for the constitution, which they saw Jackson trampling, not reshaping.
Jackson disagreed with the Founders and earlier presidents (all of whom were among the elites of Virginia and Massachusetts) regarding the relative power of the 3 branches of government and his expansion of presidential power changed that dynamic permanently. Lincoln, FDR and other presidents would cite Jackson when taking bold, unilateral action. Jackson also became president when the vote was extended to millions of Americans who had not met earlier voting requirements. Thus, he ushered in the era of popular democracy that is with us to this day, but which had been opposed by the Founders, who feared the "passions" that might be aroused among the general population and result in policies that were short-sighted and destructive. They wanted a buffer between the masses and the government They believed that government was best left in the hands of educated elites, who made the business of government their constant concern and who were able to devote the time required to adequately, dispassionately evaluate and deal with serious issues. Many in Jackson's time shared that view and feared what Jackson and popular democracy had unleashed.
Jackson's presidency was, thus, pivotal and represents a major turning point in the development of U.S. government.
Allen
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Post by pawbear on Jan 9, 2010 19:00:11 GMT -5
I've had an eye on Meacham's book for several months and will probably buy and compare it with Brand's vision of a few years back. I do believe Jackson to be a unionist but not an anti-elitist. I think his was of a new breed that sprung up from beneath and around the founding fathers. A bit different from Henry Clay who while poor was trained in law in Virginia by those who walked with the upper eschelon and married into it. There was a good deal of work some thirty years ago as to how democratic was the Democratic Party on the local levels and how elistist were the Whigs. Often the studies shown the Whigs more supportive of working class interests as they supported those of the middle class. This is not to say the Whigs were not infiltrated with their own form of elitist views but more, I think, of one that supported a view of commitment to the working class and the poorer groups. If not, how was Crockett wooed by Adams and company away from Jackson and party? Why was Jackson Tennessee party so anti land reform in Tennessee? Anyway the discussions here have been excellent and I hope they will continue.
Charlie W.
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Post by Jim Boylston on Jan 9, 2010 22:01:45 GMT -5
Insightful observations regarding the Whigs, Charlie. I'm not sure Adams and Co. really had to do much wooing to get Crockett to jump ship. Before he left for his first term in Washington he had already arranged to meet with Henry Clay upon arrival. I think Crockett's relationship with the Whigs was symbiotic. He hoped to get support for his land bill, and they were looking for a homespun type to get at Jackson in his backyard. Crockett wasn't much of a partisan anyway, and was looking for allies wherever he could find them. The Jacksonians found him too independent, and alienated him early on because of his refusal to toe the party line. They undermined his every effort in congess, so he certainly couldn't look to them for help.
I'm a little more than halfway through "American Lion." At first, I thought Meacham was devoting too much time to the Eaton affair but, as a read on, it became more clear that the scandal had a major national impact. Jackson was making decisions in light of the controversy.
Meacham also goes into a lot of detail on the nullification crisis. It's amazing how close the country came to an all out civil war in the 1830's. Both sides were arming troops and warfare seemed certain.
Jim
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Post by Allen Wiener on Jan 9, 2010 22:58:58 GMT -5
I just finished the nullification section and found it really eye-opening. I'd never read so much detail showing just how serious this crisis was and how close the country came to civil war, or at least insurrection by South Carolina. At least in Meacham's telling, Jackson was a consummate political tactician during the crisis and averted war, while leaving all of his options open. It certainly reads like a dress rehearsal for 1861 and I liked Meacham's passing references to Lincoln. It seems that most participants knew that the real issue was not nullification, but slavery, which would have to be resolved sooner or later. Meacham quotes Jackson as saying so himself.
Crockett was, indeed, averse to partisanship and, in his own way, seemed to want what Jackson said he wanted -- a unified country that preserved the union despite regional differences. However, many, including Crockett, saw Jackson's expansion of executive power as a threat to the Constitution and thus the union. Jackson was egotistical, arrogant and often deaf to views opposing his own. He was convinced that he, personally, knew what was best for the country and thought those who opposed him were misguided at best and destructive at worst. But he was also a very complex and unpredictable man, who could use tact and political skills as well as anyone when he chose to.
Allen
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Post by Jim Boylston on Jan 9, 2010 23:33:46 GMT -5
Meacham also pointed out that Jackson was actually very calculating in how he approached situations and typically only engaged in what others might have considered risky behavior if he thought the odds were highly in his favor.
Jim
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Post by Allen Wiener on Jan 10, 2010 9:48:49 GMT -5
Yeah, he was very good at sizing up a situation and guaging what approach would work best; he seemed to know what he could get away with and had total confidence in himself and belief that he was right. That led mostly to success, both in his military years and as a politician, but it also can be dangerous in a powerful and popular president. Many people were not better off from Jackson's presidency, but the country survived and crises resolved (but not always for the best). The presidency was strengthened and real popular democracy became a permanent part of the political system. He left a country that was not what the Founders had in mind, and I'm not sure we yet know how much better or worse that has been for us. The book is a very interesting take on Jackson; I want to read Sean Wilentz's short bio of Jackson when I finish Meacham for comparison.
Allen
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Post by TRK on Jan 10, 2010 10:16:38 GMT -5
Meacham touches on the inauguration day/night reception (using the term loosely) at the White House, where a throng of Jackson devotees, hangers-on, office-seekers, and street people mobbed the White House and caused a fair amount of physical damage. Historians have long treated this incident as emblematic of Jacksonian popular democracy, where the common man began to come into his own as a genuine force in American politics. I wonder how Jackson really felt when he looked at that virtual riot in the Executive Mansion, and if in his heart of hearts he wondered if he'd opened a Pandora's box. I'm hoping Meacham goes deeper into how Jackson felt about the popular democracy facet of his version of democracy (the strengthening of the executive branch vis-a-vis the legislative branch being the other key facet).
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Post by Jim Boylston on Jan 10, 2010 11:24:05 GMT -5
IMHO, Jackson was far more interested in strengthening the presidency and consolidating power in the executive branch than he was interested in the common man. He talked a good game, but I don't know that many of his policies "trickled down." His stance against the bank, for example, hurt commoners who desperately needed credit to get their goods to market. Wealthier planters could finance their own ventures with hard money, which is the position Jackson always promoted. Great if you've got money on hand, not so good if you don't. Jackson was opposed to credit, but that's an easy position to take if you don't need any. His ideas about credit and financing would, if adopted out of whole cloth, have prohibited smaller farmers and merchants to ever rise above their social stations. As a large scale planter himself, Jackson was keeping the competition at bay. Jim
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Post by Allen Wiener on Jan 10, 2010 12:01:01 GMT -5
I think the "common man" was something of an abstraction to Jackson and his approach to serving the people was highly paternalistic and condescending. He seemed removed from the realities of how the average person lived, although he himself had risen from poverty. As Jim suggests, he tended to see things from his own point of view and banking is a good example. He'd had disastrous relations with banks and his policies were based partly on that experience, rather than the impact his policies might have. Others shared his concern about the Second Bank's power, for example, but could think of more reasonable ways to curtail its power than simply killing it, and most credit in the country. Jackson didn't seem to see or care about that. He didn't only see the Bank as a threat to the government's power, he saw it as a personal threat to his/the president's power. Other's feared that his action against the Bank represented a dangerous increase in presidential power that could lead to despotism.
Internal improvements was a similar issue. Jackson opposed federal support of any projects that were not truly interstate, or national, in scope, but he defined that concept himself; "national" was whatever Jackson said it was. Ostensibly, this was to satisfy states' rights forces, who feared any increase in federal power and wanted most decisions made by the individual states. You can see how that would not be practical when commerce required serious and rapid improvement of roads and waterways, particularly in the West. But growth of population and economies in the West threatened older industries in the East, which was losing population and workforce to the West -- and, of course, that's what the West wanted; more population, thus more representation in government and more power, not to mention a growing economy. The South opposed expansion to the West and cheap sale of public lands, which they saw as a threat to slavery if non-slave states increased and the South shrank in relative size and influence.
All of these competing regional agendas pulled against each other and Jackson was in the middle of it, trying to maintain the union and keep that as an overriding priority that superseded all of these narrower issues. There was always the threat of civil war, which did come about a mere 30 years later, and Jackson had reason for concern. I think he was focused on this "big picture," not the fate of the common man, and believed that survival of the union would, in the long run, benefit everyone, but I think he either ignored or blinded himself to the consequences of what he was doing for those very common men.
Allen
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Post by Kevin Young on Jan 10, 2010 12:11:43 GMT -5
I just cracked open the book, so will be doing some catching up. I have always seen Jackson as the first president to really make a break from what the framers of the Constiution had in mind: and despite the "common man" view, Jackson started the consolidation of presidential power. I am glad that the nullification crisis is getting put in perspective (we did come to the brink and it is really no surprise that in 1860 SC made the first move).
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Post by Allen Wiener on Jan 10, 2010 12:17:40 GMT -5
Yes, when you come to the nullification crisis (about half-way through the book) I think you'll find it somewhat haunting in its clear anticipation of what played out in 1860; almost like an eerie dress rehearsal. It's not surprising that Lincoln cited Jackson's precedent during the nullification crisis; I also come away with a certainty that, had things gone too far, Jackson would have used force to subdue the nullifiers.
Allen
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Post by Kevin Young on Jan 10, 2010 12:38:31 GMT -5
Except when finished he would have shot or hanged all of them-which would have had some effect on the events in Texas.
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Post by Jim Boylston on Jan 10, 2010 13:02:44 GMT -5
I don't think there's any doubt Jackson would have used force against SC. I think he wanted to avoid it if at all possible, but he was clearly prepared to do so. Jim
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