|
Post by Allen Wiener on Jan 11, 2008 22:42:09 GMT -5
Was the objective to "fort up"? I'm not sure what they were thinking. Is it possible that Neill, Bowie, Travis saw a need to hold Bexar, and the Alamo as a defensive posiition to be held only until larger forces arrived to engage the Mexicans out in the open? So the Alamo became their temporary refuge, but only long enough to await the arrival of real forces that could engage in a battle in the open. When that strategy failed, and reenforcements didn't materialize, the only alternative was to hold the place and defend it when attacked.
AW
|
|
|
Post by sloanrodgers on Jan 12, 2008 0:53:14 GMT -5
I'm not sure, but think almost everyone saw Bexar as the gateway to the rest of Texas. I'm sure the commanders of the Alamo would have defeneded the whole town if they had been given the men and the means to put on a big show for Santa Anna.
|
|
|
Post by Herb on Jan 12, 2008 12:30:56 GMT -5
I Houston was justified in his skepticism in regards to "forting up." Glenn Glenn, I think we need to treat this comment, from a March 13th letter, with some skepticism. I haven't found any such comments in any of Houston's letters prior to his having learned of the Alamo. In fact, his March 11th orders, after he learned of the fall to Fannin directed him to withdrawal from Goliad to Victoria. Once arriving at Victoria, Fannin was to forward 1/3 of his men to Houston, and defend Victoria with the remainder. (A portion of Houston's instructions we often ignore). Elsewhere, I believe quoted in Sea of Mud are other orders from Houston given during the retreat, directing the fortifying of Copano and other key coastal sites. After the Alamo, I think, Houston genuinely did not want large portions of the army tied up in fortifications - he needed the men in his Army - to create an army of maneuver. But, he still desired key points to be fortified and held - primarily for the support of his army. I feel that a lot of Houston's protestations especially years later were politically motivated to justify his actions before San Jacinto.
|
|
|
Post by stuart on Jan 12, 2008 13:01:12 GMT -5
Stripping away both all the things he said afterwards, and his desire at the time to avoid embroilment in the "internal" affairs of Mexico Houston's views at the time were actually straightforward and sensible enough.
He was opposed to tying up the available troops in fixed defensive positions. If he had to try and hold Santa Anna he wanted to do it behind a river. His wanting to hold Copano was a different matter entirely because it was a strategically vital point at which large quantities of supplies and substantial reinforcements could be brought in by sea rather than overland. Once he fell back behind the Colorado of course Copano became useless to him. Velasco and New Washington then became the important supply points - something worth thinking about in the "forks" business. Its assumed he wanted to head for Nacogdoches, Gaines and the Old Flag, but turning towards Harrisburg meant he was also heading towards the coast - only Santa Anna got there first...
I'm thinking on my feet here, but this might be worth a thread by itself.
|
|
|
Post by elcolorado on Jan 12, 2008 13:05:38 GMT -5
Those are valid questions, Allen. But until some revealing documentation turns up we'll never know for sure. So for now, we'll have to continue to examine all the evidence available and put our collective faith in reasonable assumptions, speculation, and theories.
I think the indication is that the leaders in Bexar believed "forting up" was their best option. The best evidence we have to support that belief might be the letters addressed to Gov. Smith in Jan-Feb '36.
Houston, the Commander-in-Chief, apparently wanted to consolidate and relocate his forces to the East. I don't think he had any illusions about confronting Santa Anna from behind walls. As we know, Houston sent Bowie to demolish the fortifications Cos had erected in San Antonio. He also sought permission from Gov. Smith to blow-up the Alamo if he thought "well of it."
(Question: Did Bowie follow through with his task to demolish the town's fortifications or did they remain intact?)
In January, Gov. Smith received a letter of stubborn determination from Bowie and Neill declaring that "we will rather die in these ditches then give them up to the enemy." I don't know if the "ditches" Bowie wrote of was a reference to the defensive fortifications in town or to the Alamo. Both?
G. B. Jameson sent a letter to Houston in January, describing his intentions for the Alamo. In the letter he boasted that: "..in case of an attack we will all move into the Alamo and whip 10 to 1 with our artillery."
In February, Gov.Smith saw additional letters of optimism from Jameson and later on, Travis. I think it was this outpour of determination, bravado, optimism, and resolve that persuaded Gov. Smith and the council to not "think well of it" and reject Houston's desire to abandon Bexar.
Again, when I read all the communications coming out of Bexar, I see only a desire to fortify and defend the Alamo. Unlike Cos, who's purpose for the Alamo was clear - a base of operations. The Texans were intent on fighting Santa Anna from behind the walls of their makeshift fortress. Quite similar to what Fannin may have intended at Goliad. The idea of "forting up" seemed to be fairly popular with everyone except Houston.
The volunteers in Bexar knew they couldn't fight Santa Anna in the open. They simply didn't have the men. I suppose the case could be made that the leaders in San Antonio, after bypassing Houston and persuading the Texas government that the Alamo was vital to the survival of the colonies, tried to manipulate Houston and force him to consolidate in Bexar.
Glenn
|
|
|
Post by elcolorado on Jan 12, 2008 13:17:53 GMT -5
No disagreement, Wolf. I was referring to Houston's letter of the 17th of January. In it he expresses his skepticism or reluctance to fighting from a fixed location. Sorry for any misunderstanding.
Glenn
|
|
|
Post by Jake on Jan 12, 2008 14:34:36 GMT -5
As of Jan. 18, Neill still had the men divided between San Antonio and the Alamo, 40 at each and 34 non-effectives sitting somewhere. I think the town defenses continued in place and "in use," in the sense that they were sort of manned, until everyone was moved into the Alamo on the 19th. Whether they expended any manpower to dismantle the town defenses when they saw no real threat is open to question, though. That would have been a lot of work.
|
|