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Post by Allen Wiener on Oct 25, 2009 12:16:29 GMT -5
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Post by Kevin Young on Oct 25, 2009 21:34:54 GMT -5
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Post by Herb on Oct 26, 2009 15:48:50 GMT -5
Allen, the study of military history/use of military history by the army is nothing new in fact it is highly unusual when it isn't.
After I was commisioned, a senior officer in my first unit told me that if you truly want to be a professional you must study Napoleon.
Here's just some personal examples. Staff rides of battlefields are common, some of the ones I participated in include Civil War Battlefields: Perryville, Stones River/Murfeesboro, Chickamauga and Chattanooga, and Gettysburg. WWII: Patton's Counterattack and relief of Bastagone. (In fact one of the major reasons that our National Battlefields exsist today, was the use of Civil War Battlefields by the Army for Staff Rides - Chickamauga was the first to be preserved and Staff Rides and military mobilization was the primary reason it was preserved).
Patton's Lorraine Campaign is (was?) a required study in the Army's Professional Schools. When I was an instructor at the Armor School various historical vignettes were incorporated to illustrate teaching points. When working as a writer on field manuels we were required to include historical examples to illustrate the doctrine.
When attending the Command and General Staff College - The Centennial Campaign (1876 Souix War) was used to teach irregular war. Various Campaigns throughout history were used to teach Operational level planning, etc. etc. A formal course on US military history was a required core subject for all students.
Most unit commanders require a professional reading program for their subordinate officers to both improve their military education and writing abilities.
Like everything not everybody takes to the studies, and there is a real danger in the improper use of history.
Personally, I think the benefits outweigh the dangers. The idea of using history isn't so much to reinforce doctrine ie prescribe methods of doing things, but to make officers think and when they make decisons that violate doctrine they are doing so consciously and logically and not operating out of ignorance.
I think some of the NYT's slant on the story is that they are only now realizing that the military is a profession and that it requires professional study.
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Post by Allen Wiener on Oct 26, 2009 16:06:54 GMT -5
Interesting stuff, Herb. Thanks for posting this. I can see how this can work, having just read "Centennial Campaign." It's not that commanders are likely to find themselves in the situations that faced the army in that campaign, but it offers really sharp examples of decision making, both long term and on the spot. I also read Gray's "Custer's Last Campaign," written later. I had meant to post some reflections on those books, but got overtaken by events. But, anyone who is serious about studying the Little Big Horn needs to read both of those books.
Allen
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Post by Herb on Oct 26, 2009 16:17:39 GMT -5
I'd like to hear your thoughts on Gray, if you got the time maybe you can update the Custer thread.
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Post by Allen Wiener on Oct 26, 2009 19:47:07 GMT -5
OK, Herb; you talked me into it! I dug out my notes and went over the books a bit again and came up with a rather long post that is on the "New Custer Book" thread. Hope you find it of some interest, but I'd like to hear your take.
Allen
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