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Post by Herb on Apr 17, 2009 19:02:04 GMT -5
In the Mexican War topic, Quincymorris wrote:
I think Griffith totally missed the target in his Civil War analysis, there's a lot of condescension about how the colonials just couldn't get it right - while ignoring that his own country didn't refine their tactics until long after the evidence of the American Civil War.
While most officers are victims of their own experience, in the case of the Civil War, they were more of a victim of their early teachings at West Point. Mahan and Thayer made a concerted effort to incorporate the lessons learned from Napoleonic War to the education programs at West Point. Where they went wrong was that chose to apply Jomini as the text and not Clauswitz. most of this was simply do to availability and the fact that Jomini was published in French (a required language at West Point) and Clauswitz was published in German.
Jomini was primarily concerned with tactical lessons learned, while Clauswitz was more concerned about general principles of warfare (which is why Clauswitz still applies today). Jomini was still appropriate in Mexico, the technology was not all that different from Napoleon's time. So the young West Pointers' book learning was reinforced by their first true combat experiences. Despite the technological advances between the end of the Mexican War and the beginning of the Civil War, is it any wonder that the future generals trained in an outdated tactical method and reinforced by their only true combat experience were slow to adapt to the changes on the battlefield?
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Post by jrboddie on Apr 17, 2009 19:47:25 GMT -5
The last time I visited Antietam (Sharpsburg for those of us of the Southern persuasion) there was a class of West Point cadets who were there to study the tactics of the armies that fought there some 130 years ago.
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Post by stuart on Apr 18, 2009 14:53:03 GMT -5
While most officers are victims of their own experience, in the case of the Civil War, they were more of a victim of their early teachings at West Point. Mahan and Thayer made a concerted effort to incorporate the lessons learned from Napoleonic War to the education programs at West Point. Where they went wrong was that chose to apply Jomini as the text and not Clauswitz. most of this was simply do to availability and the fact that Jomini was published in French (a required language at West Point) and Clauswitz was published in German. Jomini was primarily concerned with tactical lessons learned, while Clauswitz was more concerned about general principles of warfare (which is why Clauswitz still applies today). Jomini was still appropriate in Mexico, the technology was not all that different from Napoleon's time. Its something also bearing in mind when thinking about 1836. More than once we hear about the fascination of seeing a "Napoleonic" army operating in what is now the American West. While this is absolutely true, it should also be remembered that the US Army of the time was equally "Napoleonic" in its thinking - and uniforms |
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Post by Kevin Young on Apr 18, 2009 16:32:16 GMT -5
While most officers are victims of their own experience, in the case of the Civil War, they were more of a victim of their early teachings at West Point. Mahan and Thayer made a concerted effort to incorporate the lessons learned from Napoleonic War to the education programs at West Point. Where they went wrong was that chose to apply Jomini as the text and not Clauswitz. most of this was simply do to availability and the fact that Jomini was published in French (a required language at West Point) and Clauswitz was published in German. Jomini was primarily concerned with tactical lessons learned, while Clauswitz was more concerned about general principles of warfare (which is why Clauswitz still applies today). Jomini was still appropriate in Mexico, the technology was not all that different from Napoleon's time. Its something also bearing in mind when thinking about 1836. More than once we hear about the fascination of seeing a "Napoleonic" army operating in what is now the American West. While this is absolutely true, it should also be remembered that the US Army of the time was equally "Napoleonic" in its thinking - and uniforms Excellent point! I think it has to do with the whole "Napoleon of the West" tag and the style of uniforms. I have even had one Alamo visitor inform me that the Mexican Army wanted so bad to be a copy of Napoleon's they event carried those type of weapons! |
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Post by Kevin Young on Apr 18, 2009 17:28:25 GMT -5
In the Mexican War topic, Quincymorris wrote: I think Griffith totally missed the target in his Civil War analysis, there's a lot of condescension about how the colonials just couldn't get it right - while ignoring that his own country didn't refine their tactics until long after the evidence of the American Civil War. While most officers are victims of their own experience, in the case of the Civil War, they were more of a victim of their early teachings at West Point. Mahan and Thayer made a concerted effort to incorporate the lessons learned from Napoleonic War to the education programs at West Point. Where they went wrong was that chose to apply Jomini as the text and not Clauswitz. most of this was simply do to availability and the fact that Jomini was published in French (a required language at West Point) and Clauswitz was published in German. Jomini was primarily concerned with tactical lessons learned, while Clauswitz was more concerned about general principles of warfare (which is why Clauswitz still applies today). Jomini was still appropriate in Mexico, the technology was not all that different from Napoleon's time. So the young West Pointers' book learning was reinforced by their first true combat experiences. Despite the technological advances between the end of the Mexican War and the beginning of the Civil War, is it any wonder that the future generals trained in an outdated tactical method and reinforced by their only true combat experience were slow to adapt to the changes on the battlefield? Interesting observations and it makes sense. I did not think Jomini was adopted as a text until the late 1850's at the USMA. As you know, Grant famously declared that he had never read it, although others do mention that they read it and Jomini's other works on their own. Of course, it does have all may have to do with how much Mahan's stuff was influenced by Jomini. I think one of Steve Hardin's mentors, Jim Pohl did an article on the influence of Jomini on the Mexican War. I think that the fact that a smaller US Army, always on the offensive (save for Fort Brown) and attacking a enemy both in the field and in fix fortifications, won every major battle of the war (some might debate Angostura) also had some influence on the future officer corps of the Union and Confederate Army. Some sides: wonder if any of the Mexican officer coprs ever read any of this stuff? Also, I used to a lot of comments about how "the worst officer in the Texas army, James Fannin, was the only West Pointer in the bunch." Of course, you were only studying French and Math in the first two years, and Fannin flunked them. |
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Post by Herb on Apr 18, 2009 18:41:00 GMT -5
Mahan conducted inspections in France and enrolled in one of the French Military Academies, returning to West Point in 1830. In 1832, he became the "Professor of Civil and Military Engineering and of the Art of War".
Henry Halleck's book Elements of Military Art and Science was published in 1846. It's critics call it a paraphrase of Jomini.
French editions of Jomini were used in the late 1830s, but I want to say it was McClellan that first provided an English translation sometime in the 1840s.
Early in 1862, West Point provided an "approved" English translation of Jomini for officers serving in the Union Army.
Russell Weigly pointed out how McClellan and Halleck hung on to the maxims of Jomini to the extreme. Which is exactly, what Dennis Mahan was trying to prevent by teaching the military art. In Weigly's words "Mahan recognized that the historical approach to war suggested a risk that officers would become bound to past and bookish solutions of problems" (as Halleck and McClellan did) "He himself emphasized that while principles of strategy remain constant, the methods of applying them must change."
Clauswitz didn't reach the US Army until well after the Civil War, and quite frankly some of his principles weren't adopted until as late as the 1980s, when the US Army really became enamored with him.
I fully believe Grant had never read Jomini, and while he also never read Clauswitz, he certainly applied the Clauswiz principles of war. Grant may have been the only person besides Lincoln that realized the key to victory (center of gravity) was the Confederate Armies and not Richmond.
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Post by Herb on Apr 18, 2009 18:52:58 GMT -5
Some sides: wonder if any of the Mexican officer coprs ever read any of this stuff? Isn't Santa Anna supposed to have had a copy of Napoleon's Maxims? |
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Post by Kevin Young on Apr 18, 2009 19:43:14 GMT -5
Mahan conducted inspections in France and enrolled in one of the French Military Academies, returning to West Point in 1830. In 1832, he became the "Professor of Civil and Military Engineering and of the Art of War". Henry Halleck's book Elements of Military Art and Science was published in 1846. It's critics call it a paraphrase of Jomini. French editions of Jomini were used in the late 1830s, but I want to say it was McClellan that first provided an English translation sometime in the 1840s. Early in 1862, West Point provided an "approved" English translation of Jomini for officers serving in the Union Army. Russell Weigly pointed out how McClellan and Halleck hung on to the maxims of Jomini to the extreme. Which is exactly, what Dennis Mahan was trying to prevent by teaching the military art. In Weigly's words "Mahan recognized that the historical approach to war suggested a risk that officers would become bound to past and bookish solutions of problems" (as Halleck and McClellan did) "He himself emphasized that while principles of strategy remain constant, the methods of applying them must change." Clauswitz didn't reach the US Army until well after the Civil War, and quite frankly some of his principles weren't adopted until as late as the 1980s, when the US Army really became enamored with him. I fully believe Grant had never read Jomini, and while he also never read Clauswitz, he certainly applied the Clauswiz principles of war. Grant may have been the only person besides Lincoln that realized the key to victory (center of gravity) was the Confederate Armies and not Richmond. That all fits and I appreciate the detailed response. I knew about Hallack- and with McClellan it explains a lot. |
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Post by Kevin Young on Apr 18, 2009 19:43:58 GMT -5
Some sides: wonder if any of the Mexican officer coprs ever read any of this stuff? Isn't Santa Anna supposed to have had a copy of Napoleon's Maxims? Yes-but did he read it! |
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Post by stuart on Apr 19, 2009 3:33:47 GMT -5
Isn't Santa Anna supposed to have had a copy of Napoleon's Maxims? Yes-but did he read it! Undoubtedly, but how much of it was actually taken in is another matter entirely. A useful parallel here might be the British infantry regulations of 1792 as devised by David Dundas. They are often referred to as the "18 Maneouvres" and criticised for compressing tactical doctrine into just 18 rigid maneouvres. In reality, as Dundas himself complained, they did nothing of the sort. The notorious 18 were just the basic ones which each battalion had to demonstrate as part of its annual proficiency test. What the regulations did do was describe how to carry out a very wide range of maneouvres indeed, with multiple ways of achieving things according to the tactical situation. They are absolutely marvellous. However; what they do not attempt to do is prescribe which particular maneouvres should be carried out in response to a given set of circumstances. That is where the experience and judgement of the individual commanding officer comes in, and if he happens to be a blockhead... So it is with Napoleon, Frederick the Great and all the other Greats who put pen to paper. They can guide an officer with all sorts of useful principles, but he has to work out the particulars for himself. |
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Post by Herb on Apr 19, 2009 10:46:08 GMT -5
However; what they do not attempt to do is prescribe which particular maneouvres should be carried out in response to a given set of circumstances. That is where the experience and judgement of the individual commanding officer comes in, and if he happens to be a blockhead... So it is with Napoleon, Frederick the Great and all the other Greats who put pen to paper. They can guide an officer with all sorts of useful principles, but he has to work out the particulars for himself. That's the maxim to top all maxims!  Back when I used to be an instructor to future company commanders, I used to emphasize that all we (teachers) were doing was given the students tools to fill their toolbox. It was their responsibility to choose the right one. A corollary to that, was that when an officer violates doctrine it should be done as an informed decision and not done out of ignorance! Sadly quite a few officers still want cookie cutter "school solutions" ala McClellan and Halleck. |
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Post by gtj222 on Apr 26, 2011 9:12:10 GMT -5
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Post by Herb on Jan 26, 2012 16:06:35 GMT -5
Having gone through previous draw downs after the Cold War, where the watch words were "no more Task Force Smiths" reference the disastrous results of the WWII draw down in Korea, and the more drastic cuts of the Clinton administration where even deeper cuts with no change to strategy and an increase in operations tempo, led to the watch wotds of "do more with less", I read with interest the current Army Chief of Staff's new watch words for the current proposed draw down "Do less with less". While I don't know how appropriate the proposed cuts are (without knowing what "doing less" actually means, they seem too radical) at least the Army seems to be adopting a realistic attitude to go with restructuring, this time.
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Post by Allen Wiener on Jan 26, 2012 17:07:03 GMT -5
I think restructuring is essential. For once, I'd like to see us "re-draw" as a guide to any draw down. This should be done with clear projections of what sort of actions we are likely to be fighting in the next 5-10 years, and what hardware and training we'll need. Are we going to be emphasizing drone strikes, intel gathering for that and other kinds of ops, special elite units and their ops, like the raid on Bin Laden and the Somali pirates, or are we talking big-time stuff like invading Iran, dismantling its nuke facilities, etc.? It's not so much a matter of money as it is one of (for once!) being prepared for the most likely NEXT war, instead of the LAST one!
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Post by Herb on Jan 26, 2012 18:06:22 GMT -5
Restructuring is essential. The problem is the United States has a perfect record, preparing for the next war - we've been wrong every time.
Seriously, the problem is you have to prepare for two very different things, the most probable things to happen, and the most dangerous things that can happen. Special operations, drones, etc. will be the most utilized on the next 10 years, however if you have to project real force, you need the heavier forces provided by tanks and mechanized infantry. Forward stationed forces eg Germany can be invaluable for force projection.
The most economical thing to do is to cut the heavy forces, they will be the least used forces in all probability. However, cutting them will require even more reliance on the Guard and Reserve (something a lot of people have objected to during Iraq, etc. And these are exactly the type of forces that are hardest to train and maintain in the reserves.
This is simplistic, but it is difficult balance to. achieve.
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