Stop-Loss Ending

[sloanrodgers]

I don't understand the huge controversy over this military policy or the pretext of the movie
by this name. I thought these retention regulations were all spelled out for recruits in their
enlistment contracts. In times of peace modern American soldiers sign-up for specific dates,
but during periods of war, one can be contractually bound until the end of the conflict.

Doesn't anyone read contracts before signing them? How are soldiers "forced" and the military
"breaking faith" when new recruits volunteered for service, then agreed to possible extentions
in the event of a war? It sounds to me like the soldiers complaining about this policy are the
ones breaking their word. The link below seems slanted or confused about the stop-loss policy.

www.nytimes.com/2009/03/22/opinion/22sun2.html

[Herb]

Well, it does show the author's ignorance, and sadly most of the rest of the country.

There's still people that somehow, think it's criminal to call up the nation's reserve - the National Guard, recall retirees, engage stop loss, etc. Whether they realize it or not, the army is not designed to fight, other than an immediate crisis eg Grenada, Panama, etc., a war without those forces (and that's why enlistment contracts are structured the way they are, and why the Federal Government pays the National Guard during its weekend drills and summer training).

The Army was restructured on purpose by former Chief-of-Staff Creighton Abrams, post Vietnam, deliberately, so as it could never again fight a prolonged war without involving the whole Nation and probably more so by forcing Congress to commit itself to the war effort - instead or reneging on their Constitutional duties as they did in Vietnam. Even though it hasn't happened quite the way he envisioned it, it still has avoided the problems that led to the collapse of the US Army in the 1970s.

In my mind one of the more disasterous policies of Rumsfeld was trying to change this policy to recreate the "flexibility" that the preVietnam army had. Committing this nation's forces to prolonged combat needs to be a decision that the nation. or at least its represenatives, make, not simply an executive order. That was Abram's ultimate vision.

[Allen Wiener]

The more I read about Rumsfeld, the more astounded I am at the man's ignorance and arrogance -- an extremely dangerous combination.

AW

[Herb]

Mar 22, 2009 15:58:20 GMT -5 Allen Wiener said:

The more I read about Rumsfeld, the more astounded I am at the man's ignorance and arrogance -- an extremely dangerous combination.

AW

Well, I think it's probably safe to say, that he and MacNamara were the two most intelliegent men to ever hold the office of SECDEF - and both would have to be equally considered the most incompetent men to ever hold the office.

I'll admit my prejudice, but to try and discard the Army, Gen Abrams created, to discard the Powell Doctrine, and ignore the advice of the sitting Chief of Staff, Gen Shinseki all highlight the arrogance you speak of. While civilian command of the armed forces is unquestioned, and generals do make as many mistakes as anybody else - it still seems strange that anybody would overturn or try to anyway, the advice and policies of three of the Army's brighter lights in the last quarter century and never question if the path he choosing was the right thing for the country and the service that he was responsible for.

It sure would cause me to queston if I was on the right track!

[Allen Wiener]

It's too bad you weren't the president, Herb, because that's the only way I can see this thing. I could understand some of that kind of attitude if Powell or another career soldier had been in Rummy's position, but not Rummy himself. He seemed, at times, to make crucial decisions basedon fantasies or a colosal lack of knowledge. I think Tora Bora was one example, but some of this is actually getting vague (along with a good many other things) these days, as old man time moves along.

AW

[Herb]

The very real problem with a lot of this including Tora Bora is in the internal culture of the Army. Very poor decisions were made on force structure in Afghanistan (as well as Iraq) by Rumsfeld, however every bit of training that anybody in the Army receives is to accomplish the mission with what ever resources are allocated. Officers, especially are expected to debate things before decisions are made - but be silent and accomplish the mission once that decision is made. The decision to not deploy field artillery to Afghanistan and rely solely on airpower is sadly a case in point.

The biggest problem at Tora Bora was US troops came under artillery and mortar fire and were unable to respond in kind. Air Power is great, but under the best of conditions it usually takes a minimum of 15 minutes (and even then you're stuck with the ordinance the plane is already carrying - instead of what may be needed) and at least 60 minutes to get the right aircraft with the right ordinance on the right target - that's why ground operations are so dependent on preplanned (best guess) Air Support. Direct Support Artillery, however can usually put the right stuff on the target in a couple of minutes. The difference is an eternity when you are under fire.

The Force Cap stuff (the maximum number of people allowed in a theater) is a peacetime necessity, and in War Time allows you to set priorities on limited resources. The problem with Tora Bora, was that at the time Afghanistan was the only thing going on for the conventional military. There should not have been a hard ceiling on numbers and type of forces deployed to the theater.

What most people don't know, is that Rumsfled was deep into a campaign to reshape the military emphasizing the Air Force and Navy Air (Shock and Awe). While I have no proof, I'm convinced that the force cap in Afghanistan and later in Iraq was driven by Rumsfeld's personal desires and not the situation on the ground.

This is a ongoing problem with the way we manage our military. In Somalia, the decision was made to rotate a Marine unit out and replace it with a light infantry Army unit. The big difference in capability was that the Marine unit included a company of tanks. The US commander on the ground request an Army tank company to replace the Marine tanks - this request was denied by the SecDef, Les Aspin. Shortly after the Marines deployed out of country the "Blackhawk Down" incident occurred. That Special Operation was mounted under White House control without the overall US ground commander even knowing about it. There were no US forces capable to respond instead, the US commander in his role as Deputy UN commander had to call on a Pakistani infantry battalion with tanks - which took a lot of time.

Of course after TV showed American bodies being dragged through the streets in Somalia, Aspin ordered the immediate deployment of a company of M1s and Bradleys by AIR to Somalia.
Like the field artillery sent to Afghanistan after Tora Bora, simply too late.

[Allen Wiener]

Fascinating, and disheartening. This is pretty much what I'd heard about Tora Bora and what I'd call Rumsfeld's fantasies or distance from reality.

Many thanks for the enlightenment. Most people seem unaware of the military aspects of these events and rarely (if ever) are they reported in the news media.

I missed these discussions in Bexar this year, Herb!

AW

[sloanrodgers]

Mar 22, 2009 13:00:24 GMT -5 Herb said:

Well, it does show the author's ignorance, and sadly most of the rest of the country.

There's still people that somehow, think it's criminal to call up the nation's reserve - the National Guard, recall retirees, engage stop loss, etc. Whether they realize it or not, the army is not designed to fight, other than an immediate crisis eg Grenada, Panama, etc., a war without those forces (and that's why enlistment contracts are structured the way they are, and why the Federal Government pays the National Guard during its weekend drills and summer training).

The Army was restructured on purpose by former Chief-of-Staff Creighton Abrams, post Vietnam, deliberately, so as it could never again fight a prolonged war without involving the whole Nation and probably more so by forcing Congress to commit itself to the war effort - instead or reneging on their Constitutional duties as they did in Vietnam. Even though it hasn't happened quite the way he envisioned it, it still has avoided the problems that led to the collapse of the US Army in the 1970s.

In my mind one of the more disasterous policies of Rumsfeld was trying to change this policy to recreate the "flexibility" that the preVietnam army had. Committing this nation's forces to prolonged combat needs to be a decision that the nation. or at least its represenatives, make, not simply an executive order. That was Abram's ultimate vision.

I agree. It seems so ridiculous. It's very hard to fight a modern war without skilled soldiers, thus
the activation of the dormant retention policies during a prolonged war. I was a retention NCO in
the Texas National Guard. When I took over the unit, it had the worst retention in the state, but
I raised it up to one of the best. I was honest with soldiers on the benefits and contracts. I don't
believe any of my reenlistees backed out of the deal. I don't know if any went to warzones during
the early 1990s, but I like to think they did their duty in Texan fashion.

This whole Stop-Loss controversy reminds me of when I was an apartment manager. No matter how
much I went over a leasing contract with renters, some folks would always feel completely justified
in breaking it weeks or months later. For some people their signature and word of honor is not their
bond, but an insidious way of manipulating the system. I had no qualms about kicking people out of
an apartment for violating the contract ( drug dealing, trashing the unit, etc. ), but think the military
has every right to hold soldiers to theirs. Ugh! I'll get off my soapbox on this topic. I'm having some
leasing flashbacks.