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Post by sloanrodgers on Aug 31, 2008 19:29:07 GMT -5
Has anyone come across the Fall/ Oct. 2008 issue of Military Heritage magazine at their local bookshop? I usually don't pick this one up anymore because it mostly concentrates on European and Asian wars that I have lost interest in over the years. Luckily I perused this one and found an article on the battle of San Jacinto by John Walker called Eighteen Minutes to Freedom. It is a fairly well-written piece if one doesn't get sidelined by all the historical mistakes. As with every other author, Gen.Houston's iron 4-pounder cannon are mistakenly described as 6-pounders. Walker also implies that the two small artillery pieces were named the Twin Sisters by the soldiers of San Jacinto. Legends has it that the two cannon actually received their name enroute to the Texas republic on board the schooner Pennsylvania. They were definitely known as the Twin Sisters when Capt. John "Tampico" Allen took custody of them in late March '36 on the Texas coast. The author is also very confused about the calibre of the Mexican artillery at San Jacinto. On page 54, the single Mexican cannon is identified as a 12-pounder and then on page 57, the victorious Texans are said to have captured a 9-pounder. The research of Greg Dimmick and statements of Santa Anna and Caro lead me to believe that the Mexican cannon was really a 6-pounder.
The author also mistakenly locates the famous Vince's Bridge on Buffalo Bayou instead of the bridge's actual location on Sim's Bayou, where Allen Vince lived. It was near this spot that James A. Sylvester captured Gen. Santa Anna, but for some odd reason, the author gives this honor to Henry Wax Karnes and Deaf Smith.
A couple minor mistakes are the identification of a Thomas J. Rusk portrait as Sam Houston and the mispelling of Burnet's (Brunet's) Bay in a San Jacinto battleground map.
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Post by sloanrodgers on Sept 9, 2008 21:22:35 GMT -5
I reckon not. Alas the victory at San Jacinto just isn't as interesting as the defeat at the Alamo. Oh, well.
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Post by Wade Dillon on Sept 18, 2008 11:05:03 GMT -5
While I have not read that issue, Rod, San Jacinto greatly captures my interest. While I have yet to read "Sea of Mud" by Dimmick, I want to.
One of the tidbits I find interesting about the battle's aftermath was that General Manuel Castrillon's body was recovered by Lorenzo DeZavala and buried in the family cemetery. I understand that the family cemetery is now underwater.
~Wade
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Post by sloanrodgers on Sept 18, 2008 17:28:15 GMT -5
One of the tidbits I find interesting about the battle's aftermath was that General Manuel Castrillon's body was recovered by Lorenzo DeZavala and buried in the family cemetery. I understand that the family cemetery is now underwater. ~Wade The original de Zavala Cemetery was indeed submerged in the 1930s. Apparently some graves were disinterred and removed to the San Jacinto battlefield, but I don't know if Manuel Catrillon is buried in the new location or his grave marked.
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Post by Tom Nuckols on Mar 20, 2011 0:51:53 GMT -5
While I have yet to read "Sea of Mud" by Dimmick, I want to. I read "Sea of Mud" last week. It led me to want to pose questions to the members of this forum who have military experience and/or education. First, literally while I was reading "Sea," The Duke's '60's Alamo movie came on, including Richard Boone, as Houston, saying Alamo defenders were "buyng time" for his army to organize. Second, Dimmick's thesis in "Sea" is partly that SA's "cream of the crop" troops got whacked at SJ. That and the mud led Filisola (and most other generals) to conclude they should retreat to Matamoros. My questions to the militarily knowledgeble are (1) did the defenders' 3/6 stand buy militarily valuable time for Houston or was 3/6 a militarily insignificant act?, and (2) did SA's losses of "cream of the crop" trooops at the Alamo and SJ really justify Filisola's decision not to advance on the Texians after SJ?
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Post by Allen Wiener on Mar 20, 2011 7:56:39 GMT -5
I lack the kind of military knowledge you refer to, so I'll confine myself to your first question, and this is just my own view, not based on any military knowledge. I don't think the stand at the Alamo provided any help to Houston or the disorganized Texian army. The Mexicans had pretty much swept up all of the Texian forces by the time Fannin's men were wiped out. I don't think Houston had made much progress in organizing a military force, or of getting the various units in Texas to follow him. However, I do think the massacres at the Alamo and Goliad angered many long-term Texian colonists who had been sitting out the war up to that point. The "Runaway Scrape" was fueled both by fear and anger. The Alamo did provide more troops for Houston in that sense and thus contributed to the victory at San Jacinto.
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Post by Herb on Mar 20, 2011 11:36:04 GMT -5
Good questions.
The stand at the Alamo did provide some time, but there are two big "buts".
The first of these is the most significant, the time provided did allow a force to gather Gonzales, but Fannin's decision not to march, and Houston's frittering time away almost caused this to be a waste. Still when Houston faced Sesma across the Colorado (mid March) the two forces were roughly equal in strength. It was Houston's decision to retreat (after Fannin's surrender) that led to massive desertions and reduced the army to vastly inferior numbers again.
The second of these "buts", is that Santa Anna's forces were spread out over a vast time-space distance. He really could not have advanced from Bexar until at least the 1st Brigade had arrived there and while the lead units arrived on March 3rd, the whole Bde did not close Bexar until Mar 8.
It is a fact that Santa Anna's best units were captured/destroyed at San Jacinto to include all the regular battalions (minus the Jimenez and Zapadore Bns) that participated in the Alamo assault. Whether Filisolas decision to retreat was justifiable or not is extremely debatable. Dimmick's book is a great place to start.
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Post by Kevin Young on Mar 20, 2011 11:40:05 GMT -5
Good questions. The stand at the Alamo did provide some time, but there are two big "buts". The first of these is the most significant, the time provided did allow a force to gather Gonzales, but Fannin's decision not to march, and Houston's frittering time away almost caused this to be a waste. Still when Houston faced Sesma across the Colorado (mid March) the two forces were roughly equal in strength. It was Houston's decision to retreat (after Fannin's surrender) that led to massive desertions and reduced the army to vastly inferior numbers again. The second of these "buts", is that Santa Anna's forces were spread out over a vast time-space distance. He really could not have advanced from Bexar until at least the 1st Brigade had arrived there and while the lead units arrived on March 3rd, the whole Bde did not close Bexar until Mar 8. It is a fact that Santa Anna's best units were captured/destroyed at San Jacinto to include all the regular battalions (minus the Jimenez and Zapadore Bns) that participated in the Alamo assault. Whether Filisolas decision to retreat was justifiable or not is extremely debatable. Dimmick's book is a great place to start. I will agree with the above. The Wayne movie concept that the Alamo bought Houston time is a little basic--it certainly was a contributing factor. If, indeed, Houston's army at San Jacinto had only one good fight in them, the frustration of the retreat, and the anger of Alamo and Goliad, was enough to explode into a victory on April 21st.
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Post by Paul Sylvain on Mar 20, 2011 12:06:33 GMT -5
Think of the aftermath of 9/11, especially in the NY metro area. Everybody lost someone they knew as either friends, neighbors and possibly even family. Everybody puled together after the attacks, out of anger and so on. Not really much different after the Alamo and Goliad, in my mind. Gonzales was hard-hit by the losses, to be certain, but I'm guessing most of the Anglo population knew someone who was killed at either the Alamo or Goliad. They might not have been a well-trained or large army, but they were, well, pissed. The frustration of the "Runaway Scrape" and personal feelings about Houston's endless "retreat" were forgotten in those few minutes of what became San Jacinto.
I doubt that the Alamo bought much time for General Sam, and from my readings I recall that some of Santa Anna's commanders questioned their leader's decision to hunker down and commit to what essentially became a two-week siege, instead of keeping a smaller holding unit in Bexar and going after Houston outright. Maybe in that sense, it bought some time for Sam, but not enough to grow and whip an army of untrained souls into shape.
Paul
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Post by Hiram on Mar 20, 2011 17:04:43 GMT -5
My interpretation is that the siege and battle of the Alamo did not buy time specifically for Sam Houston, but it did allow positive material things to occur, primarily the formation of a new government and the beginnings of a new army. When he left W-O-B on the 6th of March, Houston was accompanied by only George Hockley, William Gordon Cooke, and three other men.
The US Army used to have a slogan, "Army of One." The point being that after the 13-day stand, Houston had an army of five.
Upon his arrival in Gonzalez five days later, Houston saw the 250-300 men who had been gathering to come to the aid of the Alamo garrison. Those men became the core of what would become in a sense, the 2nd Army of the Republic.
The three hundred had reacted to the messages that were coming out of the Alamo and the subsequent rumors. The army was beginning to form due to the actions in Bexar, not as result of anything that Houston had said or done. Yes, the events of the Alamo served as an inspiration as well as raising the ire of the people of Texas; but inspiration and a desire for vengeance can only get you so far, additionally there must be substantial gains made.
In retrospect, the stand at the Alamo was in some sense, a delaying action, but that was not the mission of the garrison. Their mission was to hold the line of defense until they were relieved of their duty or until a battle took place. They were not placing themselves in the path of the Mexican Army to be human speed bumps. What originally placed them in Bexar was the simple fact that they had enlisted in the Army, had sworn an oath to serve, and were driven by their convictions to stand for what they believed in.
The Alamo garrison was sacrificed as a result of the inability of the government to overcome political in-fighting and a complete lack of a cohesive military strategy. Ironically, the military defeats at Bexar and Goliad forced the government to unite and gave the military a singular focus, which led to ultimate victory.
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Post by stuart on Mar 21, 2011 1:43:36 GMT -5
As regards the first part of the question, as I've argued before the Alamo didn't buy any time at all. Santa Anna's initial objective was the recapture of Bexar and he achieved that by a forced march over the mountains and prairies to get there on February 23 long before he was expected, but the price was leaving a substantial part of his army strung out way behind him. He also needed to be sure of Urrea, so I don't see him being held up by the Alamo. He stormed it (a) because a Centralist victory had become a political imperative, and (b) because with the last of his army (and guns) at last closing up he was wanted to be ready to move as soon as they got there.
As to Fannin, to be fair to him, he was as he admitted himself no military genius, but his refusal to march referred to by Wolfpack above was simply down to timing. Having been warned by the survivors from San Patricio and Agua Dulce that Urrea was coming he was already making preparations to pull out. Unfortunately when Houston's orders arrived a lot of his men were down at Refugio trying to evacuate some Anglo settlers and he therefore delayed his retreat because he obviously couldn't abandon them. As it happens Urrea had got them, but it was waiting (in vain) for their return that fatally delayed Fannin's retreat rather than a failure to obey orders.
As to the rest...?
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Post by Hiram on Mar 21, 2011 10:41:40 GMT -5
One of the reasons that Santa Anna chose to storm the Alamo was that the alternative would be to leave the enemy in the middle of their supply lines, which would make sustainment of the campaign extremely difficult.
And now, the most obvious of points. If the enemy (in this case, the rebels) do not have the common courtesy to come see you, and you want to defeat them, then you have to go see them.
Goliad and Bexar were the two largest insurgent garrisons in Texas. Both sat on major trails, both had been held and previously lost by the Mexican Army, and both had to be retaken. The garrison were trying to buy time for themselves when they retreated into the Alamo. It was a voluntary siege, meaning they did not try to engage the vanguard in Bexar on the 23rd.
More often than not; delay favors defense. If you wait long enough, the defense will strengthen itself. There is no coincidence in terms of the arrival of the Mexican reinforcements on March 3 and the assault three days later.
On a somewhat related topic, I place no military value on the intelligence allegedly gathered from two Mexican women. I can't envision Santa Anna taking information from two women and using that information as a reason to assault.
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Post by Tom Nuckols on Mar 22, 2011 0:15:37 GMT -5
1. What would've happened if the 300 mustered at Gonzalez and/or the 400 stationed at Goliad, rather than going east, had marched west and arrived at Bexar by March 5th? What would they have done? Hole up in the Alamo? Attack SA in Bexar? Something else? What are the likely scenarios?
2. What of the theory that Houston's flight east was calculated to lure SA onto disputed territory so the U.S. Army under Gen. Gaines would have a Jackson-blessed excuse to join the fray from Louisiana?
Regardless of Houston's motivation, it strikes me that SA's defeat by a militarily inferior force resulted from him not only risking his best troops on catching the fleeing government, but also making the basic military error of stretching his supply lines too thin. Why would he do either? Maybe because he didn't have the money to do otherwise? If his government had appropriated funds for ships and materiel, he could've kept his army properly supplied in the field. He wouldn't have had to overextend supply lines or resort to risky moves. But the government either didn't or couldn't finance a proper war. SA realized limited resources left him with only one shot at winning it: To drive east very far and very fast. He overextended his supply lines and gambled his best troops and because he had to fight this war on the cheap. Which is not to deny the valor of the Texians because they had to fight it even cheaper.
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Post by stuart on Mar 22, 2011 15:02:01 GMT -5
I think that to understand properly what happened at San Jacinto you need to take a step back and look at the mess Sam Houston had actually got himself into.
As I've remarked before Santa Anna was like a lot of the Spanish generals in the Peninsular War who would lead their men in quite incredible forced marches over all sorts of inhospitable terrain to turn up like the Devil at prayers and then fumble what could have been a victory, often because their men were exhausted.
In this case, by the hard marching he's so often criticised for, he had Houston exactly where he wanted him. Take a look at a map. Houston can't go anywhere except into Buffalo Bayou. Sure he can get some away on the ferry, but not his whole army. He has to stand and fight there. Santa Anna on the other hand can afford to wait for the rest of his forces to catch up because there's no point in mounting an immediate frontal assault - the Americans aint going anywhere.
Conversely they need to attack simply because a defensive battle is likely to get them killed - or drowned.
Now remembering the Alamo and Goliad might be a suitable way of getting them all fired up and they certainly didn't forget them after the battle was won, but the ferocity of the attack that won the battle was driven by the visceral fact that they had to win or die.
Now reel this back to consider a battle on the Colorado or any of the other positions Houston supposedly favoured before running for the border. He had men, but they weren't as well armed or as well trained as they were after the halt at Groce's and if they had clear country rather than the Buffalo Bayou at their backs would they necessarily have stood and fought so well?
I aint saying they wouldn't, but its a question that's wide open. Things turned out the way they did due to a particular combination of factors. Remove any one of them from the equation and there could be a completely different result. What, for example if Santa Anna had his whole force up with him on April 20 - and attacked?
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Post by sloanrodgers on Mar 22, 2011 18:40:30 GMT -5
Good questions. The stand at the Alamo did provide some time, but there are two big "buts". The first of these is the most significant, the time provided did allow a force to gather Gonzales, but Fannin's decision not to march, and Houston's frittering time away almost caused this to be a waste. Still when Houston faced Sesma across the Colorado (mid March) the two forces were roughly equal in strength. It was Houston's decision to retreat (after Fannin's surrender) that led to massive desertions and reduced the army to vastly inferior numbers again. The second of these "buts", is that Santa Anna's forces were spread out over a vast time-space distance. He really could not have advanced from Bexar until at least the 1st Brigade had arrived there and while the lead units arrived on March 3rd, the whole Bde did not close Bexar until Mar 8. It is a fact that Santa Anna's best units were captured/destroyed at San Jacinto to include all the regular battalions (minus the Jimenez and Zapadore Bns) that participated in the Alamo assault. Whether Filisolas decision to retreat was justifiable or not is extremely debatable. Dimmick's book is a great place to start. Good points, but I don't know how "massive" the desertions were during the retreat. It seems to me that there were a good number of available Anglo and Hispanic men, who decided to remain neutral in the conflict, then simply fled as the Mexican Army approached. When a government and general can't get or keep men, a war sometimes devolves into an evasive campaign and light cannon become much more important against a superior force. Houston and Santa Anna might have had their Waterloo on another river, if Bill Wharton had gotten off his butt and retrieved the various field pieces he was tasked to acquire in early April. A lot of unforeseen events transpired on the trail to victory. I bet Houston and most novice generals wish they had more foresight before making tough decisions. especially when it comes obtaining arms and supplies.
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