New Custer Book

[Allen Wiener]

Read on and you'll find answers to these questions. I think the major cause was the last item you raised - the difference in the caliber of men the army was recruiting, the lack of a real cause, which the Civil War had provided, and continual cuts in the military budget (just imagine!). Custer hadn't really changed, but his troops and officers had. Both Benteen and Reno hated him, particularly Benteen, who was competent but a really devious character. Reno was just plain incompetent and a drunkard by the time of the LBH. I also think Custer was bored without a military mission. Ironically, the man really seemed to be a warrior by nature, just as many of his Sioux enemies were. I believe that Stephen Ambrose wrote a book called "Custer and Crazy Horse" that may have made these kinds of comparisons between the two men.

I came away believing that Custer has received something of a bad rap by history, which may have started with the Reno court of inquiry, where the survivors of LBH decided to blame it all on the dead Custer rather than besmearch themselves or superiors who might retaliate once they were back at their posts out west. Custer made some bad mistakes at the LBH, but he was not the hateful Indian killer or monster that he has often been made out to be, particularly by Hollywood. In fact, there may be more of the real Custer in the old Errol Flynn movie than in other Hollywood treatments (and also many inaccuracies). The man did not lack courage, never shied away from a fight (which cannot be said of all of his subordinates), seemed to relish battle and saw his mission as simply a military operation that had to be carried out. He doesn't seem to have held any animosity toward the Indians, but saw them as opponents who had to be out manuvered and elminated as a threat.

The caliber of the cavalry, and maybe the whole army, declined after the Civil War and the lack of seasoning, training, discipline or perhaps motivation on the part of the troops showed at the LBH and later at Wounded Knee. Sadly, both tragedies were avoidable.

AW

[TRK]

Jun 1, 2008 17:20:16 GMT -5 Allen Wiener said:

I always come away from books on this topic wondering why some more peaceful way could not have been found to deal with the Plains Indians; why some part of the vast lands out there, much still unoccupied today, could not have been reserved for them.

In the 1870s, when the Indian wars in the United States were ratcheting up, the Canadians formulated a simple strategy that turned out to be a winner. Unlike their neighbors to the south, they honored the treaties they signed with the Indians and enforced the terms fairly. That included interdicting encroachment by settlers on Indian lands. It's telling that the Canadians enforced the treaties and managed to avoid getting into a wholesale war with the tribes using a relatively small force of Royal Canadian Mounted Police.

[Herb]

Jun 1, 2008 20:03:15 GMT -5 Jim Boylston said:

I finished Donovan's book and found it very engaging and informative. Several things struck me as significant: the lack of training or seasoning of the troops, the difference in their attitude toward Custer and the way his men had respected him during the Civil War; the bad blood among the officers in the Seventh.

I just got my copy and have only read the first 100 pages or so, but I'm curious as to the reason for what seems like a major attitude change for Custer toward his men after the Civil War.
Was the change due to the over-all environment? Was Custer so bored during peace time that he was overly harsh, or was it the change in the rank and file after the war?

I totally disagree with Allen on the difference of the quality of the men. Let's not forget, that by the end of the Civil War, the men primarily serving especially in the Army of the Potomic were largely draftees - at a time where it was very easy to avoid, and recent immigrants literally recruited right off the boat whether they could speak English or not. NOW the makeup of the western Union armies were considerably different - as was their fighting prowess, but Custer fought in the East - the material of 1876 was not significantly different from that of 1865.

Nor was Custer that different, in 1876. What was different totally was the situation, he no longer comanded an abuntantly supplied and well supported division surrounded by two other divisions and a Regular Brigade, with a whole army to fall back onto. He commanded a regiment, ill equipped, by Civil War standards and totally independent and unsupported. In 1865, he told his regimental commanders what he wanted done and they did it, in 1876 he was the man responsible for the regiment, a very vast difference and one that he repeatedly failed at, imo, throughout his period of de facto command of the 7th. IF, I'm not mistaken, the 7th is the only regiment he ever commanded, having jumped from company level duties, to staff duties, to Brigade Command and then Division Command.

There is a very significant difference between higher levels of command and lower levels of command (Regiment and below).
At Regiment and below the commander is responsible for the training and discipline of his men and is also more a leader than a commander. At higher echeclons, the commander is just that, a commander directing the activities of his subordinate commanders and his staff. The difference is significant. Custer obviously suceeded at the higher level during the Civil War, but his only true experience at the lower level was with the 7th. And, after having 10 years to shape the unit, I feel strongly based on its perforamance at the LBH, Custer failed miserably.

I'm not faulting Custer's command decisions leading up to LBH, given the situation, I think his decisons were fundamentally sound - up until he turned away from Reno.

[Allen Wiener]

I was only summarizing what I took Donovan's point to be. I don't think Donovan explained the distinction between western and eastern armies during the Civil War. He did mention several times the cutbacks in military budgets and the reduction in the size of forces.

I wonder how much that had to do with what happened at LBH; would the outcome likely have been different? Could a much larger force carry out the kind of mission Custer was on at the time, given the terrain, logistics and resultant travel problems (he couldn't even keep his pack train moving fast enough and hauling artillery was another problem). Or, had Terry and Gibbon arrived before Custer attacked or if Custer had simply delayed his attack to the next day. Donovan's account indicates that the Seventh had been detected by the group of Indians who Reno was then sent to persue, so they would have alerted the village if they hadn't been persued, thus depriving the Seventh of surprise. However, even with the element of surprise, they got walloped.

What is your opinion of Donovan's assessment of the 3 main figures (Custer, Reno, Benteen)? He doesn't seem to play the blame game all that much, but Reno clearly comes out as the worst of the 3.

AW

[Herb]

I got interrupted by a phone call before I completed my last post so there's some additions.

I think Donovan's assessment of Benteen is dead on. The man should have been courtmartialed for dereliction of duty and willful disobedience, and negligence. Clearly Benteen's leadership is all that kept the largest portion of the Regiment from total collapse, but does that absolve him from his failures? Donovan's skirts over his negligence, but to me this was particularly galling, allowing his men to sleep instead of digging in the night of the 25th, as a result of his "kindness" his soldiers suffered grievous causalities the next day.

I think Donovan's assessment of Reno is overly harsh, before the retreat from the woods. Up until that time, Reno, had performed properly and despite apparently taking a few drinks from his flask was in control. Reno from that point on conducts himself disreputably, and appears very much to have been drunk.

Custer, Donovan is overly generous in his assessment of Custer, imho. Custer's decision making on the campaign makes military sense given the situation up until he turned away from Reno, and Donovan does a good job showing that. However let's look at the Regiment that Cuter trained and organized. Custer banned the battalion/wing organization that the Regiment had used since it left Ft Lincoln, when he began the movement up the Rosebud. This left Reno without a job, and except for his aide, no staff (especially no bugler) likewise Benteen was reduced from Wing Commander to just commanding his company. Likewise the previous Battalion Commanders, Yates, Keogh, and possibly (Moylan and Wier) were back to Company Commanders. In addition, according to Donovan Custer chose to use his brother Tom as an aide, and left C Company under the command of a green 2LT. On the 25th, Custer had detailed a number of the company buglers as enlisted orderlies to him.

When Custer directed Benteen to split off to the south, Benteen, Custer directed him to take half of his old wing as a battalion command. This order made sense, in that they were people that had operated under Benteen for most of the campaign, and was in keeping with Terry's instructions to keep the Indians from moving South.

When Custer directed Reno to charge off after the Indians, instead of giving Reno troops from Reno's old wing, he gave him the other Battalion from Benteen's wing. Custer had previously relegated Reno jobless, and Reno was very clearly on the outside of Custer's decision making and intent. Reno had to move up on the fly take command of a battalion he had not commanded at during this campaign and execute an attack all on very short notice. Reno had no bugler, and we know at a minimum neither did G Company of this battalion.

When Custer turned off from Reno, let's look at the situation. The regiment had been following a very large village for days, and they knew it lay just in front of them, and they believed surprise had been lost. From the camp circles they knew they were facing at least a 1000 warriors. Gibbon's and Terry are operating to the north and should only be a day or so away. The big concern militarily is that the village will scatter and prolong the campaign. The Regiment is approaching from the east Benteen is operating to the South, Crow Territory, enemies to the Sioux, is to the West.

The decision to turn off from Reno isn't just dumb, it's criminally stupid. Your facing at least a 1000, alert (you believe) warriors, and you sent a force of little over 100 men to attack them? While you take a force a little over 200 men to do what? Your best bet is to attack with the probable 350 men and try and drive the Indians downriver toward Terry.

Of course, this is where the bill for Custer's failure to properly train, and organize the regiment comes due. Reno without buglers can't get his orders across and is directing a single company, G, instead of a battalion; officers instead of directing their companies in combat are engaging in shooting contests; C Company (led by a green 2LT, instead of it's battle hardened two time Medal-of-Honor winner, Company Commader) collapses in panic and apparently swamps the defenders on Calhoun Hill and spreads panic throughout Custer's wing. Custer rides off with Yates' Battalion of only two companies in what is at best a very questionable operation.

Don't get me wrong, I think Donovan has written an excellent book, and after all the Custer bashing of recent years, he deserves some credit. But, Donovan in trying to make Reno more culpable, has glossed over some of what Custer did that was questionable.

MacKenzie's attack on Dull Knife's village that Donovan cites as why Reno's attack should have succeeded, was with the entire 4th Cavalry not three companies, and was a very near run thing, and Carr's attack in the 1860 s bears more similarities to Mackenzie then Reno!

JMO! ;D

[Allen Wiener]

Herb, you bring a level of expertise to this, and institutional memory, that I just don't have. Thanks for posting your take on this book. I have to agree about Benteen. This is one of several Custer books I've read and I've always wondered about Benteen. For a guy who was so ticked off at Custer for "abandoning" men at Washita, he sure seemed willing to play with the lives of the men with Custer at LBH.

Donovan clearly paints a very negative picture of Reno, but I think you have a point about his carrying out the orders Custer gave him in pursuing the Indians into the camp. Given what a non-plan it was, Reno did the best he could at that point, but I also must agree that he totally fell apart once the troops had to fall back. I honestly cannot tell if the there was any chance for his small unit to hold their position in the woods, but given the initial accounts of the participants, it does not seem so. The withdrawl could have been far more orderly and many lives would have been saved had Reno kept his head and acted resposibly.

I think my impression of the Custer non-plan is in keeping with what you are saying here. He just seemed to do this one by the seat of the pants, with minimal (or no) communication with his other 2 units after he'd split the force up. I can only imagine what might have happened if he had kept the entire force together and attacked from one point. The Indians were already surprised and, from Donovan's account, suffered more casualties than I'd realized from earlier accounts. Custer was just too hasty and too willing to gamble that day. He really didn't know how large the village was or how many Indians were there, although his scouts gave him plenty of warning. I think he operated in something of a pre-conceived haze, believing that he could rout the Indians by attacking at the opposite end from Reno and creating chaos and panic in the Village. But it was the cavalry that ended up in panic and being routed. I can't argue with any of your criticisms of Custer and his short-sightedness, which seemed to set the stage for what played out.

AW

[Allen Wiener]

Jun 2, 2008 9:09:45 GMT -5 TRK said:

In the 1870s, when the Indian wars in the United States were ratcheting up, the Canadians formulated a simple strategy that turned out to be a winner. Unlike their neighbors to the south, they honored the treaties they signed with the Indians and enforced the terms fairly. That included interdicting encroachment by settlers on Indian lands. It's telling that the Canadians enforced the treaties and managed to avoid getting into a wholesale war with the tribes using a relatively small force of Royal Canadian Mounted Police.

I have only a vague notion of the differences between U.S. and Canadian behavior toward Indians, but this was my general understanding. Before I retired I dealt with both Mexico and Canada on international transportation issues. The Canadians never failed to bring up their obligations to their "first nations," often to the consternation of the U.S. side, who had little patience with this. It came up repeatedly in our negotiations over the St. Lawrence Seaway and I think I was the only person on the U.S. side who did not regard this as a joke or a diplomatic ruse by the Canadians. It showed the historic difference in attitudes toward Indians on both sides; the Canadians were really serious about this. Whatever agreements they had made with the tribes, they felt duty bound to uphold them.

AW

[Herb]

Jun 2, 2008 19:53:17 GMT -5 Allen Wiener said:

Jun 2, 2008 9:09:45 GMT -5 TRK said:

In the 1870s, when the Indian wars in the United States were ratcheting up, the Canadians formulated a simple strategy that turned out to be a winner. Unlike their neighbors to the south, they honored the treaties they signed with the Indians and enforced the terms fairly. That included interdicting encroachment by settlers on Indian lands. It's telling that the Canadians enforced the treaties and managed to avoid getting into a wholesale war with the tribes using a relatively small force of Royal Canadian Mounted Police.

I have only a vague notion of the differences between U.S. and Canadian behavior toward Indians, but this was my general understanding. Before I retired I dealt with both Mexico and Canada on international transportation issues. The Canadians never failed to bring up their obligations to their "first nations," often to the consternation of the U.S. side, who had little patience with this. It came up repeatedly in our negotiations over the St. Lawrence Seaway and I think I was the only person on the U.S. side who did not regard this as a joke or a diplomatic ruse by the Canadians. It showed the historic difference in attitudes toward Indians on both sides; the Canadians were really serious about this. Whatever agreements they had made with the tribes, they felt duty bound to uphold them.

AW

Before we give the Canadians too much credit let's keep in mind they dealt with a totally different situation. Their country was far less densely populated and there was no signigicant westward push by the population, not, until the gold strikes in the Yukon at the turn of the century.

While the Great Sioux War of 1876-77, did begin as a deliberate attempt by a corrupt administration to subvert exsisting treaties, and while the circumstances were far from unique neither were they universal in the US history. The Wars in the Southern Plains, (Kansas, Colorado, and Texas) were far different and get very little attention.

[Allen Wiener]

There were clear differences in U.S. policy during different eras. Washington tried to deal fairly with the tribes, largely at the urging of Knox, and attempted a policy that would recognize their sovereignty over specified lands. The problem was one of unequal treatment, since white Americans would never accept Indian preemption rights to any land that they wanted. 19the Century Americans believed they had a right to whatever land they settled or built on. The government might grant nominal legal rights to Indian groups, but when push came to shove would not recognize Indian rights to enforce laws or punish white violators in their own territory. The same was decidedly NOT true if Indians committed crimes against whites, in which cases the U.S. claimed the right to punish the perpetrators. Even if the government was serious in its intention to grant Indians sovereignty, the public would never tolerate it and the politicians had to give in. Combine that with the justification provided by "Manifest Destiny" and a belief in the superiority of white Christians over "savages" and there wasn't much hope for the Indians.

There were exceptions where some Indian groups did get a better deal and still live on some of their traditional lands today (upstate New York comes to mind). The early policies may have been more generous because there was still genuine fear of large scale Indian war on the frontier, and the early government may really have wanted to deal fairly with the tribes. That changed pretty quickly as land was either bought, coerced or just plain stolen to make room for whites, who would not live among Indians and wanted them out. This was partly racism and partly just plain greed for Indian land and its resources. Jackson's policy of removal had actually been contemplated by Jefferson, Monroe and J. Q. Adams too, but they never followed through. Jackson did, and just did barely get his Indian Removal Bill through Congress (with Crockett notably the only westerner voting against it).

AW

[Paul Sylvain]

If you want some insight into the Plains Tribes' way of life, including the Lakota and Northern Cheyenne encampment at the Little Big Horn (or "the Greasy Grass," as the Lakota call it) in June 1876, check out "The Day the World Ended at Little Bighorn: A Lakota History", by Joseph M. Marshall III. We don't give much thought to the logistics of maintaining a camp that size in food, water, adequate grazing for what was a huge pony herd, and so on. Marshall even goes into great detail about the size of the lodgings, and how a camp could be moved in minutes. The section on the actual fight is but a small part of this book, which goes beyond the battle to Wounded Knee. It's an excellent read, filled with insights from someone who grew up with the Lakota and heard the stories told, as they still are, in the oral tradition of the Lakota.

I have several books by Marshall, including "The Journey Of Crazy Horse: A Lakota History", which is an excellend biography about the oft-misunderstood Tasanka Uitco (or Witco) -- Crazy Horse.

Reading through these posts, I find it difficult to believe claims of a prolonged engagement lasting 2 1/2 hours. From the account of the Lakota, who said the main battle with Cuter's column last the amount of time it takes the sun to travel between two lodge poles, it amounted to about 40 minutes.

The Little Big Horn engagement was actually three battles, begiining with the so-called river fight, when Reno attacked the edge of the encampment. There was the so-called hilltop fight, where Reno and Benteen fought and survived. And there was the main battle which cost Custer the companies of men who rode with him.

Two historical events have fascinated me since childhood: The Alamo and the Battle of the Greasy Grass ("Custer's Last Stand", which wasn't a stand at all, as much as it was a rout), both for different reasons.

The figure of Custer is intriguing, but I can't help but feel he reaped his just rewards at the hands of a People he had little regard or respect for. The Battle of the Washita was not so much of a battle as it was a misguided attack on an encampment of Southern Cheyenne led by Chief Black Kettle, who brokered peace treaties in the past, and was still attempting to work for peace. His was a peaceful camp.

There were other tribes spread out in the winter camps along the Washita, and some of the camps contained more war-hungry members. Black Kettle was an outcast because of his signing other treaties, and so his camp was some distance from the others. Custer's scouts followed tracks from a hunting party to Black Kettle's camp, decided they were from a war party, and rode in at first light on a bitterly cold morning, shooting up women and children. He burned all their lodges with their winter food and clothes, shot all their horse (hundreds of them), and hauled off 50-something women and kids to an army post.

Custer was also responsible for stirring up the gold fever in the then-treaty-protected sacred grounds of the Black Hills. There was no love for Custer, but ironically, the tribes gathered at Little Big Horn did not know Custer was leading this group of soldiers until the fight was over, or nearly so.

The encampment on the LBH was the result of a call by Sitting Bull to all the tribes earlier in the year to meet and discuss what to do about continued white encroachment in their land, and the resulting thinning of the buffalo herds. It was Custer's bad luck to ride into the largest such gathering of Plains Tribes ever, at least that time.

Government policy was always about land, and how to take it away from the indigenous peoples. Many tribes suffered at the hands of the government, but perhaps none have suffered more than the Lakota. Wounded Knee, at the hands of a reconstituted 7th Calvary, is one case in point. The treatment of the survivors of this noble tribe reservations like Pine Ridge is a national disgrace that few Americans are even aware of.

IMO the Lakota have never stopped paying for the sin of fighting to defend their women and children when it was attacked by Custer, and for trying to preserve their way of life. They -- the tribes gathered at Little Big Horn that summer day in 1876 -- remembered the Washita and similar events, like Sand Creek, all too well. They were determined to not let it happen again.

No one will ever say the United States had a formal program of ethnic cleansing, but it's hard to deny that our own government used every means possible to rid the land of indigenous peoples. If there ever was a great American tragedy, this is it.

[Herb]

Timelines can be tricky things, part of the problem is what exactly are people talking about, and the other is the time compression people experince under adrenline. The longer time line includes the skirmishing that only involved some small parties of Indians, ie Custer with Keogh's Bn firing in support from the Nye-Cartwright Ridge as Yate's Bn approached the Medicine Tail Ford.

It was that action that got the Indian's attention, and is probably the initial volley firing heard at Reno Hill. From when Custer moved off the ridges and joined Yates at Calhoun Hill there doesn't seem to ba much more then some skirmishing going on. However, from the time from that initial volley fire the uniting of the commands, and their eventual splitting again a pretty good portion of time elapsed. But, from when Tom Custer's company broke in panic, to the final end, I don't think there is any doubt that the fighting lasted more then 40 minutes if that long.

Some of this is relativily easy to reconstruct simply figuring how long it takes to cover the known distances from point to point.

[Herb]

I'm hesitant to buy into simple solutions, such as Wounded Knee, was the result of the 7th Cavalry taking revenge.

Part of it, is personal experience, people with loaded weapons, acting out of fear, can rapidly escalate a tense moment into a tragedy. Both sides that morning were operating out of fear and prejudice. Speaking as a former soldier, once shots were fired, by whoever in that environment, it would have required iron discipline and great and determined leadership to have prevented what ended up happening. It sounds simple, but it's far from it.

Fear will kick in the drive for self preservation even if the situation doesn't fully justify it.

[Paul Sylvain]

Aug 17, 2008 21:34:36 GMT -5 Herb said:

I'm hesitant to buy into simple solutions, such as Wounded Knee, was the result of the 7th Cavalry taking revenge.

Part of it, is personal experience, people with loaded weapons, acting out of fear, can rapidly escalate a tense moment into a tragedy. Both sides that morning were operating out of fear and prejudice. Speaking as a former soldier, once shots were fired, by whoever in that environment, it would have required iron discipline and great and determined leadership to have prevented what ended up happening. It sounds simple, but it's far from it.

Fear will kick in the drive for self preservation even if the situation doesn't fully justify it.

I'm not trying to imply anything like a simple solution to any of this. Most events, such as Wounded Knee, is a culmination of things. Even now, more than a century later, there are differing opinions as to which side fired the shot that literally triggered that. But you can't disregard the possibility of some long, lingering hate towards the Indians by the 7th. I don't think it would tak much provocation.

On the other point, timelines are hard to establish. From my readings, the only real stab at a true skirmish line from the companies with Custer was the first group (was that Keough's men? I'd have to recheck my books), as they were eventually overrun by Gall and his warriors, the rest was said to be a rout, with a second command, and then Custers group on Last Stand Hill. Much of this is traceable by cartridge shells and the like found on the battlefield, and traceable to specific weapons.

I've seen some pretty good forensic research based on the fires there in the '80s, strongly suggesting there was much of a fight at the end, and Custer's group was taken out pretty quickly. Was it 40 minutes from the first encounter with Gall to Custer's group falling? Who, knows? But I doubt it was more than an hour, and certainly not two or two-and-a-half.

[Allen Wiener]

As I recall, Custer met little resistence at first because most of the warriors were occupied with Reno and the other end of the camp. I'm trying to recall -- but it seemed that the Indians were still focusing on Reno when they got word of the attack at the other end of camp by Custer. They then broke off the attack on Reno, which may have been key to his survival, and moved toward Custer. As the size of the Indian force rapidly increased around Custer, the ability to make any sort of stand quickly diminished until it became a rout. How long all this took is problematic, but I think Wolf is right; by matching up the times from when Reno first heard shots from Custer's position, calculating how long it took the warriors to rush to from Reno's positon to Custer's, and recreatig the rapid collapse of Custer's units, a pretty clear idea of the total time is possible. It couldn't have been too long; I think one Indian said the whole thing was over in the time it takes a healthy man to eat his dinner.

Going back over the posts on this tread, I've come around to Herb's view of Custer being largely responsible for this disaster. He didn't respect the Indians, had very weak intelligence, haphazardly seemed to have split up his command, the size of the enemy force never seemed to register with him, his "plan" lacked coherence and seemed "seat of the pants" from the start. Factor in his depending too blindly on two officers he knew were either of questionable ability or who hated him and this looks like a disaster waiting to happen. I realize this is thumbnail, but it's how the thing comes back to me now.

That's an interesting point about the mutual fear and mistrust, as well as hatred, at Wounded Knee. Given the cavalry's track record, you can't fault the Indians for trying to stash some weapons or for being wary of U.S. inentions. I seem to recall some of that 7th Cavalry later admitting they had it in for this particular group of Indians as they associated them with Custer's defeat, but they also had been plalced is something like an alert position, as if they might expect fire from the Indians at any moment. Another badly handled disaster. In fact, the entire history of U.S.-Indian relations is kind of like that. It's hard to summarize something like that, because it played out over a couple hundred years in many territories with many tribes, leaders, local political and military factors and so on. But, in the end, after many years of reading this stuff, I concluded that whites just didn't want to share the land with Indians or live among them. There was a healthy amount of racism, to be sure, but a stronger desire to clear Indians off the land and obtain it and its resources for the "advancement of civiliaztion" (yeah - there was plenty of propaganda too; "Manifest Destiny" and all that).

AW

[Paul Sylvain]

Some of you folks might find this column I wrote in June for my home-town newspaper interesting. It kind of puts a New England face on the Greasy Grass/Little Big Horn battle.

I stumbled on the 7th Cavalry muster list, and went from there. Interesting how many folks were on other details, or on sick call. Turns out these were the lucky ones.

And, being a New Hampshire boy, I was surprised at the number of troopers from New Hampshire and all the New England states, who were involved in this. We normally just think of Custer, Reno, and the other big names, but the deaths of these men touched people in all corners of the U.S., much as major events like 9/11 do today. Those that survived it, carried the experience with them for the rest of their lives.

Hope you like the column. I write a regular column that is published the second Sunday of every month in the Telegraph (Nashua, N.H.). Here's the link for the June column:

www.nashuatelegraph.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20080608/COLUMNISTS29/556009363

Enjoy!

Paul