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Post by loucapitano on Nov 3, 2014 17:51:59 GMT -5
Rich, it sounds like a piece of cake to me too. Then I began to wonder why did Santa Anna make such an effort to breach the North wall? Couldn't he have simply feinted the main attack with his 1400 men? Instead, he thrust his columns directly at the walls with axes and ladders where they bore the brunt of the casualties (from front and rear.) I agree that Morales's men fought as skirmishers, and may have been the tipping point for success entering the compound. Then again, Santa Anna may have wanted the "glory" of a Napoleonic assault on those hated Americano pirates. Morales, as a good commander, judged his situation and made the most use of his force. I don't think Santa Anna had that type of foresight and military skill. Hopefully, more food for thought. I love these discussions. Lou from Long Island
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Post by Jim Boylston on Nov 3, 2014 18:35:56 GMT -5
Rich, it sounds like a piece of cake to me too. Then I began to wonder why did Santa Anna make such an effort to breach the North wall? Couldn't he have simply feinted the main attack with his 1400 men? Instead, he thrust his columns directly at the walls with axes and ladders where they bore the brunt of the casualties (from front and rear.) I agree that Morales's men fought as skirmishers, and may have been the tipping point for success entering the compound. Then again, Santa Anna may have wanted the "glory" of a Napoleonic assault on those hated Americano pirates. Morales, as a good commander, judged his situation and made the most use of his force. I don't think Santa Anna had that type of foresight and military skill. Hopefully, more food for thought. I love these discussions. Lou from Long Island Remember, though, that most of the attacker's casualties came from the Toluca Battalion, which took a direct hit. Other than that, the assault force got "under the guns" quickly enough to render the artillery all but useless. I think this went according to plan. I don't think Santa Anna was a military genius, but he was competent enough to get this particular job done. Throwing forces at the north wall wasn't as reckless as it seems. That long expanse didn't provide for enfilading fire and was relatively less dangerous once "under the guns." The eastern and southern fronts were more deadly, with the area in front of the palisade being the most obvious killing ground. The area to the immediate west wasn't really large enough to stage attack troops because of the river.
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Post by Herb on Nov 3, 2014 20:40:21 GMT -5
Some things to think about.
"Accurate" musket fire range is about 40 yards, a trained man can fire 3-4 times a minute. Effective rifle range at that time was about 200 yards for the average shooter. Reload times are slower than a musket. Cannon would generally fire roundshot at ranges greater than 300 yards, canister at closer ranges. Reload times were about a minute for an 8/9 pounder z little less for a smaller pieces, a little more for larger ones. Roundshot that hits a unit deployed in line will take out 1 or 2 files or about 2-6 men. Properly fired canister could take out most of a company rank say 20 men. A formed unit as it marched forward before it "charged" would cover about 100 yards a minute. The actual "charge" wouuld usually be launched 20 - 50 yards from the enemy.
The attack columns took up positions close to the walls about 5:00 AM according to Filisola (1836 times adjusted to modern Central Time). These positions may have been as close as 100 yards (long musket shot) but were certainly not further than 400 yards. Morales men got within 20 yards of the SW corner undetected.
When the bugles sounded, the main columns were at the most 5 minutes from the wall. Morales' men were only a mad dash from throwing up their ladders and scaling the SW corner.
If you figure a standard artillery crew of 5 men for the 15 perimeter cannon,75 of the approximate 200 man garrison were manning the artillery. 20 men (Battle of Bexar wounded, doctor(s), Bowie) were in the hospital, leaving only 100 - 105 riflemen to defend the walls. IF you start doling out the riflemen to the North Wall, cattle pen, West Wall, Main Gate, etc. and assume every defender reached his alert position before the Mexicans reached the walls (an unsafe assumption) you are probably looking at a maximum of 15 defenders in the SW corner - 5 artillerymen 10 riflemen opposing the 100 - 120 Cazadores. Given the small distance this force had to cover, these defenders probably had only one rifle shot and NO cannon shots before they were engaged in close combat with the Mexicans scaling the walls.
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Post by sgtstryker53 on Nov 4, 2014 7:41:31 GMT -5
"So Morales' column (by comparison to the north columns) was like the "special forces" of the day. So, wouldn't they have been used as the key to capturing the fort? Only 100 plus men (crack troopers) vs. 1400 massed noise-makers. 1) Lots of attack noise on the north half of the fort. 2) Defenders run "to the sound of the guns." 3) The crack elite cazadores pick their moment and scale the walls, taking out the gun crew at the 18-pounder. Seems like a plan -- and a piece of cake -- to me."
Another reason for attacking in the dark. Makes sense to me.
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Post by Jim Boylston on Nov 4, 2014 12:23:48 GMT -5
Given the small distance this force had to cover, these defenders probably had only one rifle shot and NO cannon shots before they were engaged in close combat with the Mexicans scaling the walls. Add to that the possibility that Santa Anna knew that the 18 pounder was out of action anyway (dismounted, according to one report) and the SW corner becomes not only an important, but a very vulnerable target.
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Post by Rich Curilla on Nov 4, 2014 19:54:58 GMT -5
We are certainly figuring right by giving the Mexican commanders the benefit of a doubt about their having been able to think this through very well, but what about the Texians. They must have done some thinking and speculating and planning since March 3rd. when Travis wrote the last report (extant). Are we giving them enough credit? They could have anticipated various approaches on the part of the Mexicans and had alternate plans available, even though they were severely limited. With organization and quick communication, it would have taken less than a minute to run the length of the fort to meet a new need.
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Post by Herb on Nov 4, 2014 20:48:11 GMT -5
Rich, I'm sure Travis adjusted his defenses as the siege went on. The problem is he just didn't have the numbers to shift around that large a perimeter or the time on March 6th and then don't forget he was heavily involved and probably killed early in the battle.
I did some speculative placing of the defenders assuming that Travis did do some pre battle adjustments. Basically, every man in the Alamo was fixed in their position by the Mexican attack except the men at the palisade (I figure 5 riflemen 5 artillery men) and the church (where I figure 15 artillery men, 5 riflemen and 5 staff).
But given Sesma's report of the breakouts, and other accounts of the church cannon it seems unlikely that many of these men left the church before the breakout attempts.
Not saying I'm right, but I've crunched and crunched these numbers, the Mexican avenues of approach, and the space to be defended. If Travis was wise enough to have constituted a reserve, it's hard to conceive that it was much more than 5 or 10 men. And then given the desperate fighting on the North Wall from the get go - it's hard for me to see it going anywhere else.
What about the lunette and main gate defenders? They're a distinct possibility for shifting part of their numbers to the SW corner -IF they perceived what was happening soon enough. However, I believe the lunette defenders went to ground and hid in the trench and attempted to surrender when Santa Anna was entering the fort (the Tejana surrender account - I don't have the Reader with me to give you the exact account).
Your supposition is reasonable to me, but I just don't think there was sufficient manpower able to shift to make a difference.
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Post by Rich Curilla on Nov 4, 2014 22:10:28 GMT -5
I don't disagree at all with this. Just saying we know what the Mexicans did and nothing about what the Texians might have done as precaution. But, in the long-run and by whatever means, I think Santa Anna's tactics (and concept, if there was one) simply outsmarted these citizen-soldiers as much as outnumbered them in the final assault. Perhaps I am giving him too much credit myself.
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Post by Jim Boylston on Nov 4, 2014 23:50:29 GMT -5
I don't disagree at all with this. Just saying we know what the Mexicans did and nothing about what the Texians might have done as precaution. But, in the long-run and by whatever means, I think Santa Anna's tactics (and concept, if there was one) simply outsmarted these citizen-soldiers as much as outnumbered them in the final assault. Perhaps I am giving him too much credit myself. Nah, Rich, I think most of the time Santa Anna isn't given enough credit. He didn't get lucky here. He didn't think outside the box, but he really didn't need to. In many ways, this was a textbook assault and all went according to plan. He even planned for dealing with breakouts, which he correctly assumed would happen. On the other hand, I'm not so sure the defenders were as prepared as they could have been. I'm still not convinced that all were manning their posts when the assault began.
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Post by Rich Curilla on Nov 5, 2014 1:55:03 GMT -5
He even planned for dealing with breakouts, which he correctly assumed would happen. But I go so far as to say that Santa Anna forced the breakouts by pushing the defenders from north to south, knowing they would ultimately be outside the fort and his cavalry could ride them down.
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Post by Jim Boylston on Nov 5, 2014 11:34:14 GMT -5
No argument from me on that. Again, all part of the plan.
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Post by Herb on Nov 5, 2014 12:06:56 GMT -5
He even planned for dealing with breakouts, which he correctly assumed would happen. But I go so far as to say that Santa Anna forced the breakouts by pushing the defenders from north to south, knowing they would ultimately be outside the fort and his cavalry could ride them down. I'll go a step beyond that. I'm convinced that Santa Anna's objective wasn't the Alamo, but the total destruction of the garrison. The whole assault was designed to simply accomplish that. Rich, as you mentioned earlier the terrain dictated that the main attack had to come from the North. Given the numbers involved it's a pretty safe planning assumption that the defenders would attempt to breakout once the walls were penetrated. Again looking at the terrain, if you were Santa Anna, you would obviously want to complete the defenders' destruction on the most favorable ground for your forces. The worst scenario for the Mexican Army would be having to root out the surviving defenders from the buildings, ruins, and river bluffs to the south and southwest of the Alamo compound. By sending Morales in via the Southwest corner to seize the main gate, Santa Anna denied this unpleasant (for him) eventuality. It also reinforced the more natural inclination of the defenders to retreat to the east and the colonies into the more favorable ground for the cavalry to complete the defenders destruction. It should be noted that Santa Anna did not totally rely on all this happening. He did place Colonel Mora with a portion of the cavalry to the NW of the Alamo to defeat any defenders attempts to reach the river from the upper West Wall. A possible outcome that was in fact defeated by the unplanned shift of Cos' column and attack on the upper West Wall.
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Post by Rich Curilla on Nov 5, 2014 22:42:58 GMT -5
It should be noted that Santa Anna did not totally rely on all this happening. He did place Colonel Mora with a portion of the cavalry to the NW of the Alamo to defeat any defenders attempts to reach the river from the upper West Wall. A possible outcome that was in fact defeated by the unplanned shift of Cos' column and attack on the upper West Wall. Somehow I have missed this detail. Where is this information on Col Mora. I thought all the cavalry was to the S.E. at or near the Alameda.
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Post by Herb on Nov 5, 2014 23:25:30 GMT -5
It should be noted that Santa Anna did not totally rely on all this happening. He did place Colonel Mora with a portion of the cavalry to the NW of the Alamo to defeat any defenders attempts to reach the river from the upper West Wall. A possible outcome that was in fact defeated by the unplanned shift of Cos' column and attack on the upper West Wall. Somehow I have missed this detail. Where is this information on Col Mora. I thought all the cavalry was to the S.E. at or near the Alameda. Rich, it's toward the end of Sesma's report. Although, iirc, Mora's name is misspelled in the Alamo Reader version.
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Post by Rich Curilla on Nov 6, 2014 2:20:31 GMT -5
Somehow I have missed this detail. Where is this information on Col Mora. I thought all the cavalry was to the S.E. at or near the Alameda. Rich, it's toward the end of Sesma's report. Although, iirc, Mora's name is misspelled in the Alamo Reader version. Thanks. I'll check it. This one caught me on the fly. Hadn't seen it before.
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