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Post by Chuck T on Jul 5, 2013 22:57:40 GMT -5
Lou: I have been away for awhile, so I just read your last post.
Reno is widely criticized for retreating from the timber. That's no news. Everyone from Whitacre to Madam Fluffy to Nelson Miles himself said that Reno should have stayed, hold out forever and a day, let the Buckskin Buccaneer down blah, blah, blah.
None of these guys had to make the same decision Reno had to make. Consider his position. Custer was over there somewhere. Benteen was over the other way somewhere. The packs and escort were back there somewhere. The somewhere is what Reno knew at the time, not what we know. He was faced with 900 hostiles give or take. Some of those hostiles had worked themselves around his flank, thus forcing him into the protection of the timber and they were working their way around to his rear cutting him off from Ford A, the place where he had crossed the river. He had a finite amount of ammunition. He had no food to speak of. He was close to the river so water should not be a problem. Remember it was 95 degrees that day.
So with all these factors to consider the critics say he could have held for hours exercising control of his fires. How long does it take to use up 100 rounds of ammunition per man in a fire fight? When it is all gone what then? As far as Reno knew those hostiles could contain him until his ammunition levels were down to zero. A decision had to be made, there and then. He made it. He knew that decision was going to lose him a lot of men. It was not the U S Army's finest hour. There was nothing pretty about it. Retreats never are. Breaking contact while closely engaged is the most difficult of military maneuvers.
I would hope I would have had the moral courage, sense of situational awareness, and the required decisiveness to have done the same thing in his place.
Alan: The book is dry, and contains nothing you do not already know if you still retain the Bonafides Map, which by the way is out of print and becoming very scarce.
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Post by loucapitano on Jul 7, 2013 18:53:07 GMT -5
Thanks Chuck for helping to peel another leaf off my Custer artichoke. I really don't fault Reno for his actions. As you say, it wasn't the Army's finest hour. But given the situation, he did what he did and the court (and apparently most of his command) supported him. How slim the difference is between "to retreat under fire" and "to cut and run." But trying to go up against the Custer Myth was basically futile for a man who was only human. Maybe if he had lived to the 1930s instead of Libby, history would treat him with more understanding. My only point is that when Reno abandoning the woods (whether or not for valid reasons) it released hundreds of Sioux to cross the medicine Tail Ford and roll up the thin line of troopers strung out on the Calhoun/Keogh ridge. But Custer was already doomed at that point and the length of time he could hold out was probably affected by only a few minutes. The huge numbers of Sioux/Cheyenne attacking him from the North end of the village was overwelming. Speaking of 95 degrees, that's what we had on Long Island today. I couldn't even relax in this weather, let alone fight for my life. Thanks
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Post by Chuck T on Jul 8, 2013 11:42:42 GMT -5
Lou: A couple of things to note.
When Reno retreated to the bluffs, those hostiles that faced him earlier were in hot pursuit. It was not the retreat itself that freed up the warriors. it was the new threat presented by Custer's approach on the east bank of the river, that they became aware of and was evidently the deciding factor in drawing off, and even then they did not immediately draw off..
There were more than enough warriors left in the village, that did not engage Reno to take care of Custer.
So if you put these two things together, the lack of centralized command and control on the part of the hostiles was the very thing that prevented decisive defeat from becoming catastrophic defeat/ Had those warriors stayed and kept Reno closely engaged on the bluffs, given that Benteen had not arrived, there would have been two of the three major elements of the regiment completely destroyed, and Benteen's fate and that of the pack trains highly questionable
From a tactical perspective going after Custer with almost everything available was the only mistake the hostiles made that day.
As it was only about half that were in the fight with Reno also engaged Custer, that being on the order of 500 or so. The rest called it a day.
As to Calhoun/Keogh. That position unhinged itself when Company C went down into Calhoun Coulee. Other than that they could have probably held for some good little time. Ultimately they would have been forced to withdraw though. In my view it only depends upon the exact time and prevailing circumstances when any such withdrawl was ordered. I truly believe it could have been done successfully, and contact broken. Don't think Keogh would have ever done that on his own hook, but I believe it could have been done around the same time Company C was sent forward.
I have a good friend who lives in the NYC area that just returned from the battlefield a few days ago. He went down into Calhoun Coulee with Dr. Fox or Scott (I forget which) and others, and told me in a e-mail a day or so ago that there could have been a thousand Indians down there undetected by soldiers on the ridge, the area is that broken, and is such a very good route for infiltration to within 75 to 100 meters from the ridge top.
I think there is also something not often discussed that is very important in this regard. Custer's (with Yates) presence was unknown to the hostiles until he made his presence known in the cemetery/ Ford D area. As far as the Indians can determine up until that time Keogh's force was the only one on the field. I think other than the high speed approach up Deep Coulee (thus Henryville) they would have been a little cautious, not knowing how many they were facing
Now this may be a somewhat crude manner of expressing it but: Imagine yourself with a toilet that looks perfectly normal. Unknown to you the pipes are clogged. You flush the toilet (Company C going into Calhoun Coulee to flush out what was thought to be but a few hostiles) and the thing overflows all over your bathroom floor (in this instance out of the coulee and closely following the remnants of C overflow onto battle ridge, also sweeping around the flank of Calhoun Hill into Horse Holders Ravine and into the Keogh Swale)
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Post by loucapitano on Jul 8, 2013 16:59:06 GMT -5
Chuck, thanks for putting more clearly what I was alluding to when I referred to Keogh and Calhoun as being "rolled up." I've read several sources that noted 1000 Indians could have hid in Calhoun Coulee. And several mentioned a cautious approach until the braves realized how outnumbered the troops were . I believe one phrase by a warrior was, "Come, we can kill them all."
You know Chuck, I've been reading about Custer since the 4th garade when I read "Custer's Last Stand', a Landmark Book (1958) by Quentin Reynolds. Many books and years later I read Fox's Archeological Work and found most of the earlier works were less scientific and far more emotional regarding the heroes and/or cowards that fought that day. Regardless of the earlier scholarship, I think Fox's work is the best starting point for serious LBH research. I must admit, I enjoyed many of these romantized tales (both fiction and non-fiction,) but I think the final words have been written. It just may take a few more generations for them to sink in. (Nice toilet analogy.)
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Post by Chuck T on Jul 8, 2013 17:23:53 GMT -5
Fox is both very good and very dry. It is a technical work, and as such invaluable for supplemental work.
Custer is the prototype of the tragic American hero. Reality is that he was a not so good commander, who like stretching a rubber band until it breaks, overextended, over reached, and got a lot of good men killed needlessly.
Were he leading his civil war division of 3000 or so, the choice of scheme of maneuver would have been perfect. Remember this man never commanded a company, battalion, or regiment during the ACW. He commanded the 7th Cavalry on two big outings before LBH. Neither one of them Washita and Yellowstone will make it in the text books as sterling examples of what to do. I believe the man incompetent to lead. This brings me to the conclusion that the man lacked the vital levels of experience, despite his resume to lead a regiment of cavalry on the plains and I think the major fault lies in him not having a firm grasp on the capabilities and limitations of his command.
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Post by Allen Wiener on Jul 8, 2013 19:20:56 GMT -5
That's pretty much the way I've come to believe the Calhoun Hill and other parts of the battle played out. The far larger Indian force had a huge area in which they could conceal themselves in land formations and very tall grass (which is gone now), fire arrows at steep angles, which fell on the soldiers, or take aim at them with repeating rifles. Once they got close enough, they could make a final charge and kill all who were not able to run for it. I also recall the quote from one warrior (perhaps Gall, whose family had been killed when Reno's men began firing into the village) that they "could kill them all" with one rush, which is what happened. I think the fight on Last Stand Hill played out very much the same.
I think Reno became a scapegoat after the dust settled and, given the rout/retreat, he was tailor made for it. I don't think he was much of a commander or fighter and Custer should have known that when he gave him such a pivotal role in the attack.
I do not know if the retreat could have been more orderly or less fatal than Reno handled it, but ordering men to mount and dismount repeatedly before finally just yelling "If you want to save your butts, follow me" and taking off is the best way to handle it.
Nonetheless, Reno was probably somewhat in a state of shock as he had just had Bloody Knife's brains blown all over him, was being attacked by increasing numbers of warriors, and wondering where the hell ("I'll Support You") Custer was. There is plenty of blame to go around and Reno probably deserves his share of it, but the fault for the failure and defeat lies clearly with Custer. It was his command and his plan (such as it was) and he has to answer for it.
I also think that Reno's scapegoat status was magnified in the "protect Libby" aftermath, when a lot of men told a lot of lies to spare her feelings. Blaming Reno played into that. Some of those who fought with him in the timber later claimed there was no need to retreat and that they could have held the warriors off for quite some time, which is nonsense for reasons Chuck already cited, such as lack of Ammo, increasing pressure and numbers of warriors, etc. The also claimed the retreat could have been better led and orderly and spared some lives, which may be somewhat true, but this also sounds like a lot of hindsight and "protect Libby/blame Reno" stuff.
I've never understood why Custer was known as an Indian fighter at all, let alone the country's 'greatest' Indian fighter. His experiences are what Chuck mentioned, which is next to nothing, nor does it recommend him as much of a commander in such battles. In the Civil War, Custer had far larger forces and more motivated troops under him, and he did not hesitate to charge recklessly into any scrape or take risks, no matter how many men it might cost him. I believe that I read somewhere that his ACW unit had the highest single casualty rate of any Union force, and I wouldn't doubt it. Once he was on the vast plains fighting a very different kind of enemy, with relatively few troops, who were far less motivated, it was a different story, but he never seemed to have made any adjustments for that.
Speaking of the heat that day, don't forget how exhausted and thirsty both men and horses were when Custer began this ill-advised, seat-of-the-pants attack at something like 3 p.m. He had originally planned to attack the next day before dawn and surprise the Indians in their camp (ala Washita), but he mistakenly thought he'd been spotted and that the Indians were about to scatter. This, despite his having been told the camp was the largest any of his scouts had ever seen, meaning it would be very hard for that many people to scatter very quickly.
I find Fox absolutely indispensable. It is dry and not for the Custer novice, but if you get into the subject in any depth and are really curious about it, Fox can clarify some things better than any other source. Gray is also a key work, although I think he does go overboard with his time-motion estimates; he still gives us the best idea of where everyone was over the time period involved.
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Post by Chuck T on Jul 8, 2013 23:05:07 GMT -5
Allen: I am not sure about the tall grass. It does not matter though. Those cuts are deep, and you can see absolutely nothing in them from the ridge top.
I am also not so sure it was protect Madam Fluffy. When she and Whittaker got together they trashed both Reno and Benteen
Tell you the truth I blame her for a lot of what Custer became. He was a weak vessel emotionally anyway. After the civil war he was just another also ran, much like an actor or a singer who rises to fame quickly, and fades just as fast, what the disc jockey on oldies radio call a one hit wonder.. She was the world class prototype of MRS COLONEL, who wore her husband's rank. I have seen so many in my time, and each and every one nauseates me.
Ask yourself this it is the winter season on Broadway, and your regiment is prepping for a campaign come spring. Would you think your place would be training your regiment or attending twenty plus performances of Julius Caesar on Broadway? Interesting question, isn't it?
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Post by Allen Wiener on Jul 10, 2013 21:13:20 GMT -5
If you're interested in the LBH and have not joined the Friends of Little Bighorn, you should do so. They are a very proactive and valuable organization and they publish and good newsletter. Here is their Facebook page, which includes some photos that may illustrate some of the points we've been making: www.facebook.com/FriendsofLittleBighornBattlefield
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Post by Herb on Jul 16, 2013 13:44:20 GMT -5
To accurately assess a battlefield commander's performance, one must first place himself in that commander's shoes, what did he know, what did he see, what were his orders at the time. One other thing must be remembered commanders are given COMMAND, as the young lieutenant points out in Major Dundee. Command is responsibility not blind obedience.
We've debated these points repeatedly when it comes to Custer, but we really haven't looked at Reno.
Reno's performance is criticized at four specific points: Halting the charge and forming a skirmish line, retreating to the brush, retreating to the bluff, and his performance (or lack thereof on the bluff)
Halting the attack, as a former armor cavalryman, my inclination is not to halt an attack. Mounted attacks have a momentum and a panic generating capability that cannot be over estimated. What Nathan Bedford Forrest called "getting the skeered on" and then keeping it on. Had Reno attacked with the wing (6 companies) he should have commanded, this might emphasis might have been possible. But, the 3 companies he did command would have been simply engulfed and destroyed in a matter of minutes. While there indeed was panic in the village enough warriors rushed to the charge, that Reno was facing a powerful and DETERMINED force before he ever gave the order to dismount and form a skirmish line. Stopping a charge is difficult men as well as horses get the bit between their teeth. In this case it was the right decision. Reno's men fought as skirmishers on the valley floor far longer than they would have lasted had they continued the charge. (Under researcher - archaeology has still shown the probable existence of 4 - 7 skirmish line positions, suggesting for more maneuver on the valley floor than Reno is credited for). More later.
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Post by Chuck T on Jul 18, 2013 21:27:26 GMT -5
Could not agree more. It is the commander's responsibility to make decisions. He must live or die by those decisions. People may be critical of them in a latter day, but for the most part those that are critical were not there, and the shoulda, coulda, woulda, when not in that commander's boots is like kissing your sister. It's nice, but also meaningless.
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