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Post by Chuck T on Oct 16, 2010 10:01:08 GMT -5
Paul: I am going to have to go back and do some research about the camp's movements. You may very well be correct that the move to the banks of the LBH may have been earlier than I thought.
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Post by Herb on Oct 16, 2010 10:36:33 GMT -5
Paul: I am going to have to go back and do some research about the camp's movements. You may very well be correct that the move to the banks of the LBH may have been earlier than I thought. From the Atlas of the Souix Wars, in late April, the Souix camp was at the mouth of Mizaph Creek on the Powder River from there they moved to the Tongue River at Pumkin Creek (30 Apr - 5 May). They then moved up river to Lay Creek (12 - 16 May). From there they camped in the divide between the Tongue and Rosebud (17 - 20 May), then near the mouth of the Rosebud (21 May 24 May). From there they moved up the Rosebud occupying two different sites, before setting up where Greenleaf Creek joins the Rosebud (30 May - 3 Jun). Continuing upstream they moved to Lame Dear Creek (4- 7 Jun), Muddy Creek (8- 11 Jun) and further upstream ( 12 -14 Jun). 15 Jun was spent on the divide between the Rosebud and LBH, roughly vicinity of the Crows Nest. 16 - 17 Jun (the Battle of the Rosebud was on the 17th), the village was on Reno Creek (the site of the Lone Tepee). From there the village moved to the LBH south of Reno Creek (18 - 23 Jun). The 24th the village moved north of Reno Creek and established the camp on the LBH that Custer attacked on the 25th.
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Post by Chuck T on Oct 16, 2010 11:13:15 GMT -5
Wolfpack: I have also seen where the warriors that engaged at the Rosebud came from a camp on Ash Creek. The headwaters of Ash Creek and the site of the Lone Teepee seem to be about two miles apart, judging from a very small map I have of the area. I wonder if this was the same camp, considering the size of the total village?
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Post by Allen Wiener on Oct 16, 2010 12:07:10 GMT -5
I think the LBH village was moved once more, after the battle, apparently, further north. This later led to the impression that the village had been much larger than it was, although it was the largest many of those Indians said they ever saw. Several groups came together and were further reinforced by the "summer roamers" from the reservations.
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Post by Herb on Oct 16, 2010 13:15:28 GMT -5
I think the LBH village was moved once more, after the battle, apparently, further north. This later led to the impression that the village had been much larger than it was, although it was the largest many of those Indians said they ever saw. Several groups came together and were further reinforced by the "summer roamers" from the reservations. A significant portion of the village was taken down during the fighting on the 25th and a portion of that was re-erected overlapping the campsites erected on the 24th after Custer's wing was defeated. It indeed created confusion, in trying to reconstruct the exact size of the village. When the village broke camp on the 26th , they once more moved south - this time to the Big Horn Mountains. Soon thereafter, the camp, broke into seperate bands.
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Post by Herb on Oct 17, 2010 12:02:52 GMT -5
Wolfpack: I have also seen where the warriors that engaged at the Rosebud came from a camp on Ash Creek. The headwaters of Ash Creek and the site of the Lone Teepee seem to be about two miles apart, judging from a very small map I have of the area. I wonder if this was the same camp, considering the size of the total village? I think it probably is.
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Post by garyzaboly on Oct 17, 2010 15:47:10 GMT -5
One aspect of the Indian victory of June 25th not often considered---one that goes beyond the geographical, logistical, and weapons-related issues---is that the Sioux and Cheyenne possessed a cocky self-confidence, as fighting men, that they had earned after they drove Crook back earlier that month. High morale, and self-assurance in arms, are no small factors in winning battles.
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Post by Chuck T on Oct 17, 2010 18:10:12 GMT -5
Gary: I think it depends on how you define cocky. A soldiers self confidence is based largely upon three factors, leadership, discipline and training. With the Indians leadership in the various grouping and warrior societies was based upon past performance in battle. Indian training to become a warrior began in childhood. Indian levels of individual discipline need not be discussed, it is self evident. There is a cautionary note however. Sometimes an extraordinary degree of self confidence can lead to "victory disease". That AIN'T so good as the IJN found out at Midway.
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Post by garyzaboly on Oct 18, 2010 13:33:14 GMT -5
Gary: I think it depends on how you define cocky. A soldiers self confidence is based largely upon three factors, leadership, discipline and training. With the Indians leadership in the various grouping and warrior societies was based upon past performance in battle. Indian training to become a warrior began in childhood. Indian levels of individual discipline need not be discussed, it is self evident. There is a cautionary note however. Sometimes an extraordinary degree of self confidence can lead to "victory disease". That AIN'T so good as the IJN found out at Midway. Chieftain, As I recall, there are a few Indian accounts that speak of this self-confidence brought on by their victory over Crook. Self-confidence can also be drawn from past example, and the experience of the very recent Rosebud battle gave many of the warriors this "cocky" attitude, one that was heightened by the fact that the units of the 7th they were engaging were far fewer in number than Crook's command had been.
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Post by Chuck T on Oct 18, 2010 14:45:05 GMT -5
Gary: I have no doubt that there was an attitude of self confidence among the Indians based upon their performance of 17 June. As I recall, and I would have to check the numbers to be absolutely sure, the Indians, at around 900 warriors, were outnumbered at Rosebud.
Also, I do not doubt that self confidence can be drawn from past experience, but I believe that drawing it exclusively from this source is not always in the best interests of the force that does so. I mentioned Midway. The IJN had so much "cocky" self confidence that they were lured into an I can't be beaten so don't bother to try attitude. So, self confidence is a necessary ingredient for victory by any military force, as long as it is seasoned with a few pinches of reality.
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Post by garyzaboly on Oct 18, 2010 15:34:27 GMT -5
Gary: I have no doubt that there was an attitude of self confidence among the Indians based upon their performance of 17 June. As I recall, and I would have to check the numbers to be absolutely sure, the Indians, at around 900 warriors, were outnumbered at Rosebud. Also, I do not doubt that self confidence can be drawn from past experience, but I believe that drawing it exclusively from this source is not always in the best interests of the force that does so. I mentioned Midway. The IJN had so much "cocky" self confidence that they were lured into an I can't be beaten so don't bother to try attitude. So, self confidence is a necessary ingredient for victory by any military force, as long as it is seasoned with a few pinches of reality. True, Chieftain---"reality" and also "luck" for the Americans in 1942, since the Japanese onslaught had carved out, over a number of years prior to Midway, a huge chunk of southeastern Asia . After the loss of those 4 carriers the tide was turned of course, but if I can again use the Indians' experience against Crook---not to mention Fetterman---Crazy Horse and company definitely enjoyed some precedence from which to draw no little amount of tactical boldness and self-confidence.
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Post by Chuck T on Oct 18, 2010 16:18:05 GMT -5
Gary: I think we are trying to say the same thing only in different ways.
If you wish and interesting read on Midway that may change your mind - somewhat - about how Midway has been portrayed, particularly in the West, over the last sixty plus years read "Shattered Sword". It gives a completely different perspective, from the IJN's viewpoint of the battle. The two guys who wrote it did not resort to revisionism, but rather looked at the IJN in general and KIdo Butai in particular, and discovered they they were not as good as they thought they were, and as we thought they were.
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Post by garyzaboly on Oct 19, 2010 5:32:37 GMT -5
Gary: I think we are trying to say the same thing only in different ways. If you wish and interesting read on Midway that may change your mind - somewhat - about how Midway has been portrayed, particularly in the West, over the last sixty plus years read "Shattered Sword". It gives a completely different perspective, from the IJN's viewpoint of the battle. The two guys who wrote it did not resort to revisionism, but rather looked at the IJN in general and KIdo Butai in particular, and discovered they they were not as good as they thought they were, and as we thought they were. Chieftain, I've read two good accounts of Midway, one from a Japanese point of view---Fuchida's---and MIRACLE AT MIDWAY by Prange. I came away from those reads realizing that luck, both good and bad, played as much a part in that battle as reconnaissance and tactics and guts. And the same can be said about Little Big Horn. And Yorktown. And Gettysburg. And so on...
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Post by Chuck T on Oct 19, 2010 9:53:25 GMT -5
Gary: You certainly have two great books on Midway. Fuchida's was the earliest and as such in later years been open to a heck of a lot of criticism, particularly by the Japanese themselves. Shattered Sword does not treat Fuchida kindly and backs up what the authors have to say with some incredibly deep research into IJN carriers and how they operated. It also examines Fuchida's motives in depth and does not paint a very pretty picture of him.
It is unfortunate that Prange did not live to see any of his Pearl Harbor and Midway books published. I had a chance years ago, just after Midway was published, to sit down and buy a beer or six with Donald Goldstein who along with Kathrine Dillon put Prange's work into published form. It was a fascinating evening, one I won't soon forget.
Walter Lord also wrote a very good book on Midway, although I don't believe it was up to the level of "A Time To Stand"
Shattered Sword is almost as much of an in depth look at the IJN as it is about Midway. The two of course were completely intertwined. There is, as I said, no revisionism. Rather the book contains a complete evaluation of the IJN as a whole, and their performance in the battle. This analysis is on two tracks, equipment and doctrine, as well as leadership.
This is by far the best book I have ever read on Midway.
Now to your larger point. I agree that luck, as undefinable as it may be, is an essential part of either victory or defeat. Was it bad luck that the ration case was dropped from the pack mule? I think anyone would have to say yes.
Was it bad luck that Greene played tag with Cornwallis all over North Carolina until Cornwallis was forced to go to Yorktown in an attempt to resupply himself? Again yes, bad for Cornwallis, but it was good luck that Washington had the strategic vision to see and take advantage of the opportunity. It was also a stroke of good luck that the French Fleet was in the vicinity of the Virginia Capes. Sometimes what may seem like luck though, is in fact a leader boldly and decisively taking advantage of his opportunities.
Gettysburg in a way is the antithesis of your statements about the Indians attitudes following the defeat or tactical draw with Crook. Lee had just won Chancellorsville. ANV morale was very high. They were apparently feeding well off the Pennsylvania countryside. As soldiers they had a very good opinion of themselves and rightly so. Nearly every account I have seen, that gives a balanced view of Gettysburg, all say the same thing. Lee and the ANV had victory disease, and it led them into making decisions that cost them greatly.
Self confidence can work both ways. It worked at Little Big Horn, and it led to catastrophic defeat at Gettysburg.
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Post by garyzaboly on Oct 19, 2010 15:08:25 GMT -5
Gary: You certainly have two great books on Midway. Fuchida's was the earliest and as such in later years been open to a heck of a lot of criticism, particularly by the Japanese themselves. Shattered Sword does not treat Fuchida kindly and backs up what the authors have to say with some incredibly deep research into IJN carriers and how they operated. It also examines Fuchida's motives in depth and does not paint a very pretty picture of him. It is unfortunate that Prange did not live to see any of his Pearl Harbor and Midway books published. I had a chance years ago, just after Midway was published, to sit down and buy a beer or six with Donald Goldstein who along with Kathrine Dillon put Prange's work into published form. It was a fascinating evening, one I won't soon forget. Walter Lord also wrote a very good book on Midway, although I don't believe it was up to the level of "A Time To Stand" Shattered Sword is almost as much of an in depth look at the IJN as it is about Midway. The two of course were completely intertwined. There is, as I said, no revisionism. Rather the book contains a complete evaluation of the IJN as a whole, and their performance in the battle. This analysis is on two tracks, equipment and doctrine, as well as leadership. This is by far the best book I have ever read on Midway. Now to your larger point. I agree that luck, as undefinable as it may be, is an essential part of either victory or defeat. Was it bad luck that the ration case was dropped from the pack mule? I think anyone would have to say yes. Was it bad luck that Greene played tag with Cornwallis all over North Carolina until Cornwallis was forced to go to Yorktown in an attempt to resupply himself? Again yes, bad for Cornwallis, but it was good luck that Washington had the strategic vision to see and take advantage of the opportunity. It was also a stroke of good luck that the French Fleet was in the vicinity of the Virginia Capes. Sometimes what may seem like luck though, is in fact a leader boldly and decisively taking advantage of his opportunities. Gettysburg in a way is the antithesis of your statements about the Indians attitudes following the defeat or tactical draw with Crook. Lee had just won Chancellorsville. ANV morale was very high. They were apparently feeding well off the Pennsylvania countryside. As soldiers they had a very good opinion of themselves and rightly so. Nearly every account I have seen, that gives a balanced view of Gettysburg, all say the same thing. Lee and the ANV had victory disease, and it led them into making decisions that cost them greatly. Self confidence can work both ways. It worked at Little Big Horn, and it led to catastrophic defeat at Gettysburg. Chieftain, That's pretty much the point I was trying to make---that often luck, be it bad or good, will intervene to tip the scales of fortune one way or another. Grant had terrible luck at Shiloh until the boats arrived with reinforcements. It was also good luck for Washington that Clinton's fleet was held up by bad weather in New York, and that when Cornwallis did attempt to sneak his besieged army across to Gloucester, a bad storm stopped his boats. Santa Anna felt overly self-confident, too, when he napped that afternoon at San Jacinto. As did Pulleine in forming his regulation lines at Isandhlwana instead of laagering as advised by the Boer leaders. And Magaw at Fort Washington, believing his position invincible. In military history, the examples are legion. But at Little Big Horn it was the peculiar combination of circumstances---of poor reconnaisance (I will always believe that) by Custer, of the nature of the battlefield, of the inexperience of many of the men, of the weapons, and yes, of the self-confidence felt by the Sioux and Cheyenne etc., not only from past battle experience, but also because they were caught in a corner and had no choice but to fight and not flee. So it was a lot different from the Confederate experience at Gettysburg in that they did have the "home field" advantage, and could maneuver about at will while their opponents found themselves trapped on exposed grassy ridges. I guess we could discuss these variables ad infinitum, but in warfare, such self-confidence more often than not leads to victory---or at least to the kind of result Leonidas accomplished at Thermopylae: holding up and decimating the enemy until betrayed, and the Spartan weapons becoming broken from over-use!
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