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Post by Allen Wiener on Oct 11, 2010 12:33:48 GMT -5
Don't underestimate the impact of the terrain. All of those ravines and, at the time, tall grasses gave the Indians excellent cover from which to fire arrows, get off a quick shot before ducking down, and creeping ever closer without being seen; the cover offered few targets for the soldiers.
I'm not sure how Gatlings were hauled around, but that is pretty rough terrain; it would have been tough getting them over those mountains to start with. Remember, the pack train was miles back because the going had been so slow.
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Post by Chuck T on Oct 11, 2010 13:11:08 GMT -5
Paul, Tom, Allen:
You all bring up interesting points.
The bow and arrow was a weapon that virtually every one of the warriors was familiar with. I believe their great value was in suppressive fire, and in their relatively great rate of fire. Allen is quite correct in that the nature of the terrain provided excellent concealment along with a great deal of cover.
I am not sure that an ammunition shortage was a great factor in this battle. There were a heck of a lot of Henry repeater cartridges discovered at the base of Calhoun Hill in what was later dubbed "Henryville". I do believe however that the overall scarcity of ammunition gave them a lot of problems in the general overview of the Indian Campaigns in Toto.
The problem with the Springfield Carbine jamming is a mystery to me. It obviously happened at LBH. There were to many such reports to dismiss it as not being a factor. What is strange is that in all my reading on the Indian Campaigns I have never run into similar reports. As I understand the issue it was due to corrosion of ammunition and not to the rifle itself. If this is not true someone please correct me. Therefore it stands to reason that rather than this being a weapons issue it may very well have been a training issue which could have been avoided and corrected by more supervision at the NCO level.
The Gatling's are another one of those things where what may seem simple is not. I fully agree that Custer's route was quite difficult. On the other hand Parker's Battery of Gatling's (essentially the same gun on the same carriage) negotiated the trail from Siboney, thought Las Guasimas, to San Juan Heights along with several batteries of light artillery. Had these guns been with Custer's battalion their suppressive fire would have been devastating, even with the high probability of haveing to deal with periodic jamming.
Custer's difficulty with the pack train was either insufficient or a complete lack of training on the part of both soldiers and civilian packers. That is one aspect of this battle that need not have happened.
Another real puzzler is Custer's apparent refusal to take along a battalion of the 2nd Cavalry. The fact that Custer died may very well have denied us the real story on this one. Despite the story (and so far that is all it is in my view) that Custer did not want to dilute the glory of the 7th Cavalry by sharing it with another regiment, consider this. What commander willingly refuses more tools (i.e. combat power) to get the job done. If Custer refused this battalion as the story goes, he was a complete fool. One the other hand if Terry offered this battalion, thereby depriving himself of cavalry for use in all of the traditional cavalry tasks, then he was a fool. Something here does not make sense.
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Post by Paul Sylvain on Oct 11, 2010 14:10:21 GMT -5
I can't really fault Custer about leaving the Gatlings behind. In my opinion, this falls in the category of "Monday morning quarterbacking". Had Custer prevailed, it wouldn't have been an issue. When he failed, it became something to debate. Clearly, if he'd have had the guns with him, they may have proved a deterrent, causing the Indians to give up the offensive. Who knows? I just can't imagine the warriors wanting to take them buggers on. One wonders, also, if Custer would have opted for a different tactic, rather than pursing the course he took, had he had the guns at his disposal. We will never know.
The terrain was a major factor that worked in favor of the Indians. I've read many accounts where the warriors were able to pop up and take their shots at the soldiers who were exposed. The ravines and so on provided exceptional cover in the fight at LBH. Considering that the camp had been in place for something like a week or so, I'm also guessing the Sioux, Cheyenne, et al, new this terrain much better than Custer. Well, Custer's lack of knowledge about the area is a given. The advantage was most definitely with the Indians.
I believe the ballistics evidence at LBH (thanks to the fires there some years ago), revealed that the soldiers fired a ton of bullets at something, but obviously without much luck. I've read theories that, as the battle progressed and any semblance of Custers defense began crumbling, the soldiers went into a panic mode, resulting in so many shots being fired wildly. It seems I also read that there were a lot of new troops on this campaign, and that the inexperience and probably lack of training contributed to the panic.
This is all speculation, of course, but it still is worthy of consideration.
I'm enjoying this discussion, by the way. Let's keep it going.
Paul
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Post by Chuck T on Oct 11, 2010 15:31:12 GMT -5
Paul: I am not sure that had I been Custer I would have taken the Gatling Guns either.
Having said that I do not see anything in the way of terrain on the battlefield proper that would have impeded their use. I cannot speak for the rest of the approach march, and while I have viewed the Wolf Mountains where he crossed the divide from a distance, I can't legitimately say it would have been impossible for them to traverse.
As to you point about Custer's defense. I am not sure Custer had any "defense" prior to the last half hour or perhaps less. The deployment of the five companies, was somewhat cleared up for me not too long ago by my pulling off the shelves a copy of Philip St George Cooke's Cavalry Tactics that my daughter had given me for Christmas some years ago. I then re-read portions of the Longacre books on Civil War cavalry operations. It seems that Custer's troops employed standard doctrine at LBH.
As an example when E Troop was deployed in a skirmish line near the present cemetery, Troop F remained mounted for some time to the right and rear near what became Last Stand Hill. When L Troop dismounted on Calhoun Hill Troop I and Troop C were still mounted and initially placed in a position to support. I am fairly certain that Troop I dismounted later to avoid direct fire, but Troop C made their counterattack mounted.
This is right out of the book stuff. If a squadron (two troops) were deployed according to doctrine one would remain mounted. If a battalion (two squadrons) same thing. The way Custer split things up confuses the issue a little, 5 ( 2 and 3) + 3 + 3 + 1 instead of the even arrangements of doctrine, but I still feel quite certain that they would have stayed as close to the deployment methods they were used to as possible.
As I understand it, the reasoning for all this is that horse cavalry is not well suited to defensive operations. Therefore being at a disadvantage on defense they deploy initially with the idea that the dismounted (or defensive ) operation will be of very short duration and they keep about half their strength mounted to facilitate early resumption of the offense or take advantage of an opening the enemy gives them for counterattack and or pursuit
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Post by Allen Wiener on Oct 11, 2010 18:09:55 GMT -5
Wolfpack is the resident expert on cavalry and I will defer to him and Chieftan, who have a lot more hands-on experience here.
I don't think defense was ever in Custer's mind, and several books point out that for most of the hours during which this battle unfolded, he was on offense the entire time. Only toward the end, when the warrior force became overwhelming, were they on the defensive. I agree there were serious problems with experience and training (or rather the lack of them), but in the end, Custer had divided and sub-divided his force to the point where the Indians only needed to knock off fairly small groups, isolated from the others, one by one. I think this is what the warrior (Lame White Man?) meant when he said "There aren't that many of them; we can kill them all." I think he was talking about Calhoun's 2 companies.
I'm sort of guessing here, but things seemed so routine to the cavalry for a long time that Keough's 2 companies were actually being held in reserve, behind Battle Ridge, while Calhoun was able to handle things until the warrior counter-attack following C Troops' charge and retreat. Once the warriors began rolling over Calhoun Hill, I think they moved too fast for Keough to form up properly and, within a very short time, he was overrun. Also, at the same time that he came under attack from south by the warriors who finished off Calhoun, he was also being hit from the north by the so-called "suicide boys." I don't think too many made it Custer Hill for the grand finale.
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Post by Chuck T on Oct 11, 2010 18:32:35 GMT -5
Allen: American horse cavalry during the 19th Century largely followed the Dragoon tradition. It was a mixture of mounted and dismounted troopers that were deployed according to the situation. Therefore American cavalry differed somewhat from the European tradition which placed great value on mounted shock action such as the charge of the Union Brigade at Waterloo.
Probably the most illustrative examples of this were battles fought quite near you at Kelly's Ford in March 63 and Aldie in June 63. Brandy Station also had quite a bit of dismounted action but is most memorable for the repeated mounted charges to either take or hold Fleetwood Heights.
You are absolutely correct about defeat in detail.
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Post by Allen Wiener on Oct 11, 2010 18:49:23 GMT -5
I think that's what Custer had planned; ala the charge that Reno made. While we can't be sure what was in his head, I think he was planning a second charge further north, but did not realize how large the camp was or how difficult it was to find a suitable crossing. The cavalry dismounted and fought on foot by necessity, not by plan. I think they just found themselves there. Reno set the tone by halting his charge when he seemed to have the village on the verge of panic, dismounted his troops, and began a more defensive action. Although it's tempting to speculate that Reno might have paralyzed the warriors had he continued his advance well into the village, I think he would have ultimately been overrun by superior numbers without any supporting attack from Custer, which is what would have happened, as Custer continued his drift northward, looking for a crossing.
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Post by Chuck T on Oct 11, 2010 19:35:37 GMT -5
Allen: I think Reno gets a lot of blame and he deserves most of it. I am not sure about his attack though.
He had roughly 150 troopers, including assorted odds and sods (scouts etc). He was facing a series of villages which numbered at least 4000 (combatants and non-combatants) and perhaps as many as five or six. The village as you have seen was about a mile and a half to two miles long, although I don't think it was very wide, not straying to far from the river to the east. We can speculate here on two things:
1) Would the great mass of the village (in area) itself negated the shock effect?
2) Despite Indian accounts of initial panic, what did Reno see, what did Reno know?
History tells us that the Indians were initially in panic. Reno had no way of knowing this from where he was. What he could see is pressure starting to build to his front. His proper course of action I believe was to do just what he did. I will not argue the fact that after he made that decision that he bumbled the rest of the day, but that is not the point
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Post by Paul Sylvain on Oct 11, 2010 19:55:46 GMT -5
He had roughly 150 troopers, including assorted odds and sods (scouts etc). He was facing a series of villages which numbered at least 4000 (combatants and non-combatants) and perhaps as many as five or six. The village as you have seen was about a mile and a half to two miles long, although I don't think it was very wide, not straying to far from the river to the east. From "The Day the World Ended at Little Bighorn" (Joseph M. Marshall III): "Never before, the stories say, and certainly not since, has there been an encampment the size of the Little Bighorn gathering in the summer of 1876. It stretched for two miles along the river, and almost 200 yards at its widest point. ... "Just before the battle, the encampment along the Little Bighorn had relocated from the site along Ash Creek, some eight miles to the southeast, where it had been for a month or more. Growing numbers of people and horses necessitated the move. The horses had grazed down the grass considerably, so fresh forage was needed for them. When the soldiers attacked, the Little Bighorn encampment had been in place for only a few days. ... "The arrangement of the Little Bighorn encampment began with the Hunkpapa at the southern end, then the Itazipacola, Mniconju, Sihaspa, Isanti Dakota, Ihanktunwan Nakota, the Sicangu and Oohenunpa together, and Oglala and Sahiyela at the northern end. All around the edges, especially close to the river, were small temporary campsites of unmarried men or men who had come without their families. Near the center were pitched several warrior society lodges and at least one large meeting or council lodge. ... "The camp was situated among groves of trees, mostly large old-growth cottonwoods, many of which were taller than the tops of the lodge poles. Even from the ridges across the river (as the soldiers realized), it was difficult to see into the encampment."
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Post by Chuck T on Oct 11, 2010 20:48:26 GMT -5
Paul: I don't have that book, but I borrowed one from my son, the name of which I cannot remember, that actually did the math, based upon a similar description of the encampment and normal Indian campsite practices, and produced a warrior number of around 1200 to 1500.
The reason the circles were so compacted was because of the combination of shade and water. Two hundred yards from the river would bring it out to the approximate location of modern I90 and the service road, which is just outside the tree line. The horse herd was probably slightly north and west of the Hunkpapa Circle and extended to the north of the Oglala.
As to how long the circles had been at this location, I just don't know, but a few days sounds about right. It certainly moved there after the Rosebud which was a week before. It may have been established on the 19th or 20th, with everyone not closing upon it until the 22nd or 23rd.
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Post by Chuck T on Oct 12, 2010 3:47:30 GMT -5
I ran into something this evening which I will give you to ponder with your morning coffee. I write it here as a sidebar to the discussions we have had over the last few days regrading the state of training in the 7th Cavalry prior to an during the Montana Expedition.
The following is extracted from the official reports of Lieutenant Edward S Godfrey who commanded Troop K at Little Big Horn with some material that was not in the official report but gleaned from his article published in Century Magazine,
By my count, and it is a by name count Troop K 's present for duty in theater strength was a total of 71 all ranks. The company commander was on detached service and Godfrey the Troop 1Lt assumed command in his absence.
Casualties in Killed In Action included the 1SG, another SGT and a Corporal plus two privates. One Sergeant and two privates were wounded on the 25th and evacuated to the Steamer Far West and under care on that vessel, One corporal and 27 privates were detached to the supply base established on the Powder River prior to the march to LBH. An additional six other ranks were either on detached service at Fort Lincoln or were patients in hospital at that location, By my count Godfrey had 28 personnel effective and present for duty in the late afternoon of 25 June.
In early April Troop K was detached from the regimental main body along with Troops B & G for duty in the Department of the Gulf. I believe they were physically located in New Orleans On 16 April Godfrey received order to report to Saint Paul Minnesota. He reports there that he was reinforced by twenty five new recruits (using his words -"fresh from civil life") I do not believe he meant this in the literal sense. It is most likely that these 25 had been assembled at Jefferson Barracks, MO and probably had a week or two of very rudimentary training. So his troop is going off to war with one third of its members not having anything in the way of beneficial training they would soon require The three troops from the Gulf arrived at Fort Lincoln on 1 May and were immediately sent to an off post tent camp site about two miles away. The expedition left Fort Lincoln on 17 May.
This regiment intended to fight and subdue some of the greatest warriors in the western hemisphere, and it does not take a military genius much above the level of Bettle Bailey to understand that they have very little chance on a man for man or small vs, small unit basis. This is criminal misconduct of the highest order.
Ironically Troop K under Godfrey were among if not the best performers on 25 June
This is not an isolated case each and every troop in the 7th was reinforced in this manner just prior to starting this campaign. Is it any wonder when we study this battle the same consistent things are always brought up, Poor marksmanship, poor maintenance of weapons and horse furniture, poor overall physical health of the troops, poor horsemanship, and worst of all poor supervision on the part of the NCO's and little or no attention paid by most of the officers to their commands as a whole
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Post by Paul Sylvain on Oct 12, 2010 6:04:38 GMT -5
Here's a link detailing the 7th's muster in June 1876. Just click the "List of soldiers, officers and civilians at the Little Bighorn" link at the bottom to open it up: www.friendslittlebighorn.com/7th%20Cav%20Muster%20Rolls.htmWhat I find interesting is the number of people assigned to the 7th who were on detail, other assignments, sick, etc. Also of interest is to see where these folks were from. Even far away places like the New England states lost people in this battle. There was a soldier from my home town here in Nashua, NH killed at LBH. Paul
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Post by Mike Harris on Oct 12, 2010 9:34:11 GMT -5
Thanks, Allen. That was quite a treat. I remember my father teaching me about LBH when I was a really little, little boy. I've never taken the time to really delve into the particulars of the battle, but your photos have really piqued my interest. I enjoyed them very much.
Mike
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Post by Chuck T on Oct 12, 2010 9:49:01 GMT -5
Paul: I drew my stuff from rosters contained as an appendix to "Of Garryowen In Glory" by Melborn C. Chandler. It is a very hard to find book, published in limited numbers in the late 1950's. It is an up to that time regimental history of the 7th United States Cavalry, and is probably the best and most detailed such history that I have ever seen. For Chandler it is a labor of love. He commanded Company H in Japan and Korea. There are a couple of gloss-overs but that is to be expected I guess.
Speaking of other assignments, there was one NCO and four troopers from each troop totaling 60 that were with the pack train to assist in its movement, and that is in addition to the civilian packers and Troop B whose duty it was to guard it. Nothing, well almost nothing, is as deplorable as the performance of that element of the regiment. One wonders how the millstone around Custer's neck that the pack train became influenced Custer's decision. process on the 24th and 25th. Could it have been a situation where the logistical tail wagged the fighting dog?
History tells us Troop C was wiped out along Battle Ridge. Troop C lost 2 officers and 36 enlisted personnel there, but at the close of the day there were still 29 enlisted personnel on the books of Troop C with 24 of those being present at Little Big Horn. This type thing is common with all of the wiped out Troops. It makes you wonder where these people come from. We do know that two Troop C men had their horses break down after the regiment split but before Custer was engaged. These two men, Thompson and another eventually rejoined the regiment later in the day, and Thompson was later awarded the Medal of Honor for action at LBH. I just wonder how widespread bad horse management was? Maybe the bad management was on the part of the leadership, in forcing the march so rapidly.
Horse cavalry is a delicate arm of the service as LT Cohill observed to Miss Dandridge in "She Wore A Yellow Ribbon"
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Post by Herb on Oct 12, 2010 13:07:17 GMT -5
A lot of intersting and great comments. Some scattershot thoughts. Chuck is indeed right, that the US Cavalry tradition was primarily based on a Dragoon tradition. In fact every horse regiment raised in the US prior to the 1850s was either a Dragoon Regiment or a Mounted Infantry Regiment (there is a difference). At the beginning of the Civil War, the Army formally did away with all distinctions between horse regiments renaming, reorganizing and renumbering them as simply cavalry (but dragoons in fact). Why Dragoons and not Cavalry? - well the then heavily forested eastern US and the enemies the US faced pretty much dictated that Dragoons should be the mounted arm of the US. Not until the US faced the open spaces of Texas and the Louisanna Purchase was there a peacetime need for true cavalry. There is an internal argument within cavalry (and armor today) whether the purpose of cavalry is shock action or mobile firepower. Sadly, the proponents of the argument, miss the point that cavalry is unique, in that it can do both. The MILITARY ART is knowing (or guessing right) when to apply which. I made the point severla pages ago, that I disagree with the preponderance of today's writings that hold Custer was on the offensive throughout the battle. I think that is dead wrong. Custer, very uncharacteristically was operating with a great deal of caution. In fact he was moving with such cautiom that he surrendered the initiative to the Indians, and again as Chuck as pointed with the Indian advantage of numbers and interior lines, he doomed his wing of the 7th. From vic Wier Point, Custer caught his first real sight of the village, and realized what he faced. He summoned Benteen and the Pack Train (the Pack Train alone had rougly the same number of men as Custer's wing). Custer clearly meant to attack the village from the flank with all the Regiment minus Reno's Battalion. From that point on Custer paused. While he moved is wing further along the flank of the village, these weren't offensive operations, but staging in preparation for the assault. Custer mounted reconnassaince operations trying to determine the optimum point to deliver the Regiment(-) attack. Except for the "demonstration" by Yate's Battalion at MTC Ford (to divert attention from Reno), there were no true offensive actions. Keogh's Bn, was essentially deployed in a Hasty Defense, to wait for Benteen. While Custer continued to recon for futureoffensive operations using Yate's Bn as a personal escort. The real problem for Custer, was that Yate's Demonstration at MTC Ford, succeeded beyond his wildest expectations and drew the virtually the whole Indian strength on to his wing. The result was still not certain, but when C Company's counterattack collapsed - panic ensued in C Company and rapidly spread to the other units. Panic like courage is contagious. The size of the village. John Grey's books provide the best analysis of the village, it's growth, movements, etc. This large village was far from unique. Custer's own attack on the Washita in 1868 stumbled into a complex actually larger in numbers but over a wider area. Kit Carson's fight at Adobe Walls during the Civil War involved another huge village complex. MacKenzie's fight at Palo Duro Canyon involved a village about 2/3rds the size of LBH.
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