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Post by Allen Wiener on Mar 24, 2011 22:41:27 GMT -5
I do see Richard's point, and I wouldn't rule it out entirely. There is Indian testimony that some soldiers did shoot themselves. Based on nothing but my own suspicions, given Custer's history, I think it more likely he would have been fighting and wondering what the hell had happened, where the hell was Benteen, etc. He had family all around him and may have instinctively felt a need to fight with them and for them. Also, he may have been killed early in this fight and didn't have that much chance to consider suicide. It's the sort of question that really has no answer and, in the end, really doesn't matter; like how Crockett died.
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Post by Richard Weddle on Mar 25, 2011 0:41:55 GMT -5
I concede the possibility that Custer may have been killed early in the battle and may not have had the chance to consider suicide. I also concede he may have shot himself, although I hate to think he did. There was a lot of discussion in the 1800s about saving the last bullet for one's self, and a common understanding about the reasons why. The reasons were not always selfish. To let the Indians catch you and kill you is to strengthen them in their minds and in their society. To some extent Custer and his men shared in this common understanding. This is something Custer buffs may want to explore further. That having been said, I agree with Allen Wiener: unanswerable questions that turn into "what if" debates are quite pointless.
Richard
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Post by Paul Sylvain on Mar 25, 2011 5:33:46 GMT -5
To let the Indians catch you and kill you is to strengthen them in their minds and in their society. "Counting coup" was a huge thing in Plains tribes' culture. To deny them of that act of "bravery" certainly might have been a consideration. Paul
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Post by Chuck T on Mar 25, 2011 10:21:46 GMT -5
I fully understand both Allen's and Richard's points. The last line from the poem/song "Fiddlers Green" speaks of such things as saving the last bullet in your revolver.
There is the "possability" in the scenario that I outlined a few posts ago, that Custer could have been wounded while in the cemetery area, and taken back to LSH to be treated by Doctor Lord. Indian testimony tells us that a party of cavalrymen were in this area for about twenty minutes and that there was some minor skirmishing with Wolf Tooth's band of about 40 +/- hostiles. How they determined twenty minutes is beyond me. Most who have speculated on this think it might have been Lieutenant Smith (of Company E) who was wounded.
In either event something drove them off of this ground. Again refering to the model I layed out earlier, that would make me lean more toward a small recon party at the cemetery with E close by and F on LSH, both to guard the recon party and E and act as sort of connecting file for Keogh who was expected to break contact and join them.
Getting back to the Custer possible suicide. The evidence available tells us that he sustained a body as well as a head wound. It also tells us that the degree of mutilation was to a lesser extent than many of the others. Folks who know of such things have pointed to this lesser degree of mutilation as prime evidence that Custer committed suicide. The tale has been told many times over. The one thing that mitigates against this in my mind is Custer's very combative personality. This, in short, would not be his way out based upon all we know of the man. Allen's point about being surrounded by family (and very close friends) strengthens this argument for me.
Head shots were not uncommon at close range. Head shots were not uncommon in finishing off wounded. Head shots were not uncommon also if the shot was fired by someone close to a mortally wounded Custer in the last moments of the fight to enable him to avoid the horrors of capture and torture. What happened to the wounded in such a fight is illustrated by the fate of Dorman in the valley.
All in all the evidence is inconclusive, therefore making a judgment based upon what we know to me falls into the catagory of futile. It is also much regretted that there was not someone like a Fox to throughly explore the cemetery before it became a cemetery. I believe if memory serves that he thinks there was some activity there, although he is not specific about what he thinks may have happened.
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Post by loucapitano on Apr 7, 2011 12:56:47 GMT -5
Based on the personal character of Custer throughout his military career, I think it's highly unlikely he would take his own life, especially while there was still men around him to command. I've alsoread speculations that Custer accompanies Companies E and F to the mouth of the Medicine Tail Coulee, was severly wounded by a shot from the villiage, and was carried back up the ridges to Last Stand Hill with the remnents of the other scattered companies. Most of the comments in this thread seem to agree he was not with E and F. I'm was hoping to get some discussion going from my March 13th post as to whether Custer arrived at the LBH on the 25th and day early, or that General Terry arrived a day late on the 27th. In other words, was Custer a "glory hound" or did he assume the Indians needed to be attacked immediately on the afternoon of the 25th rather than wait until the next morning? Again, any takers?
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Post by Allen Wiener on Apr 7, 2011 14:52:01 GMT -5
Regarding your last point, Lou, Custer's orders were to scout and find the Indians and then use his judgment as to what to do. The general orders were to drive them into the column that Terry would lead southward from the Yellowstone, thus catching the Indians in between, IF POSSIBLE. I do not think the orders (either written or verbal) were that specific or narrow. Custer was doing what Reno had tried to do a short time earlier, when he led his own scout, found the Indians, but then failed to attack. Custer thought it had been a mistake. He also was preoccupied with the fear that the Indians would scatter, as they normally did, and did not have any idea the camp he was searching for was so large, held so many warriors, or that they had aggressively attacked and nearly defeated a larger force under Crook on the Rosebud the week before. I don't think he was strictly a glory grabber, although he had a healthy ego and would love to have been the guy who brought that war to a close. All in all, I think Custer was just doing his job and made some bad decisions and had some really bad luck. He also went up against a very good force that fought well and without fear and that was both angry and determined to destroy the soldiers.
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Post by Herb on Apr 7, 2011 17:20:04 GMT -5
I'm was hoping to get some discussion going from my March 13th post as to whether Custer arrived at the LBH on the 25th and day early, or that General Terry arrived a day late on the 27th. In other words, was Custer a "glory hound" or did he assume the Indians needed to be attacked immediately on the afternoon of the 25th rather than wait until the next morning? Again, any takers? Lou, Check out the events vicinity of the Crow's Nest the morning of the 25th. It seems that Custer fully intended to spend the day and most of the night resting the regiment in that location, making a night movement and attacking the suspected village on the LBH the dawn of the 26th. It was only after Custer was convinced (mistakenly) that the regiment had been discovered and the village alerted, that he ordered the regiment's continued advance on the LBH on the 25th. As Alllen says his primary concern became that the village would scatter. Thus, Custer, against his original intention, the morning of the 25th, attacked a day early, and as you say Terry arrived a day late. Given the military era, total lack of communications between the columns, and the time, distances involved neither event was an unreasonable expectation. It was only the disaster on the LBH, that made these dates even points of discussion. One that both Custer and Terry apologists have seized on.
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Post by Chuck T on Apr 8, 2011 10:12:05 GMT -5
Herb & Allen: Seeing your posts I went and dug out a copy of Terry's order to Custer. While I have no idea if Terry gave Custer a verbal order or not, the written order says nothing about dates of attack or arrival. It tells Custer what to do in broad terms and also some very specific instructions on a few places to visit (actually scout) during his journey.
My question then is why would Custer feel compelled to attack at all. The mission was to subdue and drive/return the hostiles to the resevation.
This leads me to think that had Custer on the afternoon of the 25th moved with the entire regiment to the west of the village and taken up a defensive position either blocking or sitting astride any avenue the hostiles might take to the Big Horn Mountains, the hostiles would be placed in check. Custer would have good defensive ground of his own choosing. The hostiles would be forced to do one of three things. 1) Attack Custer, while moving the village north (toward Terry). 2) Move north (toward Terry) warriors, villlage and all. 3) Sit tight (in effect Checkmate).
There need not be a battle here, but if there is one it would be one fought on Custer's ground, and on Custer's terms.
All of this presumes that Custer would take the time (and he had the time despite what the discovery theorists say) for a through reconnaissance. All the presumes that Custer is soldier enough not to give into the impulse for shock action, without first realizing that shock action/effect is but one tool in the tool bag. All this presumes that he has no verbal order that would preculde such action.
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Post by Paul Sylvain on Apr 9, 2011 4:53:35 GMT -5
Perhaps, Chuck .... but the Washita comes to mind (a site I've visited) and the decision to attack Black Kettle's camp was predicated by a scout finding tracks leading to it -- tracks which were mistakenly thought to be raiders from Black kettle's camp when, in fact, he and his camp were not involved in those raids. The only thing that saved Custer's scalp from mass attack by war parties that swarmed up towards Black Kettle's camp and Custer from other camps further down the Washita was Custer's use of human shields (captured women and children from the camp).
Impulsive? I think he was, at the Washita and at LBH. The reason it has been speculated in some books that Custer (at LBH) was trying to get to the fleeing women and children at the far end of the camp was to use them as he had at the Washita. If he had, he might have lived to fight another day, but it obviously never happened and, in fact, might not have really been in his plans at all.
Paul
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Post by Allen Wiener on Apr 9, 2011 6:19:52 GMT -5
I think that Philbrick (and perhaps Fox & others; not sure as I'm on the road right now) made a good case for Custer deciding on seizing hostages in the latter part of the battle. His job was really to round up the "hostiles" and force them onto the agencies (reservations), not to engage in any more fighting than was necessary to achieve that. I believe it is also Philbrick who emphasizes that Custer was reliving Washita at LBH, and most authors have shown that he was preoccupied with the Indians scattering. He wasn't prepared for an aggressive counterattack, nor did he realize how many warriors were in the camp when he decided to attack.
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Post by Chuck T on Apr 9, 2011 11:39:29 GMT -5
Paul and Allen: I am always very careful when speaking about intentions at LBH. We have no firm knowledge that it was Custer's intent to seize hostages.
Custer's orders were indeed to get the hostiles back to the resevation. The method was left up to him. What I am saying in the above post is that it was possibly not necessary to make an attack on the village to accomplish those goals. He could have maneuvered in conjunction with Terry/Gibbon to place the hostiles and village in check. To do so would give the hostiles/village limited options. If it were done correctly the only options would be 1) The warroirs attack Custer while the village displaces. 2) The village and warriors displace together in the only direction available to them - toward Terry, with Custer on their trail and harassing their movement. 3) Do nothing.
The only real option is for the warriors to attack, what one would assume would be army positions on ground of his own choosing defended by soldiers who are alert for an attack.
Charging headlong into a village with an entire regiment together or in dispersed parts, without previous reconnaissance makes a grand picture from the brush of a Frederick Remmington, but they are poor tactics. Even more important it shows a defeciency in operational methodology.
You accomplish your mission with plans that suggest a reasonable amount of success. You do not expend resources when there are other ways to accomplish what you set out to do. The employment of cavalry in combat, despite the adage to ride to the sound of the guns, is not or should not be a headlong charge into oblivion, with little thought to consequences.
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Post by loucapitano on Apr 9, 2011 15:00:40 GMT -5
Chuck, I think you make some very valid points. Perhaps Custer's real deficiency was that it was assumed a commander with so many years of experience with the Indians would have the best ideas of how they would behave when under attack. His one tactic appeared to be to attack before the village could scatter like at Washita. This belief lead him to attack with only 2/3rds of his exhausted regiment rather than take the time for a full reconnaissance and a unified command. The results, a "perfect storm" of misfortune. (1)Village too big. (2) Too many warriors. (3) Warriors counter attack rather than flee. (4) Indian victory over Crook the previous week. (5) And we should not discount the visions of Sitting Bull which predicted a great Indian victory. What a shame. Then again, if it didn't happen, we'd be talking about something else right now. PS: Paul and Allen, what are you doing up so early? PSS: "You can take glory with you when it's time for you to go." Errol Flynn - They Died With Their Boots On - 1941. The movie that started it all for me.
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Post by Chuck T on Apr 9, 2011 15:45:16 GMT -5
I think he also said "These tights are killing me" when he filmed Robin Hood. Can't trust a thing this fellow says.
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Post by Allen Wiener on Apr 9, 2011 22:04:31 GMT -5
Chuck, I must admit that I'd never thought of your alternative scenario, which does make sense to me. It could have worked. Maybe if Custer had better intel he might have considered it, but as it was I think he was preoccupied with the fear of the Indians scattering (hence the Benteen scout).
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Post by Chuck T on Apr 9, 2011 22:29:23 GMT -5
Allen: You know the more I think about it the Benteen scout makes more sense to me at least in theory. What he could have done instead of sending Benteen is to send a small party of scout. I would suspect had they found anything worthwhile it would not have taken all that much time to send back a gallopers with news and then reorient the regiments axis of advance.
People have been blaming bad intel for Custer's defeat since it happened. I disagree. I think he had spot on operational intelligence. He went in, every one went in including General Sheridan with the idea that they would find from 900 - 1500 warriors in camp. Most modern sources starting with Eastman to our own era have settled on this approximate amount. He also knew in what general part of the battlespace they would be found by virtue of the Reno scout. What he lacked was not intelligence at this level but tactical reconnaissance, and that was no ones fault but his own. Rarely did his scouts venture much further forward than two or three miles. That is not adequate.
Custer had a terminal case of the hurries.
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