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Post by Chuck T on Feb 26, 2011 11:22:01 GMT -5
Then there is Keogh. The story is that a Papal Medal saved his body from mutilation. The story goes on that his NCO's surrounded the previously wounded Keogh and the Indians assumed he was a man of great distinction. When they found the medal that solidified the idea in the Indian's minds and pretty much left him alone. I don't know if there is any truth to any of this (except the wearing of the Papal Medal), but it makes an interesting story and one that would warrent some investigation into Indian lore. Just when you think you have them figured out they suddenly turn the other way.
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Post by Paul Sylvain on Feb 27, 2011 6:59:19 GMT -5
Hey, maybe one of Custer's men was so pissed off at the mess he'd gotten them into that he put a gun to Custer's head! We could start a good round of historical rumor-as-fact with this one. lol
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Post by loucapitano on Mar 7, 2011 18:34:50 GMT -5
I really enjoy this Custer discussion. Two fairly recent books on Custer are: Archeology, History and Custer's Last Battle by Richard Allan Fox, Jr. To Hell With Honor by Larry Skelnar - both University of Oklahoma Press. They add to some great Custer books of the past, Like Custer's Luck because they include the recent archeological digs at the site and reach several new conclusions. One that comes to mind was that Tom Custer was tatooed in many places on his body. This may account for his mutilation, the Indians might have thought of them as souvenirs to be removed like they did with scalps. The other questions that keeps haunting me is the written message to Benteen delivered by Pvt. John Martin to "be Quick and Bring Packs..." Custer's nephew Autie Reed was there and asked where was Custer. He then proceeded to ride alone to where Custer's troops were under attack. We know he made it, because his body was found near Last Stand Hill. If he could make it, couldn't Benteen have directed his command to rescue their comrads? The sight of more than 200 calvalry charging from the South might have caused the Indians some concern that there could be many more soldiers in the area. They might have retreated to protect the village. Of course, this is just speculation. Had Benteen followed orders, he might have saved the day. Then again, he might have simply added his men to the massacre. It's what makes the Last Stand so fascinating to us armchair historians. Lou Capitano - Custer fan since 1957 (when I saw "They Died With Their Boots On" with Errol Flynn.
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Post by Allen Wiener on Mar 7, 2011 20:02:57 GMT -5
Lou, I highly recommend the Fox book; it is essential. Prior to my first visit to LBH last September, I spent months reading and re-reading several books, including Jim Donovan's "Terrible Glory," Philbrick's "Last Stand," Gray's "Centennial Campaign" and his "Custer's Last Campaign," and I ended this marathon with Fox's book. Chuck ("Chieftan") had suggested many sources, all of which were very helpful, and he noted the detailed 3-D map that is sold at the LBH gift shop, which I ordered by phone. That map is very good and takes some time to study, but is well worth the effort. However, it was only after reading Fox that everything began to fall into place and I got my fullest understanding of what took place and where. Of course, I must tell you that there is simply no substitute for actually walking the ground itself. I spent a full 8 hours on the battlefield and took a couple of hundred pictures, along with some notes. I also owe my wife about 84 high-end dinners for her beyond-the-call-of-duty willingness to spend that whole day with me (of course, I suffered through more than that at the junk stalls in Italy alone!).
This kind of study is the best way to try and piece together the movements of the soldiers and warriors, but it can never tell us what went on in the minds of the commanders. We pretty much know what happened to Reno, and we can guess what Custer was about when he galloped off. If you go back over this and other Custer threads, you'll get plenty of opinions and interpretations. My own best guess is that Custer was preoccupied with the fear of the Indians running away, which had been their M.O. in the past. He wanted to duplicate what he'd done at Washita and surprise the camp, create chaos in it, take hostages, and force an Indian surrender. It actually might have worked and Sitting Bull later said that, despite the outcome, the battle was "a near affair" that could have turned out differently. But Custer had very poor intel. and had no idea how large the village was, how angry the Indians were, how determined they were to fight, and NOT run away (note that they had been equally aggressive a week earlier in attacking Crook on the Rosebud). He also had no idea just how large the village was or how many warriors it contained. Had he known these things, he might not have split his force as he did, or he might have thought twice about attacking at all.
Custer knew that Reno had fallen back, but I don't think he realized just how badly mauled his troops were or the fact that Reno was in no shape to renew his attack. I think Custer planned to find a crossing (which eluded him), attack the camp from the other end, thus drawing warriors away from Reno and giving him the chance to regroup and renew his attack. He also banked on Benteen responding quickly to the order you mentioned and throw his troops into the fight. Such a scenario might have created the chaos in the camp that Custer wanted.
I suppose there will always be arguments about Benteen's behavior. Personally, I think his dawdling was inexcusable, whether or not his appearance on the battlefield could have saved the day. It was his duty to respond to Custer as soon as he could. One of his excuses was that Custer's order also told him to "bring packs," meaning ammunition, but the supply train was far to the rear. Nonetheless. Benteen could have sent a messenger to the train and ordered them to send up all the ammo they could as fast as they could and to join he and Custer ASAP.
In his defense, when Benteen finally did move to join Custer, his path took him directly into Reno Hill, where he saw the deplorable state of those troops. He also realized that the Indians would probably renew their attack. Reno, who outranked him, more or less ordered him not to leave, but to stay and help him (Reno) prepare for a defense of the hill. All of that is reasonable, but neither of them thought to attempt to communicate with Custer or even to find him. Only when firing was heard from Last Stand Hill did a relief force move (somewhat reluctantly) in that direction (including the wounded), only to be driven back and barely escape attacking Indians who were, by this time, finishing off Custer's men anyway.
The men who survived Reno Hill applauded Benteen's leadership and it may be that they would not have survived had he not stepped in. He gets poor marks for not having his men work at digging entrenchments during the night of June 25, as Reno did, which cost the lives of a number of Benteen's men the next day when the warriors did renew their attack. But few troops had much confidence in Reno's leadership.
The Reno hearing always seemed to me a case of "cover your butt," partly because it was easy to blame Custer, who was dead and hated in Washington anyway, and partly because neither Reno nor Benteen liked Custer at all (Benteen despised him).
Anyway, that's my 2 cents.
Allen
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Post by Chuck T on Mar 7, 2011 21:55:04 GMT -5
Lou: I cannot see a word Allen wrote that I would change. He and I differ on some details, but are in general agreement about how things went.
Your comment about Reed. Reed passed Trumpeter Martin going the opposite direction while Martin was in route back to Benteen. We don't know the exact spot of course, but logic would say it is probably somewhere south of what became the Reno/Benteen area. Logic also tells us that this happened before Reno's retreat to the bluffs.
The pack train had been problematic for the entire movement to LBH. What is not often discussed is that the pack train had more personnel either assigned to it or guarding it than either Reno or Benteen had in their entire commands. Better than one quarter of the combat power of the 7th Cavalry then was guarding or driving a bunch of stubborn, hungry, thirsty mules.
Despite what courts of inquiry, professional historians, military theorists, and people like us who do it for fun might say, I don't think Custer had a prayer beyond the point where E&F united with C,I,&L either on Calhoun Hill, or the place I am begining to think more likely Baulmer-Nye-Cartwright Ridge a couple of hundred meters away. He had no way of knowing it of course but his goose was cooked.
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Post by Chuck T on Mar 8, 2011 11:08:36 GMT -5
Lou: I looked at your last post again this morning and saw that there was something you wrote that I failed to address last night.
I suppose ever since 26 June 76 people have been asking why Benteen, Reno or both did not ride to Custer's aid. Well in fact they did, belatedly of course, because at the time they reached Weir Point there was precious little that could be done to aid him. Reno was shattered down in the valley. Benteen was fresh but his horses were not, and the pack train was still half an hour behind.
Now let's for a moment speculate that both Benteen and Reno knew that Custer was in desperate straits, and there is a lot of questionable testimony about that. The first question that arises is what would be the proper avenue of approach to reach Custer, considering that they must execute a deliberate attack on the Indian's rear to relieve him. From the Reno/Benteen position there are essentially three avenues of approach which would bring them close enough to launch an attack.
1) Follow the route they did take ending at Weir Point. It is impossible to tell today because a road cut through the Point and as a result you cannot appreciate how it was in 76. At its very end I believe that the drop off would be much to great to use for an attack. Remember Custer did not use it opting instead for an approach march down Cedar Coulee. That could have been to maintain some concealment, but I think the nature of the Point also factored in.
2)Approach down Medicine Tail Coulee. This is a wide expanse certainly suitable for maneuver. The drawback is that it is bordered on both sides by high ground. Weir Ridge on the west, and Baulmer-Nye-Cartwright on the east. Had the relief force been caught in the Coulee by Indians on the high ground the game was up.
3)The last remaining is Baulmer-Nye-Cartwright Ridge along with its southern appendage Luce Ridge. Of all avenues this was the best and it would lead the relief force into the rear of Henryville and the southern part of Battle Ridge. Two problems pose themselves here. The ridge was relatively narrow which has attendent deployment issues, and the fact that the battle for Calhoun Hill was in all likelyhood over before they could have possibly gotten there, leaving them another mile or so to go before they could reach Custer.
So in the end anyone can blame whoever they might like to, there is enough to go around. Anyone can speculate that if Reno and or Benteen had done this or that the day and Custer may have been saved. Personally I believe that given the totality of the circumstances the 7th United States Cavalry was darn lucky to have escaped with a good whipping and not an overall cataclismic disaster.
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Post by Chuck T on Mar 8, 2011 18:12:06 GMT -5
PS To my last two: It was Boston Custer not Reed that Martin met while riding with the "Big Village" message. I should have checked my references instead of trusting in memory. Sorry. I think Boston was on the payroll as a packer. I can't remember if Reed had any official status.
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Post by Allen Wiener on Mar 8, 2011 19:28:11 GMT -5
Can't recall exactly, but didn't Boston also pass Benteen? I seem to recall this being reported, followed by the question: if Boston got to Custer in time, why couldn't Benteen?
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Post by Allen Wiener on Mar 8, 2011 20:25:35 GMT -5
Something recently dawned on me that I think I'd totally missed all along, and which I don't think writers on the LBH have discussed either; when Reno charged the village he must have been just as surprised by the size of it, and the ferocity of the warriors, as Custer was later. He, too, must have expected them to scatter. If so, Custer's "plan" (whatever it was) may have made sense to him: Reno starts to scatter a panicked village, the warriors run from him, only to run right into Custer, who (Reno might have imagined) was attacking from the other end of the village, or very soon would be. Remember, Custer promised Reno that he'd be supported by the entire regiment, which also fits this thinking. Even Benteen's scout makes more sense this way. Custer sent him out to look for Indians who might be scattering. It fits the scenario Custer was used to and expected and lent itself to him thinking more along the lines of Washita than what was about to transpire at LBH.
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Post by Chuck T on Mar 8, 2011 21:42:17 GMT -5
Allen: On Boston. I don't recall reading anywhere that Boston passed Benteen. He would have been coming from a different direction initially. He may have seen him at a distance but I don't think there was any contact.
I don't think that Reno realized the size of the village initially, nor until the weight of numbers manifested itself later in the afternoon, and after the retreat to the bluffs. All he could see from his vantage point in the valley was the first circle, vicinity of Garryowen Post Office. I believe the rest would be well hidden in the woodline. As to a plan, I think Reno conceived that he was being hung out to dry, bait for what Custer thought would be an enveloping trap. I don't think he was far wrong. Had the village been smaller. Had there been adequate fords located in the "just right" position. We would then be talking about an obscure defeat of Plains Indians. Would'a, Could'a, Should'a
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Post by Allen Wiener on Mar 9, 2011 9:20:35 GMT -5
Chuck, Apparently you're right about Boston; I thought I'd seen that in Gray, but I rechecked and it only says he passed Martin, the messenger.
Reno may have been bait, but I think that still fits the plan I described; if he drew away the warriors from the village it would give Custer time to move in from behind them and catch them in a trap. It might have worked had the village been smaller, had Custer quickly found a place to cross the river, etc. But the whole thing fell apart almost immediately. Once Custer knew Reno had been driven back, I begin to wonder what he was thinking, but we've been over that before!
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Post by Herb on Mar 9, 2011 10:19:08 GMT -5
IIRC (always a dubious proposition) Boston left the packtrain in response to an earlier messenger (the C Trp Sgt?). He passed Benteen while Benteen's command was watering at the great morass.
While Benteen's command had covered more ground and thus Boston was presumably on a fresher horse, and a single man can cover more ground faster than a column, the fact that Boston "made" it and Benteen didn't is still a particular damning piece of evidence against that officer, imo.
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Post by Chuck T on Mar 9, 2011 10:24:27 GMT -5
Allen: It absolutely fits the plan. If Reno had some success then all the better. Had he failed, as he did, then the overall plan was still intact, and Custer moving in on the rear as the Indians engaged Reno on their front would multiply Custer's shock effect when he attacked. It was a Hammer and anvil. Now we know what happened. We know the primary reason it happened - lack of reconnaissance.
The question of what Custer knew and when did he know it is something that will haunt students of this battle as long as it is studied. From all I have read, I have come to the conclusion that Custer knew that Reno was engaged. I believe he also knew that he had been checked and probably knew that he had retired to the timber. I don't think he had any idea that Reno became disorganized and shattered. So in the time between the retreat to the timber and the subsequent retreat (read route) to the bluffs, I think Custer was marching on Medicine Tail Coulee Ford in good faith. So if we could pin down the start of the retreat to the bluffs, which I have not been able to do with any degree of reliability, then I think we would have the clue needed to give up the proper time frame for both of the subsequent phases of the battle. Four thirty (Chicago Time, approximately 2:30 local)) is a pretty good mark for the arrival of Benteen on Reno's bluff position.
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Post by Chuck T on Mar 9, 2011 11:16:33 GMT -5
Wolfpack: I think again it is all about timing and there is a lot of details about this particular event we do not know. What we do know and what we can devine is this. Martin left with the "Come quick, bring packs" message at the time that Custer was decending from the bluff into Cedar Coulee and subsequently MTC. We also know that a some point in the journey Martins horse was hit by fire of one or more Indians he encountered in route. We can infer that all of this took place before Reno's retreat to the bluffs, for Martin makes no mention of encountering any of Reno's troopers. At some point he meets Boston who asked "Where is the general". The reply is "Just over the next ridge you will find him". The piece of terrain that would best fit this description is, I believe, what later became know as Sharpshooter Ridge. If that is true then Boston was fairly close to Custer when they met, probably on the Reno/Benteen site or slightly south of it. Supposedly Sgt. Knaipe, C/7 Cav, had about a two mile head start on Martin. Knaipe stoped at Benteen first while at the morass, and then on to the pack train. So, either Boston Custer must have left the pack train in advance of Knaipe's arrival, or there is something completely whacky about my time sequence/distance factors. Maybe both.
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Post by Chuck T on Mar 9, 2011 12:08:28 GMT -5
Acording to the Regimental Quartermaster Returns for June 76, Boston Custer was employed as a guide, and not a packer as I had indicated earlier. Now how he got that job is anyones guess. It is interesting to note that Boston Custer, with no known experience as a guide was paid at the same rate ($100 per month) as Reynolds and Herendeen men, of vast experience. Three other very experienced men were paid at the lower rate of $75 (Gerard and Dorman as interpreters) and Bloody Knife ($50) as a guide.
There is nothing in these documents that mentions Reed being on the payroll.
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