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Post by Herb on Apr 2, 2010 11:27:33 GMT -5
Gray is also defensive of Custer and does not see that much wrong with Custer did, given his experiences with Indians, his orders, and the situation as it played out. Allen My position get's pretty complex on this issue - I think Grey and Donovan are right on this issue. But, that while Custer's decision making, given what he knew at the time those decisions were made, were pretty sound. Where I find fault is three general areas - only one of which is truly tactical. The tactical area first, I feel that Custer seriously errored, when for whatever reason he sent Reno to attack the village with only three companies - this very clearly was the main effort and because of the immediate threat to the village the Indians would respond with everything they had. Granted Custer's so called experience (in truth he didn't have that much) of Indian tribes scattering and his desire to capture the women and children and hold them as hostages, this was still a subordinate mission and should have been given to a subordinate cdr with a much smaller force. Leadership. Custer led a bitterly divided 7th to the LBH. Custer knew that and he was largely responsible. Benteen was a malcontent and a disruptive force in the 7th, long before this campaign was ever mounted. It was Custer's job to deal with this cancer long before June 25th, and he didn't. Commandership. This one's harder to explain, but it is the responsibilty of the senior commander to know the strengths and weaknesses of his subordinates and their units and to use that knowledge to his advantage. Basically, no matter how personally uncomfortable it was, Custer should have kept his least reliable subordinate, Benteen, and Benteen's battalion under Custer's personal attention.
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Post by Allen Wiener on Apr 2, 2010 13:36:18 GMT -5
I agree and the situation with Benteen has always puzzled me. Benteen had it in for Custer at least as far back as Washita and his perception that Custer had abandoned some of his men there. But I think his resentment of Custer ran deeper; I think he resented the guy in general and the attention and status he received from superiors. And, as you say, even though Custer was aware of this, he really didn't seem to take it into account in his plans.
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Post by garyzaboly on Apr 2, 2010 15:53:25 GMT -5
I agree and the situation with Benteen has always puzzled me. Benteen had it in for Custer at least as far back as Washita and his perception that Custer had abandoned some of his men there. But I think his resentment of Custer ran deeper; I think he resented the guy in general and the attention and status he received from superiors. And, as you say, even though Custer was aware of this, he really didn't seem to take it into account in his plans. True enough. Benteen had an issue with Custer's character and leadership, and it ran back to the Washita affair. The Crow and Arikara acouts had warned Custer that the Little Big Horn village ahead of him was huge. He didn't believe them, and sent Reno into a hornet's nest---as if 130 troopers could ride through over 1,500 warriors--- without proper backup. When Custer finally emerged down Medicine Tail Coulee, he was still no where near the northern end of the village. Weir talked up a storm about going to his rescue, but he didn't realize how many warriors there were, and the rescue column was also quickly turned back, either. Reconnaissance!
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Post by Jim Boylston on Apr 2, 2010 16:11:24 GMT -5
I think Custer just didn't want to be around Benteen, and their mutual dislike interfered with his command decisions. As Herb pointed out, if there's a guy you know you can't trust, you should keep him under supervision. Jim
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Post by Paul Sylvain on Apr 2, 2010 16:23:46 GMT -5
Folks -- If you want an interesting read on the LBH, I highly recommend "The Day The World Ended At Little Big Horn; a Lakota History" by Joseph M. Marshall III.
This book is based on many of the oral tales passed on and which Marshall heard growing up on the Rez. It is, however, well-balanced and offers a fresh perspective on the camp, the logistics of maintaining camp with so many people and horses, etc., there and so on. The actual battle is only a small part of this book. The bigger part of the book goes into how and why there was such a large gathering of tribes at that spot at that time.
In fact, the tribes had been at LBH -- or "the greasy grass" -- a relatively short amount of time, having been forced to move from another camp site when the large pony heard had grazed the area out.
Just reading about what a typical lodge consisted of, how long it took to break and erect a camp, how many horses each warrior had, and all of that, was totally fascinating. I don't often recommend a book, but this one is worthy of it.
Paul
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Post by garyzaboly on Apr 2, 2010 16:27:53 GMT -5
Benteen's commentaries immediately after the Washita affair make interesting reading; it went beyond any kind of envy to a disappointing distrust of Custer's tactical abilities. Benteen himself had a clean, courageous war record, both in the 1861-65 conflict and earlier plains encounters.
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Post by Allen Wiener on Apr 3, 2010 0:50:34 GMT -5
I forget now where Custer got his ideas about the size of the village, but I believe he or his scouts mis-read some signs that actually showed several other large groups of Indians had moved toward the LBH to join those already there. Instead, they thought those groups had moved away from LBH. Also, no one had calculated, or knew about, the increased number of fighting Indians who had joined the band. These were the so-called "summer roamers" - Indians who lived on the reservation much of the year, but bolted to join their friends and relatives during the summer. Nor did Custer know about the fight the Indians had with Crooke on the Rosebud only about a week before LBH. He stuck with his belief that the Indians were going to scatter and run once attacked, not realizing they had fought a pitched battle with Crooke and showed no sign of running there; nor were they about to run at LBH.
I still hope to get to LBH this year and want very much to travel the actual ground there. I've seen many maps, photos, and paintings, but still have a hard time picturing the terrain; I want to see it. I don't understand how Custer could feel confident once he began his ride up the ridge, saw Reno fighting at the southern end of the village, and must have been able to see how big a village it really was. Some time later he learned that Reno had been driven back by the Indians, but proceeded with his attack anyway, perhaps believing he'd draw warriors away from Reno, giving him a chance to counterattack. He drew the warriors away, all right, and took the brunt of the Indians fury that day.
Allen
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Post by garyzaboly on Apr 3, 2010 5:03:47 GMT -5
Right, Allen, it was essentially a failure of reconnaissance. The method of attack, from several directions at once, had served most commanders well on the plains, but Custer ignored the warnings of his scouts after the signs of the huge migration trail, and the great horse herd---which he couldn't see---moving like "maggots" on the hills far far away.
In the opening scenes of SON OF HE MORNING STAR, the actor playing Benteen said it best, when explaining what had happened, "Mistakes were made." As they always are, in war. War always seem exhiliratingly easy at the outset.
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Post by Paul Sylvain on Apr 3, 2010 6:28:46 GMT -5
From "The Day the World Ended at Little Bighorn" (Joseph M. Marshall III):
"Never before, the stories say, and certainly not since, has there been an encampment the size of the Little Bighorn gathering in the summer of 1876. It stretched for two miles along the river, and almost 200 yards at its widest point. ...
"Just before the battle, the encampment along the Little Bighorn had relocated from the site along Ash Creek, some eight miles to the southeast, where it had been for a month or more. Growing numbers of people and horses necessitated the move. The horses had grazed down the grass considerably, so fresh forage was needed for them. When the soldiers attacked, the Little Bighorn encampment had been in place for only a few days. ...
"The arrangement of the Little Bighorn encampment began with the Hunkpapa at the southern end, then the Itazipacola, Mniconju, Sihaspa, Isanti Dakota, Ihanktunwan Nakota, the Sicangu and Oohenunpa together, and Oglala and Sahiyela at the northern end. All around the edges, especially close to the river, were small temporary campsites of unmarried men or men who had come without their families. Near the center were pitched several warrior society lodges and at least one large meeting or council lodge. ...
"The camp was situated among groves of trees, mostly large old-growth cottonwoods, many of which were taller than the tops of the lodge poles. Even from the ridges across the river (as the soldiers realized), it was difficult to see into the encampment."
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Post by Herb on Apr 3, 2010 10:57:55 GMT -5
It's hard for me to defend Custer, for I really don't have much respect for him as an officer, based on some of his lesser known "exploits" in the Civil War and his actions in Kansas in 66(?).
But, it's important to remember that even though he questioned his scouts at the Crow Nest, he did trust them, and decided to encamp in that vicinity. He planned on a predawn movement and an attack on the camp on the dawn of the 26th. It was only a series of three "accidents" that convinced him he had been discovered (he hadn't) and caused him to change his plan and order an immediate movement to contact instead of the more deliberate attack he was planning for the next day.
Something else to keep in mind, is though Custer did not know Crook had been defeated on the Rosebud, just a couple of days earlier, Custer did know that Reynolds operating under Crook's command had been defeated back in March - with a command roughly half the size of Custer's. And, Reynold's had only attacked one camp, the Cheyenne, in the dead of winter.
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Post by garyzaboly on Apr 3, 2010 12:58:40 GMT -5
Whenever I read about Custer, I usually prefer the original accounts (CUSTER MYTH, CUSTER IN 76 etc)...nowhere else can you get a truer picture of what happened than by digesting these accounts yourself and formulating your own opinion. What's always struck me about the moments before Custer ordered his final advance was that he still had no concept what he was riding against, or the kind of geography he would encounter. Even at the Washita his failure to reconniter led him to discover, after the attack, that there were other villages encamped nearby (and in as broad a swath as at Little Big Horn). He barely got out of that situation, too. One analogy would be Pulleine at Isandhlwana: thousands of Zulus encamped so close by without him knowing it---also a failure of reconnaissance.
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Post by sloanrodgers on Apr 3, 2010 17:12:23 GMT -5
"This ain't the Washita River, General, and them ain't helpless women and children. They're Cheyenne brave and Sioux. You go down there if you got the nerve." -- Jack Crabb
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Post by Kevin Young on Apr 3, 2010 17:43:18 GMT -5
"This ain't the Washita River, General, and them ain't helpless women and children. They're cheyenne brave and Sioux. You go down there if you got the nerve." -- Jack Crabb ;D Was watching that myself on TMC!
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Post by Kevin Young on Apr 3, 2010 18:03:41 GMT -5
I picked up Michael Elloitt's Custerology and found it a fun read. I got it when I visted the Washita battlefield a couple of years ago so it was a great time killer as I road shotgun a on rather long trip. I am really into historiography so it was my kind of book.
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Post by sloanrodgers on Apr 3, 2010 18:06:22 GMT -5
I once knew Custer relatives that lived in Austin and thought he was a great general. Well, at least until this 1970 movie convinced me to read about the true little big man. ;D
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