The Alamo as a Refuge

[elcolorado]

I'd like to touch on something Stuart said in another thread. Stuart described the Alamo as a "refuge" as opposed to a fortress. This caused me to raise my eyebrows and scratch my whiskers. I've done some think'n on this and have concluded for myself that Stuart is absolutely right. The Alamo, after all, was designed and built as a sanctuary.

First, I took a number of long looks at Mark's pictures. Clearly, the Alamo is a "fortress" in name only. The walls and other structures were a crumbling ruin and unable to provide adequate protection. Gen. Cos tried to improve the defensive capability of the Alamo but wasn't able to finish the fortifications in the compound.

Again, as I view Marks pictures and study the improvements made by Cos, I began to consider just what Cos' intentions for the Alamo were. And it appears to me that Cos was improving the Alamo as a "post." The purpose was to provide shelter for men and materiel - a base of operation.

I also get a feel that Cos was turning the Alamo into one huge battery, capable of providing artillery support for combat actions outside the Alamo, as in the battle of Bexar. And there seems to have been little consideration given to improving the walls for riflemen, given the limited number of firing steps, banquettes, parapets, etc. Obviously, Cos, with his large force of soldiers, wasn't concerned about fighting a defensive battle from within the Alamo.

Once the Texans took possession of the Alamo, I'm not too sure they knew what to do with it. Some of the letters from Col. Neil and G.B. Jameson appear to be looking for direction or guidance from the Texas leadership. Although Jameson was able to effect limited improvements upon the defenses, the Alamo remained a work-in-progress.

When Santa Anna arrived much earlier then expected, the shocked and surprised Texans had nowhere to go and were compelled to take refuge inside the unfinished fortification. The negligent Texans were almost completely unprepared for combat. And could do little more then wait to be rescued.

I find it a bit ironic that the Alamo was created as a sanctuary and in 1836 fulfilled it's main purpose... becoming a refuge for 13 days for 183 men. Good call, Stuart!

Glenn

[Jim Boylston]

Stuart, Wolfpack, and I visited Goliad last March, and I hope they'll weigh in on this thread with their observations about that "fortress" as well.
It was an eye-opening visit, to say the least.
Jim

[sloanrodgers]

This is an interesting perspective that I have never heard before. I can see
how the mission went from refuge to fort, then back to refuge again. Sadly
it now looks like neither. It is mostly a depository for Chineese-made crap,
myths and a modicum of history. I wonder what the site's next incarnation
will be if Foreman's project isn't adopted. We shall see.

[Rich Curilla]

If you think of Cos' original fortifications -- visualize them on a plat -- you find that the overall configuration of the batteries had nothing to do with *forting up.*

The batteries in the town were only on the north edge of the plazas, facing north. The Alamo batteries (Fortines de Teran, Condelle and Cos) also covered the north and east. Cos didn't build the SW emplacement (I don't think), nor did he emplace any cannon at the other corners of the town plazas.

Thus, in my mind, his defense was planned as a half-mile long line starting with the guns at the entrances of Acequia St. and Soledad St. and ending with the apse battery in the Alamo church. True, he built the palisade and tambour and emplaced guns there, but I believe this was just to protect munitions stored in the Alamo, not to fortify it.

[stuart]

Yes I have to agree, and picking up on Jim's hint, the thing that struck us about the Goliad defences which applies equally well to the Alamo was that they were aimed at providing a measure of security rather than built as military fortifications.

They were simply secure compounds where goods and livestock could be protected from casual theft and Comanche raiders. They were never intended as military fortifications capable of standing up to artillery and a proper siege.

So far as the artillery is concerned, while its really a thread in itself, its very hard to avoid the impression that in the first place the concentration was accidental and built up over a long period of time. It was "collected" rather than planned and the subsequent emplacement owed more to an attitude of "well we've got all these guns, where can we put them" rather than any properly thought out fire-plan - or the availability of resources to service them.

Jameson was essentially a fantacist turned loose on the place and perhaps one of the reasons why he had so much difficuolty in getting men to work on the place before Santa Anna came knocking was that everybody in Bexar saw that and steered well clear of his "mad" ideas.

Has anyone ever done a proper analysis of just what it would have taken in terms of time and manpower to do what he wanted - bearing in mind that even Cos' rather more modest plans never had time to be completed.

[elcolorado]

The Texans reluctance or refusal to work was due to several factors.

No money to pay the volunteers with was one of the biggest complaints. Col's Neil and Travis were constantly asking the dysfunctional Texas government for money and other badly needed supplies. But the pleas for aid seemed to fall on deaf ears. The volunteers in Bexar must have felt abandoned by their own leaders...motivation and moral - low.

The leadership in Bexar was in trouble. If Neil had his problems with the volunteers, it was only made worse when Neil left and Travis was appointed commander. If Neil left Travis any instructions other then "hold down the fort," I'm unaware of it. We know Travis didn't want to be there. He probably viewed himself as a "babysitter" and the Texans may have picked up on his attitude. Also, Travis was only "filling in" for a few weeks while Col Neil was away and it's unlikely the men took Travis' directives seriously. And then the was the clash of personalties and leadership styles between Travis and Bowie. So IMO, the leadership in Bexar, at the time, was ineffectual and confusing.

And lastly, there was the belief that Santa Anna wasn't going to be a threat until Spring. So, a certain amount of complacency has to be factored in.

Glenn

[TRK]

rlcgtt said:

The batteries in the town were only on the north edge of the plazas, facing north.

Dr. Joseph Field, who served during the 1835 siege and storming of Bexar, wrote in 1836 that in Béxar, the "centre of the military operations [was] a square, enclosed on all sides by stone houses, with streets running from all the corners parallel and at right angles with the sides of the square." He was clearly referring to at least the Main Plaza, and, possibly, to the combination of Main and Military Plazas, when he continued that there were fortifications, each of which included provisions for "cannon," at "the entrance of every street, with the exception of that leading to the Alamo." This implies that there were barricades designed to accommodate artillery all around the plazas, not just on the north side. Field's account is at: www.tamu.edu/ccbn/dewitt/musterbexar8.htm page 8.

Another eyewitness and participant of the storming, Henry C. Dance, wrote in April 1836 that "at the entrence of each street was a dich 9 feet deep and 15 wide and imbankment throwed on sides a Breast work and mounted cannon to rake every St[reet] and cannon 18 in number." [ibid.]

Is there good, contrary evidence that the Mexicans constructed batteries only on the north side of the plazas, facing north, in Béxar in 1835?

[stuart]

Thinking out loud here I suppose once again it all depends on what you mean by batteries. A small gun poking through a barricade purely in order to be able to fire down a particular street might be a sensible idea to cover the immediate approach to the barricade, but it wouldn't necessarily be recognised as a "battery"

[TRK]

Well, even if they weren't "batteries," Field and Dance both are firm that all of the fortifications (or barricades, or breastworks, or whatever) on the corners of the plaza were similar in design and intention.

[Herb]

The American Military Tradition, is part of the problem we have, in truthfully looking at this situation. We have a natural tendency to think of the Ohio River Valley "forts" when we think of forts not a fortification designed by engineers to accomplish a specific military task. These Ohio Valley palisades and blockhouses were truthfully, nothing but refuges from the French and Indian and later British and Indian attacks. In this tradition Goliad and the Alamo are indeed forts (and for very similar reasons). To the Texas emigrants from America, this tradition was probably so ingrained, that the stone and adobe walls looked much stronger than what they really were.

Cos, was not trying to turn the Alamo or Bexar into a fort in the true military sense, but simply preparing to defend an isolated (and key) position until relieved. In the modern sense, we'd say Cos was preparing to defend a Battle Position, by emplacing long range direct fire weapons (cannon) on the enemy's avenues of approach and throwing up earthworks to protect these weapons and his men and reinforcing the natural and man made defensive positions already there.

To the Texians in 1835, capturing Bejar and removing Cos's Army as a threat was an obvious course of action. The problem for the Texians was what do you do with Bexar and the Alamo once that had been accomplished. It was a question that never was answered

[stuart]

wolfpack said:

The American Military Tradition, is part of the problem we have, in truthfully looking at this situation. We have a natural tendency to think of the Ohio River Valley "forts" when we think of forts not a fortification designed by engineers to accomplish a specific military task. These Ohio Valley palisades and blockhouses were truthfully, nothing but refuges from the French and Indian and later British and Indian attacks. In this tradition Goliad and the Alamo are indeed forts (and for very similar reasons). To the Texas emigrants from America, this tradition was probably so ingrained, that the stone and adobe walls looked much stronger than what they really were.

Summed up perhaps by the expression "forting up"

[Rich Curilla]

rlcgtt said:

The batteries in the town were only on the north edge of the plazas, facing north.

Now you've got me wondering, TRK. You are right. I have seen these accounts -- had not remembered their description of cannons at every entrance other than "that leading to the Alamo." (Wonder if he meant Potrero St. or Calaboso St.? One led to the Alamo via the footbridge; the other via the ford at La Villita.)

My comments came, I guess, from an incorrect impression formed in my mind by the descriptions of other participants who stressed the northern batteries, no doubt because these were the ones in their face as they attacked down Soledad and Acequia Streets.

[Rich Curilla]

Actually, now that I think of it, I was there! At least according to Frank Thompson. On page 48 of his novelization of The Alamo (2004), during his description of the Battle of Bexar, he says, "A shot rang out and a Texian named Curilla grabbed his arm in pain, blood seeping through his fingers." Does this count?

[TRK]

rlcgtt said:

Does this count?

Sure, Rich: only, you were so distracted by that bullet in the arm, you didn't notice those barricades and cannon on the southern ends of the plazas

[elcolorado]

I'm really surprised the Texans themselves didn't learn from the lesson they taught Cos. After retreating from the town, Cos elected to withdraw into the Alamo. The old mission became Cos' refuge. The Mexicans had the numbers to adequately man the Alamo. Somewhere between 800 to 900 soldados and numerous cannon. But in the end it didn't matter. 300 Texan volunteers forced Cos to capitulate and the fort fell into their hands. The Alamo failed as a fort for Cos.

Of course, there were a number of other existing factors that forced Cos' hand. The Alamo was poorly provisioned and could not support the large number of troops seeking safety within the crumbling walls. Troop quality was certainly an issue - too many convicts, too many conscripts, too few professionals. Morale low - desertions high. And relief was nowhere in sight.

I find it interesting when I look at Cos' actions and see the Texans on a parallel course of retreat - withdraw - entrapment. That the Texans could not... or would not see the 'hand writing on the wall' was a terrible blunder. Cos clearly demonstrated to Bowie, to Neill, and all the volunteers that remained in Bexar that even with a large garrison the Alamo was a death trap.

So does anyone believe Fannin's 300 man relief column would have been anything more then additional fuel for the funeral pyres?

Houston was justified in his skepticism in regards to "forting up."

Glenn