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Post by marklemon on Oct 22, 2007 9:07:31 GMT -5
According to the available sources, loopholes were the extent of the defenders' attempts at improving their lot along most of the open stretches of walls. The only Texian digging/excavating for which documentaion exists was done on the inner portion of the north wall, which I depict. Labastida, who has been proven to be extremely accurate by archeology, shows no such banquettes along the north extension of the Long barracks, and, barring any documentation of them, the only responsible thing to to is not show any such improvements. The interior ditches shown by Navarro were shown not only in areas of the jacales, but also in structures which we know had solid concrete roofs, so this tends to point reasoning towards interior ditches rather than indicating banquettes.
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Post by elcolorado on Oct 23, 2007 13:31:36 GMT -5
Mark. Since viewing your pictures, like Stuart, I also have some difficulty with the jacales. I find it inconceivable that the Texans would have been so foolish as to leave a large stretch of wall undefended and vulnerable. I won't debate the archaeological evidence....or the lack of it. Instead, I look at, not just logic, but the way the attack and battle unfolded. I believe Romero's attack column targeted the North section of the East wall - the jacales, and not the outer courtyard (livestock pens). Speed and silence were essential to Santa Anna's attack plan. So sending 300 men splashing, slipping, and sloshing through the flooded area to attack the outer courtyard wouldn't make sense. Attacking the Northeast wall and adjoining gate does. Clearly, Santa Anna wanted to envelop and overwhelm the Northern portion of the Alamo compound as quickly as possible. But as evidence suggests, the attack bogged down due to stiff resistance. Such was the resistance from the Alamo defenders that Santa Anna felt compelled to commit his reserves to the battle. Had the East (jacale) wall been unmanned and undefended, I feel Romero's attack column would have been over the wall and in the compound in a matter of minutes. From there, Romero's men could have, and would have, taken the defenders on both the North and West walls in the rear. Romero's soldiers would have also been in position to prevent the Texans from reaching the Long Barracks for a last stand. In short, I believe the battle would have ended much sooner then the reported 60-90 minutes. But that isn't what happened. I feel that the Texans, certainly Jameson, at some point, would have recognized that they were vulnerable to attack along the East (jacale) wall and built some sort of parapet...or banquette...or something. If not before the siege, then possibly during the siege. I think even "Forest Gump" would have had the good sense to construct defenses of some kind on or along the East wall. If indeed, the East (jacale) wall was unoccupied and undefended, one would have to question Santa Anna's battle plan. Why throw so many men against the heavily defended North wall when East (jacale) wall was wide open?? I agree that the Texans were neglegent...I just don't think they were blind. Just my opinion. Glenn
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Post by stuart on Oct 23, 2007 16:09:58 GMT -5
Comes back again to what they did after February 23. To my mind stripping thatch off the jacales would have been a pretty elementary step even for an amateur like Jameson. After that it may be a mistake to get too hung up on solid constructions like earthworks. Temporary firing steps could have been improvised from all manner of materials - including the roof structures of the jacales.
Nevertheless I still can't help but feel that Romero was always intended to attack the north wall, but came at it from the east to minimise casualties from the Texian guns. That in turn however would raise a questionmark over Ducque's intended role. Was he really intended to assault straight in or just to draw the Texians attention while the real assault was mounted by Romero? Did he rush in, perhaps encouraged by a lack of alertness on the Texians' part, instead of hanging back until after Romero hit them?
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Post by Jim Boylston on Oct 23, 2007 16:12:38 GMT -5
First off Glenn, I'm glad you reopened this can of worms because there are considerable differences of opinion among us on this issue. I'm of the camp that the defenders didn't do much during the siege, and had very little in the way of leadership. There are a lot of things about the history of the siege and battle that defy logic...the various reports that the defenders were asleep, for example, rather than at their posts... Potter's report that mentions the palisade being undefended at the time of the attack, and so on. While these claims seem outrageous, I don't think they are at odds with the way the battle played out. If, for example, the walls were largely undefended, it makes sense that the battle only lasted about an hour. It likewise makes the Mexican casualty reports seem a lot more realistic. IMO, there was a serious lack of command, bordering almost on dereliction of duty.
I agree with you here, and also think that Romero was concerned about his exposed flank had he attacked from the east.
We disagree somewhat here. I tend to think the "stall" at the north was due to a couple of factors...the convergence of too many soldados on one area at on time, and Duque taking a hit. I think SA might have misread the situation and acted too quickly in sending in the reserve, as later criticism suggests. I believe the north wall fell quickly, that the soldados were under the guns before the defenders were in position, and were up and over sooner rather than later.
Remember though the danger from artillery atop the church. It could have commanded that front with few defenders along the east wall.
But there's those pesky complaints about the men not working!
A north wall attack pretty much eliminated the possibility of taking flanking fire. Not so elsewhere.
Jim
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Post by Allen Wiener on Oct 23, 2007 17:30:47 GMT -5
That in turn however would raise a questionmark over Ducque's intended role. Was he really intended to assault straight in or just to draw the Texians attention while the real assault was mounted by Romero? Did he rush in, perhaps encouraged by a lack of alertness on the Texians' part, instead of hanging back until after Romero hit them? Perhaps, but the entire attack was intended to be a surprise and they nearly pulled it off, so why any planned feint at all? The Texians did get off at least a few rounds of canon fire from the north, which seems to have caused at least some temporary disarray. Also, Cos hit the western side of the north end at the same time that Romero was hitting the east end. I think the Mexicans knew how few Texians were in the fort and the idea was to simply overwhelm them by forcing those few numbers to defend more area than they could against such superior numbers. I also agree with Jim that the north end was chosen at least partly to avoid fire on their flanks; the same may have been true of Morales at the south/southwest section (assuming there was no real threat from the lunette). I also agree that, with Bowie out of it, there was a distinct lack of experienced or qualified leadership in the place. Add the usual stubborn independence of the volunteers or "militia," who had been commanded by Bowie, which might have added to a general lack of cooperation or discipline. This was not a trained, experienced army by any means. Frankly, Travis seemed a lot better at writing eloquent letters than commanding. As to defense of the jacales, it is possible that some effort was made to prepare a defense there, but by the time the attack came, the Texians were surprised and likely rushed to the point of greatest danger, which was the north wall. I also have to wonder why at least some Mexicans didn't simply attempt to attack the jacales area if, indeed, there was no defense evident there. Something I've always wondered about is the degree of specific plans for an attack that Travis might have drawn up. Were specific groups assigned to specific stations? Was the breakout(s) planned? Was there really an order for the last man to blow up the powder magazines? Was Travis aware that the main attack was likely to come from the north? How well trained were the gun crews? We don't have the kind of memoirs from the Texians that the Mexicans later published about their side. AW
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Post by Herb on Oct 23, 2007 18:52:35 GMT -5
That in turn however would raise a questionmark over Ducque's intended role. Was he really intended to assault straight in or just to draw the Texians attention while the real assault was mounted by Romero? There's a tendency to think of Duque's assault as the main effort, I did some work on the strengths of the various columns on another site, which I shared with Jim, that has been sadly lost, that seems to suggest that Duque was instead a supporting attack. Commander's normally weigh the main effort through providing greater combat power (Men), supporting fire (none for the any of the Alamo assaults) providing extra combat support (again none) and by selecting the commander who is to make the main assault. As I said I no longer have the figures, but I remember that Cos's column was the strongest followed very closely by Romero's, there was a significant drop off from Romero to Duque. This suggests to me that Santa Anna very deliberately weighed the flank attacks and that Duque was actually mounting a supporting attack. The fact that Cos's column was numerically the strongest and that Cos was the only General Officer actually commanding a column suggests that Cos was in fact making the main effort. This also make sense in Cos was attacking, imo, the weakest point in the defenses, (the least cannon and the fewest obstacles, man-made or natural). Again, this also follows if, as many many of us believe, that Santa Anna's intent was to drive the defenders toward the SE and the waiting cavalry.
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Post by marklemon on Oct 23, 2007 20:30:40 GMT -5
I understand those out there who want to use logic to "construct" defensive features, but it simply isn't enough to validate my putting them there. Especially since the available data directly refutes such firing steps. I determined, from the very start, to follow the data, and not let my personal feelings, of "coolness," or logic, cloud my thinking. Labastida, who was fairly meticlous in his rendering of defensive features, even to the point of delicately, and accurately, drawing the denticulated trench in the northeast courtyard, showed nothing in the area in question (Long Barracks extension). Sanchez-Navarro, who seemed manic in drawing firing steps, even where there were none, did not draw them there. These, and other things, lead me to confidently depict that section of wall as I did. But it does leave open some other possibilities: 1. The jacale rooms, six, I think, had east-facing windows. Two or three were covered by the earthen ambankment, but the remaining ones, like all other outward-facing windows were undoubtedly loopholed, as noted by Sanchez-Navarro and others. 2. The wall was roughly 11 feet tall, and, to a large degree, sheltered by the standing pools of water to the east. As drawn by Labastida, these two connecting ponds covered the entire eastern face of the fort, extending even a little beyond a line even with the north wall. These ponds have, in my opinion, long been overlooked, or dismissed, by students in their impact on any attacking force from that direction. Even if they were only five or six inches deep, the earth beneath them was a quagmire. Any advancing infantry force would be literally floundering in a few moments, in the dark with their shoes being sucked off of their feet, all the while being enfiladed with artillery fire from atop the church, as well as the northern courtyard gun, and rifle fire from the north courtyard wall. Any infantry commander worth the name would have his men oblique to the north to get out of the mess, and away from the fire. This effectively puts Romero's column at or near the northwest corner, where in fact they ended up. My point is that the Texians must have felt that the ponds, in conjunction with the enfilading artillery fire that could be brought to bear, comprised an effective barrier to attack. 3. My doubtfulness regarding firing steps, or banquettes along this wall does not rule out some other makeshift measure that, after the melee of combat, either was knocked down, or which escaped the notice of both Labastida and Navarro, ie: some planks laid across the tops of the standing walls, accessed by a ladder or two. That seems much, much more likely for the work-averse Texians to have done, instead of the mammoth task of digging firing steps to reach up to a 11 or 12 foot wall! This the Mexicans even did not do. Note that the north-running wall, for half its distance from the Sacristy to the northeast corner of the eastern courtyards, was 11 or 12 feet tall, and had absolutely no defensive features built behind it. I submit that this was the same reason that the north extension of the long barracks was devoid of any substantial defensive structure. 4. As alluded to previously, there was fire that could be brought to bear upon any force attacking this wall. Not only did a good artillery angle of fire exist to defend this place, but riflemen, firing from the north courtyard wall, and atop the granary, and even the extreme northeast corner house, which still had its flat roof, all combined to protect this sector. Mark
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Post by stuart on Oct 24, 2007 7:40:40 GMT -5
That in turn however would raise a questionmark over Ducque's intended role. Was he really intended to assault straight in or just to draw the Texians attention while the real assault was mounted by Romero? Did he rush in, perhaps encouraged by a lack of alertness on the Texians' part, instead of hanging back until after Romero hit them? Perhaps, but the entire attack was intended to be a surprise and they nearly pulled it off, so why any planned feint at all? AW Herb's comments about the numbers only underlines the likelihood that Ducque was never originally intended to head the assault, but he certainly wouldn't be the first or the last officer to come to grief in this way. I firmly believe on the available evidence this is what went wrong - inasmuch as it did go wrong. Ducque was intended to fix the attention of the north wall defenders while Cos and Romero maneouvred into position, but finding that the Texians seemed to be asleep he threw caution to the winds and tried for a coup de main by converting his diversion into a full-blown frontal assault which only alerted the Texians to their danger and resulted in the unnecessary casualties Santa Anna was clearly hoping to avoind by sending Cos and Romero in from the flanks
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Post by Jim Boylston on Oct 24, 2007 7:55:20 GMT -5
Maybe part of the problem here is the use of the term "feint". I'm not convinced any of these movements were feints. This term was used a lot in reference to Morales' movements too, and I think most of us here are in agreement that Morales' actions were not a feint at all.
We should also consider that SA's actions up to te point of the assault indicated to the defenders that he planned a long siege. Certainly Travis knew that SA did not have the appropriate artillery on hand to breach his walls, and he had no way of knowing how soon SA could get these big guns on site, but Travis likely figured he had time on his hands. His letters convey a sense of urgency, but his actions don't exhibit it at all, especially when we examine his lack of defensive preparation. I think the escalade took him completely by surprise. He was expecting a longer siege, as indicated by SA's every action. I don't think this attack was impulsive on SA's part, I think it was very calculated, and Travis was fooled. Jim
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Post by Allen Wiener on Oct 24, 2007 9:42:21 GMT -5
Yes, I agree that a breakdown of Mexican numbers as Herb has described casts the whole thing in a different light (as so much here lately has!). I would love to see that " lost work" on the Mexican numbers. And I agree that my use of the word "feint" was inaccurate; that's not what they were doing, but I wondered why there was any sort of attempt to deceive the defenders, but Stuart has explained that; the idea of Ducque's appearing to be the main attack force and then slamming them from the flanks makes sense. It's somewhat ironic that the Mexicans were taken by surprise too, in that they expected the Texians to be in position, when they were actually asleep. I think Jim has shown how Travis's mind set contributed to that.
Are there any Mexican sources that support this theory regarding the attack? I don't recall reading this in de la Pena or elsewhere. The Mexican sources all seem to just describe the four units that would comprise the attack force.
AW
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Post by stuart on Oct 24, 2007 10:38:49 GMT -5
Not that I'm aware of, I'm just trying to reconstruct what was going on from the way the attacks were weighted and directed.
The trouble with DLP, to give but one example, is that he was too close to the ground to see the bigger picture. He didn't devise the plan of attack and without that bigger picture things may have seemed to him to be a lot more confused and worse than they actually were.
Its a pretty common experience even leaving aside his political bias
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Post by elcolorado on Oct 24, 2007 11:13:19 GMT -5
I was just looking at Mark's pictures (again) of the Church battery. It does not appear that the Church guns would have been able to provide much in the way of support (flanking fire)against Romero's attacking column.
The angle looks all wrong. Given the height of the battery and Romero's proximity to the walls, I don't think the Church's gun crews would have been anything more then horrified specters. Wouldn't "friendly fire" have been a consideration??
I am also uncertain as to their visual range. In the pre-dawn darkness, would they have been able to see Romero's men at that distance??
Glenn
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Post by Allen Wiener on Oct 24, 2007 11:14:25 GMT -5
I'm a total novice on this, but to what extent are ground troops typically aware of the bigger picture (or were aware at that time)? Is it common for them to simply be told what their immediate objective is and leave out the other parts of the operation, perhaps to give them clear focus?
I just saw the D-Day segment in Ken Burns' "The War" and I'm thinking of the paratroops who were dropped behind the lines and ordered to hold their positions until troops landing on the beaches broke through and linked up with them. Most of the American paratroopers got lost and scattered, didn't know where they were, but did their best to hold on and fight whatever Germans they found around them until some Allied tanks reached them. I didn't get the impression they had a very clear idea of what the overall invasion strategy was, how many landing beaches there were, who was landing where, etc. It really wouldn't have helped them to know much more than they did know and they did their best to focus on the task they were given.
AW
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Post by Herb on Oct 24, 2007 12:07:10 GMT -5
I'm a total novice on this, but to what extent are ground troops typically aware of the bigger picture (or were aware at that time)? Is it common for them to simply be told what their immediate objective is and leave out the other parts of the operation, perhaps to give them clear focus? AW Allen, what you're describing in the US Army is called "Commander's Intent". While there's nothing new under the sun in warfare, at least for the US Army this is a newer concept that was developed out of the National Training Center experiences in the early 80s, and formally incorporated into doctrine and Operation Orders in the mid 80s. Basically the concept is for commanders two levels down to understand what the desired outcome is of that higher commander, ie. a company commander understands the Brigade Commanders Intent, a battalion commander the Division Commander. The operations order then conveys the HOW to accomplish the desired outcome. Subordinate Commanders are supposed to understand the Intent so that they can use their initiative to reach the desired outcome if the unexpected happens and the OPORDER is no longer feasible. Generally speaking in today's Army the private is expected to know the Company Commanders Intent - a pretty small picture even in 1836. Like I said this is all a recent innovations far as the US Army goes - though it could be argued that good commanders have done something similar in the past. I imagine on March 6th, 1836 only the column commanders and their seconds really understood what Santa Anna's intent was. The various column staffs /aides and subordinate commanders probably only understood the immediate mission. But, that's just supposition.
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Post by Herb on Oct 24, 2007 12:19:09 GMT -5
I really don't have a problem with somebody calling Duque's attack a possible feint. A feint is simply an attack met to draw the defenders attention away from the main attack.
To the individual soldier there is no difference whether he is participating in a feint, a supporting attack, or the main attack.
I don't think Duque's attack was a feint, but a supporting attack, (as was Romero's, and Morales', imo). We're simply trying to look at the results and guess what Santa Anna's intent was.
The only thing we can know with some certainty, thanks to Sesma's Report, that Santa Anna intended to drive a portion of the defenders outside the walls into the waiting arms of the cavalry.
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