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Post by elcolorado on Feb 12, 2009 10:46:58 GMT -5
I second Bob's comment and observation. I have often thought the ditches would have caused some degree of difficulty during the assault on the 6th. But I do not recall reading any account that spoke of the acequias being any sort of obstacle or problem that needed to be avoided or negotiated.
The same may be said about the flooded area at the rear of the church. Referring to the large wet spots as "ponds" infers a greater impediment than may have actually existed. What about natural water fluctuation? It doesn't appear to have rained during the siege. Perhaps the water was only an inch or so deep and not difficult to rapidly traverse.
Maybe we're just over-analyzing the issue...looking for a problem that didn't exist.
Glenn
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Post by cantador4u on Feb 14, 2009 4:23:06 GMT -5
Most of the discussion has been about the acequia, but I'm having a problem with the roads that are supposed to have been to the east of the Alamo corresponding with Houston St, and Nocagdoches St. Mark Lemon shows them in his book (page 169), The cover of George Nelson's book shows them, and the maps in Blood of Noble Men show them.
I was looking over my collection of early San Antonio maps and none of them show a road going out from the compound. This includes the maps of LaBastida, Navarro, Jamison, the 1849 Giraud Survey, and the map that was drawn to show the 1835 battle for Bexar. Based on these maps I would have to conclude that there were no roads to the East of the compound.
What am I missing? Where is the information for the roads and why aren't they shown on maps drawn at the time?
If there were roads to the East of the compound they would have helped troops cross the flooded area.
Paul Meske
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Post by jrboddie on Feb 14, 2009 8:19:03 GMT -5
Roads! Another great topic.
The Labastida map does not show any roads at all. I'm sure they were more like paths. We know there was a gate north of the Long Barrack. This must have led to some place. A direct path to the road to Nacogdoches is logical.
Also, I am intrigued by the note by Almonte that on March 2 "the President discovered, in the afternoon, a covered road within pistol shot of the Alamo, and posted the battalion of Jimenes there." What is a 'covered road' and how could it have been unknown for so long? Range of a pistol shot? And discovered by the President?!??!!!
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Post by elcolorado on Feb 14, 2009 11:00:53 GMT -5
I think the word "road" may be used a bit too liberally. Some of what we have been incorrectly calling roads are most likely well worn paths or trails. The so called "road" leading out of the Alamo by the Long Barrack was probably an easy path to the acequias and the corn fields during the mission period. After the Alamo was secularized, the various occupants that resided in the mission would have continued to utilize these trails due to their convenience.
Animals such as horses, cattle, and deer, will at times create their own trails through brush. These trails - some of which may have existed for years - usually lead to food and/or water sources. Over time, humans may also begin to use these trails for numerous reasons...mostly convenience. Consider it early "off-roading."
The "hidden road" Almonte commented on was probably a heavily used trail carved-out through the Texas brush. Well known to the locals but "hidden" in regards to the Mexican army. The term "Pistol shot" can be a bit subjective. I take it as the distance a pistol can throw a lead ball. Others may feel it is the effective killing range of a pistol, which is rather limited.
Santa Anna had a habit of going out ahead of his troops to evaluate his enemy and the battlefield, preferring to rely on his own judgment rather than his subordinates. He is fortunate to have avoided the sort of tragedy that severely wounded Stonewall Jackson.
Glenn
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Post by Herb on Feb 14, 2009 11:13:48 GMT -5
I second Bob's comment and observation. I have often thought the ditches would have caused some degree of difficulty during the assault on the 6th. But I do not recall reading any account that spoke of the acequias being any sort of obstacle or problem that needed to be avoided or negotiated. The same may be said about the flooded area at the rear of the church. Referring to the large wet spots as "ponds" infers a greater impediment than may have actually existed. What about natural water fluctuation? It doesn't appear to have rained during the siege. Perhaps the water was only an inch or so deep and not difficult to rapidly traverse. Maybe we're just over-analyzing the issue...looking for a problem that didn't exist. Glenn Glenn, The problem isn't that we're over-analyzing the issue, but we're looking at it from two very distinct and different angles. The discussion about the acequias began, on how they impacted the avenue of approaches ie how they would impact Santa Anna's planning for the battle. It's digressing into how did they effect the actual conduct of the battle - a totally different perspective. Bob's comment about they're not being mentioned suggests that at least for Cos and Duque they had no effect (more on this later). I would hesitate to say that about Romero - since there is precious little that we have about his column. That's what make these artifacts so significant, for now we have some historical idea of what happened over here versus merely informed speculation. When we look at an obstacle's effect on the actual conduct of a battle. We need to look at a number of things - it's intent, it's condition, and whether or not it was under fire. First off intent, properly constructed and positioned obstacles (and natural features serving as obstacles) primarily serve one of two purposes (there's others but they're really specialized subsets of these first two). One of these is to turn the enemy ie get him to move the way you want him to move. The other is to deny the enemy ie stop or delay him, generally so that the defender has more time to engage the attacker. When we talk about condition, we're talking about was it properly constructed and has it been maintained. Now the acequias weren't constructed as obstacles (except perhaps the one outside the West Wall) but they were natural obstacles that could aid the defenders - especially if they had been reinforced. In all probability they had not been properly maintained as acequias never mind as obstacles. But, the most important thing is whether the obstacle is covered by fire. If an obstacle is not covered by fire it will merely delay the enemy a few seconds. A properly constructed antitank ditch will stop a tank cold, but if it is not covered by fire, a platoon of tanks can each dismount a man with a shovel and by merely cutting into the lips of the ditch create a way through it in roughly a minute - rendering hours of work totally useless. We know that the initial assault went undetected and the Mexican Army were at the walls before being fired on. The acequias aren't mentioned by Sanchez-Navarro or DLP for the simple reason they had no effect on the battle. The front lines of the Mexican Army passed them before the defenders opened fire. Had the Mexican Army not achieved the measure of surprise they did, the acequias (no matter what their condition) would, no doubt, have had an impact on the battle.
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Post by elcolorado on Feb 14, 2009 12:03:22 GMT -5
Herb,
I have to disagree with you. The evidence strongly indicates the Mexicans were fired upon before they reached the wall. The soldados of Duques column alerted the Texians with loud and unrestrained "Viva Santa Anna" and "Viva Mexico." This cheering occurred before the given attack signal. As a result, the defenders were able to fire upon the Mexicans before they reached the walls. The reason the acequias were not mentioned in the assault might be because they were only a minor factor or not a factor at all.
Yes, the Texians were surprised, but the surprise was not total. The assaulting columns were detected due to the foolish cheering. Had the defenders in the convento courtyard not been alerted, Romero's column would probably have advanced all the way to the low wall unscathed instead of taking fire 30 yards out.
Glenn
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Post by marklemon on Feb 14, 2009 16:01:43 GMT -5
The archaeological evidence clearly suggests dry ground on what Labastida shows as wet. This means that he drew the flooded ares out of proportion to the fort, a problem which re-occurs in several other areas of his drawing. Now, I agree with Glenn, in that the term "road" is a loose description of what it most likely looked like. Almost certainly, the "road" leading from the gap off the north end of the granary and leading east, was a well-worn trail, leading straight to the acequia, and over a small foot bridge, to the Nacadoches road. As such, this foot path, or trail, would most likely not appear on any map. But the crossing (foot bridge) was still important enough for Mexican troops of some sort, to be posted there after the battle, and encamp, perhaps to guard the crossing, or perhaps just because a source of water for camping was close by. Three campfires were located here, about 20 yards from the bridge. In any event, the flooded areas must have been south of the foot bridge. This new battlefield scenario allows Romero to have approached from either (1) due east of the long barracks extension, parallel, and just north of the east-west "road," or (2) more from the northeast. My own opinion is that Romero approached as per (1). as they passed through the area now occupied by the History Shop, they were fired upon and according to de la Pena, many of them veered more to the north, to co-mingle with the northern column. At this point cohesion had broken down, and I believe that some of them passed the cattle pen sal ient gun, and crossed over the low cattle pen wall near its junction with the north end of the granary. Some also may have penetrated whatever defensive measures, or gate, which filled the 6 foot gap north of the granary. I have at this time no quantifiable evidence to support this scenario, just my hunch. To me, the apparently undefended "extension," the 6 foot gap/gate, and the low cattle pen wall would have been irresistible as an infantry commander, the 4 pounder at the corner notwithstanding. And remember, Sanchez-Navarro said specifically that the northern part of the church battery had an awkward declination to the north which prevented a gun from firing to the north. This meant that Romero could make his assault with only one piece of artillery to deal with. Mark
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Post by Herb on Feb 14, 2009 19:05:55 GMT -5
Herb, I have to disagree with you. The evidence strongly indicates the Mexicans were fired upon before they reached the wall. Glenn Well, Glen, that means the primary Texian source was lying! Joe, in every version of his accounts says the Mexicans were at the walls and even up on the walls when the garrison was aroused. Sure shots were fired by the guards, but NOT the garrison, and has been pointed out in various other posts the depth of the columns doesn't mean that every soldato was at the walls. The one person who clearly describes the initial resistance is Joe. His version of events just can't be explained any other way. The Mexicans were either at the walls when the garrison was aroused or Joe was lying.
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Post by Herb on Feb 14, 2009 19:29:42 GMT -5
Now, I agree with Glenn, in that the term "road" is a loose description of what it most likely looked like. Almost certainly, the "road" leading from the gap off the north end of the granary and leading east, was a well-worn trail, leading straight to the acequia, and over a small foot bridge, to the Nacadoches road. As such, this foot path, or trail, would most likely not appear on any map. But the crossing (foot bridge) was still important enough for Mexican troops of some sort, to be posted there after the battle, and encamp, perhaps to guard the crossing Mark Mark, it's splitting hairs, but virtually all roads in Texas at the time could be called trails. For the most part they wouldn't even qualify for simple dirt country roads today. The key things are, they generally led to water crossings, be it fords, ferries or the occaional bridge/culvert. The so called Camino Real (Nacogdoches Road) for a large part of it's length was a simple pair of waggon wheel ruts leading through some thick pine forrests (portions of which are still visible today). Glen and I each found a different map that shows this particular road we've been discussing in this topic. I would suggest that the acequia crossing was probably a bit more than a foot bridge and more akin to the culvert type bridge that is shown where Alameda crosses the acequia. But, I'm just guessing!
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Post by elcolorado on Feb 15, 2009 14:53:18 GMT -5
Herb,
No, this doesn't mean Joe was lying, but exaggeration is always a possibility. Look, when the Mexicans were discovered - by their cheering - Travis and Joe were in their bunks sleeping. It wasn't until after Baugh(?) sounded the alarm, ran to Travis' quarters and woke-up the sleeping pair, that Travis and Joe made their way to the north battery. By the time they arrived at the north wall the Mexicans may have indeed been at its base.
In truth, we simply don't know how much time elapsed between the initial moment when the Mexicans were discovered and Travis' arrival at the north battery. It may have been as much as two minutes or more. I doubt the men on the walls were going to wait for Travis and Joe to show up before firing upon the assault columns. I feel that what ever defenders there were on the walls would have instantly fired upon the attackers, and it sounds like that is just what happened. However, by the time Travis and Joe got to the wall, the Mexicans were already massed below.
I really don't think we're far apart on this question, Herb. Consider this; the soldados tasked with carrying the ladders to the wall(s) would have been at the front of the assault columns to ensure the ladders were in-place and ready to be climbed by the attackers. After all, it doesn't make much sense to have the assaulting columns arrive before the ladders, especially since the plan called for speed and surprise.
But according to DLP, scarcely a ladder made it to the walls. To me, this is an indication that the first wave, or more correctly, the men in the forward ranks, absorbed the initial fire from the Alamo - including the soldados shouldering the ladders. This could help explain why so few ladders were available for the Mexicans to climb and why the attack momentarily bogged down.
So, because Travis and Joe weren't on the scene when the shooting initially began, it may have appeared to Joe like the Mexicans were already "at the walls" when he and Travis arrived.
I seriously doubt the Mexicans were on or inside the walls before the garrison were aroused. That claim (which may not have been Joe's) strongly conflict with DLP's account. The statement in which you refer to comes from an unnamed source. Even Hansen calls this source "of little value." Whoever made those comments may not have been quoting Joe directly, but rather given us his impression of Joe's actual testimony. And lets keep in mind the possibility of exaggeration. In most every account attributed to Joe, there is the claim that Travis killed a Mexican officer with his sword before dying...a claim we have trouble believing.
Glenn
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Post by Herb on Feb 15, 2009 15:27:59 GMT -5
You're neglecting a very key part of Joe's various accounts, it wasn't just Travis and Joe sleeping - but the entire garrison was in the barracks asleep minus some guards on the walls and the picketts outside. All of whom were also apparentlly caught sleeping until the Mexican shouts. Joe very clearly testifies - it wasn't just him and Travis rushing to the walls but the entire garrison.
Now, if the cannon were preloaded (or even just one cannon with grape) all it would take is one guard firing one cannon to do the amount of damage you're talking about before the rest of the garrison arrived.
BTW, I have no doubt that Joe's memories of the events are exaggerated -AS IS DLP's. I don't mean to be smart, but it is a very significant event to have a number of people shooting at you trying to kill you. There is a very significant difference to Sanchez-Navarro's account of the battle and DLP's. It doesn't mean one is lying and the other is not, but the volume of fire that Duque's column (has borne out by the casuality figures ) was significantly higher.
Now there's a pretty simple explanation for this. The North Wall was considerably closer to the sleeping garrison then the West Wall. Even assuming that every defender went to his assigned position, and not to the nearest threatened point, it would take longer to reach the West Wall - and the difference between the two Mexican officers' interpetation of the quality of the resistance.
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Post by Herb on Mar 1, 2009 11:31:46 GMT -5
Mark,
Something significant occurred to me this morning, as I was outside before the sun came up. The defenders in the cattle corral, standing in a ditch firing over a low wall, with the higher horse corral wall behind them were completely invisible to Romero's troops except for their muzzle flashes. Unlike the majority of defenders elsewhere in the compound who were sky lined, the fire from these "undetected" defenders would have had an even bigger "morale" effect than physical ie almost an ambush.
Something to consider when pondering Romero's shift toward the North Wall.
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Post by stuart on Mar 1, 2009 12:16:36 GMT -5
Its also worth pointing out that the "muzzle-flashes" from black powder weapons at night are nothing of the sort - you're talking about full scale illum.
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Post by marklemon on Mar 11, 2009 22:49:23 GMT -5
Mark, Something significant occurred to me this morning, as I was outside before the sun came up. The defenders in the cattle corral, standing in a ditch firing over a low wall, with the higher horse corral wall behind them were completely invisible to Romero's troops except for their muzzle flashes. Unlike the majority of defenders elsewhere in the compound who were sky lined, the fire from these "undetected" defenders would have had an even bigger "morale" effect than physical ie almost an ambush. Something to consider when pondering Romero's shift toward the North Wall. Herb, Overall, I agree with your point, but must add that the defenders in the "cattle pen" area were not standing in a ditch, but rather behind the 4.5 foot high rough stone wall. The trench was some 3 feet to their rear, and served as a protected area in which the riflemen could step to reload, or as a refuge from incoming small arms fire. This was the situation as revealed by Jake Ivey's dig in that location. Mark
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Post by marklemon on Mar 12, 2009 21:55:57 GMT -5
During this last two weeks, as I was in San Antonio during HHD's, my sidekick and old high school friend John Noonan discovered (right off the end of our parking lot at the Day's Inn!) an 80+ foot long section of the Acequia Madre (aka Alamo Madre) off of which used to branch the Acequia del Alamo, and the Acequia de la Villita. It was somewhat hidden behind a wooden fence, and enclosed by an iron gate, but the gate only had a piece of string securing it, and we walked in and did some rough measuring. Along its entire length, it was mostly filled with earth, lined on both sides by limestone, and varied in width from 4 feet to no more than 5 feet wide. (Bear in mind, this section was pristine, and had not been renovated or restored. ) I have studied the technical drawings of the other, restored section of this acequia over in HemisFair Park, and the width over in that section varies from about 4 to about 6 feet at the widest. This indicates to me that, far from the extreme widths reported on threads on this forum, the acequia madre was no more than 4 to 6 feet wide, and average more along the lines of 4.5 feet for the most part. It therefore follows that the branches off of the main artery would be either the same widths, or more likely a bit narrower. What this all means is that the branches off of the madre acequia could very well have been only two or three feet wide, and could have easily been jumped over by the assaulting columns, providing of course they were visible to them. Mark
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