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Post by alamonorth on Aug 6, 2010 18:33:29 GMT -5
I find one of the more haunting theories that Tucker tirelessly promotes is the question of how quickly the north wall fell. Reuben Potter was also of this opinion. Richard Fox, in his masterful study of the Custer battle , Archaeology, History and Custer's Last Battle (1993) uses a combat model of tactical stability and disintegration. If Tucker is correct, Fox's model coincides very nicely.Once the north wall fell any stability collapsed and it was virtually every man for himself. There is even some potential evidence that Mexicans were in the south of the fort prior to the collapse of the north wall. Fox's model was based on a professional military force, so the situation in the Alamo with non professional warriors could have been much worse. An early capture of the walls goes a long way to explaining the paucity of Mexican casualties and it also makes the idea of a major exodus more plausible.
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Post by Chuck T on Aug 6, 2010 19:01:25 GMT -5
I appreciate Fox's work. The real question in my mind about both battles is how long is long, how quick is quick?
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Post by Allen Wiener on Aug 6, 2010 20:59:53 GMT -5
See our discussion about Custer at the LBH under "General History" for more details, but I tend to agree with Philbrick that, while Fox is probably correct in his description of what played out, his concept of disintegration is really a matter of semantics. He agrees, for example, that there was uniform tactical stability until the troopers were simply overwhelmed, literally, by vastly larger numbers. Getting wiped out and being no longer physically able to mount anything resembling an orderly defense might be viewed as "disintegration," or maybe it's just the way things look when you get wiped out by such overwhelming numbers. I mean, what is his alternative? What else was/is possible in such cases?
Nonetheless, I agree that this is likely what happened at the Alamo, considering that they were confronted by overwhelming numbers and, in addition, were taken largely by surprise and had the additional handicap of many men being caught asleep (including Travis) and the resulting time-lag in trying to respond to such an attack.
Allen
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Post by alamonorth on Aug 6, 2010 21:29:42 GMT -5
Actually disintegration is not about being overwhelmed. As Fox notes " Another type of disintegration is brought about by the shock of an enemy attack. Sudden and acute, combat shock is most debilitating"
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Post by Chuck T on Aug 6, 2010 21:56:50 GMT -5
What we are all talking about here is how long a time period elapsed from the start of each attack to the tipping point, after which the jig was up. I think if you read and believe Tucker the whole thing was over before Travis got out of bed and got is pants on. I agree it was relatively quick but not that quick. As to how much resistance there was on the north wall I don't think we will ever know for sure, but there must have been some or else the Mexican casualties would have been much lighter.
At LBH there was definately a tactical disintegration. I think though that there is more than sufficient evidence, Fox notwithstanding, to suggest that the attack out of Medicine Tail Coulee, over Greasy Grass Ridge and ultimately to Calhoun Hill, the point of initial disintegration took much longer to develop. My hunch is that it was on the order of an hour to an hour and a half.
I do not believe that Fox and by extention his theories are the last word on LBH, although I must agree that Fox is a scholar and Tucker is a hack.
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Post by Allen Wiener on Aug 6, 2010 22:18:14 GMT -5
Actually disintegration is not about being overwhelmed. As Fox notes " Another type of disintegration is brought about by the shock of an enemy attack. Sudden and acute, combat shock is most debilitating" This is what I mean by semantics. What's the actual difference? The Custer/LBH literature, including Fox, is pretty consistent in estimating the final encounter unfolded over a matter of 60-90 minutes, as Chieftan says, or even longer. This was partly due to the Indians being preoccupied for a time with Reno and later by using stealth and caution to slowly approach the troops with Custer through ravines and tall grasses. Things on Calhoun Hill were considered stable enough for some time to allow two companies under Keough to be held in reserve, behind Custer Ridge. An attack from Calhoun Hill toward Greasy Grass Ridge was even mounted and succeeded briefly, before the Indians launched a devastating counter attack, which led to bolder advances that soon grew in intensity and numbers; the tipping point. What had been a fairly stable standoff quickly turned into a rout. At least one warrior account claimed that there was a fear among Indians that the encounter would end in the sort of siege/standoff that had occurred on Reno-Benteen Hill. Indians later said that it was only the boldness of some of them that initiated the aggressive attack that quickly grew into a massacre. Fox's description of these events does not vary significantly from others, but he puts the "disintegration" tag on what happened when this sudden reversal occurred. However, I hasten to add that this is a very minor point regarding Fox's excellent and meticulously researched work, which is among the very best on the LBH. The difference between his work and Tucker's is like night and day, to put it mildly. At the Alamo, I tend to agree that the north wall probably held out longer than Tucker wants us to think, if only that there was sufficient manpower to get off at least enough cannon shots to hurt the Toluca battalion; not all the casualties could have been from friendly fire. Once those kinds of numbers got over the walls, it was the same chaotic scenario as LBH; how much of a disciplined, organized defense is possible under those conditions, even with the best trained troops in the world? It was probably a matter of minutes after that before north wall defenders were either killed or on their way to the Long Barrack or out of the fort. Allen
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Post by Chuck T on Aug 6, 2010 22:50:42 GMT -5
Tactical disintegration is not an all at one time affair. At LBH there were at least three and possibly four such events in the Custer area alone. Reno also presided over a tactical disintegration in the valley fight, his protestations, which was self serving bile, notwithstanding.
I think it is very probable that a similar series of events happened at the Alamo. The north wall was probably one, There was probably a similar event in the long barracks, and either another similar event or the execution of a breakout starting in the area in front of the chapel.
Just because one of these events happened does not mean that others are destined to follow suit. Many times during the Korean War platoons would be overrun while the remainder of the company held fast and ultimately restored the position by either fires or counterattack.
Tucker wants his presentation of the facts to fit the scenario he weaved, fabricated, or both. Those things that pointed away from the truthfulness of his agenda driven presentation were either omitted or destorted. He wanted to sell books and either he or his publishers decided that a factual retelling of the story complete with anaylisis would not, where sensationalism would
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Post by alamonorth on Aug 6, 2010 23:56:55 GMT -5
Just to keep this thread on track about the Alamo, I am just suggesting that Fox's combat model probably does apply to the Alamo (and probably every other lost battle) and that our task is to either prove or disprove Tucker's thesis that the tipping point occured as early as he suggests. Logically, if not historically, it makes sense. The Mexicans were probably at the wall and over it in less than a half -hour. The process of disintegration was probably underway at the first shots and if the Mexicans were on the walls by the time the majority of defenders started to become functionally organized, it was too late. As Potter wrote " But a few and not very effective discharge of cannon from the works could be made before the enemy were under them and it was probably not till then that the worn and wearied garrison was fully mustered... This all passed within a few minutes after the bugle sounded. The garrison, when driven from the thinly manned outer defenses, whose early loss was inevitable, took refuge in the buildings" This book is very important and we cannot afford to ignore it. Not that it is a masterpiece of politically correct Alamo scholarship; which it isn't; but because it raises questions that we have to deal with one way or another. In the late 1960's Erich Von Daniken wrote Chariots of the Gods. The scientific community either ignored or badmouthed the ideas. As a result, tens of millions of people accepted his nonsense.. As Alamo scholars, we have the responsibility of testing , proving or refuting every Alamo theory or statement that comes our way. Mark Lemon said it best when he signed my copy of his book with these memorable words " Remember the Alamo-but Accurately"
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Post by garyzaboly on Aug 7, 2010 6:30:01 GMT -5
The north wall did not just fall to the Mexicans and then everything fell apart. Let's not forget that Cos' strike against most of the west wall was occurring at the same time, and the Texian defenders at the north wall were suddenly outflanked. End of north wall defense.
Also, consider that Some of Romero's men broke into the corrals at about the same time that the north and west walls were being overrun. It was a complete exterior breakdown, without even including the entry made by Morales' cazadores in the south.
Regarding Custer: since my early teen days, when I first read the works of David Humphreys Miller and Col. W. A. Graham, I always wondered why white historians quickly dismissed Indian accounts---which generally agreed that Custer's men were initially organzied in their resistance, but very quickly fell apart in destruction, rout, even panic. The same thing holds true for Mexican accounts of the Alamo, which have often been as swiftly dismissed. The irony in each case is that as more research is done, the more we learn that much of what the "opposition" accounts tells us is revealed as true.
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Post by Chuck T on Aug 7, 2010 9:46:48 GMT -5
I completely agree that Exodus must be read, studied and refuted, if only for the sake of generations that follow us. I also agree with Gary that Mexican accounts cannot be dismissed out of hand. I think that the only area where there is possibly some distance between our views is in the matter of tactical disintegration. I don't think we can automaticly assume that it took place in any of the three instances that Gary points to.
I think a good case could be made that a competent commander would have realized that the perimeter of the Alamo was much too large for the number of defenders at hand. Therefore that commander would have pre-designated alternate or suplementry positions in the event the primary positions became untenable. John Myers Myers mentioned that the doorways of all of the rooms leading off of the interior of the plaza were fortified with earth fill between stretched cowhide. I have always thought that strange because it would limit normal access, and have never read it anywhere else. If it were true however it would point to some measure of pre-planning for a fall back once the outer perimeter was breached. It may well be that these blocked doorways were the product of work carried out on 5 March as related by Joe. This is the 20th Century trained, 21st Century mind speaking here. Unfortunately that does not easily translate into the 19th Century mindset of an untrained commander. It is common sense though, so I don't think it is too far a reach.
Perhaps there was a complete tactical disintegration on the north wall. Perhaps there was a period of resistance followed by a rather hasty retreat. The two are different, but easily mistaken one for the other. I guess my bottom line here is that I think we rush to judgment if we assume that the north wall or any other of the break-in that Gary lists were the actual tipping point.
I urge all of you to read an account of Company E, 7th Marines on 28 November 1950 at Chosin. You will be amazed at the similarities between that action and the Alamo. In fact it almost reads like an Alamo without walls. Company E was vastly outnumbered. Platoon positions were overun. The company commander and his XO were both killed early on trying to prevent a tactical disintegration. Somehow though they came together and held. A lot was due to pre-planning. A lot was due to outstanding leadership on the part of company officers and NCO's. And a lot was due to superior firepower overcoming superior numbers. Alamo scholars will come away with more than a few "if onlys".
The only "If only" that matters though is the quality of competent leadership of the Alamo garrison and the amount of pre-planning they did, before we can absolutely conclude that a tactical disintegration took place, if so where it took place, and was it a complete one time event or a series of smaller events in series with one another.
It also may be well to point out that tactical disintegration can happen to well trained forces who are not outnumbered. The Old Guard at Waterloo is a prime example.
Gary: If you want to discuss indian accounts of LBH post on the Custer Again and we can go at it. By the way I don't disagree with your premise, only in the way that some have taken these accounts out of context leading them to what I believe are errors of conclusion. I shall stand by and I am sure Allen will join the fracus.
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Post by Herb on Aug 7, 2010 10:28:15 GMT -5
While, I'm of the personal opinion, that the outer walls fell fairly quickly, (I'll point out two key accounts, Joe's reported testimony that Mexicans forces were at the walls as the Texians arrived, and DLP's accounts of the light conditions, that the attack occurred about BMNT and ended at sunrise - a time period just under 60 minutes), I would disagree vehemently that the Mexican forces suffered light casualities. Even if you accept the lowest reported Mexican losses this is still somewhere around 20-30% of the attacking infantry. This represents a very significant loss in a very short time.
When, you consider the force that made the attack were primarily the best units in the Mexican Army, the various Mexican statements about another such victory destroying the Mexican Army becomes even more relevant. While I won't argue that fratricide played an effect - it always has in every battle - its effects are usually much more psychological than physical.
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Post by Chuck T on Aug 7, 2010 11:00:22 GMT -5
Does anyone know the tactical formation that the Mexican Army used in its attack on the north wall? The losses suffered by the Toluca Battalion speak more to being caused by cannon fire more than small arms. There is a point where an attacking force would be under the guns and relatively safe from their fire, in that the guns could only be depressed so far. If the Mexican Army was in a two up one back formation the possability exists that the lead battalions were indeed under the walls while Toluca was still exposed to cannon fire. Therefore Joe's account, and a large number of Mexican casualties could be completely consistent.
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Post by Allen Wiener on Aug 7, 2010 12:23:39 GMT -5
Well, there had to have been some considerable resistance for Santa Anna to have sent in the reserves. An hour sounds about right. As Herb notes, several Mexican officers regarded the losses as serious and some questioned attacking at all before the siege guns arrived.
Regarding disintegration, I suppose there is a distinction between individuals breaking ranks and coherence breaking down, and a unified force standing together, continuing to fight, until each man is killed by the overwhelming numbers. The end result is still the same; all the defenders are eventually, and pretty quickly, killed by the onslaught of overwhelming force. At some point, human instinct must take over and men either continue firing or fighting, or seek to escape, probably with no specific plan or objective in mind, but merely an instinctive fight-or-flight instant choice.
Frankly, I have no problem with these kinds of scenarios and theories about either battle; I don't see how any of it significantly reflects on the soldiers involved. The Mexican soldiers at San Jacinto reacted in much the same way and that force seems to have disintegrated more decidedly and quickly than the Alamo defenders may have, and they actually had numerical superiority, so the attacking force can't really be said to have been superior or overwhelming in the same sense that the Mexicans at the Alamo, or the LBH warriors, were.
I don't regard Tucker's book as either important or new. I don't see anything in it that hasn't been written up and documented in several earlier works, and in far more capable hands. What I see is the same kind of hackneyed effort to spin previously-known facts into an agenda-driven scenario that passes for sensationalism and is marketed as "a shocking new account," or whatever the PR stuff says. Jeff Long did the same thing with his description of Crockett's death, which he suggested tells us something about Crockett's character. He needed to look into both a good deal more. However, as Chuck says, it is important to read and critique them in order to show them for what they are.
Allen
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Post by garyzaboly on Aug 7, 2010 16:01:37 GMT -5
Chieftain, Wolf, Allen at al, All good observations expressed here. R. M. Potter penned the early warning that it would be a mistake for anyone studying the Alamo to assume that its main plaza was intended to be the main line of defense. He underscored the point that it was simply an OUTERWORK for the artillery, and once it fell the secondary, more critical "fortification" would be the strong, stone-built long barracks. Yet even here the Texians proved that they were rank amateurs at war, for Sanchez-Navarro noted that had they made the convento building into a "citadel," and armed it with cannon, the Mexicans probably wouldn't have taken the fort!
The cowhide-and-earth interior defenses are confirmed in at least two contemporary accounts, and in Potter's subsequent accounts largely drawn from Mexican veterans. The Marines' stand at Chosin reservoir was truly incredible. Of course Travis and company, while excellent fighters when they had to be, were not Marines.
It's pretty clear in Sanchez-Navarro's battle plan that Cos' force punched its way through the west wall while the north and east walls were being attacked. It would have been difficult for any north wall defenders to remain in place when being hit by volley fire, or sharpshooter fire, from their left, not to mention from elsewhere within the compound. This is when the long barracks became the second line of defense.
Chieftain, there was a time when the Custer fight consumed me; the Montana Historical Society even owns a Custer painting I did in 1976, LAST STOP ON BATTLE RIDGE, on the 100th anniversary. I've tried to buy the more important books that interpret the battle, but I always find myself falling back on the accounts given by the participants, and on the results revealed by archaeology. The Custer Fight is a HUGE can of worms, and no two people ever agree on any one interpretation. I have been away from studying the battle for too long, but my concept of the battle is based largely on those contemporary accounts I've read, and archaeological reports of the battlefield (Fox, etc.). That's pretty much how I approach the Alamo, too: I din't really rely too much on modern-day opinion unless it's backed up with some evidence of a like nature.
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Post by Chuck T on Aug 7, 2010 16:56:55 GMT -5
Gary: Can't disagree with a word of what you said. I knew Myers drew heavily on Potter, and assumed that is where it came from. The Marine reference was meant more toward leadeship, training, and planning. The long barracks as a citadel would have made the plaza a deathtrap. Would love to see the painting. Did you do it on site?
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