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Post by Herb on Aug 18, 2008 10:58:40 GMT -5
That's an interesting point about the mutual fear and mistrust, as well as hatred, at Wounded Knee. Given the cavalry's track record, you can't fault the Indians for trying to stash some weapons or for being wary of U.S. inentions. I seem to recall some of that 7th Cavalry later admitting they had it in for this particular group of Indians as they associated them with Custer's defeat, but they also had been plalced is something like an alert position, as if they might expect fire from the Indians at any moment. Another badly handled disaster. In fact, the entire history of U.S.-Indian relations is kind of like that. It's hard to summarize something like that, because it played out over a couple hundred years in many territories with many tribes, leaders, local political and military factors and so on. But, in the end, after many years of reading this stuff, I concluded that whites just didn't want to share the land with Indians or live among them. There was a healthy amount of racism, to be sure, but a stronger desire to clear Indians off the land and obtain it and its resources for the "advancement of civiliaztion" (yeah - there was plenty of propaganda too; "Manifest Destiny" and all that). AW There probably was a revenge factor, but that took place in the aftermath, when the firing didn't cease. Remember Godfrey's (?) questionable actions where a number of women were killed. There was a very militant part to the Ghost Dance Religion, the whites were significantly out-numbered on these reservations. That the seriousness of the threat was overstated by the Indian Agents, and overestimated by the high command, only made the situation worse. Almost any regiment would have acted as the 7th did. It is possible that somebody like Crooke, might have been able to defuse the situation by meeting with the Indians. Back to Custer. While the start of the Centennial Campaign, is probably the worse escapade of a deliberate land grab by the US Government in violation of treaties, in our history. Let's not forget, that the Lakota on the Little Bighorn weren't a bunch of peace loving innocents. The very fact that they were on the LBH, a territory that they had driven the Crow Indians out of only a couple of years earlier shows that they, too, believed in "Manifest Destiny" just that it was their manifest destiny. I'm not saying their wrong justifies the US wrong, but there were no innocents.
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doc
Full Member
Posts: 88
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Post by doc on Sept 9, 2008 8:06:28 GMT -5
Gents:
Yesterday, I received the following message from Jim Donovan:
"I had lunch with Steve Harrigan last week and your name came up (of course) . . . as you may know from Alan [Huffines] or elsewhere, I've got a contract to write a book on the Alamo. (This past March a book I wrote entitled A TERRIBLE GLORY came out and sold well enough for the publisher to consider another book by me.) As you know, there aren't enough Alamo books--okay, pick yourself off the floor now . . .
I've been down at the CAH the past few weekends looking through several collections, and plan on many more days there, and of course the Texas State Archives. And the DRT Library. And maybe Mexico, though that's an undertaking . . . I don't expect to find any new finds like the one [William C.] Davis found--Ramirez y Sesma's report--but I want to look through as many files as possible. That's the plan, anyway."
Those of you who admire Jim's Custer book, will probably be excited to know about his current project.
Dios y Tejas,
Doc
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Post by sloanrodgers on Sept 9, 2008 19:27:10 GMT -5
That's cool doc. Since I've delved into this wonderful genre of Texas history it seems like new information is always being found or old data is accurately reinterpreted. I'm sure Mr. Donovan can locate new and rarely published items throughout the archives of Texas as long as he is willing to dig into those old documents. I would suggest that Jim search the republic claims and G.L.O. records for the Alamo defenders. I believe TRL's papers are being enshrined in a collection at Texas State University in San Marcos, so there might also be some unknown treasures within. Adios.
P.S. Check your pm doc on another matter.
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Post by Paul Sylvain on Sept 9, 2008 20:17:20 GMT -5
I have to agree with Jim -- there can never be enough Alamo books. It seems like I learn something new with each book I read.
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Post by bobdurham on Nov 17, 2008 10:46:44 GMT -5
I've been reading Donovan's Custer book -- I'm liking it a lot so far. Thanks a lot for the recommendation.
Bob
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Post by Allen Wiener on Oct 26, 2009 19:45:15 GMT -5
Let me apologize in advance for the length of this post, but if you are interested in the Custer fight and the issues and events surrounding it, you need to know this.
John S. Gray’s Centennial Campaign gives the most thorough background to the 1876 campaign that I’ve ever read. He clarifies the deliberate effort of the Grant administration, and Grant himself, to violate the terms of treaties and the fact that they knew the Indians were only doing what had been allowed under those treaties. They had done nothing wrong, but the government was going after them all the same. They U.S. wanted the Black Hills gold fields cleared for mining and the land itself secured for the railroads and settlement. Pressure on the administration from land speculators, commercial interests (mining, railroads) and settlers was so great that the administration saw no way out but to screw the Indians. Part of the plan was to make it look like the Indians had violated some understanding and, frankly, it wasn’t hard to sell an anti-Indian public on the idea of getting rid of Indians and opening their lands to whites. The Cherokee case that we researched for the Crockett book was very similar and I’ll wager that most U.S.-Indian relations were similar. It was always about the land, when push came to shove.
Centennial Campaign is essential for a clear understanding of the background to the events that led to Little Big Horn, but the book does not dwell that much on the battle itself. It is essential to also read Gray’s Custer’s Last Campaign for the most thorough, detailed and irrefutable analysis of the fight, the days leading up to it, what Custer did that day and why it all went wrong. Gray’s time-motion analyses are definitive and, at times, mind-boggling. I can’t even imagine the research Gray must have done to produce that analysis, but it is incredible. These books are not for the light reader or casual student of Custer, but they are essential for a thorough understanding of the event.
I found Gray the most objective, dispassionate author I’ve read on the subject, yet he clearly comes down on the side of the Indians as having been put in an impossible situation, damned to lose regardless of what they did. He emphasizes that these events must be seen from the Indian point of view as well as the white. The choice for the Indians really was to go onto reservations that were designed to end their way of life and, ultimately, their culture and to make “white men” and farmers of them, something for which they were distinctly ill-suited. I think this is why Sitting Bull went to such extremes to avoid taking his people onto the reservation (for his bio, see The Lance and the Shield by Robert Utley).
Gray’s books destroy several long-held views, especially those that try to blame Custer alone for the defeat and accuse him of disobeying orders. In fact, Custer followed orders to a fault. He was given considerable latitude in deciding what to do as events unfolded, since the command did not know where the Indians were and, most important, the size of the village and the number of warriors. Custer and his scouts seem to have initially misread the movements of the Indian camp, fearing that it was breaking up and that the Indians would be difficult to round up. Instead, the “summer roamers” (reservation Indians who seasonally joined their non-reservation brethren on the plains) had actually been joining the main camp and enlarging it to some 2,000 warriors, far more than anyone in the command expected. The scouts misread signs indicating movement of large groups of Indians into a single group, and also misread the Indians’ intentions. It was assumed that they would be surprised and scatter. Thus, the strategy was to surround them, run off their ponies, and attack them from all sides, confounding and panicking them. This was the strategy Custer had used at Washita and he planned to do the same at Little Big Horn. He did not know that these Indians had fought a large battle with Crook only days earlier, bloodying Crook and sending him retreating. They weren’t about to run away and were more concerned with protecting a huge village full of women and children than scattering.
Custer’s plan was to conceal and rest his force on June 25th, then surround the village and launch a surprise attack at dawn. However, the plan was scotched once the Indians had spotted Custer’s force and were able to prepare for attack. Custer then saw no alternative to striking immediately and was forced to improvise by sending Reno to attack one end of the village while he attacked the other, expecting Benteen to hurry along, as he had been ordered to do. Much of Custer’s plan was driven by his belief that the village was smaller than it actually was and that the Indians would scatter and run. The Indians actually never contemplated running and were furious and determined; they went on the attack at once in full force. It was Custer who was taken by surprise.
There is some information suggesting that at least some of Custer’s scouts expressed concern over the size of the village and warned Custer that he might be taking on a force too large for the 7th, but that Custer simply did not believe them.
As in Donovan’s book, A Terrible Glory (which also is a good read and generally comports with Gray), Custer is seen as improvising his plan on the fly, but he is also seen as having little choice, given the assumptions about the village size, the Indians’ presumed intentions and his orders. Much blame is placed on Benteen for dawdling and for outright lying later on about what Custer did or said. Almost everything I’ve read on the Little Big Horn is highly critical of Benteen and apparently he deserves that and may have deserved a court martial as well. Gray does not level any of the criticism at Reno that Donovan does and Reno is seen as having little choice but to order the retreat to Reno Hill, which pretty much ended any hope of Custer’s plan working out. My own conclusion is that Custer was doomed from that moment. However, the conduct of Reno’s retreat is seen as a totally botched disaster that was badly handled and left many men dead who might otherwise have survived. There is no mention of Reno’s drinking, which Donovan emphasized. Gray does not mention the death of Bloody Knife and the impact that had on Reno, who was standing near Bloody Knife when he was shot in the head, his blood and brain matter splattering onto Reno. In fact, Gray makes no effort to analyze personalities, animosities among the commanding officers, or their history. Nor does he go into Custer’s management of the command from the time he took over the 7th Cavalry, which Herb has discussed elsewhere.
Gray does not think Custer was at all to blame for the disaster and that what went wrong was largely due to poor intelligence and a decision to go ahead based on false assumptions. However, given what was expected, once Custer knew that his force had been spotted, he had little choice but to abandon his plan for a dawn Washita-like attack on the 26th and move ahead with a more hurried attack in broad daylight, or rethink things while (according to his thinking) the Indians took off. On the other hand, once he really knew the huge size of the village, he might have realized that such scattering would have been difficult for so large a group. His dispatching of Benteen is explained by his concern that Indians might be running off and the need to herd them all together. However, he takes Benteen to task for dawdling, as everyone does. Nonetheless, Gray does not see things turning out much differently even if Benteen had shown up much sooner. The 7th Cavalry was just far too outnumbered and outfought that day to have won, and Reno’s retreat pretty much ended Custer’s planned attack from different directions. The terrain over which this battle played out was huge and even Gray questions whether Benteen could have reached Custer in time to make a difference (other than adding to the casualties), even if he had hot-footed it over there.
Gray makes use of long-neglected or dismissed testimony of Custer’s Indian scouts, who were with Custer nearly to the end, which enhances his analysis considerably and supports his findings. He is very dispassionate about the idea of any morality being attached to this war, although he does present the views that both sides had of the campaign, giving the Indians their due. He also sees it as tragically unavoidable. His detailed account of events following the Little Big Horn, which were a virtual circus under the commands of Terry, Gibbon (a really underhanded individual) and Crook is really a book in itself. You have to read this to really appreciate what it was like to fight the Indians on the plains at that moment and how inept some of the U.S. command was. Given Nelson Miles’ success against the Indians later on, it seems even more difficult to understand.
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Post by Herb on Oct 26, 2009 21:07:38 GMT -5
Allen, pretty thorough analysis, imo. I think if you take Gray's two books, the CGSC Atlas i referred to and Donovan's book, you get a very thorough study of the Battle and Campaign.
I may be repeating myself, but I don't like Custer, he held his men to a strict standard that he himself did not maintain. He deserted his men in combat or on campaign several times at least twice in the Civil War, once during the campaign in Kansas (for which he was court martialed), and abandoned Maj Elliot's party at Washita. Still when you look at his orders, and what he knew or thought he knew at the various decision points it is awful hard to find fault with his decisions. Some were obviously wrong - but only with hindsight and perfect knowledge (for instance though the column was discovered by the Indians the camp was still surprised and unwarned (the Indians that discovered the column around the Crow's Nest and earlier were actually Summer Roamers returning to the reservation). the final discovery just before reaching the LBH was too late to make a difference.
Reno's performance while not outstanding was not bad either, until Bloody Knife was killed, whether drinking or going into shock when Bloody Knife's brains were splattered on his face, Reno fell apart when he ordered (?) the retreat to the bluffs.
Benteen is another story all together. His dawdling especially after he knew the command was fighting violates every principal and tradition of the cavalry. Even after he joined Reno and after the attempted "march" to join Custer when they reoccupied the bluffs - Benteen failed to enforce the digging in of his company, and as a result his company suffered more casualities then any other during the next phase of the battle - and that failure almost led to the collapse of the bluff position.
Benteen, more than any other individual I believe is responsible for the devastation of the regiment. His actions, imo, were willfully and criminally negligent. He should have been prosecuted.
I don't believe that the fate of Custer's command, was definte whether Benteen arrived or not. There are just too many instances of a small force being able to withstand a larger. Why Custer further divided his command into mutually unsupported forces (Keogh's Bn vic Calhoun Ridge and Yate's Bn vic of Last Stand Hill) is ultimatly imo purely subjective and speculative.
I still think that it is the collapse of C Company that ultimately determined the fate of the command. Why this company collapsed and panicked (and apparently spread their panic to the other two companies in this area) , and why it's commander and 1st Sergeant died on Custer hill instead of trying to rally their company vic of the south of Calhoun Ridge are to me the key unanswered questions.
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Post by Paul Sylvain on Oct 27, 2009 6:03:19 GMT -5
If you want to read a truly fascinating book about the Greasy Grass (we know the site as the Little Bighorn), you must read "The Day The World Ended at Little Bighorn" by Joseph M. Marshall III. I can't recommend this book strongly enough.
The book doesn't spend much time on the actual battle, but focuses on the Lakota/Cheyenne encampment on the Greasy Grass. Marshall is at least part Lakota and grew up living with the Lakota and hearing about the battle from tribal elders. But the book is not merely heresay and campfire yarns. Marshall does his homework and the research shows. We all know that the Lakota encampment was huge, but if you want a true perspective of the logistics in maintaining a camp this size, check this book out.
In fact, the campsite was the second large gathering place that June. The Indians had outgrown an earlier site -- the size of the pony herd meant they had grazed out one large campsite quite a distance from the Greasy Grass, forcing them to look for another site. They hadn't been at the Greasy Grass all that long when Custer arrived that June morning. It was by chance that he stumbled on it, more than anything.
There is a lot in the book about the tribal way of life and routines in those days. Traditional ways are mentioned. He paints a very human portrait of folks like Gall and Crazy Horse and the peoples of the Plains. Again, we know this was a massive gathering -- perhaps 2000 warriors and as many as 6,000 to 8,000 ponies. Why so many horses? Most Plains Indians had at least a couple of general horses per lodge -- used to haul up to a ton of "household goods", including the actual lodge and poles and so on -- in addition to a couple of stocky, stronger horses used for buffalo hunts and a couple of quick, lighter horses for war parties.
And why had these tribes gathered in such numbers that June? Sitting Bull had called for a summer meeting back in the spring, to discuss the continued encroachment of the whites through their hunting grounds. The buffalo had been killed in large numbers and driven off their traditional migration routes, making their fewer numbers harder to find. The buffalo was the source of lodge skins, clothing, food, and many items used in daily life. Sitting Bull felt a meeting was necessary to talk strategy and make plans about what to do.
In fact, that very June morning, the various chiefs were in a meeting near the far end of the camp when the camp was initially attacked. How big was the encampment? They -- the chiefs -- didn't even know the camp was being attacked. They couldn't hear the soldiers' rifles firing into the camp from the far end. Finally, someone ran in and told them the wasicu soldiers were attacking. Gall ran to his lodge, near where the shooting was taking place, to grab his weapons; he arrived to find his two wives and his children shot to death by random bullets that tore through his lodge. The remainder of the camp did not know about Gall's loss until that night. Gall, meanwhile, led the first assault out against Custer's main body of the 7th. The first (and only) real skirmish line by the soldiers quickly fell under Gall's attack, starting the route towards "Last Stand Hill". Crazy Horse led a group of warriors from the other end of the camp and drove on towards Custer's main body.
"The Journey of Crazy Horse; a Lakota History", also written by Marshall is a similarly excellent study of this misunderstood figure. Crazy Horse was an amazing man, to say the least -- very humble, quiet, and unassuming. He was a man of great humanity and caring when it came to his People.
Interestingly, it appears that it wasn't until the main battle with Custer was over, that they realized they'd been fighting Custer. All they knew was that their camp was under attack and they were defending it from that point on. The battle of the Washita, where Custer attacked what actually was a peaceful camp near what is now Cheyenne, Oklahoma, something like eight years earlier, was still pretty fresh in their minds.
Anyway, I digress. Check out Marshall's book on the Little Bighorn. It's a worthy addition to any collection on this subject.
Pul
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Post by Allen Wiener on Oct 27, 2009 8:41:34 GMT -5
Paul - thanks for the suggestion. I have a fair-sized collection of Custer books, which (like the Alamo books) continues to grow.
Returning to a point both you and Herb mentioned, it is puzzling as to why Custer further divided his small force after he clearly knew the size of the village. Gray and others show that Custer was told about the collapse of Reno's force before he moved forward with his own attack at the northern end of the village (was it Boyer who brought him the bad news about Reno? Can't recall now.). Of course, the next question is, what options did Custer have at that point? And, if he knew his improvised plan had failed with Reno's retreat, what did he hope to accomplish by continuing with his own attack? I agree that we can only speculate at this point; I think Gray's speculations are well-informed and worth considering, but still speculation (as Gray acknowledges).
Once engaged by the Sioux & Cheyenne, I think Custer was doomed insofar as his ammunition was going to run out. One of Benteen's failures was to respond to the message written by Cooke to "bring packs" and to hurry; that Custer had found a large camp. That's not a lot of dots to connect! Obviously, Custer was moving to attack and needed the ammo and Benteen's troops.
Allen
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jerry
Full Member
Posts: 60
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Post by jerry on Oct 27, 2009 9:08:36 GMT -5
Allen, Upton and Sons Booksellers/Publishers usually publish two to three quality Custer titles per year. Check them out at shop.uptonbooks.com/Jerry
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Post by Herb on Oct 27, 2009 12:20:51 GMT -5
Allen,
I was going to write this last night, but forgot to as I was writing my response.
There are two places I disagree with your analysis. The first of these is your assessment of Gibbon, though at one time I was probably pretty close to your opinion. As you know, Gibbon was the original commander of the Iron Brigade, then commanded a division in Hancock's corps, and at Gettysburg commanded Hancock's corps, while Hancock was serving as the acting commander of the Army (remember Meade was not on the scene until late). Gibbon's role at Gettysburg was crucial and the ultimate Union victory was largely dependent on his actions on Day 1 and Day 3. IIRC, he was a Corps Commander by the end of the war. A year after the LBH, Gibbon moved expeditously and decisivily to intercept the Nez Perce when they moved over the mountains and enterred the Dept of Montana. So the question that needs to be asked, is why did Gibbon whose whole career was that of a model commander act so uncharacteristically during the LBH campaign?
Gibbon left Fort Ellis (Billings) on 1 April (this was an especially harsh winter with snow falling up until early June) and reached Camp Supply on 9 April. Here he established a supply base, and departed on 12 April marching down the Yellowstone to Tullock's Creek (21 April). Here he received (from Terry) word that Crook had been defeated on the Powder River on March 17th and had retreated and would not take the field again until May. As Terry would also not take the field until May, Gibbon was ordered to halt. During the ensuing 19 days Gibbon energetically sent out scouting parties that found no trace of the Souix.
On May 9th Gibbon again started down the Yellowstone and on the 16th Gibbon's scouts located a large village on the south side of the Yellowstone at the Tonque River. Gibbon ordered his column to move to the Tonque cross the Yellowstone and attack the village. Gibbon's force tried to force a crossing, but after trying for over an hour were unable to cross. Gibbon called off the attack and went into camp roughly opposite of the Indian encampment. Up until May 23rd, there was continual skrimshing, but Gibbon made no further attempts to cross the river - nor did he report the Indian location or the fighting to Terry. Why?
Well, I think the answer is twofold, first and formost Gibbon's column is isolated in Indian Territory some 400 miles from Terry and 200 miles from a telegraph back where he started. And, obviously he has no idea where Crook is. (In fact Gibbon did send a dispatch on May 27th to Terry once it was obvious that the Indians had moved further south and it appeareed possible for a messenger to make it through). It was this dispatch that led Terry to move toward the Yellowstone and establish the Pwder River Depot, here he ran into several more couriers from Gibbon with the entire story - and shortly there after meet with Gibbon and decide to send Reno and his wing of the 7th out on Renos recon in the direction of the last known location of the Indian village.
The second and an important fact in itself, is that Gibbon fell sick and was bedridden while all this was going on at the Tonque River. Now this sounds kind of petty, but as I've mentioned many times the physical demands of campaigning are intense, add in the factors of what is basically a month and a half of operating exposed in Winter conditions and marching through snow and his sickness, Gibbon was very clearly not operating with either the physical or mental energy at this point that command requires.
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Post by Allen Wiener on Oct 27, 2009 14:53:56 GMT -5
Herb,
It's too bad that Gray doesn't really go into any of that. He really casts Gibbon as being derelict in not relaying information about the camp's location. Your explanation makes sense. Gray really describes that entire post-Little Big Horn campaign as a near-comedy.
Allen
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Post by Herb on Oct 27, 2009 17:17:49 GMT -5
The post LBH campaign was ridiculous. After his defeat at the Rosebud, Crook retreated and literally went fishing. Terry admittedly concerned with caring for the wounded from LBH, broke contact with the Indians and withdrew back to and down the Yellowstone. Crook's and Terry's movements after they once again began offensive operations would be comical if not for the human cost.
It wasn't until Sheridan brought Col Mackenzie and his 4th Cavalry up from Texas to Wyoming, and Nelson Miles and his infantry to Montana and basically put tactical operations in their hands that the campaign was brought to a sucessful conclusion .
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